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Becember 1, 1978 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 2(; 
No. 78-572-CFH 
U.S. PAROLE COMM. 
v. 
GERAG~Y (former prisoner) 
Cert to CA 3 (Adams, 
Garth, Lacey, dj) 
Federal/Civil (habeas) Timely (w/ 2 extns 
SUMMARY: The Government seeks r-eview of a decision of the 
CA 3 holding (1) that the claim of a former prisoner con-
cerning his eligibility for parole was ·not moot even though his 
~A~ entence had expired and the DC had .refused to certify the suit 
. '~. [ a~ and (2)- tha~ the Parole Con;;;;ission' s-;:;::ole 
release guidelines (a) violate the Parole Act by failing to give 
consideration· to the length of a prisoner 1 s sentence and (b) constitute 
an unconstitutional ex post facto enhancement of the sentence. 
C F R -r $CN\M""'L~ ~-
J ?J 
FACTS: Resp. Geraghty is a former Chicago policeman who 
( was convicted of demanding shake down payments, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and of making false declarations concerning 
his involvement in the extortion scheme, in violation of 
18 u.s.c. 1623. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment. 
The conviction was affirmed on appeal. United States v. Braasch, 
505 F.2d 139 (CA 7), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975). 
Resp. was sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a), which makes 
a prisoner eligible for parole after service of one-third of 
the sentence. He. was sentenced in the Summer of 1973. Just after 
the s~~tence was imposed, the Parole Commission issued its new 
parole release guidelines, indicating that the nature of the 
crime committed, as well as institutional behavior and liklihood 
of recidivism, would be taken into account in fixing the date 
of parole. The guidelines suggested that resp. should serve 
between 26 to 26 months in prison, substantially more than 
1/ 
the 16 months when he would become eligible for parole.- After 
his conviction _ w~s affirmed, resp. moved to have his sentence reduced 
pursuant to Fed. R. Crim P. 35. The motion was granted, the DJ 
finding that his expectations had been frustrated by the new 
guidelines. Resp. 's sentence was accordingly reduced to 30 
months' imprisonment. 
Resp. twice sought release on parole, and was twice denied. 
On his second attempt, the Parole Commission indicated that he 
________. 
would be continued without further consideration of parole 
until the expiration of his term of imprisonment. 
Resp. then filed this civil action in the District Court 
!/ As indicated in the pool memo in United States v. Addonizio, 
cert. pending, No. 78-156, there was apparently a widespread expecta-
tion among sentencing judges before the new guidelines were pub-
lished that prisoners with good institutional records would be 




for the District of Columbia, seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief. The complaint alleged that the guidelines were invalid 
under the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, and that 
they violated the ~ post facto provision of the Constitution. 
Resp. sought certification of the case as a class action on 
behalf of "all federal prisoners who have been or will become 
eligible for release on parole." 
The action was transferred to the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, where resp. was incarcerated; on the theory that 
it was in reality a petn for a writ of habeas corpus. The 
DC (Herman) rejected resp. 's motion for class action certifica-
~ion. The court found that the issues raised by -res_p. were 
not applicable to all members of the proposed class, and that 
not all members had the same interest as resp. The court also 
rejected the argument that the suit should be certified as a 
class action because of the possibility of mootness on appeal. 
Petn. 82a. On the merits, the DC found that the parole guidelines 
were entirely lawful and it denied the relief requested. 
Resp. appealed. While the appeal was pending, resp.'s 
term of imprisonment expired and he was released from prison. 
The Parole Commission moved to dismiss the appeal as moot, and 
the CA deferred consideration of the motion pending considera-
tion of the case on the merits • 
DECISION BELOW: In a lengthy opinion by Judge A~, the CA 3 
reversed and remanded. The court held (1) that the suit 
was properly brought as an action for a declaratory judgment 
under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Parole Act; (2) that 
although the suit was moot as to resp., if the DC should have certified 
the case as a class action, the suit was not moot; (3) that the 
DC erred in failing to consider, ~ sponte, the possibility 
( of certifying a narrower subclass out of the heterogeneous 
class specified by resp. The court also indicated (4) that 
if resp. 's averments about the operation of the parole system 
were correct, then "the parole guidelines as administered may 
well be inconsistent with the [Parole Act]," and the parole 
guidelines "as applied to certain prisoners may violate the 
~post facto prohibition." Petn. 65a-66a. Accordingly, the 
case was remanded for the DC to evaluate the possibility of 
certifying a subclass and to take evidence on the nature of 
the parole system. The court left little doubt, however, as 
to how these issues should be resolved. 
With respect to the mootness question, the court 
accepted that there was no longer a live controversy between 
~ resp. and the Parole Commission. The question, therefore, was 
whether the case fell within one of the exceptions to the moot-
ness doctrine. Resp. suggested two possibilities: that the action 
was capable of repetition yet evading review, and that the 
action should be certified as a class action, with the certifica-
tion "relating back" to the date when the suit was filed. 
The court found that the case shared "many characteristics" 
with actions capable of repetition yet evading review. Admittedly, 
prisoners with longer sentences would retain their grievances 
long enough to achieve appellate review. But since prisoners 
with shorter sentences were particularly impacted by the refusal 
of the Parole Commission to take sentencing length into account, 
the court found that "the limited probability of review for a 
prisoner with a short sentence [was] particularly pertinent." Petn. 
27a. 
,. The central thrust of theCA's ruling, however, related 
~- to the exception for properly certified ,class actions. See 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397-403 (1975). The court rejected 
the Parole Board's argument, based on Board of School Commissioners 
of Indianapolis v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975 (per curium), 
that the exception could not apply because the DC had expressly 
refused to certify the proceeding as a class action. This 
reading of Jacobs, according to the court, was incompatible 
with other decisions. In particular, the court referred to two 
lines of cases·: those where the grievance is of such short dura-
tion that, by the time the district court has been able to rule 
on the motion to certify the suit as a class action,. the grievance 
has already lapsed, ~, Gerstein v. Pugh 2 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 
(1975); and those where the trial court has not certified the 
case as a class action, but individual complainants with a live 
controversy have been allowed to intervene in the proceeding, 
~,Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 310 n. 1 (1976). In 
light of these authorities, the court suggested that "certifiability, 
not actual certification," is the crucial question. Petn. 21a n. 43. 
Accordingly, if class certification was appropriate, the mootness 
of resp.'s claim did not bar adjudication. Petn. 28a. 
This did not end the inquiry into ·class certification, how-
ever, for the CA agreed with the DC that the class proposed by 
resp. was not appropriate for certification. Petn. 28a-30a. :~ espite 
hurdle, the court observed that, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)(4), 
the DC has the power to limit the use of overbroad classes by 
the use of subclasses. The court indicated that this · ' · : 
authority may be exercised ~ sponte. Furthermore, the court 
found that it was probable that a manageable subclass of prisoners 
this 
sharing the same interests as resp. could be defined. The 
t court accordingly held that the DC had abused its discretion 
by not considering the possibility of certifying a subclass 
of prisoners ~ sponte. The case was remanded for evaluation 
of this possibility. Petn. 32a. 
Although this might have ended the matter, the court found 
that it would "improvidently dissipate judicial effort" not to 
reach the merits. The court concluded that the parole release 
guidelines were infirm on two grounds: first, they failed to 
take into account the length of the sentence imposed by the 
trial court in determining the date of release; second, as they 
applied to prisoners sentenced before their adoption_, they 
constituted impermissible ~ post facto legislation. 
The court suggested that the failure to take length of 
sentence into account was incompatible with congressional intent 
in adopting the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976; 
the court also intimated that it violated constitutional concepts 
of separation of powers. The legislative argument was not based 
on any of the provisions of the Act. Indeed, the court admitted 
that although the Act requires consideration of ~ number of 
specific factors in determining the date of release, the length 
of sentence is not among them. See 18 u.s.c. § 4207 (1976). Rather, 
the court focussed on the legislative history, and in particular 
on the different emphases in the House and Senate Committees 
and how they were resolved in Conference. Basically, the Senate 
was primarily interested in firm guidelines that would reduce 
the disparity in actual time served for similar offenses. The 
House wanted to continue the practice of releasing prisoners 
with good institutional behavior upon service of one-third of 
their sentence. The Conference stated that its intent was that 
( the Parole Board should "review .and con~ider both the nature 
and circumstances of the offense and the history and character-
istics of the prisoner •••• " Petn. 43a. Despite this rather 
broad mandate, the court concluded that "the Commission in 
effect is following the views of the Senate version of the PCRA, 
rather than the policies of the Conference Committee." Petn. 44a. 
The separation of powers argument was more elusive. But 
the court suggested that if it were true that the Parole Com-
mission was giving no weight to the judicially-determined 
sentence in fixing a parole date, "serious questions are raised 
whether the constitutional protections provided by an independent 
judiciary are being undermined." Moreover, the court suggested 
that the assumption of power by the Parole Commission to 
ignore judicial sentences violated the non-delegation doctrine. 
'~ether or not federal criminal penalties should be redrafted[,] 
it is of dubious constitutional propriety to delegate so crucial 
a legislative VJnction to a non-representative body with no 
standards other than a direction that the results 'not depre-
-
ciate the seriousness of the offense' and 'be consistent with 
the public welfare.'" Petn. 53a. 
Turning to the ~ post facto issue, the court noted that 
resp. had been initially sentenced in the summer of 1973, just 
before the new parole release guidelines were issued. The 
court did not refer to the fact that resp. 's sentence had sub-
sequently been reduced in 1975 in response to the guidelines. 
Proceeding on the assumption that the 1973 sentence was of 
controlling significance, the court concluded that the new 
' -: 
guidelines, if they were being applied in the manner alleged 
by resp., deprived prisoners under a prior sentence of the 
"possibility of a substantially more lenient punishment." Petn. 58a. 
They thus fell afoul of the~ post facto clause. T~e CA relied on 
Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S.653 (1974), where the Court held that for 
purposes of a repeal of a statute barring parole for certain 
drug offenders, parole eligibility is determined at the time 
of sentencing, and is not affected by a subsequent repeal. The Court no t 
situation, 
in dictum th9.t th~ converse I "a repealer of parole eligibility 
previously available to imprisoned offenders[,] would clearly 
present the serious question under the ~ post facto clause of 
Art. I, §9, cl. 3, of the Constitution, of whether it imposed 
a 'greater or more severe punishment than was prescribed by law 
at the time of the ••• offense."' 417 U.S. at 663. In holding 
that the parole guidelines, as described by resp., violated the 
~ post facto clause, the court expressly noted its disagree-
ment with the contrary holdings of the 2nd and 6th circuits. 
Shepard v. Taylo~, 556 F.2d 648 (CA 2 1977); Ruip v. United States, 
555 F.2d 1331 (CA 6 1977). Because the Parole Board had argued 
that it engaged in individualize-d consideration __ ~£ prisoners, 
and did not apply the guidelines mechanically, the court indicated 
that the DC would have to take further evidence on remand. 
CONTENTIONS: The SG contends that theCA's mootness decision 
is in conflict with the decisions of this court and is directly 
contrary to decisions of other circuit courts of appeals and 
presents _an important question of federal jurisdiction. The 
holding that the class action exception applies even where the 
DC has not certified the case as appropriate for a class action 
is inconsistent with Sosna and Jacobs, supra, which require a 
'named plaintiff who has ••• a case or controversy at the time 
( the complaint is filed, and at the time the class action is 
certified by the District Court pursuant to Rule 23 •••• " Sosna, 
419 u.s., at 402. The "relation back" exception of Gerstein v. 
Pugh, supra, does not apply, since there can be no contention 
that the present controversy is so inherently temporary in 
nature that it is capable of evading judicial review even at 
the trial court level. Decisions involving intervention, such 
as Baxter v. Palmigiana, supra, are inepplicable. 
Furthermore, the ruling that · the trial court erred by failing, 
~ sponte, to consider the creation of subclasses, is unprecedented, 
and will create unmanageable difficulties for the district courts. 
The ruling conflicts with the general principles that it is 
the responsibility of the litigants, not the judge, to establish 
~ the propriety of a class action certification, and that grounds 
for reversal may not ordinarily be urged on appeal that were 
avai.lable, but not raised, in the district court. The decision 
exposes the trial courts to reversal and renewed proceedings 
for failing to construct class action theories that even plaintiff's 
counsel, with an adversarial interest in the lit~gation, has 
not dreamed up. As a result, it impairs the efficient use of 
judicial resources in class action liti_gation. 
With respect to theCA's ruling that the parole guidelines 
are infirm because they fail to take length of sentence into 
account, the SG argues that the CA displayed a complete mis-
understanding of the respective roles of the courts and the 
Parole Commissiou in determining the length of incarceration. 
The court imposes a sentence, which under § 4205 sets the minimum 
required and maximum permissible period of confinement. During 
the period between these points, the Commission has substantial 
discretion to decide whether to grant release on parole, 
including the power to decline to give weight to the sentence 
imposed. Until 1970, the Commission exercised this discre-
tion on a case-by-case basis. But in response to widespread 
criticism that this led to arbitrary and erratic decisions, 
it began to experiment with structured release criteria, which 
were formally embodied in the guidelines in 1973. Congress was 
well aware of the guidelines when in passed the Parole Commission 
and Reorganization Act in 1976, in fact, the Act in good measure 
was designed to ratify the guidelines. The Act makes no mention 
of any obligation of the Commission to give consideration to 
the length of the prisoner's sentence in applying its guidelines. 
The legislative history reflects approval of the use of guidelines 
to reduce the effects of sentencing disparity. Finally, the 
decision below conflicts with two other courts of appeals that 
have reviewed the same legislative history and have concluded 
that the guidelines are consistent with the Act. Garcia v. U.S. 
Board of Parole, 557 F.2d 100, 107 (CA 7 1977); Banks v. United 
States, 553 F.2d 37, 40 (CA 8 1977). 
Turning to the ~ post facto ruling, the SG would distinguish 
decisions such as Warden v. Marrero, which concern the availability 
of parole, from the present case, which involves when parole 
eligibility will be exercised. Resp. was no less eligible for 
parole after 1973 than he was prior to 1973. During both periods, 
parole officials had very broad discretion in determining when 
he would be released. The only difference is that after 1973 
the guidelines provide a structure for the exercise of that 
discretion. They do not alter any justified expectation of parole. 
In addition, as the CA noted, the decision below conflicts 
with the decisions of the CA 6 and CA 2 in Ruip and Shepard, supra. 
' 
Resp. Geraghty has filed a motion to substitute members 
of the putative class as respondents in this court, or in the 
alternative, to allow these members to intervene. Presumably, 
this is to defeat the suggestion of mootness. Resp. does not 
address the mootness issues or the issues con~erning the 
vailidity of the parole guidelines on the merits. 
DISCUSSION: The issues in this case bear some relation 
to those in United States v. Addonizio, No. 78-156, cert. pending, 
United States v. Edwards, No. 78-157, cert. pending, and 
Bonanno v. United States, No. 77-1665, cert. pending. To be s·u.re, 
those cases do not present a facial attack on the Parole 
Commission guidelines, but involve ~he question whether the 
sentencing judge, under either 28 u.s.c. §§ 2255 or 2241, can -- -; .......__...... 
vindicate his "expectations" about the actual length of imprison-
ment when these expectations are frustrated by the guidelines. More 
broadly, however, all of these cases raise issues about the 
proper allocat·ion of sentencing responsibility between the 
courts arid the Parole Commission ~ They also shar~ in common a 
concern about the fairness of having the Parole Commission 
consider questions of relative culpability after this has been 
weighed by the trial judge in imposing the initial sentence. 
Whatever disposition the Court makes of these cases, it would 
be desireable to consider them together at Conference. The Clerk's 
Office advises that there is only one response outstanding in 
the Addonizio, Edwards, Bonanno trilogy--a response from Resp. 
Edwards which was due November 15. Perhaps the Court should call 
for a response on the merits in the present case, and when it 
arrives relist all of these cases for discussion at the 
same Conference. 
The instant case appears to be a possible candidate for 
summary reversal on the jurisdictional question. The _CA's 
....._---.- -------- ..........__ --........_____----- ----- ------- --------
decision that the class action exception to the mootness doctrine 
applies in this case rests on two holdings. The first--that 
the courts of appeals may in effect review the denial of 
class certification when the action is moot as to the named 
plaintiff, and may order that the certification "relate back" 
to date of filing--is without colorable support in the decisions 
of this Court. The second--that the DC abused its discretion 
by failing to certify a subclass on its own initiative--is 
equally unprecedented and quite mischievous. Reversal on the 
mootness issue would of course mean that the ruling below on 
the merits would be vacated. 
If the Court does not summarily reverse, then the case would 
appear to be a clear grant on both the jurisdictional and 
the substantive issues. The ~ling below creates circuit 
-:::> 
conflicts on three points. In holding t~at the court of appeals 
may review the denial of class certification when the named 
plaintiff no longer presents a live controversy, the decision 
conflicts with Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n., 
560 F.2d 271 (CA 7 1977). In holding that the parole guidelines 
conflict with the 1976 Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 
the case conflicts with Garcia, supra (CA 7) and Banks, supra 
(CA 8). And in holding that the guidelines violate the~ post 
facto Clause , the decision conflicts with Ruip, supra, (CA 6) 
and Shepard, supra, (CA 2). The questions involved are of substantial 
importance because of the uncertainty they creat for pris@ners and 
because of the decision's potential for interference with the 
management of the federal parole system. It might · 
be suggested that the decision is not final, because the CA 
remanded for further proceedings in the DC and that, -with the 
jurisdictional question technically unsettled, the ~~ling 
with respect to the parole guidelines 
is dictum. But finality is not a jurisdictional requisite 
to certiorari under 28 u.s.c. § 1254(1). And, more fundamentally, 
the CA left no doubt but that the DC should certify the action 
as a subclass, and proceed to enter the findings that the 
Parole Commission does not rely on length of sentence in 
reaching parole decisions (which is conceded) and that it applies 
the sentencing guidelines in the overwhelming majority of 
cases (which does not appear to be in dispute). In these 
circumstances, the remand hearing on both the jurisdictional 
and the substantive issues would be a mere formality. 
CFR and summarily reverse or grant. There is a motion to 
substitute members of the putative class or in the alternative 
to intervene. 
11/22/78 Merrill Ops_, in petn. 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned ... ... ...... ...... , 19... No. 78-572 
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MEMORANDUM 
Re: No. 78-572 - U. S. Parole Comrn'n v. Geraghty 
No. 78-904- Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper 
No. 78-1008 - Satterwhite v. City of Greenville 
I would be inclined to grant both Geraghty and 
Roper and to hold Satterwhite. If the Court is settled on 
granting only one, however, Geraghty should probably be it. 
In Satterwhite, the named plaintiff's claim was 
dismissed on its merits after the DC had already denied class 
certification without an evidentiary hearing. TheCA 5, ~ 
bane, declined to permit the named plaintiff to represent a 
putative class of women victimized by sex discrimination, 
reasoning that Mrs. Satterwhite was not a proper class repre-
sentative as required by Rule 23. The court thought that once 
her claim was adjudicated on the merits the ruling could not 
be ignored. And the merits determination indicated that 
Mrs. Satterwhite did not have claims · typical of the members of 
the class nor did she have an adequate common interest or nexus 
with them. 
The decision rested on an application of Rule 23, 
then, and not on the case or controversy doctrine. Moreover, 
the court placed some emphasis on the fact that a full hearing 
had not been held on the certification issue. In this case, 
- 2 
Satterwhite had failed to seek an evidentiary hearing or 
to make an offer of proof regarding the appropriateness of 
a class action. The court noted that it might be a different 
case had a hearing been held and certification been improperly 
denied by the DC. In those circumstances, a record would have 
been made, the named plaintiff would share no responsibility 
for the court's error (which might bear on the adequacy of the 
named plaintiff's representation), and any error of law by the 
trial court would go uncorrected if the case were dismissed. 
In both Geraghty and Roper the named plaintiffs' claims 
had been mooted by factual circumstances rather than adjudicated 
to have been meritless from the beginning. Geraghty involves 
an attack on the Parole Commission's parole release guidelines. 
The named plaintiff in that case was released from prison upon 
expiration of his sentence while appeal was pending. The CA 3 
held that if class certification was appropriate, the mootness 
of Geraghty's own claim should not bar adjudication of the case. 
It noted that Geraghty's attorneys, '~hile not possessed of a 
legally continuing relationship with members of the plaintiff 
class, have nonetheless undertaken this lit.igation on a class-
oriented basis. There is no indication of any diminution of vigor 
in their efforts despite the release of Geraghty. Indeed, as al-
ready observed, they represent another individual plaintiff who 





prima facie case of functional adversity, a central element 
which the mootness doctrine seeks to preserve." Petn. 27a. 
In Roper, the named plaintiffs instituted suit as 
credit card holders to recover for violations of state usery 
statutes to the extent provided by the National Bank Act. The 
DC refused to certify a class of 90,000 similarly situated 
persons. The defendant thereupon tendered to respondents their 
money demands, interest, and court costs, and the DC dismissed 
the action. The CA 5 held that the named plaintiffs could ap-
peal the denial of class certification. Judge Rubin, writing 
for the court, recalled his statement for the court in 
Satterwhite that good reason exists for permitting the named 
plaintiff to appeal from denial of class certification, though 
the plaintiff's claim became moot prior to appellate review, 
when there had been a full evidentiary hearing on the certi-
fication issue. Particularly, unless the named plaintiff were 
permitted to appeal, review of the certification decision would 
depend upon the intervention of a putative class member, who is 
not entitled under a Fifth Circuit case to notice of the indi-
vidual compromise and who may therefore be unaware that the 
class is without a representative. 
The court thought that a viable controversy existed 
with respect to the certification issue and that the named 
plaintiffs were in a position to raise it because they had 




they been satisfied with the offer of judgment, they would 
have maintained a stake in procuring class-wide relief. 
Moreover, they maintained a nexus with the class and con-
tinued to be adequate representatives for purposes of 
Rule 23, in the court's view. In their response, respondents 
elaborate on their stake in the prospect of class certifica-
tion. They explain that substantial expenses have been in-
curred in the proceeding thus far by the named plaintiffs and 
that such expenses may exceed the full amount of individual 
claims. Were the case to proceed as a class action, these 
expenses would be spread among a larger group of people. 
These three cases, then, present the mootness issue 
in (perhaps) significantly different light. The impropriety 
of allowing appeal of a denial of class certification is 
probably the clearest in the Satterwhite situation. That case 
presents not only case or controversy problems but also Rule 23 
problems in regard to adequacy of representation. The named 
plaintiff's failure to prevail on the merits established that 
she had not suffered the discrimination assertedly uniting the 
putative class. Presumably, not having experienced the injury 
alleged, Satterwhite was not in a position to represent the 
class in an informed way. As noted above, the court in 
Satterwhite also placed some weight on the absence of a hearing 
on the certification question. (Though there may have been no 
evidentiary hearing in Geraghty either. See Geraghty Petn. 78a). 
. . 
- 5 -
An affirmance in Satterwhite, then, is not likely to affect 
the decisions in Geraghty or Roper. Indeed, the CA 5 views 
Satterwhite and Roper as perfectly reconcilable. 
Only if the Court thinks it is more likely than not 
that Satterwhite will be reversed should the petition in that 
case be granted; only then will a resolution in that case 
provide guidance in cases like Geraghty and Roper, which ap-
pear to be more common. Reversal of Satterwhite is unlikely, 
however, in light of this Court's decision in East Texas Motor 
Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977). There the Court 
held that the named plaintiffs should not have been recognized 
by the court of appeals as representatives of the class the DC 
declined to certify because: 
the trial court proceedings made clear 
that [the named plaintiffs] were not 
members of the class of discriminatees 
they purported to represent ..•• 
The District Court found upon abundant 
evidence that these plaintiffs lacked 
the qualifications to be hir.ed as line · 
drivers. Thus, they could have suffered 
no injury as a result of the alleged 
discriminatory practices, and they were, 
therefore, simply not eligible to repre-
sent a class of persons who did allegedly 
suffer injury. Id., at 403-404. 
Moreover, there is no clear intercircuit conflict on 
the issue whether a person whose claim was rejected on its 
merits might properly represent a putative class. See Goodman 
v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325 (CA 4 1978) (alleged to conflict 
with the CA 5's decision but only remanding the case to the DC 
- 6 -
for retention on the docket for a reasonable time to permit 
a proper plaintiff to come forward). 
Roper, by contrast, presents the clearest case for 
allowing appeal of the certification issue. First, it is not 
even apparent that the named plaintiff's claims were mooted 
out because they opposed the defendant's proffer of settlement. 
This was the ground for Judge Thornberry's separate concurrence. 
Moreover, the named plaintiffs assert a continuing interest in 
certification -- namely, ·spreading their litigation costs among 
the members of the putative plaintiff classo Geraghty does not 
assert that interest, nor is it clear that it pertains to his 
suit. There is arguably no Rule 23 adequacy-of-representation 
problem in Roper because the named plaintiffs at least suffered 
the same injury as class members and may manage the suit in an· 
informed way. 
The Geraghty decision is the most troubling. In that 
case, there is no indication that the named plaintiff has any 
interest in representing the putative class. Geraghty's at-
torneys, rather, are endeavoring to serve as counsel for the 
is 
class if it/ultimately certified. Though the court adverted to 
the possibility of their representing an intervenor, at the 
time of the appeal apparently no motion to intervene had been 
advanced. 
- 7 -
Considering only the mootness issue, I think it 
might be prudent and efficient to take both Roper and 
Geraghty. That is so because an affirmance in Roper would 
not necessarily mean that Geraghty was properly decided and, 
relatedly, a reversal in Geraghty would not necessarily dis-
pose of the Roper case. But Geraghty does clearly present 
the issue whether appeal of a denial of certification may be 
had when the named plaintiff's claim is truly moot. It pre-
sents the sharpest conflict, then, with theCA 7's decision in 
Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 560 F.2d 271 
(1977). Thus, if only one petition is to be granted, Geraghty 
should be the one. 
Petitioners in two of the cases seek review of 
questions other than the mootness issue. In Satterwhite, the 
only issue is the mootness point. Roper presents a few addi-
tional but insubstantial issues; the mootness issue is advanced 
in the first and second questions presented. Geraghty does in-
vel~ a few arguably certworthy issues besides the mootness point, 
which is set forth as the first question presented. The court 
in Geraghty held that the DC abused its discretion in failing 
to certify a subclass though subclasses were not $ -~gested by 
the plaintiff himself. (Second question presented.) Respondent 
points out, however, that the plaintiff had no chance to suggest 
that subclasses be created. Though the plaintiff requested that 
the DC rule on the class motion as soon as practicable, the DC 
- 8 -
refused to do so until it was ready to announce its decision 
on the merits. Had the DC ruled promptly -- prior to its 
decision on the merits -- the plaintiff would have proposed 
a redefinition of the class, he says. Thus the decision on 
this point is not manifestly unreasonable and no inter~circuit 
conflict is alleged. 
The court also intimated that the parole guidelines 
conflict with the 1976 Parole Commission and Reorganization 
Act (third question presented), and violate the~ post facto 
Clause of the Constitution (fourth question presented). Two 
other circuits have indicated their belief that the guidelines 
are consistent with the Act. Garcia v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 
557 F.2d 100, 107 (CA 7 1977) (reserving the question, however); 
Banks Vo United States, 553 F.2d 37, 40 (CA 8 1977) (arguably 
dicta). And two circuits have decided that the guidelines do 
not affront the~ post facto Clause. Shepard v. Taylor, 
556 F.2d 648 (CA 2 1977); Ruip v. United States, 555 F.2d 1331 
(CA 6 1977). 
Respondent emphasizes, however, that the case was up 
in the CA on appeal from summary judgment; accordingly, the facts 
are in dispute. In evaluating the guidelines on their merits 
theCA based much of its reasoning on Geraghty's allegations, 
which may or may not be proved. And the factual issues may be 
developed qn remand in such a way as to put Geraghty's case in 
even a stronger light. Thus, respondent submits, such important 
- 9 -
issues should not be adjudicated on essentially hypothecated 
facts. Respondent has a point. TheCA itself noted that: 
Since this case comes before us from 
a dismissal by summary judgment, and 
since Geraghty has provided factual 
support for his characterization of 
the guidelines, we must take his ac-
count as[£Qrrect for purposes of this 
appeal. J 
[*] However, since the Parole Commission 
has presented contradictory material, and 
since a large part of Geraghty's proof is 
inferential, the case cannot be resolved 
by summary judgment in Geraghty's favor 
on the basis of the present record. Petn. 
36a. 
It may be wise to await a determina~ion on remand, then, 
provided the judgment of the CA is sustained on the jurisdictional 
issue. But it may be efficient to hear the merits issueas long 
as the case is here on the jurisdictional point. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.§n.puutt <!Jmtrt of fltr ~lttittlt ~tntr.s 
~"Jas!~ton. p. <4. ;W~JI.~ 
February 23, 1979 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 78-572 -U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty; 
No. 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper; 
No. 78-1008 -Minda Satterwhite v. Greenville, Texas. 
The Conference voted to grant one or more of the above 
cases and was interested in a suggestion as to which should 
be selected. 
I recommend that we grant both Roper and Geraghty and 
hold Satterwhite. The grant in Roper should be limited to 
questions 1 and 2 (may named plaintiff whose case has mooted 
out appeal the denial of class action certification) and in 
Geraghty to questions 1 (the same as the Roper issue); 3 (are 
parole guidelines inconsistent with the statute); and 4 (was 
the ~ post facto clause violated by applying the guidelines 
in this case). 
I enclose a memorandum about these cases prepared by my 
clerk, Gary Sasso. 
t\<M\,'u.. \)~ _ -nv._ fy~ ~~ Sincerely yours, 
~~ ·o&e.¥'o:ftv \s ~tl" .tw. \sti.'Ls <M A 
~ ~ts ~~~,&It+_ \t ~i /1~ 
~ ~t-~ w<~ c:l...t...u:~ ~- ~, '"'t. c4 \M)-\ ~ 
Enclosure a c} . • 
~ o.. cla.. ~s; ~ ~ tl.v.. ~V\11.1\1 \.s IMl VII\. ~ \MU 
~ i-Jc.e_ Urt oE &t-v~ . 1: ~ ~ok ~ ~. p~ 
February 23, 1979 
Court .......... ~ ....... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No.78-572 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
U. S. PAROLE COMMISSION 




Burger, Ch. J .......... . 
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Stewart, J ........................... . 
White, J ............................ . 
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Powell, J ........................... . 
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CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMU N 
.:§u:vulltl' <qom:-t of tltt ~nitt~ .$itat.ce 
~ae!yittgfon:, lEJ. <q. 2llgtJ!.$ 
February 28, 19 79 
• 
Re : No. 78 - 57 2 - U.S. Parole C ommission v . Geraghty 
No . 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty Nationa l Bank v . Rope r 
No . 78-1008- Satterwhite v . Greenville , Texa s 
Dear Byron: 
This relates to your letter of February 23 recominending tha t 
certiorari be granted in both Roper and Geraghty and that Satterwhite 
be held for the othe r two. I fully agree . 
I am. so1newhat disturbed , however , at your proposed lhnitation 
of the grant in Geraghty . I think I would feel better if we grant Geraghty 
across the board. The second issue concerns the propriety of the Third 
C ircuit ' s ruling that the Distric't C ourt should have considered the pos s i-
bility of certifying a subclass of plaintiffs sua sponte . This ruling i s 
really related to the Tb.ird Circuit's ruling on the first issue becaus e 
the Court of Appeals agreed that tbc plaintiff's proposed class was un-
manageable . Thus , unless the trial court had a duty to consider sub -
! class certification sua sponte , the case would be moot even under the rationale of the Court of Appeals . As the SG points out , a rule requiring trial judges to mull over possibly appropriate subclasses would impose 
unique and unprecedented burdens on trial judges . 
In a way, the presence of the second issue in Geraghty makes 
it an easier case because the Court could reverse on this issue alone . ----
I arn also inclined io feC'l illat ihe subsiantive issues in GeraghJ:y 
are , indeed, ripe . As I read the opinion of the Court of Appeals in its 
entire ty, it seems to me that the District Court is given no discretion 
on remand. 
For these reasons, I am inclined to grant Gcr~}J!.Y. on all issues . 
Mr . Justice White 





;%iu:vrtntt <qomt cf t~t ';!littit.dt ~mug 
~l:tSlfittgfLllt, lfl. <q. 2rl?J!.,;l 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMU N February 2 8, 197 9 
• 
Re : No . 78-57 2 - U.S. Parol e C ommission v. Geraghty 
No . 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty Nationa l Bank v. Ro p e r 
No . 78- 1008- Satterwhite v . Greenville , Texa s 
Dear Byron: tJ"Vi.-• ~ ~ 
This relate s 
...:c;._--'"'- ;'-
recommending that 
and that Satterwhite 
I an1 somewhat disturbed , however, at your proposed limitation 
of the grant in Geraghty . I think I would feel better if we grant Geraghty 
across the board. The second issue concerns the propriety of the Third 
Circuit ' s ruling that the District Court should have considered the poss i-
bility of certifying a subclass of plaintiffs sua sponte . This ruling is 
really related to the Third Circuit ' s ruling on the first issue because 
the Court of Appeals agreed that the plaintiff' s proposed class was un-
rnanageable . Thus , unless the trial court had a duty to consider sub-
class certification sua sponte , the case wou l d be n10ot even under the 
rationale of the Court of Appeals . As the SG points out , a rule requiring 
trial judges to mull over possibly appropriate sub cla sses would impose 
unique and unprecedented burdens on trial judges . 
1 j In a way, the presence of the second issue in Geraghty makes vvt an easier case because the Cou rt could rever se on this issue alone . 
I am. a lso inclined to feel that the substantive is sues in Ger~1:_y 
are , indeed, ripe . As I read the opinion of the Court of Appeals in its 
entirety, it seerns to me that the District Court is given no discretion 
on rernand . 
For these reasons , I an1 inclined to grant Ger_~gb!Y_ on all i ssues . 
Mr. Justice White 
cc : The Corrie renee 
Sincerely, 
Rp. G: r:gt-t&j ~ 
·: . 
pi/Ag Ja.tfVI/J itv:d ~ 
1S'-<ffcvl-r &,aph~ 1 t:t.A . 
' Vi.H- It 0 I.e ad-u ta- 6 -
1_ ))eWe_ rl fS 11/Ylrt.Q ~ 
'-1-o Mf ~_r;,f /11P ~IJ ss -u:/.e . ./, 
. G) Or1 ~ 12-) Jww · Mtf!Af 
"Al?~ sud!t /~hhc...o.ft.Wt 
k cia i ('(I ef COVt w.Je_ :J 
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I 
'·' . . . .· ... 
... 
... ~ 
.:§nputttt <!J'ourl of ut~ ~~~ .:§taf:tg 
Jlagfring:tlttt. ~. <If. 21l.;iJt.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 




March 1, 1979 
US Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty; 
Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. 
Roper; 
Satterwhite v. Greenville, TX. 
I do not object to granting Geraghty across 
the board. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
cmc 
1 
.§ 14rrtn1r C!J 01trl of t~ t ~lnitd1 .§\ t ll tr.s 
~a.s-Irmgton .. Jl. C!J. 2Dc?JI-2 
CHAMBERS OP 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE March l, 1979 
.. 
RE:~ U. S. Parole Commission v. Gerag~ty 
78-904- Deposit Guaranty National Bank.v. Roper 
78-1008 - Satterwhite v. Gr eenville, Texas 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I vote as follows : 
78-572 - U.S. Parole Commission v. 
78-904 
Geraghty 
Deposit Guaranty National 
Bank v. Roper 
78-1008 - Satterwhite v. 
Greenvi lle, Texas 
- Grant in ful l 
- Grant Questions l a nd ~ 
- Hold for 78-572 and 
78-904 . 
Regards , 
March 2, 1979 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No.78-572 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
U. S. PAROLE COMMISSION 




Burger, Ch. J .... ............. . v.' ~ · .. 
Brennan, J ..................... Y . :./ 
Stewart, J ........................ 11 ••• 
White, J. . . .. . . .. . .. . . . . .. .... V.. ~ 
Marshall, J .......................... . 
Blackmun, J ................... v:'. ... . 
./ Powell, J ........................... . 
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... /.. ... . 
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-
September 28, 1979 
78-572 u.s. Parole Commission v. Geraqhty 
Dear ,John: 
I aqree with Bill Rrennan that there is no reason 
for you to recuse in this ca~e. 
~incerely, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
lfP/SS 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~ 
September 28, 1979 
RE: No. 78-572 United States Parole Commission v. 
Geraghty 
Dear John: 
I see no reason whatever why you should recuse 
yourself in the above. 
Mr. Justice Stevens 







,Sn:punu <lfllllrl .o:f flr.t ~t.tb" ,j;btf.tg 
·~lh~g~httt. J. <!f. 2.(J.;iJ!~ 
JUST ICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
I 
j 
September 28, 19;7.9 
I 
Re: 78-572 - United States Parole Commission 
v. Geraghty 
The briefs on the merits have reminded me that I 
was a member of the Seventh Circuit panel that affirmed 
Geraghty's conviction in 1974, see United Sta·tes v. 
Braasch, 505 F.2d 139. I did not, howe~er, sit ~n the 
panel that subsequently refused to review a reduction 
in his sentence, see 542 F.2d 442. 
Since the appeal on which I did sit raised no 
quest ions concerning the severity of Geraghty's sentence--
and really had nothing whatsoever to do with the various 
issues now before us--I do not think there is any reason 
for me to recuse myself. However, I thought I should 
advise you of the facts and if the re is any contrary 
feeling on the Court, I would welcome your advice. 




TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Ellen 
DATE: October 1, 1979 
RE: US Parole Commission v. Geraghty, No. 78-572 
The SG has filed a helpful reply brief addressing some of 
the key arguments. The brief does not, however, convincingly answer - ..., 
resp's most persuasive point - that denial of class certification ~~ 
must be reviewable to prevent that issue from forever evading revi~~ 
The SG cites the Jacobs case and the dicta in Spangler v. Pasadena~~ 
Board of Education to the same effect. As you pointed out, these 
dicta are controlling if they are the law. But neither case dealt 
wj th appe ~l from a denial of class status, since the actions had been 
treated as class actions below. Resp has raised strong policy 
concerns suggesting that the result should be different here. 
Although I think he is wrong, the answer is not as simple as the SG 
contends. 
The SG also answers the motion to intervene filed by 5 
prisoners with live claims in this Court, arguing that the Court is 
without jurisdiction to grant the motion because intervention cannot 
revive a dead case. 
On the merits, the SG adds some current statistics: in 1978, 
11% of the PC's decisions delayed release until after the guideline 
range, while 10% allowed early release. 
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JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.:§uvuutt <!fllltrl of tlft 'J!tttUtb ~'lmts­
~a:S"lpn:gtctt.. ~. <!f. 2ll?J.!..;t 
October 9, 1979 
/ 
Re: No. 78-752 - United States Parole Commission 
v. Geraghty 
Dear Chief: 
This note will confirm my comment to you yesterday by 
telephone that, after further examination of this case, 
my vote is to affirm. Accordingly, now that the case 
has been assigned to me, I shall endeavor to write it 
in that direction. 
I would have thought, however, that the same person 
should write this case and No. 78-904, Deposit Guaranty 
National Bank v. Roper. They fall in the same area and 
perhaps might have been covered in a single opinion. 
Inasmuch, however, as you wish to retain Roper for your-
self, I suggest that we plan (if the votes in Guaranty 
hold firm) to bring the two cases down together. I 
would not wish us to be working at cross-purposes, even 
to a slight degree. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Confe r e nce 
,; 
. / 
.:§uvult.tt cq omi cf tltt ~ttittb- ~ffiltg 
~aglftttghm. ~. <!f. 2!1.?'-1~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMU N November 
Re: No. 78-572 - United States Parole Commission, 
et al. v. Geraghty 
Dear Chief: 
This circulation of a proposed opinion in the above 
case will bring into focus the connection between this 
case and your pending op1n1on in No. 78-904, Deposit 
Guaranty National Bank v. Roper. In my letter of October 
9 and in your memorandum of November 1, each of us 
expressed some concern about conflict between the two 
opinions. 
I have endeavored to draft Geraghty so that it would 
provide .a minimum of tension with Roper. Indeed, as you 
will observe, Roper is cited in Geraghty several times. 
You, of course, already have a Court in Roper. De-
spite this fact, I call to your attention two minor points 
in the Roper opinion that might create problems with 
Geraghty. These are the only ones, I believe, that are of 
some concern to me: 
1. On pp. 6-7 and n.7 in Roper there is an 
implication that a plaintiff who settles his 
individual claim may not appeal a denial of a 
class certification. The case authority 
cited is the dissenting opinion {although it 
is not described as a dissent) in United 
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald. This does not 
directly conflict with the op1n1on in 
Geraghty, since Geraghty also does not 
involve a voluntary settlement. I am not 
persuaded, at least at this point, that the 
settlement situation is all that easy and 
clear. I would prefer that it be left open 
until presented in a "concrete" factual 
context. 
2. On pp. 8-10 your op1n1on seems to approve the 
distinction in the Electrical . Fittings case 
between a judgment on the merits and "true" 




"The Court perceived the critical distinction 
between the definitive mootness of a case or 
controversy, which ousts the jurisdiction _of 
a federal court and requires dismissal of the 
case, and a judgment in favor of a party at 
an intermediate stage of litigation, which 
does not in all cases terminate the right to 
appeal." 
If I understand this language, I think it could be read as 
adopting the Solicitor General's argument that "expiration" 
of a claim is different for Art. III purposes from a judg-
ment on the merits of the claim. This may not be fully 
consistent with Geraghty. 
I shall be interested in your reactions to this. If 
my concern as to these two points in Roper is alleviated, 
I would be in a position to join your opinion in that case. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
..:§.u.pr ttttr tG ourt of tip• 'J!hritdt jstatrs 
';mru;Jrington. ~. cr;. 20?)*~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
November 16, 1979 
Re: 78-572 -U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty 
Dear Harry: 
Your draft and my editorially revised Roper passed in 
today's circulations. There are some "tensions",~, 
the final sentence on your page 11. This is not 
surprising between a case with a clear economic and 
property interest and one with quite a different element. 
I may need to clarify possible ambiguities; for example, I 
rest firmly on Roper's economic interest in spreading the 
legal costs over the class and on the idea that 
appealability is not terminated by the final judgment 
here, rather than on any "obligation" of Roper to the 
putative class. Geraghty does not seem to have a parallel 
economic interest. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
'J 
l 
.§upumt Qimu-t .of f:lrt ~ni~~ .:§fattg 
Jraglfittghtu. ~. ~· 2ll~'!~ 
CI--IAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.. 
November 16, 1979 
Re: 78-572 - United States Parole Commission 
v. Geraghty 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 





JUSTICE Wt< . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
·:~tntt Q}llurlllf tfrt ~b ~tatr~ 
Jlu!pngbtn. ~. (!}. 2llc?'!~ 
November 19, 1979 
RE: No. 78-572 United States Parole Commission v. 
Geraghty 
Dear Harry: 
I am happy to join your opinion for the Court 
in the above. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
I. ' ... 
1-
' 
.§nprctttt ~cnrt .of tift ~tb- ~tatts 
~a.gfringhttt. ~. <lJ. 20p'~.:l 
CHAMBE:RS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE November 20, 1979 
Re: No. 78-572 - U.S. Parole Commission 
v. John M. Geraghty 
Dear Harry, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Blackrnun 
Copies to the Conference 
erne 
78-572 u.s. Parole Commission v. Geraqhty 
Dear Harry: 
As I was on the •short side• in both Roper and 
Geraqhty, I expect to write a dissent. 
I orobably will use Geraqhty as the princiPal case 
for my iHssent, with a brief separate dissent in Roper. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
lfP/SS 
cc: The Conference 
d ~rf tip~ '2,lni1d' ;;_ 
1 i .)df, i<l . (q. l!Ll~Jl-;3 
CHA!· .. tf:'CRG O F 
-JUSTICE li/,riRY A. BL.ACI~MU N November 29 , 1919 
/ 
Dear Bi ll : 
I fully understand your concern and discomfiture , fo r I 
agree that our past cases seem to move first in one direction 
· and then in another. As a consequence , the drafting of the 
proposed opinion for this case proved to be , for me at least , 
a difficul t tas k. I believe , however , that my handling o f 
these pas t cases, i ncluding i n particular footnot e 7, i s a n 
honest one . 
I shal l recirculate shortly with minor revisions , some of 
whic h are occasioned by the changes made by the Chief Justice 
in his new draf t o f the opinion in Roper. My c hanges may or 
may not all e vi ate your concerns. 
I am not sure th a t I u nders t a nd your discomfiture with 
part V, as e xp ressed in the next to the last paragraph of your 
letter of Novembe r 21. I . had thought that the opinion (page 
17) indicated that the District Court did not h a ve sua sponte 
responsibility to const r uct su bclas s e s. In the new draft, I 
am emphasizing this, and I believe that the additional lan-
gu age should satisfy your concern on this point. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Jus tice Rehnqui s t 
cc : The Conferenc e 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.in.prtmr <!Jttttrt cf tip• ~nitcl) j;tatca-
'lUaa-lyhtghllt, W. (If. :111btJl·.~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL November 29, 1979 
Re: No. 78-572 - u.s. Parole Com. v. Geraghty 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 




TO: Ellen DATE: Dec. 31, 1979 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Geraghty 
Having revewed your draft of 12/28, I can well 
understand why you found it rather difficult to write a 
dissent. Apart from the absence of a precedent that fairly 
can be said to be wholly controlling, and in view of the 
multiplicity of standing cases (both Article III and 
1~udential) including the mootness cases, the Court's opinion 
presents a "moving" target. It agrees with Roper that the 
application of Article III must be on an 'issue by issue" 
basis; it bisects the mootness doctrine into "flexible" 
and "less flexible" cases, and it defines a "live controversy" 
in a wholly unique way. 
Nevertheless, Ellen, your draft is too long - as I 
am sure you recognize. Nor is my familiarity with the 
myriad of cases sufficiently familiar to enable me to give 
you precise guidance as to how best to eliminate five or 
six pages from the text and perhaps also reduce somewhat 
the notes. I nevertheless make the following observations. 
1. With the rider I have dictated (and attached 
hereto) the introductory paragraph on page 1 is OK. 
2. I also think your part I (pp. 2-6 , inclusiv€0 
is a fine basis introduction - though it is confined to 
I 
non class action cases. The text in Part I is a bit 
forbidding because of the multiple citation and repetitive 
citation of the full titles of cases. Possibly you can do 
something about this. 
3. Part II of the draft moves into a discussion 
of the class action cases. This Part includes six and a 
half pages of text. It reads well, and is supportive of our 
2. 
position. Yet, I view Part III, commencing on page 13, as 
the heart of our dissent. To the extent that we will discuss 
in Part III cases now in Part II, I suggest that we hold 
our fire on these cases until we are attacking or responding 
to the Court opinion. 
I do think that much of what you have written in 
Part II is excellent, and I am not sure how best to preserve 
it without appearing to be repetitious and unduly prolonging 
the opinion. 
What would you think of combining Parts II and III, 
and weaving your treatment of the authorities discusssed 
in Part II into our principal attack on the Blackmun 
opinion that we now make in Part III. 
4. After our Part I, I would move directly to 
a description of what the Blackmun opinion says and really 
rt#/f/3:5 ~
does to Aritlce III mootness. Part III commencing at 
~ 
page 8 is a good starting place. He takes quite a few 
liberties, as I view it, with prior decisions, paying scant 
attention to the fact that Gerstein lends no support to HAB 
because its decision turned on the short time span involved 
so that cases almost always would evade review. The same 
situation existed in~~ although there a class had been 
certified - as you correctly emphasize. 
I have dictated, and will give you herewith, some 
random thoughts as to what we might say in response to the 
3. 
Court's new distinction between "flexible" and "less flexible" 
~ 
mootness. I think this can be ehe focal point of .a alll!:fcr 
1\ 
ta~s t e~ our attack. 
Despite what I have said above as to the central 
importance of HAB's Part III, I suppose what he says commencing 
at the bottom of page 14 and going through page 15 in his 
redefinition of "personal stake" actually is the most 
radical portion of his analysis. 
He identifies three "imperatives" of a continuing 
live dispute: (i) a sharply presented issue, (ii) a 
concrete factual setting; and (iii) a self interested party 
who actually is contesting the case. 
The last of these imperatives is conspicuously 
absent in the present case, despite HAB's conclusion that 
"these elements can exist with respect to the class 
certification issue notwithstanding the fact that the named 
plaintiff's claim on the merits has expired." He then 
makes the astonishing statement: 
"Respondent here continues vigorously to 
advocate his right to have a class certified." 
4. 
Is there anything in the record that indicates any 
interest on respondent's part? To be sure his lawyer is 
here, but he concedes that his re~ no longer has the 
slightest interest in the outcome of the litigation. 
Then, as you demonstrate quite well, HAB's splitting 
the mootness "atom" into two, is unprecedented and unsound 
(seep. 16) . 
In sum, Ellen, we will have a stronger - and more 
readable - dissent if we move at a fairly early point to 
define our targets - drawing them specifically and fairly 
from HAB's opinion. Then, we should attack them with 
precedent and logic. As to the precedents, you have already 
distinguished those Harry relies upon, and emphasized 
those that support our view. Your task is to do this as a 
~ 
part of our basic rebuttal, rather than spreading ~ out. 
-1 
I know that it is easier for me to suggest this 
restructuring of the draft than it will be to accomplish 
this. I will appreciated your doing this, taking such 
time as may be necessary. Our dissent is important, at least 
in the interest of continuity of doctrine. We also should 
let the law schools know that at least some of us think 
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MEMORANDUM , 
TO: Ellen DATE: Dec. 31, 1979 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Geraghty 
Having revewed your draft of 12/28, I can well 
understand why you found it rather difficult to write a 
dissent. Apart from the absence of a precedent that fairly 
can be said to be wholly controlling, and in view of the 
multiplicity of standing cases (both Article III and 
prudential) including the mootness cases, the Court's opinion 
presents a "moving" target. It agrees with Roper that the 
application of Article III must be on an 'issue by issue" 
basis; it bisects the mootness doctrine into "flexible." 
and "less flexible" cases, and it defines a "live controversy" 
in a wholly unique way. 
Nevertheless, Ellen, your draft is too long - as I 
am sure you recognize. Nor is my familiarity with the 
myriad of _cases sufficiently familiar to enable me to give 
you precise guidance as to how best to eliminate five or 
six pages from the text and perhaps also reduce somewhat 
the notes. I nevertheless make the following observations. 
1. With the rider I have dictated (and .attached 
hereto) the introductory paragraph on page 1 is OK • . 
2. I also thi nk your part I (pp. 2-6), inclusive 
is a fine basis introduction - though it is confined to 
\t 
non .class action cases. The text in Part I is a bit 
forbidding because of the multiple citation and repetitive 
citation of the full titles of cases. Possibly you can do 
something about this. 
3. Part II of the draft moves into a discussion 
2. 
of the class action cases. This Part includes six and a 
half pages of text. It reads well, and is supportive of our 
position. Yet, I view Part III, commencing on page 13, as 
the heart of our dissent. To the extent that we will discuss 
in Part III cases now in Part II, I suggest that we hold 
our fire on these cases until we are attacking or responding 
to the Court opinion. 
I do think that much of what you have written in 
Part II is excellent, and I am not sure how best to preserve 
it without appearing to be repetitious and unduly prolonging 
the opinion. 
What would you think of combining Parts II and III, 
and weaving your treatment of the authorities discusssed 
in Part II into our principal attack on the Blackmun 
opinion that we now make in Part III. 
4. After our Part I, I would move directly to 
a description of what the Blackmun opinion says and really 
does to Aritlce III mootness. Part III commencing at 
page 8 is a good starting place. He t akes quite a few 
liberties, as I view it, with prior decisions, paying scant 
attention to the fact that Gerstein lerids no support to HAB 
because its decision turned on the short time span involved 
so that cases almost always would evade review. The same 
situation existed in Roper, although there a class had been 
certified - as you correctly emphasize. 
3. 
I have dictated, and will give you herewith, some 
random thoughts as to what we might say in response to the 
Court's new distinction between "flexible" and "less flexible" 
mootness. I think this can be -the focal point of a major · 
thrust of our attack. 
" Despite what I have said above as to the central 
importance of HAB's Part III, I suppose what he says commencing 
at the bottom of page 14 and going through page 15 in his 
redefinition of "personal stake" actually is the most 
radical portion of his analysis. 
He identifies three "imperatives" of a continuing 
live dispute: (i) a sharply presented issue) (ii) a 
concrete factual setting; and (iii) a self interested party 
who actually is contesting the case. 
The last of these imperatives is conspicuously 
absent in the present case, despite HAB's conclusion that 
"these elements can exist with respect to the class 
certification issue notwithstanding the fact that the named 
plaintiff's claim on the merits has expired." He then 
• 
makes the astonishing statement: 
"Respondent here continues vigorously to 
advocate his right to have a class certified." 
4. 
Is there anything in the record that indicates any 
interest on respondent's part? To be sure his lawyer is 
here, but he concedes that his respondent no longer has the 
slightest interest in the outcome of the litigation. 
Then, as you demonstrate quite well, HAB's splitting 
the mootness "atom" into two, is unprecedented and unsound 
(seep. 16). 
In sum, Ellen, we will have a stronger - and more 
readable - dissent if we move at a fairly early point to 
define our targets - ·drawing them specifically and fair-ly 
from HAB's opinion. Then, we should attack them with 
precedent and logic. As to the precedents, you have already 
distinguished those Harry relies upon, and emphasized 
those that support our view. Your task is to do this as a 
part of our basic rebuttal, rather than spreading it out. 
I know that it is easier for me to suggest this 
restructuring of the draft than it will be to accomplish 
this. I will appreciated your doing this, taking such 
time as may be necessary. Our dissent is important, at least 
in the interest of continuity of doctrine. We also should 
let the law schools know that at least some of us think 
the Court's decision is a radical departure from prec e dent 







TO: Ellen DATE: ,Jan. 17, 1Q80 
FROr.'l: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
78-572 Geraqhtv 
I have reviewed carefully, and with much 
the revised draft of 1/16/80 of an opinion in this case. I 
conqratulate you on a closely knit and persuasively reasoned 
dissent. You have restructured the opinion alonq the lines 
suqqested very well inoeed. I also thank Greq for doinq an 
early edit to accommodate my time problem. 
Apart from self evident editinq, I have tried to 
eliminate what seemed to me to be marginal statements -
in the notes and text. Some, it seemed to me, adoeo 
Others, seemed to reach out a bit for arguments that 
debatable. Actually, my eliminations have not been numerous: 
yet, when you and Greg reread the opinion, bear in mind that 
our basic points are so stronq, it would be unwise to present 
marginal arquments. 
The lonq rider I have dictated for paqe 9 is 
designed merely for emphasis and increased clarity. Rut I 
raise this rather fundamental question. If, indeed, Roper 
Preserves the essence of Article III should I reconsider my 
2. 
tentative decision to dissent in that case as well as in 
Garaqhty? "M' ,,~ ....... q"IJ"·t· .. ·• ... ,.' ,, ,.;.~'!II... ' ' ! .. 
~ •• ~ .. ' . , D 
$~'it\~~"'l~~'I have not yet reexamined Roper, which I read 
several weeks aqo. I I will, of course, do this, and suqqest , 
that you complete your preliminary draft of the dissent. 
Then I would welcome the views of both of you on the question 
I raise. " ~- ,.;._· ' 
The distinction we draw on oaqe 9 appears to put 
Geraqhty in a substantially different liqht from Roper. This 
does not surprise me too much, as I have always Perceived 
Geraqhty as the more shockinq of the two oecisions by this 
Court. Moreover, unless Justice Stewart has chanqed his min~ 
in Geraqhty, he may be a possible ioin in our dissent. Nor 
has Justice Rehnquist come to rest, as I understand it. 
In order to move this alonq, I suqqest that it qo 
to the printer today, hopinq to obtain a Chambers Oraft 
before I leave for Florida tomorrow afternoon. I could then 
,, 
review that and let you know by telephone if I have chanqes. .' , 
Meanwhile your co-clerks can review the Chambers Draft. ., . 
is an important dissent. The Court is makinq a maior 
departure from Article III iurisprudence. The law reviews ' 
~·( h,· ~. 
are certain to examine the opinions with care. Ours must be ;, ·~ ,.,. 
~ ~ .(j ~' 
.,+.; 
the soundest reasoned even if not the most popular result. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
er 1/22/80 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Ellen 
RE: No. 78-572, Geraghty Chambers Draft 
Before going to press on this, I'd like to draw your 
attention to two things: 
1. What we say about Art. III here is in some tension 
with your concurring opinion in United States v. Richardson, 418 
U.S. 166 (1974). Particularly at pages 184 and 196-197, you seem 
to adopt the Harlan view from Flast v. Cohen, that the barriers 
against the "public action" are prudential only. I think that your 
more recent opinions for the Court reject that view (Warth v. 
Seldin, and Gladstone, Realtors, for example), and that Richardson 
should be read in liqht of the stricter Art. III limits imposed in 
those cases. 
2. On a more mundane level, I have added some citations 
and clarified the language of Foot 6. In the course of 
editing, I had previously 
footnote, in which I had 
notice upon settlement an 
second paragraph of that 
ledged that the obligation to give 




been imposed by some courts even before certification. It destroys 
the flow of the footnote to put that thought back in, and I have 
concluded that it is not inconsistent with what we now say. 
Finally, I have found no direct support for the last 
sentence in note 6. The closest I have come is Newberg's treatise, 
where he says that the Sosna/Franks result is analogous to the 
well-settled rule that a trust does not fail for want of a trustee. 
<' 
- ? \o pv--e ~s ~ 
• I am circulating my 
f.,>·4a f. ternoon. ;I 
· · · ·· If my records are correct, both of you voted 
tentatively as I did at Conference. I believe all of the 
votes are in except yours. I would welcome company, and 
therefore invite your comments. Indeed, even if you conclude 
not to join me, I would still welcome any suqgestions - as I 
view what is written in this case in particular as like ly to 
have a significant effect on Article III iurispruoence • 
. ~ ... 
Although there i~ some tension between Geraghty and 
Roper, that you have joined, there are some distinctions. At 
the practical level (emphasized by the CJ in his Roper 
opinion) there is a major distinction bet.ween the two cases. 
If Roper were decided the way that I think it should be, 
members of the putative class - havinq slept on their rights 
for nine years more or less - may be barred by ~he statute of 
limitations. .J! . '~>. I , 
- In GeraqhtJ, no one will be adversely affected by 
applyina conventiona Article III mootness. Geraghty's 
counsel, as you will remember, was refreshinqlv candid about 
this. He aqreed that his only client, Geraahty, had nothinq 
whatever to qain by class certification. ~oreover, counsel 
stated that there would be no problem in commencinq another 
suit to test the validity of the parole procedure. Th~re " 
were plenty of available clients still imPrisoned with terms 
lonq enouqh to assure they would not be Parolert durinq the 
course of litigation. 
~·' •. -
.. '· "• .. 
2. 
In short, a fresh suit - for which "captured 
clients" are available - would ensure that the issue is 
litiaated. 'l'he reasons principallv reliet1 upon in :Ro-oer for , 
preservtnq the class action simply do not ~xist in Ger.aqhty . 
Sincere-ly , 
Justice Stewart 




JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.iu.prtmt <!JMni of tlft ~t~ .ilatts 
-asftinghnt. ~. <!J. 2ll~~~ 
v 
February 1, 1980 
I 
Re: No. 78-572 - United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your dissent in this case. I have joined 
the Chief's opinion in Roper, and therefore do not anticipate 
joining your forthcoming dissent in Roper. Frankly, I think our 
cases on "mootness" are at sixes and sevens, and that any 
litigant or any court can derive support from statements made in 
one or another of them. Because I think Harry's opinion for the 
Court in this case is not lacking in precedental support, and 
because I think there is undoubted tension between a "join" in 
Roper and a dissent in this case, I shall probably write 
separately to explain my position. I hope to do so within the 
next two or three days. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
,jnp:rtmt Q}ltltftqf tlft~b ~taf.tg 
~MJringhm. ~. (!}. 2ll.;f,. ~ 
..JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~ 
~ 
Re: 78-572 - United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty 
Dear Lewis: 
Please add my name to your dissenting opinion. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~ttprtmt Q}onrt of t~t> ~u~ .:§tatr.s 
~z.t.slrmgton. ;m. <.q. 20c?J~;J 
March 11, 1980 
Re: 78-572 - U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty 
Dear Harry: 
/ 
I have made a final review of this case after 
reading Lewis' revised dissent in Roper. As you know, 
I have never viewed these cases as being governed by 
the same principles; for me the application of 
traditional concepts of mootness calls for reversal of 
Geraghty and affirmance of Roper, since the former has 
no vestige of interest in the litigation. 
If Lewis makes some changes in his dissent in this 
case, I may join him. 
Otherwise, I will simply dissent "solo". 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.iu.pumt <qourt of tqt ~nitt~ .itattg 
:Jifa:gfrington, ~. <q. 2.llp'l>$ 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE March 11, 1980 
PERSONAL 
Re: 78-572 - U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty 
Dear Lewis: 
I could join your dissent if 
(a) on line 9, page 9, after "paid" you insert 
"into court but not accepted by plaintiffs .", 
(b) change the final sentence of the first full 
paragraph to read: 
"One can disagree with that analysis yet conclude 
that Roper affords no support for the Court's 
holding here." 
Mr. Justice Powell 
·~·, 
March 11, 1980 
Dear Chief: 
Thank you for your letter of this oate. 
I am happy to make the chanqes in my dissent that 
you suqqest. 









THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u.pumt <!Jcurt ttf tqt ~tdt ~tatts 
'JIDagfringtcn., ~. <!J. '2flc?Ji·2 
March 11, 1980 
Re: 78-572 - U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty 
Dear Harry: 
I have made a final review of this case after 
reading Lewis' revised dissent in Roper. As you know, 
I have never viewed these cases as being governed by 
the same principles; for me the application of 
traditional concepts of mootness calls for reversal of 
Geraghty and affirmance of Roper, since the former has 
no vestige of interest in the litigation. 
If Lewis makes some changes in his dissent in this 
case, I may join him. 
Otherwise, I will simply dissent "solo". 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.:iu.prtmt <!Illud llf t4t ~b ;italtg 
..-agfri:ngron. IO. <!I· zogrn.~ 
March 12, 1980 
Re: 78-572 - United States Parole Commission 
v. Geraghty 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you for the accommodation in your 
dissent, which I now join. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.:§uvumt (!Jll'ltrt Gf tlrt 'Jtlnitd~ j;rn.tta 
2)tlaalrhtg-httt. ~. <!J. 2llblJ!~ 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
March 13, 1980 
Re: No. 78-572 - United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty 
On page 11 of the proposed opinion I am inserting the 
following immediately after the numeral in the eighth line 
of the second paragraph: . . 
"See also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S., at 469." 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.§ttprtutt ~omt of tltt 'Jtlnitdt ..§ita:Ua 
'J]tlaaJri:ttgt~. ~. ~· 20&tJI-;l 
MEHORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
March 13, 1980 
Re: No. 78-572 - United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty 
On page 11 of the proposed opinion I am inserting the 
following immediately after the numeral in the eighth line 
of the second paragraph: . . 
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April 22, 1980 
78-572 u.s. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty 
Dear Henry: 
I return my opinion in this case with your 
suqqested editorial changes, and in qeneral they seem fine as 
usual. 
Both my clerk and I do have some question as to 
what seems to me to be an unnecessary use of "hyphens". My 
impression is that recently vour office has been suqqestinq 
the addition of more hyphens than usual. I am inclined to 
leave stylistic decisons of this kind to you, and if vour 
usaqe is heinq accepted qenerally by other Chambers I will 
acauiesce. 
I do note that the Government Printing Office Style 
Manual (January 1973), page 75, §6.16 a~dresses the use of a 
hyphen "to form a temporary or made compound", and states 
that "restraint should be exercised" in this usaqe. This 
would apply, in my view, to "personal stake requirement" and 
"class action context". ~ 
The matter is not one of vast consequence, and 
accordingly if vou will let me know tha.t your present usage 
of hyphens is beinq followed uniformly in Court opinions, I 
will be content. I do think uniformity with respect to 
stylistic matters of this kind is desirable, and therefore I 
will rely on your iudqment. 
. ,i, ~·. "' } 
"'" 











s~ ~~ la {: ~-(! 
]) To : The Chief Just i ce 
_ .•. :~~. '? /~A- 1u #1ot.A ~ r Mr . Just i ce Brennan 
cV \\ , - f' . .,~~ Mr. Justice Stewart 
f\.'\.C ~, ~f. ~ Mr. Justice Wnlte 
.A\>'\.~ . • .. I). A .I .~ _ _-1-- Mr. Justice M~snall 
CQ~.,.- r-1)) ~ fL.() ti~ Pi!J;sell 
.J\~ ~\ z::J. , . _ fl . _ A (] Mr Ju: r, n mqu.lst 
~\v- c¥- '/1A. C~ - 1 { Mr: J·..:...>t vi;) ~covens 
~.L.y4-~ --J/ From : Mr. Justice Blackmun 
l t~~~ tr{ 1~u~ 12_. 
~. . ~2nd DRAFT '~circulat:ed· 2 9 NOV 1979 
~ ~II J _/,.J'o./ \\ 
SUPREME COUR' OF THE 'UNiTED S' AT~ 
~ tirfJIL '' ~ ~ ~s~~-:_2, '3 to ~ 7 fJ I 2.. 
M_ 2 ?, .:::t;~United Stat.es Parole Commission On Writ of Certiorari to V 
/'- -
1 
) _ et !l., Petitioners, the United States Court 
~ ~~ v. of Appeals for the Third 
·~,~~ _ John M. Geraghty. Circuit. 
~ II \'-
~ »1 ~ ~.-t..- ~venit&-,~ /1 b- _ 1 Lf 
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
t{ ~ This case raises the question whether a trial court's denial 
1 _ .I '-'~ of a motion for certification of a class may be reviewed on 
/~~ ~ _ appeal after the named plaintiff's personal claim has become 
~~~"moot." The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
~~ ~·.--' - ..J • ...ceacuit held. that a named plaintiff, respondent here. who 
~D- · . ~rv--br~ght a class action challenging the validity of the United 
, States Parole Commission's Parole Release Guidelines, could 
rl /" /_,~ ~' continue his appeal of a ruling denying class certification even 
~-~ .., though he had been released from prison while the appeal was 
? ? pending. We granted certiorari. 440 U. S. 945 ( 1979), to 
-- l 'f .. ~ consider this issue of substantial significance, under Art. III of 
1 . ~ the Constitution, to class action litigation,
1 and to resolve the 
4 . A~~ , ict in a~ach among the Courts of Appeals.
2 
yv"" r gra of certiorari also included the question of the validity of the 
,.A ~ L arole Release Guid<>lines, an i~sue left open in United States v. Addonizio, 
Jf L ,/. S 442 U.S.-,- (1979) (slip op. , at 5--6). We have concluded, how-
J c..r) l <>ver, that it would be premature to r<>ach the merits of that question at 
_,..- ~ this time. See injm, at 17. 
_ L ~ While the petition for a writ of certiorari was pending, respondent 
I AJ ~~ Geraghty illed a motion to substitute as respondents in this Court. five 
~ ~---- • prisoners, then incarcera.ted, who also were represented by Geraghty's 
111~ attorneys. In the alterna.tive, the pri ·oners sought to intervene. We • J_. p yv.- _ deferred our ruling on the motion to the hearing of the case on the merits . 
...-}'IAYl ~ / ~ [Footnote 2 is on p. 2} ~
nY ~ ~~--(( ·- .J"' $'~~ ' • . ,.,;vr" ~ v'~ ~n.ft4{TD ~· ;;J!Jifi"P"'" ~~-~ 
rw-- ~~~v· ~~trJI\~~~ 
78-572-0PINION 
2 UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY 
I 
In 1973, the United States Parole Board adopted explicit 
Parole Release Guidelines for adult prisoners.3 These guide-
lines establish a "customary range" of confinement for various 
classes of offenders. The guidelines utilize a matrix. which 
combines a "parole prognosis" score (based on the prisoner's 
age r.t first conviction. employment background, and other 
personal factors) and an "offense severity" rating. to yield 
the "customary" time to be served in prison. 
Subsequently, in 1976. Congress enacted the Parole Com-
mission and Reorganization Act (PCR.A). Pub. L. 94-230. 90 
Rtat. 219. 18 U. S. C. ~~ 4201-4218. This Act provided the 
440 U. S. 045 (1979). The~e prisonrr,;, or mo"t of thrm , no\\' nl~o 
hrwe been rclea~ed from incflreemtion. On September 25, 1979, a. supple-
ment. to the motion to ~ubstitutc or intervene wn~ filed, proposing six new 
~ub,-titutr respondents or intrrnnors; ench of t hc~e is a. pre~entl~· in-
rarrcrnted fcdernl prisoner who, allegrdl~·, hns been ndversely affrrted b~· 
thr guideline>' nne! who i~< reprrf'entrd b~· Cicrnght~·'s counsrl. 
Rinrc we hold thnt. re~ponrlrnt. mny continue to litigntr the rlflss rert ifi-
c::ttion issue, there is no need for us to consider whether the motion should 
br grnnted in order to prrvrnt the cnsr from bring moot. We conclude 
t hilt the District Court. initially should l'llll' on the motion. 
3 Sec, e. g .. Armour v. City of Anniston. 507 F. 2d 46. 48-49 (CA5 
J!179): Susman v. Lincoln AmPrica.n r'01']J .. 5~7 F. 2d R6fi (CA7 1!178), 
rrrt. pending, No. 78-116!1: Goodman \'. Schlesinger. 5R4 F. 2cl 1325, 
1332-1333 (CA-~ 1!)78); Camper v. ('alumet Petrochemirals, Tnt .. 584 
F. 2cl 70 (CA5 1978); Roper v. Consun•e. lnc., 578 F. 2d 1106 (CA5 
2978), nff'd sub nom. Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank t'. RopPr, ante , p.-
(1079); Sattl'1·u•hite v. City of Greenville. 57R F. 2cl 987 (CA5 1978) 
(en bane), rcrL pending, No. 7R-100R: Vtm Cannan v. Breed. 565 F. 2d 
1096 (CA9 Hl77): Winokur v. Bell Fedeml Savings ~~ Loan Assn .. 560 
F. 2cl 271 (CA7 1977), cert. clrnird. 435 U. S. 932 (1978); Lasky v. 
Quinlan. 55S F. 2cl 113:3 (CA2 1977); Kuahulu v. Employers lns. of 
Wausau. 557 F. 2cl 1334 (CA!) Hl77); Boyd v. Justices of Special 1'e1·m , 
546 F. 2d 526 (CA2 1976); Napier v. Gertrude. 542 F. 2d 825 (CAlO 
1076), cert. drnird, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977). 
~ 38 Fed. Reg. 31942-31945 (1973). The guidelines cmrentl~r in force· 
npprar nt 28 CFTI § 2.20 ( 1970). 
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first legislative authorization for parole release guidelines. It 
required the newly created Parole Commission to "promul-
gate rules and regulations establishing guidelines for the 
powe [r] ... to grant or deny an application or recommenda-
tion to parole any eligible prisoner." § 4203. Before releas-
ing a prisoner on parole, the Commission must find, "upon 
consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense 
and the history and characteristics of the prisoner," that re-
lease "would not depreciate the seriousness of his offense or 
promote disrespect for the law" and that it "would not jeop-
ardize the public welfare." § 4206 (a). 
Respondent John M. Gcr~hty was convicted in the United 
States District Court for the Northerri:01strict of Illinois of 
conspiracy to commit extortion. in violation of 18 U. S. C'. 
§ 1951. and of making false material declarations to a grand 
jury. in violation of 18 U.S. C'. § 1623.4 On .January 25, 1974. ~ 
two months after initial promulgation or' the release guide-
lines. respondent was sentenced to concurrent prison terms 
of four years on the conspiracy count and one year on the false 
declarations count. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit affirmed respondent's conviction~. United 
State'! Y. Braasch, 505 F. 2d 139 (1974). ccrt. denied sub nom. 
Geraghty v. United States. 421 U.S. 910 (1975). 
Geraghty la.ter, pursuant to a motion under Fed. Rule 
C'rim. Proc. 35, obtained from the District Court a reduction 
of hi" sentence to 30 months. Thr court granted the motion 
because, in the court's view, application of the guiclelinrs 
"·oulrl frustrate the sentencing judge's intent with respect to 
the length of time Geraghty would serve in prison. Un1'ted 
States v. Braasch, No. 72 CR 979 (ND Ill., 1975). appral 
dism'd and mandamus denied, 542 F. 2d 442 (CA7 1976). 
4 The Pxtortion count wns b:-t~ed on rrspondrnt'R usE' of his position ns a 
Yire squ::~d officer of the Chicngo police forcr to "~hnkedown" dispenserR 
of nlcoholic beverngcs; the fnlsc drrlnrntions concerned hiR involvement. 
in this scheme. 
t 
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Geraghty then applied for release on pa.role. His first 
application was denied in January 1976 with the following 
explanation: 
"Your offense behavior has been rated as very high sever-
ity. You have a salient factor score of 11. You have 
been in cnstody for a tota.J of 4 months. Guidelines cs-
tablislH'cl by the Board for adult cases which consider the 
above factors indicate a runge of 26-36 months to hC' 
served bdorC' release for case's with good institutional 
progrmn performance and adj ustrnent. After review of 
all relevant factors and information presented, it is found 
that a derision at this consideration outside the guidelines 
does not appear warranted.'' App. 5, 24. 
If the customary release date' applicable to respondent under 
the guide] ines ·were adhered to, he woukl not be paroled before 
serving his entire sentence minus good-time credits. Geraghty 
applied for parole again in June 1976; that application was 
denied for the same reasons. He then instituted this civil 
suit as a cl~_action in the United States District Court for 
the District Ofl:""olumbia, challenging the guidelines as incon-
sistent ·with t11C' PCRA and the Constitution, and questioning 
the procedures by which the guidelines v;·ere applied to his 
case. 
Respondent sought certification of a class of "all federal 
prisoners who are of\\·ho 'W1tt"brcome eligible for release on 
parole." Id., at 17. Without ruling on Geraghty's motion. 
the court tranRfrrred the case to tlw Middle District of Penn-
sylvania. 'vherc respondent was incarcerated. Geraghty con-
tinued to press his motion for class certification, but the comt 
postponed ruling on the motion until it was prepared to render 
a decision on cross-motions for summary judgment. 
The District Court subsequently denied Geraghty's request 
for class certification a.nd granted summary judgment for peti-
tioners on all the claims Geraghty asserted. 429 F. Supp. 
737 (MD Pa. 1977). The court regarded respondent's action 
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as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to which Fed. Rule 
C'iv. Proc. 23 applied only by analogy. It d~ed class certifi-
cation as "neither necessary nor appropriate." 429 F. Supp., 
at 740. A class action was "necessary" only to avoid moot-
nC'ss. The court found such a consideration not comprehended 
hy Rnle 23. It found class certification inappropriate because 
Geraghty raised certain individual issues and , ina.smuch as 
some prisoners might be benefite-d by the guidelines, becausr 
his claims were not typical of the entire proposed claF>s. 429 
F . Rupp., at 740-741. On the merits, the court ruled that the 
guidelines are consistent with the PCRA and do not offend 
tlw Ex Post Facto Clause. U. R. Const., Art. I. § 9, cl. 3. 429 
F. Stlpp., at 741- 744. 
R0spondent. individually "and on behalf of a cla.ss." ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit. App. 29. Thereafter, another prisoner, Becher, who 
had been denied parole through applicatiOn of the guidelines 
and who was represented by Geraghty's counsel, moved to 
intervene. Becher sought intervention to ensure that the 
legal issue raised by Geraghty on behalf of the class "will not 
esrape review in the appeal in this case." Pet. to Intervene 
After Judgment 2. The District Court, concluding that the 
filing of Geraghty's notice of appeal had divested it of juris-
diction, denied the )etition to intervene. Becher then filed a 
timely notice of appeal from the denial of intervention. The 
t\YO appeals were consolidated. 
On J~7, before an brief had been filed in the 
Court of Appeals, Geraghty was mandatorily released from 
prison; he had served 22 months of 11s sen ence, and had 
earned good-time credits for thr rest. Petitioners then moved 
to dismiss the appeals as moot. The appellate court reserved 
decision of the motion to dismiss until consideration of the 
merits. 
The Court of Appeals, concluding that the litigation was not 
moot, reversed the judgment of the District Court and re-
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manded the case for further proceedings. 579 F. 2d 238 
(CA3 1978). If a class had been certified by the District 
Court. mootncss of respondent Geraghty's personal claim 
would not have rendered the controversy moot. Ace. e. (]. , 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975). The Comt of Appeals 
reasoned that an erroneous denial of a class certification should 
not lead to the opposite result. 579 F. 2d, at 248-252. 
Rather, certification of a. "certifiable" class, that erroneously 
had been denied, relates back to the original denial and thus 
preserves jurisdiction. Ibid. 
On the question whether certification erroneously had been 
denied, the Court of Appeals held that necessity is not a pre-
requisite unrler Rule 23. 579 F. 2cl. at 252. The court ex-
pressed doubts about the District Court's finding that class 
certification was "inappropriate." ']\Thile Geraghty rais0d 
some claims not applicable to the entire class of prisoners who 
are or will become eligiblr for parolC', the District Court could 
havE' "certif[iedl certain issues as subject to class adjudication. 
and ... limitr r d] overbroad classes by the use of sub-classes." 
!d., at 253. Fa.ilurr "to consider these options constituted a 
failure properly to exercise discretion. Indeed. this authority 
may be exercised sua sponte." Ibid. The Court of Appeals 
also held that refusal to c0rtify bC'cn.usP of a potential conflict 
of interest between Geraghty and other m0rnbers of the puta-
tive class was error. The subclMs mechanism would hav0 
remerlied this problem as m'll. ld .. at 252- 253. Thus. tlw 
Court of Appeals reversed the denial of class certification and 
remanded the case to the District Court for an initial evalua-
tion of the proper subclasses. Icl., at 254. The court also 
remanded the motion for intervention. !d .. at 245. n. 21." 
In order to avoid "improvidently dissipatring] judicial 
E-ffort." id., at 254, the Court of Appeals went on to COilsider 
"·hether the trial court hnd decided the merits of respondent 's 
case properly. ThE' District Court's entry of sumn.1ar_v .inrlg-
5 Apparently Becher, too, hn~ now been rrle:t Hrd from prison. 
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ment 'ms found to be error because "if Geraghty's recapitula-
tion of the function and genesis of the guidelines is supported 
by the evidence." the guidelines "may well be" unauthorized 
or unconstitutional. Id., at 259. 268. Thus, the dispute on 
the merits also was remanded for further factual development. 
II 
Article III of the Constitution limits federal "judicial 
Power." that is. federal court jurisdiction, to "Cases" and 
"Contro1:ersies." This case or controversy limitation serves 
"two complementary" purposes. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. R. 
83. 95 (1968). It limits the busine~<s of federal courts to 
"question~ prrsentrd in an adversary context and in a form 
hi~<torically viewed as capable of resolution through the judi-
cial process." and it defines the "role assigned to the judi-
ciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the 
federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the 
other branches of government." Ibid. Likewise. mootnf'ss 
has two aspects: "when the issues presented are no longer 
'live' or tl1f' parties lack a Jc~~:all:v cognizable interest in the 
011trome." Powell v. Af cCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496 (1969). 
1t is clear that the controversy over the validity of the 
Parolf' Release Guidelines is still a "live" one betwecn peti-
tioners and at least some membf'rs of thf' class rrspondf'nt 
seeks to represent. This is demonstrated by the fact that 
1wisoners currently affectrcl by the guidelines have moved to 
hc snbstitutcd. or to intervene, as "named" respondents in this 
Court. See n. 1, supra. 'Ve therefore are concerned here 
" ·ith the second aspect of mootne~<s. that is. the parties' inter-
est in the litigation. The Court has refrrred to this concept 
as the "personal stake" requirement. E. g .. Franks v. Bow-
man Transportation Co., 424 U. R. 747. 755 (1976); Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U. S. 186. 204 (1962). 
The personal stake requirement relates to the first purpo~<e 
of the case or controversy doctrine-limiting judicial powrr 
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to disputes capable of judicial resolution. The Court in /?last 
v. Cohen, 392 U.S., at 100-101, stated: 
"The question whether a particular prrson is a proper 
party to maintain the action docs not, by its own force, 
raise separation of powers problems related to improper 
judicial interference in areas committrd to other branches 
of the Federal Government. . . . Tllus, in terms of Ar-
ticle III limitations on federal court jurisdiction. the 
question of standing is rrlatcd only to whether the dispute 
sought to be adjudicated \Yill be presented in an adver-
sary context and in a form historically viewed as capable 
of judicinl resolution. It is for that reason that the em-
phasis in standing problems is on whether the party 
invoking federal court jurisdiction has 'a personal stnke 
in the outcome of the controversy,' Baker v. Carr, [369 
U. S.l, at 204, and \\'hether the dispute touches upon 'the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.' 
Aetna Life Insurance Co. "· Haworth, r300 U. S.l. at 
240-241." 
Ree also Schlesi11ger v. Reservists to Stop the TtJ!ar, 418 U. R. 
208. 216-218 (Hl74). 
The "personal stake" aspect of mootness doctrine also serv<:>s 
primarily the purpose of assuring that federal courts are pre-
sented 'vith disputes they are capable of resolving. One 
commentator has defin<:>d mootness as "the doctrine of stancl-
inlt.:'et in a time J;ame: The requisite personal interest that 
must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) 
must continue throughout its existence (mootness) ." Monag-
han, Constitutional Ad.iudication: The Who and When. 82 
Yale L. J. 1363, 1384 ( 1973). 
III 
On several occasions the Court has considered the applica-
tion of the "personal stake" requirement in the class action 
context. In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), it held that 
·" 
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mootness of the named plaintiff's individual claim after a 
rlass has been duly certified does not render the action moot. 
It rcasonerl that "even though appellees ... might not again 
enforce the Iowa durational residency requirement against 
r the class representative l. it is clear that they will enforce .it 
against those persons in the class that appellant sought to rep-
re8ent anrl that the District Court certified." I d., at 400. 
The Court stated specifically that an Art. III case or con-
troversy "may exist ... between a named defendant and a 
n1ember of the class represented by the named plaintiff. even 
thouf!h the claim of the named plaintiff has becorne moot." 
ld .. at 402.6 
Although one might argue that Sosna contains at 1 st an 
im )lication that the cn ICa factor or Art. III purposes is the 
timing of c ass certi ca wn, ot 1er cases, app ying a 'rea ion 
b~monstrate thal 'timi~1g is not crucial.~ 
\Vhen the claim on the merits is "capabl~ct 
evading review," the named plaintiff may litigate the class 
certification issue despite loss of his personal stake in the out-
come of the litigation. E. g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 
110. n. 11 (1975). The "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review" doctrine, to be sure, was developed outside the class 
action context. Sec Southen1 Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 
219 U.S. 498. 514-515 (1911). But it has been applied where 
-
It 
the named plaintiff does have a personal stake at the outset 
of the lawsuit, and where the claim may arise again with 
respect to that plaintiff; the litigation then may continue not-
"·ithstanding the named plaintiff's current lack of a personal 
6 The claim in Sosna also fit the traditional category of actions that arc 
drrmed not moot deRpite the litigant's loss of prrsonal stake, that is, thosr 
"capable of repetition, yet evading review." See Southern Pacific Term-
inal Co., v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). In Franks v. Bowman 
'Transportation Co., 424 U. S., at 753-755, however, the Court held tha.t 
the class action aspect of mootness doctrine does not depend on the class 
claim's being so inberentl~r transitory that it meets the "capable of 
repetition , yet evading review" standard. 
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stake. See, e. g., Wewstew v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147, 149' 
(1975); Roe Y. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 123-125 (1973). Since 
the litiga.nt faces some likelihood of becoming involved in the 
same controversy in the future, vigorous advocacy can be ex-
pected to continue. 
When. however, there is no chance that the named plain- ( 
tiff's expired claim will reoccur, mootncss still can be avoided 
through certification of a class prior to expiration of the named 
plaintiff's personal claim. E. g., Franks v. Bowman Trans-
portation Co., 424 U. S .. at 752-757. Sec Kremens v. Bart-
ley, 431 U. S. 119, 129-130 ( 1977). Some claims are so in-
herently transitory that the trial court will not have even 
enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before· 
the proposed representative's individual interest expires. The 
Court considered this possibility in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420· 
U. 8 .. at 110, n. 11. Gerstein was an action challenging pre-
trial detention conditions. The Court assumed that the 
named plaintiffs were no longer in custody awaiting trial at 
tho time the trial court certified a class of pretrial detainees. 
There was no indication that the particular named plaintiffs 
might again be subject to pretrial detention. NonethcleE's, 
the case was held not to be moot because: 
"The length of pretrial custody cannot be ascertained at 
the outset. and it may be ended at any time by release on 
recognizance. dismissal of the charges, or a guilty ph'a, as 
well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is by no 
means certain that any given individual. named as plain-
tiff, would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district 
judge to certify the class. Moreover, in this case the con-
stant existence of a class of persons suffering the depriva-
tion is certain. The attorney representing the named 
respondents is a public defender. and we can safely as-
sume that he has other clients with a continuing live-
interest in the case." Ibid. 
Sec also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 F. R., at 402, n. 11. 
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1n two different contexts the Court has stated that the pro-
posed class representative who proceeds to a. judgment on the 
merits may appeal denial of class certification. First, this 
assumption w an portant ingredient," Deposit Guaranty 
Nat. Bank . Roper, nte, p.- (slip op., at 10), in the re-
jection of it terloc ry appeals, "as of right," of class certifi-
cation denials. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesa.y, 437 U. S. 463, 
46~. 470. n. 15 (l~ed that denial of 
claRs status will not necessarily be the "death knell" of a small 
claimant action. since there still remains "the prospect of pre-
vailing on the merits and reversing an order denying class 
certification." Ibid. 
Second. in United Airlines, Inc . . McDonald, 43 U.S. 385. 
393-395 ( 1977), the Court held tha putativ ass member 
may intervene, for the purpose of appealing the denial of a 
class certification motion, after the named plaintiffs' claims 
have been satisfied and judgment entered in their favor. Un-
dcrl~ring that decision was the view that "refusal to certify 
"·as subject to appellate review after final judgment at tlH' 
behest of the named plaintiffs." !d., at 393. And today. the 
Court holds that named plaintiffs whose claims are satisfied 
through entry of judgment over their objections may appeal 
the denial of a class certification ruling. Deposit Guaranty 
N nt. : v. Roper, ante, p. -. 
erstein, cDonald, and Roper are all examples of cases 
fo ncl to be moot. despite the loss of a "persona.! stake" in 
the merits of the litigation by the proposed class representa-
tive. The interest of the named plaintiffs in Gerstein was 
precisely the same as that of Geraghty here. Similarly, after 
judgment had been entered in their favor, the named plain-
tiffs in McDonald had no continuing narrow personal stake in 
the outcome of the class claims. And in Roper the Court 
points out that an individual controversy is rendered moot. in I 
the strict Art. IU sense. by payment and satisfaction of a final 
judgment. Ante, p.- (slip op .. at 6). 
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These cases demonstrate th f tho 
Art. ITT mootness doctrine.7 As 1e past, 
Art. III justiciability is "not a legal concept with a fixed con-
tent or susceptible of scientific verification." Poe v. Ullman, 
367 U.S. 497.508 (1961) (plurality opinion). "fT]he justi-
ciability doctrine [is] one of uncertain and shifting contoms." 
Flast Y. Cohen, 392 U.S .. at 97. 
TV 
Prrhaps somewhat anticipating; tochy's decision in Roper, 
petitioners arp:uc that the situation presented is entirely dif-
ferent when mootness of tlw individual claim is caused by 
"expiration" of the claim. rather than by a judgment on the 
claim. They assort that a proposPd elass representative "·ho 
individually prevails on the merits still has a "personal stakP" 
in the outcome of the litigation. \rhilo the named plaintiff 
whoso claim i~ truly moot docs not. ln the latter situation .. 
"·here no class has been certifiPd. there is no party before tlw 
l 
7 Three of the CoUJj's caReR might br drsrribrd a,; adopting 11 l e~R flrxi-
hlc fiJU!.f2arh. In 'J'hdianapolis School Comm.'rs v . .!arabs, 420 U. ~. ] ~q 
(1975), and inVWein~tein v. Bradford. 423 U.S. 147 (1975), dismi8snl of 
putntivo cla8S :;:uits, ns mook'1·n~ ordrrrd nfter thr nnmcd plaintiffs'' 
rlnim~ becnme moot. And in Pasadena City Bd. of Education v. Spanqler, 
427 U. S. 424, 430 (1976), it wns indirntrd thnt thr artion would hnYr 
hrrn moot, upon rxpiration of thr n.1mNl plaintiffs' claims, hnd not the 
Unitrd States int('n·ened ns a pnrt~· pl~1intiff. Enrh of these. howeYer, 
was :1. cn~e in ll'hich there 11·as nn nttrmpt to apprnl the merit~ without 
first having obtnined proper rcrtificntion of n, rln~s. In rnch rn8r it wnR 
1 he defendnnt who prtitionrd this Comt for rr,·iew. As is observed 
~llhsrfJuently in t.hc text, nppral from ..i£ninl of rlns,; rlassificntion is p~ 
mittrd in ~ome rirrumstaiierf' whrre nppen l q!!, thr merits ]s not. In thr 
sffitation where the propo~rd rbRFreprr~entalivr has lost. a "pcrsonnl 
f'take," the mrrits c.'lnnot br rrnrhed until a. clns~ properly is certified. 
Although ihc Court prrhaps ro11ld ha\·r rrmnndrcl Jacobs and Weinstein 
for reconsideration of the clnss certific:1tion issue, n,; the Court of Appenls 
did here, the pnrtics in tho8e Clli"C'S did not suggest "relation bnck" of 
claRS certification. Thus II'C do not find this line of casrs dispositi1·e of ' 
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court with a live claim, and it follows, it is said, that we have 
no jurisdiction to consider whether a class should have been 
certified. Brief for Petitioners 37-39. 
We do not find this distinction persuasive. As has been 
noted earlier. Geraghty's "personal stake" in the outcome of 
the litigation i~no different from that 
of the putative class represE'ntativcs in Roper. Further, the 
opinion in Ro:;:;er-' - t'Flat the approach to take in apply-· 
ing; Art. III i Issue by issue. "Nor does a confession of judg-
ment by defel ants on'!(; than all the issues moot an entire 
case; other issues- ill the case may be appealable. We ran 
assume that a district court's final judgment fully satisfying 
named plaintiffs' private substantive claims would preclude 
their appeal on that aspect of the final judgment; however, 
it does not follow that this circumstance would terminate 
the named plaintiffs' right to take an appeal on the issllc of 
class certification." Ante, p. - (slip op., at 7). See also 
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S., at 392; Powell v. 
M cCorrnack, 395 U. S., at 497. 
Similarly, the fact that a named plaintiff's substantive 
claims are mooted due to an occurrence other than a judgment 
on the merits does not mean that all the other issues in the 
case are mooted. A plaintiff who brings a class action presents 
two separate issues for judicial resolution. One is the claim 
o~e other is the claim that he is entitled to 
represent a class. "The denial of class certification stands as 
an adjudication of one of thE' issues litigated," Roper, ante, 
p.- (slip op., at 9). We think that in determining whether 
the plaintiff may continue to press the class certification claim. 
after the claim on the merits "expires," we must look to the 
nature of the " ersonal stakC'" in the class certification claim. 
DE' crmmmg Art. III's "uncer ain and s I mg contours, sec 
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 97, with respect to nontraditional 
forms of litigation, such as the class action, requires reference 
to the purposes of the case or controversy requirement. 
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Application of the personal stake requirement to a proce--
dural claim, such as the right to represent a class, is not auto-
matic or readily resolved. A "legally cognizable interest," as 
the Court described it in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S .. at 
496, in the traditional sense rarely ever exists with respect to 
the class certification claim.8 The justifications that led to 
the development of the class action include tf1e protection of 
the defendant from incon'SIS'tent obligations, the protection of 
the interests of absentees, the provision of a convenient and 
economical means for disposing of similar lawsuits. and the 
facilitation of the spreadin of litigation costs among numer-
ous litigants with similar claims. ee. e. g., Advisory Com-
mittee Notes on Feel. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, 28 U.S. C. App., pp. 
427-429; Note, Developments in the Law-Class Actions. 89' 
Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1321- 1323. 1329-1330 (1976). Although 
the named representative receives certain benefits from the 
clnss nature of the action. some of which are regarded as de-
sirable and others as less so.u these benefits generally are by-
products of the class action device. In order to achieve the 
primary benefits of class suits, the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure give the proposed class representative the right to have ~ 
a class certified if the requirements of the rules are met. This 1• .J.v 
I ,. '7J 
"right" is more analogous to the' private attorney general con- ? ~ 
1 / cept than to the .. type of ni'terest trachbonally thought to d.d:" ~~ ,, 
lfV , _)_,.__'-'~satisfy the "personal stake" requirement. See Roper, ante, -~ L-...., 
MV'v- "p. - (slip op., at 10-11). _ &.... 11 /-1- ,.., 
As noted above. the purpose of the "personal s!!ke" require- ( ~ 
1/' _ A~ },A ment is to assure that the case is in aform capable of judi- ~ ~ 
L' V' .~r cial resolution/?) The ir'lieratL~s of a dispute capable of judicial" .-L?_ 
(l"""'- resolution a~arply pre~ented issues in a concrete factual ~ 
- -- ~L/J--vv- Y - 8 ·were the class an indisprnsablP party, the n:1med plaintiff'~ interests ~ 
1 ~ in rertifica.tion would appro:1ch a "legally cognizable interest." rp . . . , 9 See, e. g., Landrrs, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Con-
• ~umer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedmc Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 842 (1974); Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of De-
~ '''"<lion, 55 F . R. D. 375 (1972) . 
~ 
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setting and self-interested parties vigorously advocating op-
posing positions.Fr(i;ih v. Bowman Transportation Co., 
424 U.S., at 753-756; Baker v. Carr, 369 U. 8., at 204; Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U. S., at 503 (plurality opinion). We conclude 
that these elements can exist with respect to the class certifica-
tion issue.notw1t stan ing t 1e ac t at the name am 1ff's 
cli:tim on t 1e merits as p1re . 1e questiOn whether class 
ceitlfr~mains as a concrete, sharply pre-
sented issue. In~ v. Iowa it was recognized that a named 
plaintiff whose claim on the merits expires after class certifica-
tion may still adequately represent the class. Implicit in that I 
decision was the determination that vigorous advocacy can be 
assured through means other than the traditional requirement 
of a "personal stake in the outcome." Respondent here con- } 
tinues vigorously to ~d s right to~
/ 
We ther~<i that an action brought on behalf of a 
rlass does not become moot upon expiration of the named 
plaintiff's substantive claim, even though class certification 
has been denied.10 The propos:ed representative retains a 
"personal stake" in obtaining class certification sufficient to 
assure that Art. III values are not undermined. If the appeal 
results in reversal of the class certification denial, and a class 
subsequently is properly certified. the merits of the class claim 
then may be adjudicated pursuant to the holding in Sosna. 
l, 
~ ...... 
Our holding is limited to the appeal of the denial of tlw 
class certification motion. A named plaintiff whose claim 
expires may not continue to press the appeal on the merits 
until a class has been properly certified. See Roper, ante, 
p. - (slip op., at 10). U, on appeal. it is determined that 
class certification properly was denied. the claim on the merits 
must be dismissed as moot. 
~~4 
·~ .. ·' 
10 We intimate no view ns to whethrr a. namrd plaintiff who settles the ) ~~ '-'\..-' 
individual claim after denial of clnss certification mny, consistent with 
Art .. III, appeal from the adver~e rulin~r on clnss ccrtifica.tion. See 
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 393-394, and n. 14 
(1977). 
78-572-0PlNION 
16 UNITED STATES PAROLE COMl\I'N v. GERAGHTY 
Our conclusion that the controversy here is not moot does 
not automatically establish that the named plaintiff is entitled 
to continue litigating the interests of the class. "[ll t does 
shift the focus of examination from the clements of justiciabil-
ity to the ability f tl . e nam cl representative to 'fairl and 
adecu:atel rotect e interests of t1c class. ule 23 (a)." 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. R .. at 403. We hold only that a case 
or controvf'rsy still exists. The question of who is to reprr-· 
sent the class is a separate issuc. 11 
We need not clecide er0 whether Geraghty is a proper rcp-
rcsentati~e purpos0 o representmg the' class on the 
me~ No class as yet has been certified. Upon remand. the 
District Court can determine whether Geraghty may continue 
to press the class claims or whether another representative 
"·ould be appropriate. vVe decide only that Geraghty was a 
proper representative for th0 purpose o a Jpe, m e ru mg 
denymg cer 1 c lO 1 o 1e c a 1a 1e mit1ally defined. 
Thus, it was not improper for the Court of Appeals to consider 
whether the District Court should have granted claRs 
CPrtification. 
v 
We turn now to the question whether the Court of App0als'· 
decision on the District Court's class certification ruling was 
proper. Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred in 
requiring the District Court to consider the possibility of cer-
tifying subclasses sua sponte. Petitioners strenuously con-
tend that placing the burden of identifying and constructing 
subclasses on the trial court creates unmanageable difficulties. 
Brief for Petitioners 43-51. We feel that the Court of Ap-
peals' decision here docs not impose undue burdens on the dis-
11 See, e. g., Comment, A Search for Principles of Mootness in the Fed-
em[ Courts: Part Two-Clns~ Actions, 54 Texas L. Rev. 1289, 1331-1332· 
(1976) ; Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions 
Following Dismissal of the Glas~ Representative, Hl74 Duke L. J. 573, 
602-608. 
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trict courts. Respondent had no real opportunity to rPquest 
r0rtifi.cation of subclasses aftN tho class he proposed was rr-
jccted. The District Court denied class certification at tho 
same time it rendered its adverse decision on the merits. Re-
questing suhclass certification at that time would have bP-en 
a futile act. The District Court was not about to invest effort 
in deciding the subclass question after it had ruled that no 
relief on thf' merits was available. Tho remand merely p;ivrs 
respondent the opportunity to perform his function in the 
adversary systrm. On remand. however. it is not the Distric 
Court that is to bear the burden of constructing f:ubclasscs 
That burden is upon the rrspondent a.nd it is he who i 
required to submit proposals to thr court. The court has n 
sua sponte obligation so to act. With this modification. th 
C'ourt of Appeals' remand of the case for consideration of sub 
clnr-ses was a proper disposition. 
It would be inappropriate for this Court to reach the merits 
of this controversy in the present posture of the case. Our 
holding that the case is not moot extends only to the appeal of 
the class certification denial. If the District Court again 
denies class certification. and that decision is affirmed. the 
controversy on the merits will be moot. Furthermore. al-
though the Court of Appeals commented npon the merits for 
the sole purpose of avoiding waste of judicial resources. it did 
not reach a final conclusion on the validity of the guidelines. 
Rather, it held only that summary judgment was improper 
and remanded for further factual development. Given the 
interlocutory posture of the case before us, we must defer 
decision on the merits of respondent's case until after it is 
determined affirmatively that a class properly can be certified. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the\ 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this l 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
To: The Chief (;·u.st ice 
Mr. Ju::-;Licc· :2., .,3nnan 
Mr . Jll8"Ll"'t0 I S\l:ll' t ,) 
Mr. .:;uct·i ) ' ,i.-~o 
l.'r . Ju.stJ 3 fr.n·sh~11 
Mr. Jur;C~··') .>J'.''~J11 
~Lr. ,JlL] L i C' E .tHll' ·i. st 
r,:r . t .. Jl.LrJ.,~""lOO I ~ ... -J ...... 1S .... 
From: l~r. Justiea Bl~ck:JUn 
Circulated: 
3rd DRAFT Recircula td: _FEB D 1980~-
SUPREME COURT OF THE. UNITED STATES 
No. 78-572 
United States Parole Commission l On Writ of Certiorari to 
et al. , Petitioners, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Third 
John M. Geraghty. Circuit. 
[ "ovember -, 1979] 
Ma. Ju~TICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case raises the question whether a trial court's denial 
of a motion for certification of a class may be reviewed on 
appeal after the named plaintiff's personal claim has become 
"moot." The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held that a named plaintiff, respondent here, who 
prought a class action challenging the validity of the United 
States Parole Commission's Parole Release Guidelines, could 
continue his appeal of a ruling denying class certification even 
though he had been released from prison while the appeal was 
pending. We granted certiorari; 440 U. S. 945 (1979), to 
consider this issue of substantial significance, under Art; III of 
the Constitution, to class action litigation/ and to resolve the 
conflict in approach among the Courts of Appeals.2 
1 The grant of certiorari also included the question of the validity of the 
Paro~ Release Guidelines, an isrme left open in United States v. Addonizio, 
442 U. S - , - (1979) (slip op., at 5-6) . We have concluded, how-
ever, thai it would be premature to reach the merits of that question at 
this time. See infra, at 17. 
While the petition for a writ of certiorari was pending, respondent 
Geraghty filed a motion to sub::;tituto as respondents in this Court five 
prisoners, then incarcerated, who also were represented by Geraghty's 
attorneys. In the alternative, the prisoners sought, to intervene. We 
deferred our ruling on the motion to the hearing of the case on the merit!i, 
[Footnote 2 is vn p. 2] 
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I 
In 1973, the United States Parole Board adopted explicit 
Parole Release Guidelines for adult prisoners.3 These guide-
lines establish a "customary range" of confinement for various 
classes of offenders. The . guidelines utilize a matrix, which 
combines a "parole prognosis" score (based on the prisoner's 
age at first conviction, employment background, and other 
personal factors) and an "pffense severity'' rating, to yield 
the "customary" time to be served in ·prison. 
Subsequently, in 1976, Congress enacted the Parole Com-
mission and Reorganization Act (PCRA), Pub. L. 94-233, 90 
Stat. 219, 18 U. S. C. §§ 4201-4218. · This Act provided the 
440 U. S. 045 ( 1979) . These prisoner:;, or most of them, now also 
lJaye been rl'lea~l'd from incarceration. On September 25, 1979, a supple-
ment to t.he motion to substitute or intervene wa~; filed, proposing six new 
sub:;titute rl'~pondent:; or intervenor~; each of these is a presently in-
carcerated fl'deral pn~01wr who, allrgedly, ha.: been adversely affected by 
tho guideline,.; and who i~ rl'prr~en t Pd by C:Prnghty's counsel. 
Sinro Wt:' hold that. rf'Kpondent. may l'Ontinue to lit.igate the class certifi-
cation issue, tlwre ~~ no need for us to con8ider whether the motion should 
be granted in order to prevent thl' ca:;e from bemg moot. We conclude 
that thl' Di~trirt Court initially should ntle on the motion. 
2 See, e g. , A1'mour v. City of Anniston, S97 F . 2d 46, 48-49 (CAS 
1!J7H) ; Susman v. Lincoln American Co1'p., S87 F . 2d 866 (CA7 1978), 
eert. pending, No. 7S-1169 ; Goodman v. Schlesinger, S84 F . 2d 1325, 
1332-1333 (CA4 1978) , Camper v. Calumet Petrochemicals, Inc., S84 
F . 2d 70 (CAS 1978) ; Roper v. Consurve, Inc., S78 F . 2d 1106 (CAS 
2978), aff'd sub nom. D eposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p.-
(197H) ; Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, S78 F . 2d 987 (CAS 1978) 
(en bane), rert. pending, No. 78-1008 ; Yun Cannan v. Breed, S6S F. 2d 
1096 (CA9 1977) ; Winoku1' ,. Bell Federal Savings & Loan Assn., S60 · 
F . 2d 271 (CA7 1977), rert deml'd, 43S U. S. 932 (1978); Lasky v. 
Quinlan. 55~ F . 2d 1133 (CA2 1977) ; Kuahulu v. Employe1's Ins. of 
Wausau , 5S7 F. 2d 1:334 (CA9 1977) ; Boyd v. Justices of Special Term, 
S46 F. 2d 52G (CA2 1976) ; Napie1' " · Gertrude, S42 F . 2d 82S (CAlO · 
1976) , cert . dmird, 42H U. S. 1049 (1977) . 
u 38 Fed. Hrg. 31942-31945 (1973) . The guidelines currently in force-
tippear at. 28 CFR § 2.20 (1979). 
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first legislative authorization for parole release guidelines. It 
required the newly created Parole Commission to "promul-
gate rules and regulations establishing guidelines for the 
powe [r] . . . to grant or deny an application or recommenda-
tion to parole any eligible prisoner." § 4203. Before releas-
ing a prisoner on parole, the Commission must find, "upon 
consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense 
and the history and characteristics of the prisoner," that re-
lease "would not depreciate the seriousness of his offense or 
promote disrespect for the law" and that it "would not jeop-
ardize the public welfare.'' § 4206 (a). 
Respondent John M. Geraghty was convicted in the United 
States District" Court for the Northern District of Illinois of 
conspiracy to commit extortion, in violation of 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1951, and of making false material declarations to a grand 
jury, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1623.4 On January 25, 1974, 
two months after initial promulgation of the release guide-
lines, respondent was sentenced to concurrent prison terms 
of four years on the conspiracy count and one year on the false 
declarations count. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit affirmed respondent's convictions. United 
States v. Braasch, 505 F. 2d 139 ( 1974), cert. denied sub nom. 
Geraghty v. United States, 421 U.S. 910 (1975). 
Geraghty later, pursuant to a motion under Fed. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 35, obtained from the District Court a reduction 
of his sentence to 30 months. The court granted the motion 
because, in the court's view, application 'of the guidelines 
would frustrate the sentencing judge's intent with respect to 
the length of time Geraghty would serve in prison. United 
States v. Braasch, No. 72 CR 979 (ND Ill., 1975), appeal 
dism'd and mandamus denied, 542 F. 2d 442 (CA7 1976). 
4 The extortion count was based on re~pondent•s use of his position as a 
vice squad officer of the Chicago police force to "shakedown" dispensers 
of alroholic beverages; tlu'l fa! ·e derl:uatiom;· concerned his involvement 
i» this scheme. 
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Geraghty then applied for release on parole. , His first 
application was denied in January 1976 with the following 
explanation: 
"Your offense behavior has been rateq as very high sever-
ity. You have a salient factor score of 11. You· have 
been in custody for a total of 4 months. Guidelines es-
tablished by the Board for adult cases which consider the 
above factors indicate a range of 26-36 months to be 
served before release for cases with good institutional 
program performance and adjustment. After review of 
all relevant factors and information presented, it is found 
that a decision at this consideration outside the guidelines 
does not appear warranted." App. 5, 24. 
If the customary release date applicable to respondent under 
the guidelines were adhered to. he would not be paroled before 
serving his entire sentence minus good-time credits. Geraghty 
applied for parole again in June 1976; that application was 
denied for the same reasons. He then instituted this civil 
suit as a class action in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia, challenging the guidelines as in_con-
sisteut with the PCRA and the Constitution, and questioning 
the procedures by which the guidelines were applied to his 
case. 
Respondent sought certification of a class of "all federal 
prisoners who are or who will become eligible for release on 
parole." /d., at 17. Without ruling on Geraghty's motion, 
the court trausferred the case to the Middle District of P~nn­
sylvauia, where respondeut was incarcerated. Geraghty con-
tinued to press his motion for class certification, but the court 
postponed ruling on the motion until it was prepared to render 
a decision on cross-motions for summary judgment. 
The District Court subsequently denied Geraghty's request 
for class certification a.nd granted summary judgment for peti-
tioners on all the claims Geraghty asserted. 429 F. Supp. 
137 ·(MD Pa. 1977) . The court regarded respondent's ac~ion 
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as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to which Fed. Rule 
Civ. Proc. 23 applied only by analogy. It denied class certifi-
cation as "neither necessary nor appropriate." 429 F. Supp., 
at 740. A class action was "necessary" only to avoid moot-
ness. The court found such a consideration not comprehended-
by Rule 23. It found class certification inappropriate because 
Geraghty raised certain individual issues and, inasmuch as 
some prisoners might be benefited by the guidelines, because 
his claims were not typical of the entire proposed class. 429 
F. Supp., at 740-741. On the merits, the court ruled that the 
guiJelines are consistent with the PCRA and do not offend 
the Ex Post Facto Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 429 
F. Supp. , at 741- 744. 
Respondent, individually "and on behalf of a class," ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit. App. 29. Thereafter, another prisoner, Becher, who 
had been denied parole through application of the guidelines 
and who was represented by Geraghty's counsel, moved to 
intervene. Becher sought intervention to ensure that the 
legal issue raised by Geraghty on behalf of the class "will not 
escape review in the appeal in this case." Pet. to Intervene 
After Judgment 2. The District Court, concluding that the 
filing of Geraghty's notice of appeal had divested it of juris-
diction, deoied the petition to intervene. Becher then filed a 
timely notice of appeal from the denial of intervention. The 
two appeals were consolidated. 
On June 30, 1977, before any brief had been filed in the 
Court of Appeals, Geraghty was mandatorily released from 
prison; he had served 22 months of his sentence, and had 
earned good-time credits for the rest. Petitioners then moved 
to dismiss the appeals as moot. The appellate court reserved 
decision of the motion to dismiss until consideration of the 
merits. 
The Court of Appeals. concluding that the litigation was not 
moot:, reversed the Judgment of the District Court and re-
• 
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manded the case for further proceedings. 579 F. · 2d 238 
(CA3 1978). If a class had been certified by the District 
Court, mootness of respondent Geraghty's personal claim 
would not have rendered the controversy moot. See, e. g., 
1osna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975). · The Court of Appeals 
reasoned that an erroneous denial of a class certification should 
not lead to the opposite result. · 579 F. 2d, at 248-252. 
Rather, certificatio.n of a "certifiable" class, that erroneously 
had been denied, · relates back to the original denial and thus 
preserves jurisdiction. lbid. 
On the question whether certification erroneously had been 
denied, the Court of Appeals held that necessity is not a pre~ 
requisite under Rule 23. 579 F. 2d, at 252. The court ex-
pressed doubts about the District Court's finding that class 
certification was "inappropriate." 'While Geraghty raised 
some cla1ms not applicable to the entire class of prisoners who 
are or will become eligible for parole, the District Court coutd 
havr. "certif[ied] certain issues as subject to class adjudication, 
and . .. limite [ d] overbroad classes by the use of sub-classes-." 
I d., at 253. Failure "to consider these options constituted a 
failure propedy to exerCise discretion. Indeed, this authority 
may be exercised sua sponte." Ibid. ·The Court of Appeals 
al o held that refusal to certify because of a potential conflict 
of interest between Geraghty and other members of the puta~ 
tive class was error. · The subclass mechanism would have 
remedied this problem as well. -ld., at 252-253. Thus, the 
Court of Appeals reversed the denial of class certification and 
remanded the case to the District Court for an initial evalua-
tion of the proper subclasses. 1d., at 254. "The court also 
rema11ded the motion for intervention. !d., at 245, n. 21.5 
In order to avoid "improvidently dissipat[ing] judicial 
effort." id., at 254. the Court of Appeals went on to consider 
whether the ' trial court had decided the merits of respondent's 
case properly. The District Court's entry of summary judg-
s. AJ?par~ntly Becher, too, h tti:i now b.een relea.1:1ed from prison. 
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ment was found to be error because "if Geraghty's recapitula-
tion of the function and genesis of the guidelines is supported 
by the evidence," the guidelines "may well be" unauthorized 
or unconstitutional. /d., at 259, 268. Thus, the dispute on 
the merits also was remanded for further factual development. 
II 
Article III of the Constitution limits federa.I "judicial 
Power," that is, federal court jurisdiction, to "Cases" and 
"Controversies." This case or controversy limitation serves 
"two complementary" purposes. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 
83, 95 '(1968) . lt limits the business of feqeral courts to 
"questions presented in an adversary context and in a · form 
historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judi-
cial process," and it defines the "role assigned to the judi-
ciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the 
federal courts will not intrude into areas committed tO the 
other branches of government." lb,id. Likewise, mootness 
has two aspects : "when the issues presented are no longer 
'live' or the parties lack a legally eognizable interest in the 
outcome." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). 
It is clear that the controversy over the validity of the 
Parole Release Guidelines is still a "live" one between peti-
tioners and at least some members of the class respondent 
seeks to represent. This is demonstrated by the fact that 
prisoners currently affected by the guidelines have moved to 
be substituted, or to intervene, as "named" respondents in this 
Court. See n. 1, supra. We therefore are concerned here 
with the second aspect of mootness, that is, the parties' inter-
est in the litigation. The Court has referred to this concept 
as the "personal stake" requirement. E. g., Franks v. Bow-
man Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755 (1976); Baker ·v. 
Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962) . 
The personal stake requirement relates to the first purpose 
of the casp or controversy doctrine-limiting judicial power 
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' . ,, 
'to disputes capable of judicial resolution. The Court in Flast 
v. Cohen, 392 U.S., at 100-101, stated: 
"The question whether ' a particular person is a proper 
party to maintain the action does· Iipt, by it~ o~n force) 
raise separation of ·powers problems related to improper 
judicial iuterference' in areas committed to other branches 
of the Federal Government . . : : Thus, in terms ~~ Ar-
ticle III limitations Oi) federal court juri~diction, the 
question of standing is related only to whether the dispute 
sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adver.;. 
sary context and in a form historically viewed as capable 
of judicial resolution. Il i ~ for that reason that the em-
phasis in st,anqing problrms .is on whether the party 
invoking federal co~rt jurisdiction has 'a .personal stake 
in the outcome of ~he COI~troversy,' ·Baker v. Carr, [369 
U. S.], at 204, ancl wpether the dispute touches upon 'the 
legal relations of pttrties having adverse legal interests,' 
Aetna Life Insura'fl.ce Co. v. Haworth, [300 U. S.], at 
240-241." 
See also Schlesinger v, ]l(3ser~ts to Stop the War, 418 ·u. S. 
208, 216- 218 ( 197.4) , . 
The "personal stake" aspect of mootness doctrine also serves 
primarily the purpose of assuring that federal courts are pre-
sented with disputes they are capable of · resolving. One 
commentator has defined mootness as "the doqtrine of stand-
ing set in a time frame : The requisite personal interest that 
must exist at the commencement of the litigation .(standing) 
must continue throughout its existence (mootness)." Monag-1 
han, Constitutional Adjudication : The Who and When, 82 
Yale L. J. 1363, 1384 (1973). 
III 
On several occasions the Court has considered the applica-. · 
tion of the "persona} -stake' ' r~quireme~1tt in .thlil ~lass action 
cohtext. J.n Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975) , it held that. 
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mootness of the named plaintiff's individual claim after a 
class has been duly certified does not render the action moot. 
It reasoned that "even though appellees ... might not again 
enforce the Iowa durational residency requirement against 
[the class representative], it is clear that they will enforce it 
against those persons in the class that appellant sought to rep-
resent and that the District Court certified." Id., at 400. 
The Court stated spf'cifically that an Art. III case or con-
troversy "may exist ... between a named defendant and a 
member of the class represented by the named plaintiff, even 
though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot." 
I d., at 402.8 
Although one might argue that Sosna contains at least an 
implication that the critical factor for Art. III purposes is the 
timing of class certification, other cases, applying a "relation 
back" approach, clearly demonstrate that timing is not crucial. 
When the claim on the merits is "capable of repetition, yet 
evading review," the named plaintiff may litigate the class 
rf'rtiflcation issue despite loss of his personal stake in the out-
come of the litigation. E. {f., Gerstein v. Puyh, 420 U. S. 103, 
JlO, n. 11 (1975). 1.'he "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review" doctrine, to be sure. was developed outside the class 
action context. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 
219 U.S. 498,514-515 (1911). But it has been applied where 
the named plaintiff does have a personal stake at the outset 
of the lawsuit, and where the claim may arise again with 
rrspect to that plaintiff; the litigation then may continue not-
v,:ithstanding the named plaintiff's current lack of a personal 
6 The claim in So.sna also fit the traditional category of actions that are 
deemed not. moot despite the litigant's loss of personal stake, that is, those 
" c·apable of repetition, yet evading review." See Southern Pacific Term-
inal Co., v. ICC, 219 U. S. 4\)8, 515 (1911). In Jlranl.;s v. Bowman 
Transportat ion Co ., 424 U. S., a,!, 753-755, however, the Court held that 
the class action nspect of mootness doctnne does not depend on the class 
l'laim 's being so inherently tntn:>itory that it meet::; the "capable of 
re1:>etition, yet evading review" ::;tandard. 
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stake. See, e. g., Weinstein v. Br!Jdford, 423 U. S. 147, 149 
(1975); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 123-125 (1973). Since 
the litigant faces some likeli?ood of becoming involved in the 
same controversy in the future, vigorous advocacy can· be ex-
pected to continue. 
When, however, there is no chance that 'the named plain-
tiff's expired claim will reoccur, mootness still can be avoided 
through certification of a class prior to expiration of the named 
plaintiff's personal claim. E. g., Franks v. Bowman "Trans-
portation Co., 424 U. S., at 752-757. See Kremens v. Bart-
ley, 431 U. S. 119, 129-130 (1977). Some claims are so in-
herently transitory that the trial court will not have even 
enough time to rule on a motion for Class certification before 
the proposed representative's individual interest exp"ires. The 
Court considered this possibility in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U. S., at 110, n. 11. Gerstein was an action challenging pre-
trial detention conditions. 'The Court assumed that the 
named plaintiffs were no longer in custody awaiting trial at 
the time the trial court certified a class of pretrial detainees. 
There was no indication that the particular named plaintiffs 
might again be subject to pretrial detention. Nonetheless, 
the case was he1d not to be moot because: 
"The length of pretrial custody cannot be ascertained at 
the outset, and it may be ended at any time by release on 
recognizance. dismissal of the charges, or a guilty plea, as 
well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is by no 
means certain that any given individual, named as plain-
tiff, would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district 
judge to certify the class. Moreover, in this case the con-
stant existence of a class of persons suffering the depriva-
tion is certain. The attorney representing the named· 
respondents is a public defender, and we can safely as-
sume that he has other clients with a continuii1g live, 
interest in the case." Ibid. 
See also Sosna v .. Iowa, 419 U. S.~ at 402, n .. 11~ 
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In two different contexts the Court has stated that the pro· 
posed class representative who proceeds to a judgment on the 
merits may appeal denial of class certification. First, this 
assumption was "an important ingredient," Deposit Guaranty 
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. - (slip op., at 10), in the re-
jection of interlocutory appeals, "as of right," of class certifi-
cation denials. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 
469, 470, n. 15 (1978). The Court reasoned that denial of 
class status will not necessarily be the "death knell" of a small 
claimant action, since there still remains "the prospect of pre-
vailing on the merits and reversing an order denying class 
certification." Ibid. 
Second, in United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 
393-395 ( 1977), the Court held that a putative class member 
may intervene, for the purpose of appealing the denial of a 
class certifica.tion motion, after the named plaintiffs' claims 
have been satisfied and judgment entered in their favor. Un-
derlying that decisiou was the view that "refusal to certify 
was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the 
behest of the named plaintiffs." ld., at 393. And today, the 
Court holds that named plaintiffs whose claims are satisfied 
through entry of judgment over their objections may appeal 
the denial of a class certification ruling. Deposit Guaranty 
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. - . 
Gerstein, McDonald, and Roper are all examples of cases 
found not to be moot, despite the loss of a "personal stake'' in 
the merits of the litigation by the proposed class representa-
tive. The interest of the named plaintiffs in Gerstein was 
precisely the same as that of Geraghty here. Similarly, after 
judgment had been entered in their favor, the named plain-
tiffs in McDonald had no continuing narrow personal stake in 
the outcome of the class claims. And in Roper the Court 
points out that au individual controversy is rendered moot, in 
the strict Art. III sense, by payment and satisfaction of a final 
j.udgment.. A rtle, p. - (slip op., at 6). 
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These cases demonstrate thE;). flexible character of the 
Art. III mootness doctrine/ As has been noted in the past; 
Art. III justiciability is "not a legal concept with a fixed con ... 
tent or susceptible of scientific verification." Poe v. Ullman, 
36iU. S. 497,508 (1~61) (plurality OI)itiion). "[T]he justi .. 
ciability doctrine [is] one of uncertain and shifting contours,'; 
Fla.st v. Cohe1L1 392 U. S., at 97. • 
' I 
IV 
Perhaps sqmewhat anticipating today's decision in Roper; 
petitioners argue that the situation presented · is entirely dif-
ferent when nwotness ~f the individual claim is -caused by 
"expiration" of th~ qlai1p, ra~her tha1~ by a judgment on the 
claim. They assert that a proposed class representative who 
individually prevails 011 the merits stillhas a "personal stake1' 
in the outcome of the litigation, .while the named plaintiff 
whose claim is truly moot does not. , In the latter situation, 
where no class has been certified, there is no party before the 
1 Three of the Court's case. might be described as adopting a less flexi-
blu approaeh. In htdianapoli~ School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 
(1975), and in Weinstein v. Bmdford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975), dismissal of 
putatJvfl cia~~ ~uit:;, as moot, wa:!i ordered ' after the named plaintiffs' 
1·laim;; became moot. And in Pasadena City· Bd. of Education v. Spangler, 
427 ll. S. 424, 4:30 (1976) , it. wa.~ indieated that the action would have 
bee11 moot, upon expiration of the named plaintjff:,;' claims, had not the 
United State~ intervened as a party plaintiff. Each of the:;e, however, 
wa:; a ca:;e in whtrh there waK mi attempt. to appeal the merit:; without 
tir:;t hnving obtained proper certification of a class. In each case it was 
the defrndant who petitionpd this Court for rrview. As is oboorved 
~nb~equently in the text, itppeal from denial of clas~:; clas~:;ification is per-. 
mitted in :;orne c1i·cnmstanees when• appeal on the merits is not. In the 
~ituation where the propo~ed cla~~ rrpre~Pntative ha:; lost a · "per~onal 
stake," the merits c:mnot lw rPached until a class properly is certifird. 
Although the Court perhap:s could have remanded Jacobs and Weinstein 
for recon~tderation of the elm;::; eertifiration i;.;;o;ue, as the Court of Appeals 
did hen•, the partir~ in thooo caHei' did not :;uggest "relation back" of 
\ola:ss certification. ThuR we do not find this line of cases .dispositive ' of 
the que::;tion now before u&. 
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court with a live claim, and it follows, it is said, that we have 
no jurisdiction to consider whether a class should have been 
certified. Brief for Petitioners 37-39. 
We do not find this distinction persuasive. As has been 
noted earlier, Geraghty's "personal stake" in the outcome of 
the litigation is, in a practical sense, no different from that 
of the putative class representatives in Roper. Further, the 
opinion in Roper indicates that the approach to take in apply-
ing Art. III is issue by issue. "Nor does a confession of judg-
ment by defendants on less than all the issues moot an entire 
case; other issues in the case may be appealable. We can 
assume that a district court's final judgment fully satisfying 
named plaintiffs' private substantive claims would preclude 
their appeal on that aspect of the final judgment; however, 
it does not follow that this circumstance would terminate 
the named plaintiffs' right to take an appeal on the issue of 
class certification.' ' Aute, p. - (slip op., at 7). See also 
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S., at 392; Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U. S., at 497. 
Similarly, the fact that a named plaintiff's substantive 
claims are mooted due to an occurrence other than a judgment 
on the merits does not mean that all the other issues in the 
case are mooted. A plaintiff who brings a class action presents 
two separate issues for judicial resolution. One is the claim 
on the merits; the other is the claim that he is entitled to 
represent a class. "The denial of class certification stands as 
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated," Roper, ante, 
p. - (slip op., at 9). We think that in determining whether 
the plaintiff may continue to press the class certification claim, 
after the claim on the mer·its "expires," we must look to the 
nature of the "personal stake" in the class certification claim. 
Determining Art. Ill's "uncertain and shifting contours," see 
Flast \'. Cohen, 392 U. S. , at 97, with respect to nontraditional 
forms of litigation , such as the class action, requires reference 
to the purposes of the case or controversy requirement, 
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Application of the personal stake requirement to a proce-
dural claim, such as the right to represent a class, is not auto-
matic or readily resolved. A "legally cognizable interest," as 
the Court described it in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S., at 
. ' 
496, in the traditional sense ·'rarely ever. exists with respect to 
the class certification claitn.8 The justifications that led to 
the development of the class action include the protection of 
the defendant from inconsistent obligations, the protection of 
the interests of absentees, the provision of a convenient and 
economical means for disposing of similar lawsuits, and the 
facilitation of the spreading of litigation costs among numer-
ous litigants with similar claims. See, e. g., Advisory Com-
mittee Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, 28 U.S. C. App., pp. 
427-429; Note, Developments in the ·Law-Class Actions, 89 
Harv. L. Rev. 1318, '!321-1323, 1329-1330 (1976). Although 
the named representative ·receives certain benefits from the 
class nature of the action, some of which are regarded as de-
sirable and others as less so,9 these benefits generally are ·by-
products of the class actiou device. In order to achieve the 
primary benefits of class suits, the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure give the proposed· class representative the right to have 
a class certified if the~requirements ofthe rules are met. This 
"right" is more analogous to the private attorney general con-
cept than to the type of interest traditionally thought to 
satisfy the "personal staRe" requirement. See Roper, ante, 
p.- (slip op., at 10-11). 
As noted above, the purpose of the "personal stake" require-
ment is to assure that the case is in a form capable of judi-
cial resolution . The imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial 
8 Were the class an indispensable party, the named plaintiff's interests 
in certification would approach a "legally cognizable interest." 
9 See, e. g .. Lander~. Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Con-
sumer Cla:,:s Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47· S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 842 (1974) ; Simon, Cla~s Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of De--
t:ltr.uction, 55 F . It: D , 375 (1972) . 
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resolution are sharply presented issues in a concrete factual 
setting and self-interested parties vigorously advocating op-
posing positions. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 
424 U. S., at 753-756; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S., at 204; Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U. S., at 503 (plurality opinion). We conclude 
that these elements can exist with respect to the class cert~fi.ca­
tion issue notwithstanding the fact that the named plaintiff's 
claim on the merits has expired. The question whether class 
certification is appropriate remains as a concrete, sharply pre-
sented issue. Ill Sosna v. Iowa it was recognized that a named 
plaintiff whose claim on the merits expires after class certifica-
tion may still adequately represent the class. Implicit in that 
decision was the determi11ation that vigorous advocacy can be 
assured through means other than the traditional requirement 
of a "personal stake in the outcome." Respondent here con-
tinues vigorously to advocate his right to have a class certified. 
We therefore hold that an action brought on behalf of a 
class does not become moot upon expiration of the named 
plaintiff's substantive claim, even though class certification 
has been denied.10 The proposed representative retains a 
"personal stake" in obtaining class certification sufficient to 
assure that Art. III values are not undermined. If the appeal 
results in reversal of the class certification denial, and a class 
subsequently is properly certified, the merits of the class claim 
then may be aclj udicated pursuant to the holding in Sosna. 
Our holding is limited to the appeal of the denial of the 
class certification motion. A named plaintiff whose claim 
expires may not continue to press the appeal on the merits 
until a class has been properly certified. See Roper, ante, 
p. - (slip op., at 10) . If, on appeal, it is determined that 
10 We intimate no view as to whether a named plaintiff who settl~ the 
individual claim after 'denial of class certification may, consistent with 
ArL. III, appeal from the adver~e ruling on class certifica.tion. See 
United Airlines, lnc v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 393-394, and n. 14, 
( 1977). 
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class certification properly was denied, the claim on the merits 
must be dismissed as moot.11 f 
Our conclusion that the controversy here is not moot does 
11 MH. JusTic~; PowELL, in his diss«:'nt, advocates a "~dly foo nal!>!Jc" 
approach to Art. III, ]Jost, at 4, and suggests that our cci ·ion today is 
lhe Court's first d«:'parture from the formalistic view. /d., at 6-11. We 
agree that the issue at hand is one of first impres~:>1on and thus, in that 
11urrow sen~e. is "unpn•cedeuted," id., at 11. Wf:' do not belif:'ve, however, 
that the decision cou~titutes a redefinition of Art. III principles or a 
";;ignificant departure," id., at. 1, from "carefully considered" precedents, 
id., at 9. 
The ero~ion of the strict, formalistic perception of Art. III was begun 
WE'll beforP toda~·',: df:'cision. For f:'xample, the protf:'stations of the dissent 
ar<· ~t rikiugly rrmiubef:'nl. of l'vlr. .lust ice Harlan's dis~·nt in Plast v. 
Cohen, :~9~ ll. S. 8:3, 116, in 1968. ::\Jr. Justice Harlan hailed the tax-
pa~·rr standiug rule pronounced in that cast' as a "new doctrine" resting 
"on premJs<'s that do not w1th::;tand analysis." !d .. at 117. He felt that 
the problf:'ms prr::;pnted by taxpayer standing "involve nothing less than 
the proper fun('tiouing of tlH• federal courts, and so run to the roots of our 
constitutional systt'm." /d., at 116. Tlw taxpayer::; werr thought to com-
plain a::; "private attorneys-gf:'nera 1," and " [ t I he interests tht>y represent, 
and the right~ the~· t>spouse are ut>reft of any pE'rsonal or proprietary 
colomtion." !d .. at 119. Such taxpayer actions '·are and must be ... 
'public actions' broug11t to vindicatP public rights." !d., at 120. 
Notwith,.;landing tlw taxpayrr~' lack of a formalistic "personal stake," 
even .Ju:;!Jce Harlan fpJt that the ca::;e should be held nonjusticiable on 
purely prudrntial ground:>. HiH interprt>tation of the cases led him to 
condudr that ''it is . . . clear that Lplaintiffs in a public action] as such 
:He not, c·on~titnt wnall~· excluded from the federal court;::.." Ibid. (emphasis 
iu origina I) . 
I,.; it not .,;om(•what ironic that MH. Juwl'l(.:E PowELL, who now seeks to 
explain United Airli·nes. Inc. v. McDonald, supm, as a ~htforward 
aupli<;ll tion of Fiettled doctrint>, post, at 7-9, expressed in lm; di~sent in 
MrDonald . .J-:~Tt'r . S., at :396, thr vit>w that thr holding re::;tpd on a funda-
mental mi:::concrptton about the mootne:;~ of an uncertified clasH action 
a tt'r ~:>elt rmen o the namrd plaintiffs' claims He stated: 
'·J'f·rvading the Court'~ opinion i~ the assumption that the elas;; action 
:>Omt>how contimwd aftt>r tht> Dbtrict Court denied clas~ ~tatu~ . But that 
n~:;umption i~ :;upportec.l. nc1ther by the text nor by the history of Rule 23~. 
, 
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not automatically establish that the named plaintiff is entitled 
to continue litigating the interests of the class. "[I]t does 
shift the focus of examination from the elements of justiciabil-
To the contrar~· •. .. thP denial of cla~s status converts the litigation to an 
ordinary noncla::;.s action ." /d., at 399. 
TIH' di:ssent went on to Hay: 
"[Prtitionerl arguei' with great force that, as a result of the settlemPnt of 
thPir individual claims. ihP namPd plaintiffs 'could no long appeal the 
denial of clas,.;' status that had occurred years earliPr. . . . Although this 
question has not bePn decidPd by this Court, the answer on principle is 
clear. Thr ~PttlPmPnt of nu individual claim typically moot~ any i~su~ 
a;;;:sociatPd with it . . . . Thi~ cas<' i:-; sharply distingui~hable from cases 
Ruch as Sosna ' . fou•a . . .. and Pranks v. Bowman Transp. Cu . .. . where 
WP nllowPd namrd plaiutiffs who,;<' individual claim:; were moot to continue 
to repre:sent their cla::;:,:e,.;. In tho~e ca~e~, the District Courts previou~ly 
had c(•rtifi<>d the classe~, thus giving them 'a legal statu~ separate from 
the intere:st[:s] nsserted by [the named plaintiffs].' Sosna v. Iowa, supra, 
at 399. Thi~ ca:;e presents prPci:;ely the opposite situation: The prior 
denial of cla:s~ statu~ had Pxtinguishf'd any representative capacity." 432 
U. S., at 400 (footnote omittrd). 
Tim~. tlw a:;sumption thought" to be "[p]ervacling the Court'~ opinion" 
in McDonald, and :so y]gorously ilttackrd by the dis:sent there, is now rele-
gated to ''gratuituu,.;" ''dictum," po8t. at 8. MR. Ju::;·rrcE PowELL, who 
findH the ::;ituation pretit•ntrd in the ca:se at hand '·fundamentally different" 
from that in .So8rta and 1/r-an/.:s, post. at 5, a~ouncl~ the facts of 
McDonald ' 'Khnrply di;;tiugui:;hable" from those previou:s cases. 432 U.S., 
at 400. 
We do uot recite the:se ca:se:s for the purpose of ~bowing that our result 
i;; mandated by tlw precrdent~. We concede that the prior cases may be 
said to be somewhat confusing, and that some, perhap:s, are irreconcilable 
with other:;. Our point is that the stri~ formali:;tic v~II 
jurisprudence, while perhaps tlw starting point of all inquiry, is~d 
with exceptions. And, in creating each exception, the Court has looked 
-::;, to pra'Ctf · T • · an rudential considerations. The resulting doctriiie"Ciln 
br characterized, ap y, as e ; 1 l' een developed, not irrespon-
sibly, but "with some carr,'' post. at 2, including the preoout case. 
Tlw di~seut iti correct thd one~ exception:; are made to the formalistic 
interpretation of Art. III , principlrd distinctions and bright lines become 
more difficult to draw. We do not attempt to predict how far down the 
roQd the Court evrntually will go townrd premi:;ing jurisdiction "upon the· 
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ity to the ability of the named representative to 'fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.' Rule 23 (a)." 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S., at 403. We hold only that a case 
o•· controversy still exists. The question of who is to repre-
St'nt the class is a separate issue.12 
We ueed not decide here whether Geraghty is a proper rep-
resentative for the purpose of representing the class on the 
merits. No class as yet has been certified. Upon remand, the 
District Court can determine whether Geraghty may continue 
to press the class claims or whether another representative 
would be appropriate. We decide only that Geraghty was a 
bare exi:stenc·r of a ~ha rply pre~entcd i~su<> in a concrete and vigorously 
arg~~t·d C'a:>P," po~>t, at 12. Each case mu~t be decided on its own facts. 
Wc· ha~tPH to note, however, that thi:-~ case does not even approach the 
rxtn•nw frared b~· the di::;:-;ent. Thi::; re:;pondent ~Pred act~concr!te 
injut} .. .U" a re::;ult of the putatively illegal conduct, and this injury would 
~at i:-~t\' the formali:-~tic per:;onal stake requirement if damages were sought. 
SPt', e. (J., Powell v. MrConnacl.:, 395 1J. S., at 495-500. Hi:; injury con-
timt<'d up to aud bryond the time the District Court denied class certifica-
tion . We rnerPly hold that whPn a District Court errmlf'ously denif'S a 
pmcPdmal motion, which, if correctly decided, would have prevented the 
ac·tiou from becoming moot, an appeal lies from thP denial and the cor-
rt•<"tPd ruling ''rplatPs back" to tlw datP of the original denial. 
,lU tcial proce:;i:i will not become a vehicle for "concerned bystand-
\'1',, '' post, at 4, Pven if one in respondent's position can conceivably be 
('haracterizc•d a,.; a by:;tander, becau:;e the issue on the merits will not be· 
:tddres:;Pd until a clas:; with an interest in the outcome has been certified. 
Tlw " relation back'' principlP, a traditional equitable doctrine applied to 
tla,.;s certific·ntion rlaim~ in Gerstein v. Pugh, s·upra, serves logically to· 
eli~ I ingui~h t hi~ ca~e from thr one brought a day after the prisoner is 
relPased. See post, at 1:3. n. 15. If the named plaintiff hao; no personal 
stak<' in the onteome at t.he time cia::;;; certification is denied, relat.ion back 
of appellatP rrver~al of that. denial :;till would not prevent mootness of 
the· ac·t ion. 
12 Srr, e. g .. Comment, A Srarch for Principleo; of Mootnr::>i:i in the Fed-
L'ral Courts: Part Two-Cla:;:-; Actiou:;, 54 Texas L. Rev. 1289, 1331-1332· 
(1976); Coumwnt, Contimmtion aml H(•ru·e:;e11tation of Cla~s Actions· 
Foll0wing l isrni;;~al of the Cia:;;; Representative, 1974 Duke L . J. 57a~ 
002'-60 ' . 
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proper representative for the purpose of appealing the ruling 
denying certification of the class that he initially defined. 
Thus, it was not improper fl>r the Court of Appeals to c011sider 
whether the District Court should have granted class 
certification. 
v 
We turn now to the question whether the Court of Appeals' 
decision on the Disttict Court's class certification ruling was 
proper. Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred in 
requiring the Disttict Court to consider the possibility of cer-
tifying subclasses 8Ua sponte. Petitioners strenuously con-
tend that placing the burden of identifying and constructing 
subclasses Oll the tt1al court creates unmanageable difficulties. 
Brief for Petitioners 43-51. We feel that the Court of Ap-
peals' decision here does not impose undue burdens on the dis-
trict courts. Respondent had no real opportunity to request 
certification of subclasses after the class he proposed was re-
jected. 'i''he District Court denied class certification at the 
same time it rf'nderert its aclverse decision on the merits. Re-
questing subclass certincation at that time would have been 
a futile act. The District Court was not about to invest efl'ort 
in deciding the subelass question after it had ruled that no 
relief on the merits was available. The remand merely gives 
respondent the opportunity to perform his function in the 
adversary system. Ou remand. however. it is not the District 
Court that is to bear the burden of constructing subclasses. 
That burden is upon the respondent and it is he who is 
required to submit proposals to the court. The court has no 
sua sponte obligation so to act. With this modification, the 
Court of Appeals' remand of the case for consideration of sub-
classes was a proper disposition. 
It would be inappropriate for this Court to reach the merits 
of this controversy in thr present posture of thf' case. Our 
holding that the case is not moot exte11ds only to the appf'al of 
the class certification denial. If the District Court again 
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denies class certification. and that decision is affirmed, the 
controversy on the merits will be moot. Furthermore, al-
though the Court of Appeals commented upon the merits for 
the sole purpose of a voiding waste of judicial resources, it did 
not reach a fi11al conclusion on the validity of the guidelines. 
Rather, it held only that summary judgment was improper 
a11d remauded for further factual development. Given the 
interlocutory posture of the case before us, we must defer 
decision on the merits of respondent's case until after it is 
determined affirmatively that a class properly can be certified. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
I.., ~ ' 
No. 78- 572 
[Evw.. #u.. 
Q.,{ foJ-1 ~ ~ ftJ 
United Staks Parole Cowmissionl 0 11 Wri t of Certiorari to 
et al., Petitioners, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Third 
John M. Geraghty. Circuit. 
[November --, 1979) 
_() , rvl M~. JusTICE. BLACKMUN d.elivered the opin.ion of the Cou~t. 
~ ( ~·:; '.,;{ '4 . ·. This c~se raises th~ qu~stwn ·",·h ~ther a tnal cour~'s de mal 
r ~ ,_} of a motwn for certificatiOn of ·a class ·may be reviewed on 
IUt.., -~- J ' appeal after th~ n.amed plai11tiff's pe~somil Claim has beco:ne 
I~Qllt. Circuit held ·that a named plaintiff, respondent ·here, who 
fkP i 1skMc.1"moot." The Umted States Court of Appeals for the Thuti 
kao M ( 0 M.L- brought a Class action ·cha]lenging the valid}ty of the United 
~ M.~ States Parole Commissiori's Parole 'Release Guidelines, coulti 
( _ continue his appeal of a niling denying class certification even 
ql Arttta- .Kt. though he had 'been released from prison while the appeal was. 
V. J ~pending. ··we granted certiorari, 440 'U. S. 945 (1979), to pkJ. iAJ~t-rtf. consider this . issue of substantial significance, under Art. III of 
'the Constitution, to class action 'litigation;1 and to ·resolve the 
conflict in approach among the Courts o'f Appeals.2 
1 The grant Of certiorari also included the qu<'stion of. the validity of the 
Parole Release GuidPlin.es, an issue left open in · Um'ted States v. Addonizio, 
442 U. S. 178, 184 (1979). We have concluded, however, that it would 
be premature to Te<l<'h the merits of that que:::tion at this . time. See infrf!, 
at 17. 
While the petition for a writ of ccrtiorn.ri wus pending, respondent 
Geraghty filed a motion to substitute as respondt>nts in this Court fi-ve 
prisoners, then incarct>rated, who also wcro represented by Geraghty's 
attorneys. In the alternative, the prisoners sought to intervene. We 
deferred our ruling on the motion to the he:1ring of' t~e case on the merits. 
[Footnote ~ i8 OYl p. S] 
.. 
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In 1973, the United States Parole Board adopted explicit 
Parole Release Guidelines for adult prisoners.8 · These guide-
lines establish a "customary range" o(confinement for various 
classes of offenders. The guidelines utilize a matrix, which 
combines a "parole prognosis" score (based on the prisoner's 
age at first conviction, employment background, and other 
personal factors) and an "offen.se severity" rating, to yield 
the "customary" time to be served in' prison. 
Subsequently, in 1976. Congress enacted the Parole Com-
mission and Reorganization Act (PCRA), Pub. L. 94-233, 90 
Stat. 219, 18 U. S. C. §§ 4201-4218. This Act provided the 
440 U. S. 945 ( 1979). The~;e prison(•r,:, or mo~t of them, now al~o 
have been rrlen ~f'd from incarrrmtion. On September 25, 1979, a supple-
ment to the motion to substitutr or intcr\'enr wa~ filed, propo~ing six new 
substitute respondent;; or intcrvrnors; rnrh of these is a pre~ently in-
carcerated fedrral prboner who, allegedly, ha~ been adversely affected by 
tho guidclinrR and who i~ 'rrprC'~rnted b~· Gl.'rnght~· 's counsrl. 
Since wo hold that. respondent. mar continue to litigate the class certifi-
cation is::;ue, then• i~ no need for UH 1 o con~ider whether the motion should 
be grnnted in order to prrvcnt fhc ca~e from being moot. We conclude 
that the Distrirt Court initially :should rule on the motion. 
3 See, e. g., Armour v. City of Anniston, 597 F . 2d 46, 48-49 (CA5 
1979); Susman v. Lincoln American Corp .. 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978). 
cert. pending, No. 78-1169; Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F. 2d 1325, 
1332-1333 (CA4 1978); Cam]Jer v. Calumet Petrochemicals. Inc., 584 
F. 2d 70 (CA5 1978); Roper Y. Consurve, Inc., 578 F. 2d 1106 (CA3 
2978), aff'd sub nom. Deposit Guamnty Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p.-
(1979); Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, ·578 F. 2d 987 (CA5 1978) 
(en bane), cert. prndi11g, No. 78-1008; Vun Cannon v. Breed, 565 F . 2d 
1096 (CA9 1977); Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 560 
F. 2d 271 (CA7 1977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 932 (1978) ; Lasky v. 
Q·uinlan, 558 F. 2d 1133 (CA2 1977); Kuahulu v. Employers Ins. of 
Wausau, 557 F. 2d 1334 (CA9 1977); Boyd v. J-ustices of Special Term, 
546 F. 2d 526 (CA2 1976) ; Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F . 2d 825 (CAIO 
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 104-9 (1977) . 
3 38 Fed. Heg. 31942-319-1:5 (1973). The guidelines currently in force, 
appeaT at 28 OFR § 2.20 (1979). 
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first legislative authorization for parole release guidelines. It 
required the newly created Parole Commission to "promul-
gate rules and regulations establishing guidelines for the 
powe[r] ... to grant or deny an application or recommenda-
tion to parole any eligible prisoner." § 4203. Before releas-
ing a prisoner on parole, the Commission must find, "upon 
consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense 
and the history and characteristics of the prisoner," that re-
lease "would not depreciate the seriousness of his offense or 
promote disrespect for the law" and that it "would not jeop-
ardize the public welfare." § 4206 (a). 
Respondent John M. Geraghty was convicted in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois of 
conspiracy to commit extortion, in violation of 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1951, and of making false material declarations to a grand 
jury, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1623.4 On January 25, 1974, 
two months after initial promulgation of the release guide-
lines, respondent was sentenced to concurrent prison terms 
of four years on the conspiracy count and one year on the false 
declarations count. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit affirmed respondent's convictions. United 
States v. Braasch, 505 F. 2d 139 (1974), cert. denied sub nom. 
Geraghty v. United States, 421 U.S. 910 (1975). 
Geraghty la.ter, pursuant to a motion under Fed. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 35, obtained from the District Court a reduction 
of his sentence to 30 months. The court granted the motion 
because, in the court's view, application of the guidelines 
would frustrate the sentencing judge's intent with respect to 
the length of time Geraghty would serve in prison. United 
States v. Braasch, No. 72 CR 979 (ND Ill., 1975), appeal 
dism'd and mandamus denied, 542 F. 2d 442 (CA7 1976) . 
4 The extortion count was based on r~:>spondent's use of his position as a 
vice squad officer of the Chicago police force to "shakedown" dispensers 
of alcoholic beverages; the fal~e declarations concerned his involvement 
in· this l>'Cheme. 
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Geraghty then applied for release on parole. His first 
application was denied in January 1976 with the following 
explanation: 
"Your offense behavior has been rated as very high sever-
ity. You have a salient factor score of 11. You have 
been in custody for a total of 4 months. Guidelines es-
tablished by the Board for adult cases which consider the 
above factors indicate a range of 26-36 months to be 
served before release for cases with good institutional 
program performance and adjustment. After review of 
all relevant factors and information presented, it is found 
that a decision at this consideration outside the guidelines 
does not appear warranted." App. 5, 24. 
If the customary release date applicable to respondent under 
the guidelines were adhered to. he wou1d not be paroled before 
serving his entire sentence mi11us good-time credits. Geraghty 
applied for parole again in June 1976; that application was 
denied for the same reasons. He then instituted this civil 
suit as a class action in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia, challenging the guidelines as incon-
sistent with the PCRA and the Constitution, and questioning 
the procedures by which the guidelines were applied to his 
case. 
Respondent sought certification of a class of "all federal 
prisoners who are or who will become eligible for release on 
parole." Id., at 17. Without ruling on Geraghty's motion, 
the court transferred the case to the Middle District of Penn-
sylvania, where respondent was incarcerated. Geraghty con-
tinued to press his motion for class certification, but the court 
postponed ruling on the motion until it was prepared to render 
a decision on cross-motions for summary judgment. 
The District Court subsequently denied Geraghty's request 
for class certification and granted summary judgment for peti-
tioners on all the claims Geraghty asserted. 429 F . Supp. 
737 (MD Pa. 1977). The court regarded respondent 's action 
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as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to which Fed. Rule 
Civ. Proc. 23 applied only by analogy. It denied class certifi. 
cation as "neither necessary nor appropriate." 429 F. Supp., 
at 740. A class action was "necessary" only to avoid moot-
ness. The court found such a consideration not comprehended 
by Rule 23. It found class certification inappropriate because 
Geraghty raised certain individual issues and, inasmuch as 
some prisoners might be benefited by the guidelines, because 
his claims were not typical of the entire proposed class. 429 
F. Supp., at 740-741. On the merits, the court ruled that the 
guidelines are consistent with the PCRA and do not offend 
the Ex Post Facto Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 429 
F. Supp., at 741-744. 
Respondent, individually <~and on behalf of a class," ap· 
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit. App. 29. Thereafter, another prisoner, Becher, who 
had been denied parole through application of the guideliues 
and who was represented by Geraghty's counsel, moved to 
intervene. Becher sought intervention to ensure that the 
legal issue raised by Geraghty on behalf of the class <~will not 
escape review in the appeal in this case. ' ' Pet. to Intervene 
After Judgment 2. The District Court, concluding that the 
filing of Geraghty's notice of appeal had divested it of juris-
diction, denied the petition to intervene. Becher then filed a 
timely notice of appeal from the denial of intervention. The 
two appeals were consolidated. 
On June 30, 1977, before any brief had been filed in the 
Court of Appeals, Geraghty was mandatorily released from 
prison; he had served 22 months of his sentence, and had 
earned good-time credits for the rest. Petitioners then moved 
to dismiss the appeals as moot. The appellate court reserved 
decision of the motion to dismiss until consideration of the 
merits. 
The Court of Appeals, concluding that the litigation was not 
moot, reversed the judgment of the District Court and re-
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mantled the . case for further proceedings. 579 F. 2d 238 
(CA3 1978). If a class had been certified by the District 
Court, rnootness of respondent Geraghty's personal claim 
would not have rendered the controversy moot. See, e. g., 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975). The Court of Appeals 
reasoned that an erroneous denial of a Class certification should 
not lead to the opposite result. 579 F. 2d, at 248-252, 
Rather, certification of a "certifiable" elass, that erroneously 
had been denied, relates back to the original denial and thus 
preserves jurisdiction. 1bid. 
On the question whether certification erroneously had been 
denied, the Court of Appeals held that necessity is not a pre-
requisite under Rule 23. 579 F. 2d, at 252. The court ex-
pressed doubts about the District Court's finding that class 
certification was "inappropriate." While Geraghty raised 
some claims not applicable to the entire class of prisoners who 
are or will become eligible for parole, the District Court could 
have "certif[ied] certain issues as subject to class adjudication, 
and ... limiter d] overbroad classes by the use of sub-classes." 
ld., at 253. Failure "to consider these options constituted a 
failure properly to exercise discretion . Indeed, this authority 
may be exercised sua sponte." Ibid. The Court of Appeals 
also held that refusal to certify because of a potential conflict 
of interest between Geraghty and other members of the puta-
. tive class was error. The subclass mechanism would have 
remedied this problem as well. !d., at 252-253. Thus, the 
Court of Appeals reversed the denial of class certification and 
remanded the case to the District Court for an initial evalua-
tion of the proper subclasses. ld., at 254. The court also 
remanded the motion for intervention. !d., at 245, n. 21.5 
In order to avoid "improvidently dissipat[ing] judicial 
effort," id., at 254, the Court of Appeals went on to consider 
whether the trial court had decided the merits of respondent's 
case properly. The District Court's entry of summary judg .. 
5 Apparently Becher, too, has now been released from prison. 
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ment was found to be error because "if Geraghty's recapitula-
tion of the function and genesis of the guidelines is supported 
by the evidence," the guidelines "may well be" unauthorized 
or unconstitutional. ld., at 259, 268. Thus, the dispute on 
the merits also was remanded for further factual development. 
II 
Article III of the Constitution limits federal "judicial 
Power," that is, federal court jurisdiction, to "Cases" and 
"Controversies." This case or controversy limitation serves 
'itwo complementary" purposes. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 
83, 95 (1968). It limits the business of federal courts to 
uquestions presented in an adversary context and in a form 
historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judi-
cial process," and it defines the "role assigned to the judi-
ciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the 
federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the 
other branches of government." Ibid. Likewise, mootness 
has two aspects : "when the issues presented are no longer 
'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the 
outcome." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486; 496 (1969). 
It is clear that the controversy over the validity of the 
Parole Release Guidelines is still a "live" one betweell peti-
tioners and at least some members of the class respondent 
seeks to represent. This is demonstrated by the fact that 7 
prisoners currently affected by the guidelines have moved to 
be substituted, or to intervene, as "named" respondents in this 
Court. See n. 1, supra. We therefore are concerned here 
with the second aspect of mootness, that is, the parties' inter-
est in the litigation. The Court has referred to this concept 
as the "personal stake" requirement. E. g., Franks v. Bow-
man Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755 (1976); Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). 
The personal stake requirement relates to the first purpose 
of the case or controversy doctrine-limiting judicial power 
18-57~-0PINION 
8 UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY 
to disputes capable of judicial resolution. The Court in Flast 
v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 100-101, stated: 
"The question whether a particular person is a proper 
party to maintain the action does not, by its own f.orce, 
raise separation of powers problems ·related to improper 
judicial interference in areas committed to other branches 
of the Federa.l Government .... ·Thus, in terms of Ar~ 
ticle III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the 
question of standing is related only to whether the dispute 
sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adve_r ... 
sary context and in a form historically viewed as capable 
of judicial resolution. It is for that· reason that the em~ 
phasis in standing problems is on whether the party 
· invoking federal court· jurisdiction has ·'a personal stake 
in the outcome of the controversy,' Baker v. Carr, [369 
U. S.], at 204, and whether the dispute touches upon 'the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests,' 
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, [300 U. S.], at 
240-241." 
See also Schlesinger v. Reserv-ists to Stop the · War, 418 U. S. 
208, 216-218 (1974). 
The "personal stake" aspect of mootness doctrine also serves 
primarily the purpose of assuring that federal courts are pre .. 
sented with disputes they are capable of "resolving. One 
commentator has defined mootness as "the doctrine of stand-
ing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that 
must exist at the commencement of the 'litigation (standing) 
must continue throughout its existence (mootness) ." Monag-
han, Constitutional Adjudication: The · Who and When, 82 
Yale L. J. 1363, 1384 (1973). 
III 
On several occasions the Court has considered the applica-
tion of the "personal stake" requirement in the class action 
·· context. In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U, S. 393 (1975), it held that 
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mootness of the named plaintiff's individual claim after a 
class has been duly certified does not render the action moot. 
It reasoned that "even though appellees ... might not again 
enforce the Iowa durational residency requirement against 
[the class representative], it is clear that they will enforce it 
against those persons in the class that appellant sought to rep-
resent and that the District Court certified." I d., at 400. 
The Court stated specifically that an Art. III case or con-
troversy "may exist ... between a named defendant and a 
member of the class represented by the named plaintiff, even 
though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot." 
Id., at 402.6 
Although one might argue that Sosna contains at least an 
implication that the critical factor for Art. III purposes is the 
timing of class certification, other cases, applying a "relation 
back" approach , clearly demonstrate that timing is not crucial. 
When the claim on the merits is "capable of repetition , yet 
evading review," the named plaintiff may litigate the class 
certification issue despite loss of his personal stake in the out-
come of the litigation. E. g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 
llO, n. ll (1975). The "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review" doctrine, to be sure. was developed outside the class 
action context. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 
219 U.S. 498, 514-515 (1911). But it has been applied where/ 
the named plaintiff does have a personal stake at the outset 
of the lawsuit, and where the claim may arise again with ---resy.ect to that pla,intiff; the litigation then may continue not-
WithStanding the named plaintiff's current lack of a personal 
8 The claim in Sosna also fit the traditional category of action:; that are 
deemed not moot. despite the litigant';; JosH of per~onal stake, that is, those 
"capable of repetition, yet evading review." See Southem Pacific Tenn-
1:nal Co., v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911) . In Fmnkli \'. Bmcnwn 
Tmnspo1'tation Co., 424 U. S., at 75:3-755, however, the Court held that 
the class action aspect of mootness doctrine does not depend on the cla~s 
claim's being so inherently trnnsitory that it meets the "capable of 
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stake. See, e. g., Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147, 149 
(1975); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 123-125 (1973). Since 
the litigant faces some likelihood of becoming involved in the 
same controversy in the future, vigorous advocacy can be ex-
pected to continue. 
When, however, the're is no chance that the named plain-
tiff's expired claim will reoccur, mootness still can be avoided 
through certification of a class prior to expiration of the named 
plaintiff's personal Claim. 'E. g., Franks v. Bowman Trans-
portation Co., 424 U. S., at 752-757. See Kremens v. Bart-
ley, 431 U. S. 119, 129-130 ( 1977). Some claims are so in-
herently transitory that the trial court will not have even 
enough time to rtile on a motion for class certification before 
the proposed representative's individual interest expires. The 
Court considered this possibility in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U. S., at 110, n. 11. Gerstein was an action challenging pre-
trial detention conditions. 'The Court assumed that the 
named plaintiffs were no ' longer in custody awaiting trial at 
the time · the trial court certified a Class of pretrial detainees. 
There was no indication that the particular named plaintiffs 
might again . be subject to pretrial detention. Nonetheless, 
' the case was held not to be·moot because: 
"The length of pretrial custody cannot be ascertained at 
the outset, and it may be ended at any time by release on 
recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or a guilty plea, as 
·well as by acquittal or conviction after trial It is by no 
means certain that any given individual, named as plain-
. tiff, would be in pretria] custody long enough for a district 
judge to certify the class. Moreover, in this case the con-
stant existence of a class of persons suffering the depriva-
tion is certain. The attorney representing the named 
respondei1ts is a public defender, and we can safely as-
sume that he has other clients with a continuing live 
interest in the case." Ibid. 
See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S., at 402, n. 11. 
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In two different contexts the Court has stated that the pro-
posed class representative who proceeds to a judgment on the 
merits may appeal denial of class certification. First, this 
assumption was "an important ingredient," Deposit Gu.aranty 
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. - (slip op., at 11) , in the re-
jection of interlocutory appeals, "as of right," of class certifi-
cation denials. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 
469, 470, n. 15 (1978). The Court reasoned that denial of 
class status will not necessarily be the "death knell" of a small 
claimant action, since there still remains "the prospect of pre-
vailing on the merits and reversing an order denying class 
certification." Ibid. 
Second, in United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 
393-395 ( 1977) , the Court held that a putative class member 
may intervene, for the purpose of appealing the denial of a 
class certification motion, after the named plaintiffs' claims 
have been satisfied and judgment entered in their favor. Un-
derlying that decision was the view that "refusal to certify 
was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the 
behest of the named plaintiffs." !d. , at 393. And today, the 
Court holds that named plaintiffs whose claims are satisfied 
through entry of judgmeut over their objections may appeal 
the denial of a class certification ruling. Deposit Guaranty 
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. -. 
Gerstein, J.)!f cDonald, and Roper are all examples of casesl 
found not to be moot, despite the loss of a "persona.! stake' ' in 
the merits of the litigation by the proposed class representa- ~ 
tive. The interest of the named plaintiffs in Gerstein was 
precisely the same as that of Geraghty here. Similarly, after 
judgment had been entered in their favor , the named plain-
tiffs in McDonald had no continuing narrow personal stake in 
the outcome of the class claims. And in Roper the Court 
points out that an individual controversy is rendered moot, in 
the strict Art. III sense, by payment aud satisfaction of a final 
judgment. Ante, p.- (slip op., at 6). 
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These cases demonstrate the flexible character of the 
Art. III mootness doctrine.7 As has been noted in the past; 
Art. III justiciability is "not a legal concept with a fixed con-
tent or susceptible of scientific verification." Poe v. Ullman, 
367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961) (plurality opinion). "[T]he justi-
ciability doctrine [is] one of uncertain and shifting contours." 
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 97. 
IV 
Perhaps somewhat anticipating today's decision in Roper, 
petitioners argue that the situation presented is entirely dif-
ferent when mootness of the individual · claim is caused by 
''expiration" of the claim, rather than by a judgment on the 
claim. They assert that a proposed class representative who 
individually prevails on the merits still has a "personal stake" 
in the outcome of the litigation, wliile the named plaintiff 
whose claim is truly moot does not. In the 1atter situation, 
where no class has been certified, there is no party before the 
7 Three of the Court's cases might be described as a.dopting a less fiexi~ 
ble approach. In lndimiapolis School Comrn'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 
(1975), and in Weinstein v. Bmdford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975), diiillli~sal of 
putative cla~s Ruits, as moot, WlU' ordrred after the named plaintiffs' 
claims beeame moot. And in Pasadena. City Bd. of Education v. Spangler, 
427 U. S. 424, 430 (1976), it. was indi(·ated that the action would have 
been moot, upon expiration of the 1wmcd plaintiffs' claims, had not t1te· 
United States intervened as a party plaintiff. Each of these, however, 
was a case in which there was an attempt t.o appeal the merits wit.hout 
first having obtained proper crrtification of a class. In each case it was 
the defendant who petitioned this Court for review. As is observed: 
subsequently in the text,· appeal from denial of class classification is .per-
mitted in some circumstances wl1ere appeal on the merits is not. In the 
situation where the proposed class rrpre~enta tive has lost a "per~onal 
stake," the merits cannot be rcachrd until a class properly i::; certified. 
Although the Court perhaps could have remanded Jacobs and Weinstein 
for reconsideration of the cia:;:; certification i:»·ue, as the Court of Appeals 
did her~, the parties in those case:; did not i'luggest "relation bm:k" of 
class certification. Tim:; we do uot find this line of cases dispositive of' 
the question now before us. 
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court with a live claim, and it follows, it is said, that we have 
no jurisdiction to consider whether a class should have been 
certified. Brief for Petitioners 37-39. 
We do not find this distinction persuasive. As has been 
noted earlier, Geraghty's "personal stake" in the outcome of 
the litigation is, in a practical sense, no different from that 
of the putative class representatives inr..Roper. Further, the 
opinion in Roper indicates that the approach to take in apply-
ing Art. III is issue by issue. ''Nor does a confession of judg-
ment by defendants on less than all the issues moot an entire 
case; other issues in the case may be appealable. We can 
assume that a district court's final judgment fully satisfying 
named plaintiffs' private substantive claims would preclude 
their appeal on that aspect of the final judgment; however, 
it does not follow that this circumstance would terminate 
the named plaintiffs' right to take an appeal on the issue of 
class certification." Ante, p.- (slip op., at 6-7). See also 
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S., at 392; Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U. S., at 497. 
Similarly, the fact that a named plaintiff's substantive 
claims are mooted due to an occurrence other thau a judgment 
on the merits does not mean that all the other issues in the 
case are mooted. A plaintiff who brings a class action presents 
two separate issues for judicial resolution. One is the claim 
on the merits; the other is the claim that he is entitled to 
represent a class. "The denial of class certification stands as 
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated," Roper, 'ante, 
p. -- (slip op., at 9-10). We think that in determining 
whether the plaintiff may contiuue to press the class certifica-
tion claim, after the claim on the merits "expires," we must 
look to the nature of the "personal stake" in the class cer-
tification claim. Determining Art. III's "uncertain and shift-
ing contours," see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., at 97, with respect 
to nontraditional forms of litigation, such as the class action, 
requires reference to the purposes of the case or controversy 
requirement. 
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Application of the personal stake requirement to a proce-
dural claim, such as the right to represent a class, is not auto-
matic or readily resolved. A "legally cognizable interest," as 
the Court described it in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S., at 
496, in the traditional sense rarely ever exists with respect to 
the class certification claim.8 The justifications that led to 
the development of the class action include the protection of 
the defendant from inconsistent obligations, the protection of 
the interests of absentees, the provision of a convenient and 
economical means for disposing of similar lawsuits, and the 
facilitation of the spreading of litigation costs among numer-
ous litigants with similar claims. See, e. g., Advisory Com-
mittee Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, 28 U.S. C. App., pp. 
427-429; Note, Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 
Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1321- 1323, 1329- 1330 (1976). Although 
the named representative receives certain benefits from the 
class nature of the action, some of which are regarded as de-
sirable and others as less so,9 these benefits generally are by-
products of the class action device. In order to achieve the 
primary benefits of class suits, the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure give the proposed class representative the right to have 
a class certified if the requirements of the rules are met. This 
"right" is more analogous to the private attorney general con-
cept than to the type of interest traditionally thought to 
satisfy the "personal stake" requirement. Se\ Roper, ante, 
p.- (slip op., at 11-12). 
As noted above, the purpose of the 11personal stake" require-
ment is to assure that the case is in a form capable of judi-
cial resolution. The imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial 
8 Were the class an indispensable party, the named plaintiff's interests 
in certification would approach a "legally cognizable interest." 
9 See, e. g., Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Con-
sumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 842 (1974); Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of De-
struction, 55 F . R. D. 375 '197'2) . 
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resolution are sharply presented issues in a concrete factual 
setting and self-interested parties vigorously advocating op-
posing positions. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 
424 U. S., at 753-756; Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S., at 204; Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U. S., at 503 (plurality opinion). We conclude 
that these elements can exist with respect to the class certifica-
tion issue notwithstanding the fact that the named plaintiff's 
claim on the merits has expired. The question whether class 
certification is appropriate remains as a concrete, sharply pre-
sented issue. In Sosna v. Iowa it was recognized that a named 
plaintiff whose claim on the merits expires after class certifica-
tion may still adequately represent the class. Implicit in that 
decision was the determination that vigorous advocacy can be 
assured through means other than the traditional requirement 
of a "personal stake in the outcome." Respondent here con-
tinues vigorously to advocate his right to have a class certified. 
We therefore hold that an action brought on behalf of a 
class does not become moot upon expiration of the named 
plaintiff's substantive claim, even though class certification 
has been denied.10 The proposed representative reta.ins a 
"personal stake' ' in obtaining class certification sufficient to 
assure that Art. III values are not undermined. If the appeal 
results in reversal of the class certification denial, and a class 
subsequently is properly certified, the merits of the class claim 
then may be adjudicated pursuant to the holding in Sosna. 
Our holding is limited to the appeal of the denial of the 
class certification motion. A named plaintiff whose claim 
expires may not continue to press the appeal on the merits 
until a class has been properly certified. See Roper, ante, 
p.- (slip op., at 10). If, on appeal, it is determined that 
10 We intimate no view as to whether a named plaintiff who settles the 
individual claim after denial of clas:; certification may, consistent with 
Art. Ill, appeal from the aclver:;c ruling on class certification. See 
United Airlines, lnc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 393-394, and n. 14 
(1977). 
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class certification properly was denied, the claim on the merits 
must be dismissed as moot.11 
Our conclusion that the controversy here is not moot does 
11 MR. Jus·riCE PowELL, in his dissent, advocates a "rigidly formalistic" 
approach to Art. III, post, at 4, and suggests that our decision today is 
the Court's first departure from the formalistic view. /d., at 6-11. We 
agree that the issue at hand is one of first impres~on and thus, in that 
narrow sense, is "unprecedented," id., at 11. We do not believe, however, 
that the deci~Sion constitutes a redefinition o'f Art. III principles or a 
"significant departure," id., at 1, from "carefully considered" precedents, 
id., at 9. 
The ero~Sion of lhe ~trict, formalistic perception of Art. III was begun 
well before today's decision. For example, the protestations of the dissent 
are strikingly remini:scent of Mr. Justice Har1an'i:i dis:sent in Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U. S. 8~~. 116, in 1968. Mr . . Ju::;tice Harlan hailed the tax-
payer standing rule pronounced in that case as a "new doctrine" resting 
"on premises that do not with::;tand analy:sis." /d., at 117. He felt that 
the problrms presented by taxpayer standing "involve nothing less than 
the proper functioning of the federal courts, and so run to the roots of our 
constitutional system." !d., at 116. The taxpayers were thought to com-
plain as "private attorneys-general," and "[t]he interests they represent, 
and the rights they espouse are bereft of any personal or proprietary 
coloration." /d., at 119. Such taxpayer actions "are and must be ... 
'public actions' brought to vindicate public rights." /d., at 120. 
Notwithstanding the taxpayers' lack of a formalistic "personal stake," 
even Justice Harlan felt that the ca~e should be held nonjusticiable on 
purely prudential grounds. His interpretation of the cases led him to 
conclude that "it is ... clear that [plaintiffs in a public action] as such 
are not comtitutionally excluded from the federal courts." Ibid. (emphasis 
in original). 
Is it not somewhat ironic that MR. Jus'l'ICE PowELL, who now seeks to 
explain United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, supm, as a straightforward 
application of settled doctrine, post, at 7-9, expressed in his dissent in 
McDonald, 432 U. S., at 396, the view tl1at fhe l10lding rested on a funda-
mental misconception about the mootne~s of an uncertified Cla:;s action 
after settlemeut of the nam<'d plaintiff"' claims? He stated: 
"Pervading the Court's opinion is the assumption that the class action 
somehow continued after the District Court denied class status. But that 
assumption i.s supported neither by the text nor by the history of Rule 2~. 
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not automatically establish that the named plaintiff is entitled 
to continue litigating the interests of the class. "[I]t does 
shift the focus of examination from the elements of justiciabil. 
To the contrary, ... the denial of class status converts the litigation to an 
ordinary noncla::;s action." !d ., at 399. 
The dissent went on to say: 
"[Petitioner·] argueii with great force tha1, as a result of the settlement of 
their individual claims, the named plaintiffs 'could no long appeal the 
denial of cla~s' statu:; that had occurred years earlier. . . . Although thil'! 
question has not been derided by thi~ Court, the answer on principle is 
clear. The set1lemeJlt of an individual claim typically moots any i::;suCl'! 
associated with it. . . . This case is ~harply dbtinguishable from ca3es 
such as Sosna v. !O'Il'a ... and F'raukl! Y. Bowmau Transp. Co . ... where 
we allowed named plaintiffs whose individual claims were moot to continue 
to represent their classe». In thos<' case;;, the District Courts previously 
had certified the cla::;:,;e~, thu::; giving them 'a legal status separate from 
the interestLs] asserted by [thr named plaintiffs].' Sosna v. Iowa, supra, 
at 399. This case presents precisely the opposite situation: The prior 
denial of cla::;s status had extingui::;hed any representative capacity." 432 
U.S., at 400 (footnote omitted). 
Thus, the assumption thought to be "[p Jervading the Court's opinion" 
in McDonaLd, and so vigorously attarked by the dissent there, is now rele-
gated to "gratuitou::;" "dictum," post, at 8. MR. JusTICE PowELL, who 
finds the situat ion presented in the case at hand "fundamentally different" 
from that in Sosna and Franks. post, at 5, also found the facts of 
McDonald "sharply distinguif'hable" from tho::;e previous cases. 432 U.S., 
at 400. 
We do not recite the~e cases for the purpose of showing that our result 
is mandated by the precedent::;. We concede that the prior cases may be 
said to be somPwhat confusing, tmd that some, perhaps, are irreconcilable 
with others . Our point is that the strict, formalistic view of Art. III 
jurisprudence, while perhaps the starting point of all inquiry, is riddled 
with exceptions. And, in creating each exception, the Court has looked 
to practicalities and prudential considerations. The resulting doctrine can 
be characterized, aptly , as "flexible"; it has been developed, not irrespon-
sibly, but "with some care," post, at 2, including the present case. 
The dissent is correct that once exceptions are made to the formalistic 
interpretation of Art. III, principled distinctions and bright lines become 
more difficult to draw. We do not attempt to predict how far down the 
road the Court eventually will go toward premising jurisdiction "upon tl1e 
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ity to the ability of the named representative to 'fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.' Rule 23 (a)." 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S., at 403. We hold only that a case 
or controversy still exists. The question of who is to repre-
sent the class is a separa.te issue.12 
We need not decide here whether Geraghty is a proper rep-
resentative for the purpose of representing the class on the 
merits. No class as yet has been certified. Upon remand, the 
District Court can determine whether Geraghty may continue 
to press the class claims or whether another representative 
would be appropriate. We decide only that Geraghty was a 
bare existence of a :sharply pre~ented i::;sue in a concrete and vigorously 
argued case," post, at 12. Each case must be decided on its own facts. 
We hasten to note, however, that Uti:> casr does not even approach the 
extreme feared by the dissent. This respondent suffered actual, concrete 
injury as a re:;ult of thr putatively illegal conduct, and this injury would 
satisfy the formalistic per:;onnl stake requirement if damages were sought. 
See, e. g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S., at 495-500. His injury con. 
tinued up to anti beyond the time the District Court denied class certifica. 
tion. We merely hold that when a District Court erroneously denies a 
procedural motion, which, if correctly decided, would have prevented the 
action from becoming moot, an appeal lies from the denial and the cor. 
rected ruling "rE>latr~ back" to the date of the original denial. 
The judicial procc,;:s will not become a vehicle for "concernrcl bystand-
ers," post, at 4, l'Vl'n if one in respondent's position can conceivably be 
characterized as a bystander, because the issue on the merits will not be 
addressed until a cla:;;s with an interest in the outcome has bren certified. 
The "relation back" principle, a traditional equitable doctrine applied to 
class certification claims in Gerstein v. Pugh, supra. serves logically to 
distinguish this case from the one brought a day after the prisoner is 
released. See post, at 13, n. 15. If the named plaintiff has no personal 
stake in the outcome at t.he time class certification is denied , relation back 
o{ appellate reversal of that denial still would not prevent mootness of 
the action. 
12 See, e. g., Comment, A Search for Principles of MootnE>ss in the Fed-
eral Courts: Part Two-Cia~~ Action:;, 54 Texas L. Rev. 1289, 1331-1332 
(1976); Comment, Continuation and Hepre:sentation of Class Actions 
Following Di:smissal of the Cia:;:; Reprc~entative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 
602-608. 
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pfoper representative for the pur•pose of appealing the ruling 
denying certification of the class that he initially defined. 
Thus, it was not improper for the Court of Appeals to consider 
whether the District Court should have granted class 
certification. 
v 
We turn now to the question whether the Court of Appeals' 
decision on the District Court's class certincation ruling was 
proper. Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred iii 
requiring the District Court to consider the possibility of cer-
tifying subclasses sua sponte. Petitioners strenuously con-
tend that placing the burden of identifying and constructing 
subclasses on the trial court creates unmanageable difficulties. 
Brief for Petitioners 43-51. We feel that the Court of Ap-
peals' decision here does not impose undue burdens on the dis-
trict courts. Respondent had no real opportunity to request 
certincation of subclasses after the class he proposed was re-
jected. The District Court denied class certification at the 
same time it rendered its adverse decision on the merits. Re-
questing subclass certincation at that time would have been 
a futile act. The District Court was not about to invest effort 
in deciding the subclass question after it had ruled that no 
relief on the merits was available. The remand merely gives 
respondent the opportunity to perfor·m his function in the 
adversary system. On remand, however, it is not the District 
Court that is to bear the burden of constructing subclasse~. 
That burden is upon the respondent and it is he \vho is 
required to submit proposals to the court. The court has n 
sua sponte obligation so to act. With this modification, th 
Court of Appeals' remand of the case for consideration of sub 
classes was a proper disposition. 
It would be in~priate for this Court to reach the merits 
of this controversy in the present posture of the case. Our 
holding that the case is not moot extellds only to the appeal of 
the dils's certification deui.al. lf the District Court again -
-
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denies class certification, and that decision is affirmed, the 
controversy on the merits will be moot. Furthermore, al-) 
though the Court of Appeals commented upon the merits for 
the sole purpose of avoiding waste of judicial resources, it di~ '"? 
nqt reach a final conclusion on the validity of the guidelines. 
Rather, it held only that summary judgment was imprope 
and remanded for further factual development. Given the 
interlocutory posture of the case before us, we must defer r 7 
decision on the merits of respondent's case until after it is 
determined affirmatively that a class properly can be certified. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated a.nd the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
er 12/28/79 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court holds today that the named plaintiff in an 
action brought on behalf of a class has a "'personal stake' in 
obtaining class certification" which, wholly apart from his 
interest in obtaining relief on the merits for himself or anyone 
else, is sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy 
limitation on the jurisdiction of a federal court. Ante, at 15. 
The analysis proceeds in two steps: First, the Court concludes 
that mootness is a wholly flexible doctrine which may be adapted 
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. Second, 
the Court holds that a right "analogous to the private attorney 
general concept" supports the jurisdiction of an Art. III court 
to decide whether an action may be maintained on behalf of a 
class. Because both steps depart radically from settled law in 
a manner that cannot rationally be confined to the narrow issue 
presented in this case, I dissent. 
I 
2. 
As the Court has said, this case involves the personal 
stake aspect of the mootness doctrine. Ante, at 7-8. There is 
no doubt that the controversy, if any exists, involves a claim 
that federal courts may properly resolve without intruding upon 
the province of the political branches. The only question is 
whether there is a plaintiff who may raise it - that is, whether 
there is a controversy between adverse parties which casts the 
dispute in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial 
resolution. 
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the 
personal stake requirement at some length, most commonly in the 
context of arguments that a plaintiff has no standing to bring 
an action in the first instance. We have repeatedly held that 
the inquiry has a double aspect: On the one hand, it derives 
from Art. III limitations on the power of the federal courts. 
On the other, it embodies self-imposed restraints on the 
exercise of judicial power. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 u.s. 106, 
112 (1976); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 u.s. 
91, 99 (1979); Warth v. Seldin, 422 u.s. 490, 498 (1975). 
To the extent the personal stake is a constitutional 
prerequisite to the invocation of judicial power, it must 
continue throughout the action. See ante, at 8. Should the 
plaintiff lose that minimum stake, there is no continuing "case 
3. 
or controversy" and the Court must dismiss the action as moot. 
Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S 395, 401-403 (1975); North Carolina 
v. Rice, 404 u.s. 244, 246 (1971); SEC v. Medical Committee for 
Human Rights, 404 u.s. 403, 407 (1972); Powell v. McCormack, 
395 U.S. 486, 496 n.7 (1969). When mootness is predicated upon 
this constitutional deficiency, we do not inquire into practical 
concerns which often militate against a dismissal of the action 
by the time it reaches this Court. Richardson v. Ramirez 418 
U.S. 24, 37 (1974); see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 u.s. 393, 401 n.9 
(1975). Instead, we routinely vacate and remand such cases with 
directions to dismiss. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 
u.s. 36, 39 (1950). However, Art. III may be satisfied by some 
continuing impairment of personal interests which is unaffected 
by the mootness of the original claim to relief. In such cases 
our constitutional power to hear the case is unabated, and we 
may base our prudential decision whether to do so in part on the 
obvious practical differences between an action we are asked to 
dismiss at its inception and one in which the parties have 
invested substantial resources. 
The prudential aspect of standing and mootness is 
aptly described as a doctrine of uncertain and shifting 
contours. Ante, at 12. But the shared constitutional core of 
these doctrines is not flexible. Despite the doctrinal 
4. 
revolution of the last decade, which has liberalized the 
requirements of Art. III to the point where "'an identifiable 
trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of 
principle,'" United States v. SCRAP, 412 u.s. 669, 689 n. 14 
(1973), quoting Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 u. 
Chi. L. Rev. 601, 613 (19 ), we have continued to insist that 
principle alone is simply not enough. Only last term the Court 
stated without dissent that "in order to satisfy Art. III, the 
plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered some actual 
or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal 
conduct of the defendant. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina 
Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 u.S. 59, 72 (1978); 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. 429 u.s. 
252, 260-261 (1977); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights 
Org., 426 u.s. 26, 38 ( 1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 u.s. [490], 
499 [(1975)]; Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 u.s. 614, 617 
(1973)." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of of Bellwood, 441 
U.S. 91, 99 (1979). See also Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare 
Rights Org., 426 U.S., at 59 n.7, 60, 64 (BRENNAN, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
We have squarely rejected all attempts to substitute 
"abstract concern with a subject" for the "concrete injury 
required by Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights 
5. 
Org., supra, 426 u.s., at 40; see Schlesinger v. Reservists to 
Stop the War 418 u.s. 208, 227 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 
U.S. 488, 494 (1974); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 u.s. 727, 738 
(197 ). We have called this requirement an "indispensable," 
Shclesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War 418 u.s. 166, 181 
(1974), and "irreducible" constitutional minimum, United States 
v. Richardson, 418 u.s. 166, 181 (POWELL, J., concurring); Simon 
v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, 426 u.s., at 60, 
id. at 64 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); to which we have 
"steadfastly adhered." Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 
617 (1973)(footnotes omitted). 
If a plaintiff can demonstrate the concrete personal 
injury required by Art. III, he may in some circumstances be 
permitted to argue the rights of third parties or the public 
interest in support of his claim. Singleton v. Wulff, supra, 
428 u.s., at 113; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 u.s. 438 (1972); 
Griswold v. Connectcut, 381 u.s. 479 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 
346 u.s. 249 (1953). Prudential considerations militate against 
this result, Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 
U.S., at 100; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 
429 U.S., at 2G3. but congressional authorization sweeps away 
such concerns. We have therefore construed the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, to permit suits by "private 
6. 
attorneys general" representing the public interest - but only 
where the plaintiff also alleges concrete, individual injury, no 
matter how small. Sierra Club v. Morton, Supra 405 U.S., at 
727-728~ cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 u.s. 163, 166-
167 (1972)~ Tileston v. Ullman, 318 u.s. 44, 46 (1943). In no 
event may Congress abrogate the Art. III minimum. Gladstone, 
Realtors, v. Village of Bellwood, supra, 441 U.S., at 100~ 
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 u.s. 488, 494, 493-494 n. 2 (1973). 1 
The personal stake requirement may appear formalistic 
in such cases. But we have insisted upon it because it is a 
requirement imposed by the Constitution, "founded in concern 
about the proper - and properly limited - role of the courts in 
a democratic society." Warth v. Seldin, 422 u.s. 490, 498 
(1975)~ see United States v. Richardson, 418 u.s., at 188-189 
(POWELL, J., concurring). This consistent thread in our 
decisions "prevents the judicial process from becoming no more 
than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of 
concerned bystanders." United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 
687 (1973)~ see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 u.s., at 740~ Simon 
v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 u.s., at 60 
(BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment). Because the interest 
of a "private attorney general" is by definition that of a 
concerned bystander, we have never permitted that interest alone 
7. 
to supply the personal stake necessary to support the 
jurisdiction of a federal court. 
II 
Until today our decisions in the class action area had 
applied these principles in a straightforward fashion. Our only 
departure from settled law has been to recognize that a class 
that has been certified in accordance with Rule 23 "acquire[s] a 
legal status separate from the interest asserted by [the named 
plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, 419 u.s. 393, 399 (1975). We have 
therefore held that "given a properly certified class," the live 
interests of unnamed but identifiable class members may supply 
the case or controversy required by Art. III after the 
individual claim of the named plaintiff becomes moot. Franks v. 
Bowman Transportation Co., 424 u.s. 727, 755-756 (1976); Sosna 
v. Iowa, supra, at 402. 
Neither Sosna nor Franks remotely suggests that Art. 
III may be satisfied by any means other than the traditional 
requirement of a personal stake in the outcome. Both cases 
simply acknowledge the effects of a procedure which gives legal 
recognition to additional--and unquestionably adverse--parties 
plaintiff. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hawor~h 300 U.S. 227, 240 
(1937).2 The situation is entirely different when the named 
plaintiff's claim becomes moot at a time when the interests of 
8. 
absent class members cannot be recognized because the district 
court has not properly certified the class. In these 
circumstances, the existence of a case or controversy turns 
entirely on the individual interest of those who seek to 
represent the class. Because the named plaintiffs have no 
personal interest in representing a class and cannot rely for 
Art. III purposes upon the live interests of absent third 
parties in securing their representation, we have uniformly held 
that these actions may be permitted to continue only when the 
named plaintiff is able to allege some personal stake in 
addition to his interest in obtaining relief for the class. 
Thus, a named plaintiff who alleges no individualized 
injury at the outset of the action "may not seek relief on 
behalf of himself or any other member of the class." O'Shea v. 
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495 (1974). If the named plaintiff 
states a claim which becomes moot before the district court has 
ruled on his certification motion, the entire case must be 
dismissed as moot unless it falls within "that narrow class of 
cases" involving wrongs which are capable of repetition but "by 
nature [so] temporary" that they "become[] moot as to [the named 
plaintiffs] before the district court can reasonably be expected 
to rule on a certification motion." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 
103, 110-111 n. 11 (1975); see Swisher v. Brady, 438 u.s. 204, 
9. 
213-214 n. 11 (1978); Sosna v. Iowa, supr,a, 419 U.S., at 402 n. 
11. In such cases, depending on "the reality of the claim that 
the issue would otherwise evade review," we have permitted 
certification to "relate back" to the filing of the complaint 
for Art. III purposes. Ibid. This rule embodies in shorthand 
form a principle first noted in Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. 
ICC, 219 u.s. 498, 515 (1911) and subsequently established in a 
long line of decisions bearing no relationship to class 
actions.3 Although the Court has never fully explained how the 
furthest reaches of the Southern Pacific rule may be squared 
with Art. III, that rule has never been thought to undermine the 
constitutional requirement of a personal stake in the outcome.4 
In any event, the Court has applied it in the class action 
context only where an "individual [plaintiff] could .•• suffer 
repeated deprivations" with no means of redress and thus retains 
an individualized stake in the outcome of the action on the 
merits. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 u.s., at 110 n. 11; see Roe v. 
Wade, 410 u.s. 113, 125 (1973). 
Where there is no suggestion that the challenged 
conduct will recur and evade review, we have never suggested 
that "relation back" may save an uncertified class action once 
the named plaintiff's claim becomes moot. Even if the plaintiff 
has obtained district court approval of his proposed class, the 
1 0 • 
case will be moot if the attempted certification is determined 
on appeal to have been so faulty as to prevent the class from 
obtaining separate legal status under Sosna. Indianapolis 
School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 u.s. 128 (1975); see Baxter v. 
Palmigiano 425 u.s. 308, 310 n.1 (1976); Pasadena City Board of 
Education v. Spangler 427 u.s. 424, 430 (1976). 
If certification is denied, the named plaintiff who 
abandons his claim to represent the class by failing to appeal 
that ruling cannot continue to litigate the merits after his 
individual claim becomes moot. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 u.s. 
147 (1975); see Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 
436 u.s. 1, 8 (1978). We have never squarely addressed a case 
in which a mooted named plaintiff continued to press the class 
claims by appealing the denial of certification. But the named 
plaintiffs in Jacobs, Baxter, and Spangler each vigorously 
asserted the claims of the class. They did not do so by the 
procedural route of appealing a denial of certification only 
because the district court had granted - albeit defectively -
class status. Therefore, it was the defendant who raised the 
question of the named plaintiffs' right to represent a class, a 
right which the named plaintiffs continued to assert. By failing 
to remand for correction of the procedural defects in the oral 
certification order, we recognized that a named plaintiff has 
11. 
suffered no injury which could be redressed by adequate 
certification and implicitly held that an individual's interest 
in representing a class is insufficient to supply the personal 
stake necessary to satisfy Art. III. 
It is true that the Court has twice permitted appeals 
from the denial of class certification after the named 
plaintiffs' claims on the merits had been satisfied. Deposit 
Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, a·nte, at United Airlines, Inc. 
v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977). But neither case supports the 
broad proposition that the claim to represent a class may be 
asserted by a plaintiff who has no other personal stake in the 
outcome of the action. 
In McDonald, putative class members were permitted to 
intervene to appeal an adverse class certification ruling after 
the individual claims of the original named plaintiffs had been 
settled pursuant to a judgment on the question of liability. Id. 
Provided their individual claims were not time-barred, the 
intervenors in McDonald plainly possessed the personal stake 
necessary to continue the action, for those claims had yet to be 
resolved.5 Indeed, the Court devoted its entire opinion to the 
issues of timeliness and limitations, a focus which obscures the 
meaning of the case as precedent on the question of mootness. 
Unsupported as it is by reasoning on that question, McDonald can 
12. 
mean no more than that an action which is promptly pursued by 
interested parties at all times does not "die" in an Art. III 
because of an interval in which neither the original nor any 
substitute party was present before the court. The same 
conclusion is implicit in those cases in which the Court has 
permitted the representatives of the estates of deceased 
criminal defendants to carry on their appeals, Wetzel v. Ohio, 
371 U.S. 61 (1962), as well as those class actions in which we 
have relied upon the interests of timely intervenors without 
inquiring whether the intervention occurred before the mooting 
of the original named plaintiff's claim, Baxter v. Palmigiano, 
425 u.s., at 310 n. 1. 
The Court did state in McDonald that the denial of 
class certification would be subject to appellate review at the 
behest of the named plaintiffs, 432 u.s., at 393, a dictum which 
was repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 u.s. 463, 469, 
470 n. 15 (1978), and is today adopted as the law. Deposit 
Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, at As explained in 
Roper, however, this rule turns entirely upon a "critical 
distinction between the definitive mootness of a case or 
controversy •.. and a judgment in favor of a party at an 
intermediate stage of litigation ••• " Slip op., at 9. When 
such a judgment has been entered, the Court holds, Art. III is 
1 3 • 
only indirectly concerned and the central question is 
appealability. Id., at 7, 12. Moreover, the Roper Court 
expressly notes the named plaintiffs' interest in obtaining 
class certification in order to reduce their costs of litigation 
-an interest not present here. Id., at 10 n. 8. Although 
Roper may be criticized on other grounds, ante, at , its 
rationale leaves undisturbed the fundamental understanding which 
unifies our decisions in this area: without more, a named 
plaintiff has no personal stake in any "claim" to represent a 
class.6 
IV 
In my view, the foregoing precedents dispose of this 
case. We cannot rely on the personal stake of the unnamed 
members of the putative class, as we did in Franks and Sosna, 
for they have not been identified in a proper certification 
order. There has been no suggestion that the issue is one 
which, like the pretrial confinement in Gerstein, could evade 
review. On the contrary respondent's lawyer has assured us that 
if this case is held to be moot he will immediately file another 
action. Although the Court does not rule on the motion to 
substitute new parties respondent filed with this Court, that 
motion was filed well over a year after respondent was released 
from prison. In the interim respondent had not only obtained a 
1 4 • 
ruling from the Court of Appeals but also filed his petition for 
certiorari. In these circumstances the motion can scarcely be 
deemed timely within the meaning of McDonald. Nor is the 
question one of appealability as defined in Roper. Accordingly, 
the case is moot under the rule of Indianapolis School Comm'rs 
v. Jacobs and Weinstein v. Bradford unless the plaintiff can 
identify some personal stake, not present in those cases, which 
could be affected by the outcome of this action. 
No such stake has been identified. In the words of 
his own attorney, respondent "can obtain absolutely no 
additional personal relief" in this case and is here solely to 
represent other parties. Transcript of Oral Argument, at 25-26. 
The Court does not suggest that respondent has a personal stake 
in obtaining relief on the merits for the members of the 
putative class. Indeed, it must squarely reject that contention 
in order to hold that mootness precludes consideration of the 
claim on the merits until a class is properly certified. 
Instead, the Court holds that respondent has a personal stake in 
the "claim" that he is entitled to represent a class, wholly 
apart from the merits. In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
makes no attempt to identify any benefits that may accrue to 
this plaintiff from the use of the class action device. Rather, 
he is said to have a personal stake in obtaining class 
1 5. 
certification because (i) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
give him a "right," "analogous to the private attorney general 
concept," to have a class certified in certain circumstances, 
and (ii) he "continues vigorously to advocate his right to have 
a class certified" in what the Court finds to be a "concrete 
factual setting." Ibid. 
This novel approach to the personal stake requirement 
leads to a result which is reconcilable with our past class 
action decisions in a narrow technical sense: We have never 
dismissed as moot an appeal from a denial of class 
certification. But the result reached today will require 
reconsideration, if not outright overruling, of substantial 
portions of the settled law governing this area. Moreover, the 
Court attempts to avoid the conclusion implicit in our decisions 
- that a named plaintiff has no personal stake in representing a 
class - by drawing an untenable distinction between the named 
plaintiff's right to have a class certified and his right to 
obtain relief for that class on the merits. Finally, the Court 
relies exclusively on factors that have previously been thought 
relevant only to the prudential decision applicable to cases 
which have been shown to be within our jurisdiction as defined 
by Art. III. If these factors alone suffice to establish the 
personal stake required by the Constitution, then this case is a 
1 6. 
startling departure indeed - for it upsets the settled 
understanding that a plaintiff who can identify no concrete 
injury that may be remedied by judicial action has no claim to 
the resources of an Art. III court. 
A 
If, as the Court holds today, a named plaintiff's 
stake in obtaining class certification is sufficient to satisfy 
the requirements of Art. III whenever concrete adversity is 
present in fact, then at least three of our precedents must be 
subject to reconsideration on the ground that their analysis was 
wholly misguided. 
First, Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs can 
survive only if the newly defined personal stake in obtaining 
class certification may be destroyed when the issue is raised on 
appeal by the defendant rather than the plaintiff. As the Court 
intimates today, this irrational distinction must be rejected 
and Jacobs recast as a case that was moot only because the named 
plaintiff failed to suggest the proper ground in support of his 
claim. 
Second, it appears that we must jettison that portion 
of Gerstein v. Pugh which limits the occasions on which a mooted 
named plaintiff may continue to press his certification motion 
after his own claim becomes moot to those cases which are 
1 7 • 
"capable of repetition, yet evading review." It would be 
difficult to justify such a limitation even on prudential 
grounds, for the named plaintiff's interest in obtaining 
certification surely cannot be increased by the district court's 
denial of his motion in the first instance. 
Third, the Court's view cannot logically be confined 
to moot cases. If a plaintiff who is released from prison the 
day after filing a class action challenging the parole release 
system could seek certification of the class, why should a 
plaintiff who is released the day before filing the suit be 
treated differently? As an Art. III matter, there can be no 
difference - both plaintiffs clearly satisfy the minimum the 
Court has determined to tolerate in this case. Even on 
prudential grounds, the difference between the posture of this 
action on remand and the posture of a newly filed action is so 
subtle as to escape detection. This Court has ruled neither on 
the merits nor on the propriety of the class action. At the 
same time, it has vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, 
which in turn vacated the decision of the District Court dealing 
with these questions. Accordingly, there is no law of the case 
to preserve. Moreover, counsel expressly stated that the 
mootness aspect of this case was of no practical importance 
whatever, because the same issues will be raised in a new action 
1 8 • 
if this one is dismissed as moot. Transcript of Oral Argument, 
at 25. It is difficult to imagine a case in which the 
prudential considerations aligned against a finding of mootness 
are less compelling. If the holding of O'Shea v. Littleton 
survives at all, its scope has been drastically reduced. 
B 
The Court attempts to avoid yet more drastic 
incursions into settled law by rejecting respondent's attempt to 
litigate the merits of the class claims. This result is 
accomplished by separating respondent's interest in representing 
the class into two separate "claims": First, that the action 
may be maintained on behalf of a class~ and second, that the 
class is entitled to relief on the merits. Because Art. III is 
not easily applied to "procedural claims," respondent is said to 
have a personal stake in the first claim despite his lack of a 
stake in the second. This distinction is wholly illusory. 
Any attempt to uncover the personal stake underlying a 
"procedural claim" is bound to end in frustration, because the 
claim that a litigant is entitled to employ a procedural device 
is not a separate claim at all. As the Court notes today in 
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, these issues are 
"ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Slip Op., 
at 6. A motion for class certification resembles a motion for a 
1 9 • 
determination that the plaintiff is entitled to join additional 
parties or to present his case to a jury rather than a judge, in 
that each seeks only to present a substantive claim in a 
particular context. It is meaningless to discuss anyone's 
interest in these issues apart from his claim to relief on the 
merits, for they have value only insofar as they may enhance the 
possibility of obtaining that relief. The parties are permitted 
to litigate them, not because they have some independent 
personal stake in the procedures, but rather because they are 
part and parcel of their attempt to establish substantive 
claims.? As we held in O'Shea, a plaintiff may not invoke the 
jurisdiction of a federal court simply to decide whether he may 
represent a class. I see no reason why the result should change 
because the plaintiff once had standing to sue on his own 
behalf. 
Because respondent in this case has no interest in 
obtaining class certification apart from his generalized 
interest in representing the class on the merits, the result 
reached today cannot be reconciled with the most basic premises 
of our class action decisions. 
c 
Although the Court's departure from our class action 
precedents is troubling, by far the most radical aspect of the 
20. 
case is its willingness to accept the "private attorney 
general's" abstract concern with the interests of third parties 
- here those of the defendant, absent class members and the 
court in avoiding the inconveniences occasioned by multiple 
lawsuits - as a personal stake within the meaning of Art. III. 
We have steadfastly refused to countenance such plaintiffs in 
other factual settings which would amply satisfy the Court's 
twin tests of authorization in law and adversity in fact.B See 
p. supra. 
This break with tradition is in no sense justified by 
the need to recognize the novel interests at stake in 
"nontraditional forms of litigation". Ante, at 13. The class 
action is scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 merely codified and 
provided standard procedures for dealing with a form of action 
that had long been known at equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class 
Actions§ 1004 (1977). That federal jurisdiction should 
properly attach to the class aspect of such actions as an 
adjunct to the litigation of an individual claim has never been 
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new procedural 
devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to the 
recognition of different "means for presenting a case or 
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts." Aetna 
Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S., at 240 (1937)(Declaratory 
21. 
Judgment Act)(emphasis supplied), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L. 
Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933). Unless we are 
willing to abandon the personal stake requirement entirely, this 
freedom must end when we are unable to identify a concrete 
injury that may be remedied in the course of the litigation. 
The effects of a finding of mootness on the vitality of a device 
such as the class action,9 which has significantly advanced the 
administration of justice, must always be a factor in prudential 
decisions made under the rubric of mootness. But such policy 
judgments are powerless to authorize a plain violation of Art. 
III. 
I would hold that the absent members of the class are 
not presently before the Court, and that the individual 
respondent no longer has any interest in the injuries that may 
be redressed if this action is permitted to continue. Because 
the action lacks a plaintiff having that minimal personal stake 
which is an absolute constitutional prerequisite to the 
jurisdiction of an Art. III court, I would vacate the decision 
of the Court of Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss 
the action as moot. 
FOOTNOTES 
These decisions unequivocally reject the 
suggestion, expressed in some earlier opinions, that Congress 
might be able to confer jurisdiction where none would otherwise 
exist under Art. III. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (WHITE, J., concurring): see Linda 
R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S., at 617. Because there is no 
expression of congressional will in the case before us, however, 
the issue is not presented here. 
2 The order certifying the class represents a 
judicial finding that injured parties other than the named 
plaintiff exist and provides a definition by which they may be 
identified. Certification sharpens the interests of unnamed 
class members in the outcome, for only thereafter wil they be 
bound by the result. Moreover, unnamed parties can be certain 
after certification that the action will not be settled or 
dismissed without the approval of the court and appropriate 
notification to class members. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Vigorous 
advocacy is thereafter assured by the authoritative imposition 
on the named plaintiffs of a duty adequately to represent the 
entire class. Even if the named plaintiff's own claims 
subsequently become moot, the court can police his performance 
and decertify the class under Rule 23 if the representative 
FN2. 
defaults in this responsibility. The posture of the case is no 
different in principle from the more traditional representative 
action in which a single party who cannot be brought before the 
court because of his incompetence, for example, is permitted to 
litigate through an appointed fiduciary. 
Although some courts have suggested that Rule 23(e) 
notice must be required even before certification and others 
have indicated that the named plaintiff's duty to the class 
begins with filing rather than certification, none has applied 
either theory after certification has been denied. See Advisory 
Committee Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 104 (1966) • . 
3 American Party v. White 415 U.S. 767, 770 n.1 
(1974); Storer v. Brown 415 U.S. 724, 737 n.8 (1969); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124-125 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 
330, 333 n. 2 (1972); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969); 
Sibron v. New York, 302 U.S. 40 (1968)(alternative holding); 
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 u.s. 629 (1953); see 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S., at 149; SEC v. Medical 
Committee for Human Rights, 404 u.s., at 406. Although Roe and 
Dunn involved class actions, the Court made no reference to the 
procedural posture of the case in determining that neither case 
was moot under the Southern Pacific rule. 
4 Although the rule was initially applied only to 
FN3. 
litigants whose stake in the outcome was assured by specific 
threats to their own future interests, subsequent cases suggest 
that even those individuals who allege no such threat may 
continue to litigate if their claim is by nature so inherently 
trnasitory that it otherwise would evade review at the behest of 
any single challenger. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S., at 
333 n. 2; Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 u.s., at 814. Such cases can be 
explained on the basis of the importance of the issues addressed 
or on the theory that a constitutional rule absolutely 
precluding review in whole classes of cases would represent an 
abdication of judicial responsibility so serious as to erode the 
role of the courts in our federal system by imposing 
inappropriate burdens on the political branches. Although 
either explanation arguably is inconsistent with the rigid rule 
that Art. III requires a "personal stake in the outcome" in 
every case, the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that rule 
despite the existence of the exception. See p. , supra. 
5 It is significant that the Court found it 
necessary to decide whether the intervenors' claims were barred 
by limitations; that is, that they had some prospect of 
obtaining relief from a favorable judgment on the merits of the 
class claims. This inquiry would seem unnecessary if, as the 
Court holds today, they had a personal stake in the class 
FN4. 
certification issue itself. In fact, members of the putative 
class whose arguably meritorious claims have "expired" by reason 
of limitations would stand in a strikingly similar position to 
the plaintiff before us today. 
6 This understanding is further reflected in the 
repeated dictum that a properly certified class is necessary to 
supply adverseness once the named plaintiff's claim becomes 
moot. East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 406 
n. 12 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, 424 
U.S., at 754 n. 6, 755-756; see Zablocki v. Redhail, 98 S. Ct. 
673, 679 n. 6 (1978); Kremens v. Bartley, 431 u.s. 119, 129-130 
(1977); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 39 
(1974)(jurisdiction in this Court proper only because state 
courts had treated action as a class). Conversely, we have 
often stated that the named plaintiff's individual claim must 
be a live one both at the time the action is filed and - subject 
to the Gerstein exception - at the time of certification. 
Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S., at 143 n. 6 (BRENNAN, J. 
dissenting); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 u.s., at 402; see Bell v. 
Wolfish, u.s. n. 5 (1979). 
7 In this very case, respondent's interest in the 
merits is the sole motivation for his attempt to represent a 
class. The class claims were addded to his complaint only 
FNS. 
because he feared that intervening mootness would otherwise 
prevent a final determination of the merits. App. at 17, Brief 
of Respondent at 23, 33. The same theme infused respondent's 
argument before this Court, which he attempted to devote 
entirely to the merits, urging that the mootness question was 
"not very significant" because if the case were held moot 
another pr.isoner would simply file a new case. 
8 The Court finds initial authorization for the 
"private attorney general" concept in the fact that Rule 23 
grants named plaintiffs a right to have a class certified in 
certain circumstances. But we have held that even Congress may 
not grant us jursidiction when Art. III does not. Far less so 
may a rule of procedure which "shall not be construed to extend 
..• the jurisdiction of the United States district courts." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 82. The Court's test must therefore be that 
whenever a rule of law - common law statute, or rule - confers a 
right to litigate the only requirement of Art. III is that there 
be "sharply presented issues in a concrete factual setting and 
self-interested parties vigorously advocating opposing 
positions." But these requirements are surely met in the 
typical "private attorney general" action brought by an 
individual ,as citizen to challenge governmental action found to 
be offensive or simply wrong. Respondent's actual interest in 
FN6. 
this case has nothing to do with the procedural protections 
mentioned by the Court. See n. 7, supra. It is neither 
surprising nor improper that respondent should be concerned with 
the legality of the parole system rather than the rights of 
strangers or the smooth running of the judicial process. But if 
the degree of "vigor" and "self-interest" with which this 
respondent approaches the certification question is sufficient 
to satisfy the Court's Art. III test, then the advocate who 
presses a deeply held belief as to the public interest must also 
prevail against a challenge based upon Art. III. 
9 In view of the tremendous analytical gap the Court 
is willing to bridge to save this action, it is appropriate to 
note how slight are the practical imperatives for hearing this 
case. I have already noted the unimportance attached to the 
mootness question by respondent's lawyer. See p. , supra. 
This attitude is likely to be fairly typical of class actions 
brought under Rule 23 (b)(1) or (2) in which only injunctive or 
declaratory relief is sought. Such actions are not subject to 
the danger, illustrated by Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, 
ante, at , of complete frustration through sequential 
settlement offers "picking off" each intervening plaintiff. Nor 
is the loss of a single plaintiff potentially disastrous because 
others are deterred by the enormous notice costs that often flow 
FN7. 
from the certification of a class under Rule 23 (b)(3). 
Moreover, the question is not whether the parole commission may 
ever be required to conform its guidelines to the mandates of 
the law. As we have expressly noted in another context, if the 
guidelines are invalid there will be other plaintiffs who may 
properly challenge them. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 
U.S. 454, 467 n. 13 (1975). 
\ 
lfp/ss 12/31/79 Rider~, p. ~?(Geraghty) 
Note to Ellen: 
Possible Approach to Part II of our opinion: 
This case presents a fundamentally different 
situation. No class has been certified and the only 
plaintiff no longer has any personal xxag stake in the 
litigation. In my view, the precedents of this Court, 
and the purpose of Article III, require a dismissal of 
what remains \ - essentially a lawyer's case, however 
conscientious the lawyer may be ~ But the Court today 
views the case differently, and constructs new doctrine 
to justify breathing life into a lawsuit with no parties 
plaintiff. 
It anounces for the first time there are two 
categories of "~the Article III mootness doctrine": 
"flexible" and "less flexible". Ante, at 12 and n. 7. 
Not surprisingly, the Court then relies on cases 
said to 11H.demonstrate" the flexible type of mootness 
in class action litigation. These cases include So 
Gerstein, McDonald, and today's decision in Roper, 
ante at 11. 
2. 
(Ellen: Here distinguish each of these cases 
much as you have done so in your draft.) 
The "less flexible" approach to the mootness 
doctrine is said to be illustrated by Jacobs, Bradford 
and Spangler. As these are about to be made second class 
precedents, they are relegated to afs footnote. Ante, 
p. 12 n. 7. But these cases are qui t e recent decisions 
of this Court; no Justice who participated in any of them 
suggested the distinction made today; and, as the opinions 
therein make clear, settled principles of Article III 
jurisprudence - long established by prior cases - were 
applied. I suppose it would have been awkward to overrule 
them today. Yet this would have been the straightforward 
method of dispatching the "less flexible" cases. The 
Court's abbreviated treatment ignores their relevance -
~f not controlling force - to the issue presented by 
the present case. 
(Note to Ellen: Here discuss these three cases 
much as you already have in your draft, distinguishing 
3. 
them from the "more flexible" cases and emphasizing that 
they are indistinguishable on principle from the 
present case). 
lfp/ss 12/31/79 Rider A, p . 21 (Geraghty) 
We thus have a case in which the named plaintiff 
(the respondent here) no longer has any interest in the 
injuries asserted in his complaint , and where no member 
of the putative class is before the Court . The case 
therefore lacks a plaintiff having that minimal personal 
stage which is a constitutional prerequisite to the 
jaxixxBEXXBRK jurisdiction of an Article III court . 
In any realistic sense , the only party before this 
Court who appears to have an interest xaxxha is a 
counsel who no longer has an identifiable client . 
I would vacate the decision of the Court of 
Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss the 
action as moot . 
lfp/ss 12/31/79 Rider A, p. 7 (Geraghty) 
Note to Ellen: 
Possible Approach to Part II of our opinion: 
This case presents a fundamentally different 
situation. No class has been certified and the only 
plaintiff no longer has any personal xxag stake in the 
litigation. In my view, the precedents of this Court , 
and the purpose of Article III, require a dismissal of 
what remains - essentially a lawyer's case, however 
conscientious the lawyer may be. But the Court today 
views the case differently, and constructs new doctrine 
to justify breathing life into a lawsuit with no parties 
plaintiff. 
It anounces for the first time there are two 
categories of "j!the Article Ill mootness doctrine": 
"flexible" and "less flexible". ~' at 12 and n. 7. 
Not surprisingly, the Court then relies on cases 
said to "&demonstrate" the flexible type of mootness 
in class action litigation. These cases include 




(Ellen: Here distinguish each of these cases 
much as you have done so in your draft.) 
The 11 less flexible" approach to the mootness 
doctrine is said to be illustrated by Jacobs, Bradford 
and Spangler. As these are about to be made second class \ 
\ 
precedents, they are relegated to aia footnote. ~, 
p. 12 n. 7. But these cases are quite recent decisions 
of this Court; no Justice who participated in any of them 
suggested the distinction made today; and, as the opinions 
therein make clear, settled principles of Article III 
jurisprudence - long established by prior cases - were 
applied. I suppose it would have been awkward to overrule 
them today. Yet this would have been the straightforward 
method of dispatching the "less flexible" cases. The 
Court's abbreviated treatment ignores their relevance -
of not controlling force - to the issue presented by 
the present case. 
(Note to Ellen: Here discuss these three cases 
much as you already have in your draft, distinguishing 
lfp/ss 12/31/79 Rider A, po 21 (Geraghty) 
We thus have a case in which the named plaintiff 
(the respondent here) no longer has any interest in the 
injuries asserted in his complaint, and where no member 
of the putative class is 
//+'~~~~~. 
before the CourtA The case 
therefore lacks a plaintiff having that minimal personal 
stage which is a constitutional prerequisite to the 
~HxixxaEXXRRK jurisdiction of an Article III court. 
In any realistic sense, the only party before this 
Court who appears to have an interest xaxxka is~ 
G'L/ * 
counsel who no longer has ~ ideatifiab~ client. 
~ A 
I would vacate the decision of the Court of 
Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss the 
action as moot. 
lfp/ss 12/31/79 Rider A 2 p. 7 (Geraghty) 
The foregoing decisions, largely ignored by the 
Court's opinion, establish principles that this Court 
has applied consistently. ~o ~e sure they in7 the 
initial question of standi~ to ~~tion rather 
1\ 
~~~_r-vv~ .. 
than~class action~o But there is no exception in Article 
~ 
III for class actions ) )the constitutional doctrines of 
standing and mootness focus alike on whether a personal 
stake is at issue in a live ~ntroversy.) We have 
recognized, however, that when a class has been 
certified in accordance with Rule 23 it "acquires a 
legal status separate from the interests asserted by 
[the named plaintiff]" Sosna v. Iowa :~ 419 U.S. 393, 
399 (1975) . 
' ' 
lfp/ss 12/31/79 Rider A, p. 1 (Geraghty) 
This suit was filed by respondent as a class 
action while he was serving time in a federal prison. 
The District Court denied class& certifica~ion and 
~ 
( 
granted summary for petitioners. 
A 
Respondent appealed, 
but before any brief was filed he was unconditionally 
released from prison. Petitioners then moved to dismiss 
I 
\ the appeal as moot, but the Court of Appeals denied 
~ 1\ 
that motion , ~versed the judemeat of the District Court ~~~~ 
liCLAP < .x-t '-.J _) 
and he case for further proceedings. The 
court concluded that despite the conceded mootness of 
P" . ~ ~ .!~ ./. ~ . . ~ •• ex~ ~~,_,~~ 
the
4 
cl.asg a~ft--ism respondent's personal claim, 
remained ai live controversy in which respondent - as 
class representative - had sufficient interest to 
1 fpjss 1/17/80 
, apparently is elevated by the Court's opinion 
this case to the status of new doctrine. If this 
is the intent, there is serious tension with the 
opinion of Chief Justice Burger for the Court in 
Roper, also handed down today. In Roper, the Court 
is careful to explain that allowing the named 
plaintiff who has prevailed on the merits to 
continue in the case for the purpose of appealing, 
within the statutory period, the denial of class 
certification rests upon the "critical distinction" 
between mootness deriving from a iudgment and 
mootness deriving from events extrinsic to the 
litigation. ~' at , slip op., at 9. When a 
iudgment has been entered the Roper Court holds 
that Article III is relevant only indirectly to a 
central question of appealability. Id., at 7, 12. 
Roper also expressly notes that the named plaintiff 
whose judgment was satisfied retains an economic 
interest in sharing litigation costs with the 
class. Thus, it is far from apParent how these two 
cases can be reconciled. Here, mootness did not 
derive from a iudgment; rather, it resulted solely 
from an extrinsic event - the unconditional release 
from prison of the only named plaintiff. Thus, a 
2. 
distinction viewed as "critical" by the Roper Court 
is iqnored by the Seraqhtv Court. 
Althouqh Roper fairly may be criticized 
on other qrounds, ~' at it carefully leaves 
undisturbed the fundamental rule that a plaintiff 
who can no lonqer assert a concrete iniury 
remediable by iudicial action has ceased to present 
a case cognizable in an Article III court. 





~ No. 78-572 United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he 
was serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a 
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will 
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The 
District Court denied class certification and granted summary 
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before ~ 
~fddl, 
£ ilg~ •AY briefs, he was unconditionally released from prison. A . 
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The Court 
of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment of the 
District Court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. 
Conceding that respondent's personal claim was moot, the Court 
of Appeals nevertheless concluded that respondent properly could 
appeal the denial of class certification. The Court today agrees 
with this conclusion. 
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First, 
'd-
t.Q~  says that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may 
1\ 
be adapted as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of 
litigation. Ante at 8 - 12.f econd, the Court holds that the 
named plaintiff has a right "analogous to the private attorney 
2. 
general concept" to appeal the denial of class certification 
even when his personal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12 -
16. Both steps are significant departures from settled law that 
rationally cannot be confined to the narrow issue presented in 
this case. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
As the Court observes, this case involves the 
"personal stake" aspect of the mootness doctrine. Ante, at 7. 
There is undoubtedly a "live" issue which an appropriate 
plaintiff could present for judicial resolution. The question 
is whether respondent's present interest in the controversy 
makes him a proper plaintiff. 
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the 
personal stake requirement with some care. When the issue is 
presented at the outset of litigation as a question of standing 
to sue, we have held that the personal •stake requirement has a 
double aspect. On the one hand, it derives from Art. III 
limitations on the power of the federal courts. On the other, 
it embodies self-imposed restraints on the exercise of judicial 
power. E.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 (1976); 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 u.s. 490, 498 (1975). The prudential 
aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine of uncertain 
contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional minimum has been 
3. 
given definite content: "[i]n order to satisfy Art. III, the 
plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered some actual 
or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal 
conduct of the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of 
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979).~/ Although non-economic 
injuries can confer standing, the Court has rejected all 
attempts to substitute abstract concern with a subject - or with 
the rights of third parties - for "the concrete injury required 
by Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 
426 u.s. 26, 40 (1976).l/ 
As the Court notes today, the same threshold 
requirement must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 
8; see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential 
considerations not present at the outset may come into play 
after the parties have invested substantial resources in an 
action and generated a factual record. But an actual case or 
controversy in the constitutional sense "must be extant at all 
stages of review." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n. 10 
(1974). Cases that 'no longer "'touc[h] the legal relations of 
parties having adverse legal interests'" are moot because 
"federal courts are without power to decide questions that 
cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them." 
North Carolina v. Rice, 404 u.s. 244, 246 (1971)(per curiam), 
4. 
quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 u.s. 227, 240-241 
(1937). The limitation f l ows directly from Art. III. DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, 416 u.s. 312, 316 (1974) (per curiam).l/ 
Since the question is one of power, practical 
considerations do not control. Sosna v. Iowa 419 u.s. 393, 401 
n.9 (1975); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 36 (1974); 
United States v. Alaska s.s. Co., 253 u.s. 113, 116 (1920). Nor 
can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the 
necessary individual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the 
original wrong may supply the individual interest in some 
circumstances. Sibron v. New York, 392 u.s. 40, 53-58 (1968). 
So, too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so 
inherently transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal 
course of litigation. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 
416 u.s. 115 (1974); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 u.s. 
498, 515 (1911). The essential and irreducible constitutional 
requirement is simply some showing of continuing or threatened 
injury at the hands of the adversary. 
J~i-r-~-1:;;~~~ ~~/ 
These cases demonstrate that the core requirement of a 
;\ 
It \ 1 
v 
personal stake in the outcome is not flexible. On the eontrary, ~ 
~, 
A the personal stake requirement sometimes appears rigidly 
formalistic. See Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 u. 
5. 
~~ 
Chi. L. Rev. 601, 613-614 (1968). We ~have insisted upon the 
requirement in mootness and standing cases because it is 
/NIL-
embedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by.~ 
Constitution, "founded in concern about the proper - and 
properly limited - role of the courts in a democratic society." 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we have, 
until today, "prevent(ed] the judicial process from becoming no 
more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests 
of concerned bystanders." United States v. SCRAP, 412 u.s. 669, 
687 (1973): see Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 
supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment): Sierra 
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.727, 740 (1974). 
II 
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the 
Court has applied consistently. These principles were developed 
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no 
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a putative 
class representative who alleges no individual injury "may not 
seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the 
class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974). Only 
after. a class has been certified in accordance with Rule 23 can 
it "acquir(e] a legal status separate from the interests 
asserted by (the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra at 399 
6. 
(1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live interests 
of unnamed but identifiable class members may supply the 
personal stake required by Art. III when the named plaintiff's 
individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bowman Transportation 
Co., 424 u.s. 747, 755-756 (1976): Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402. 
This case presents a fundamentally different 
situation. No class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff 
no longer has any personal stake in the litigation._!/ In the 
words of his own lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no 
additional personal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 
~t;:;:;,, .: .. , ~ 
25. Even the lawyer has evinced no interest in\represent~ 
~.cM~J&~~s . 
esponden , as opposed to ~ personJ presently incarcerated~6-
Ibid.~/ In these circumstances, Art. III and 
o :fi. Lh~-e eo~ . But the Court views the case differently and 
constructs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has 
no plaintiff. 
The Court announces today for the first time - and 
without attempting to ~econcile the many cases to the contrary -
that there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness 
doctrine": "flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12 and 
n.7. The Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the 
application of "flexible" mootness to class action litigation. 
7. 
These cases include Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 u.s. 103, 110-111 n.11 
(1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 u.s. 385 (1977), 
and today's decision in Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, 
ante, p. Each case is said to show that a class action is 
not necessarily mooted by the loss of the class representative's 
personal stake in the merits, even though no class has been 
certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself is cited for the 
proposition that the requirements of Art. III may be met 
"through means other than the traditional requirement of a 
'personal stake in the outcome.'" Ante, at 15. The Court 
grievously misreads these precedents, for they show nothing of 
the kind. 
A 
In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that~ 
p~QQeew~ gives legal recognition to additional 
adverse parties. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 u.s. 
227, 240 (1937).~/ And in Ge~stein, the Court applied a rule 
~ 
long established by non-class action cases that never  been 
thought to erode the requirement of a personal stake in the 
outcome. Gerstein held that a class action challenging the 
constitutionality of pretrial detention procedures could 
continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions had brought 
their detentions to an end. The action did not continue because 
a personal stake in the outcome on the merits was unnecessary. 
Rather, the lawsuit fell in "that narrow class of cases" that 
are "distinctly 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" 
4 2 0 U • S • , at 1 1 0 n • 1 1 • ]_/ 
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the 
denial of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of 
the class representative's claim on the merits. But neither 
case departs from traditional understandings of the personal 
stake requirement. In McDonald, a putative class member 
~ ft-1 /)..../-~,; ~ ~-~ 
intervened~o appeal the certification ruling. 432 u.s., at 
390.~/ Because the Court found that her claim was not time-
8. 
barred, the intervenor in McDonald possessed the stake necessary 
to pursue the action. Indeed, the Court devoted its entire 
opinion to showing that the intervenor's claim for relief had 
not expired.~/ At most, McDonald holds only that an action which 
4u+f-~4...,_ ~~ ~'"'~ 
is ~~l.¥ ~'l!'iH.lQtJ by interested partiesi\a..t ali time" does not J 
"die" in an Art. I II sense , b'il'ii'ii'lli'il gf a ~li"ie£ 4Itte'l!' eel il'\ \Jhich 
I'loQlt'R9r the~al l'lor-..t.'Re-sJ.~hst :Hnte par'ey otet& preseRt 8efore 
tfte 10blft~/ 
eod'tt-ee&'eeo6 in McDonald that the "refusal to ., 
certify was subject to appellate review after final judgment at 
the behest of the named plaintiffs. • . " 432 U.S., at 393. 
~ , 4-.c.H-·<--, 
That &~ee~mA repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 u.s. 
9. 
463, 469, 
' t / _4 ~ .. ~ ... J4 u,~c. ..... ,J...tr ¥#J..W.I( 
470 n. 15 (1978), , today is adopted as law. Roper 
\ 
has explains, however, that the rule allowing a plaintiff who 
prevailed on the merits to appeal the denial of class 
certification rests upon the "critical distinction" between 
mootness deriving from a judgment and mootness deriving from 
events extrinsic to the litigation. Ante, at , slip op. at! 
9. When a judgment has been entered, the Court holds that Art( 
III is relevant only indirectly to the central question of ~ 
appealability. Id., at 7, 12. Roper also expressly notes the / 
named plaintiffs' economic interest in sharing litigation costls 
with the class - an interest not present here. Id., at 10 n. 
Although Roper may be criticized on other grounds, ante, at 
it leaves undisturbed the fundamental rule that a plaintiff wh 
w.L~, 
can no longer assert a concrete injury remediable by judicial 
action has ceased to present a case cognizable in an Art. 
court. 
B ~~~--
\...a.,_ ·~......, ~£l.lt"' .... ~ Hu,.cj..,w~ 1 
· ~~~~~-;;~~~~~~~~~~~~~~v-----~ The ·~~~~ exiblt. cases cited by the Cour apply 
~ ~z:II:. ~;..e.-..c(Ac· .4• ·~• ) >--
t~• ~Qem@A~al ~1@ in cases closely analogous to this one. 
~ 
Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U~S. 128 (1975)(per 
curiam); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 u.s. 147 (1975)(per curiam); 
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 u.s. 424, 430 
(1976). As they are about to become second class precedents, 
_.. -
... fp/ss 1/17/80 
, apparently is elevated by the Court's opinion in 
~or 
this case to the status of new doctrine. IT this 
L;;, .. , ~._.._.,... ..-....-.. -jL, > ..-- e-.J ~l..p:-/o"'-"- c 
~ ~_h,ere is serious tensionAw~~ the Mv.Jt ~owef 
r-e.0Acttr5 ~op~-1 ~ lcfi; -\n~ ---
~; nj,Qn e c MtA a:¢2s;;(Sri&;~~ ~~in 
Jil.op~~ -~~ •Jil~ee eL Jill toela:y>a In Roper, the Court 
a.-
is careful to explain that allowinq ).i1e named 
plaintiff who has prevailed on the merits ~~ ~ 
c~M Case ffir the t'M£peso of appealj~ 
17i~atatatocy per~ the denial of class 
~<lUilc af- o.. 
certification xests upoc. .,_. "critical distinction" 
between mootness deriving from a iudgment and 
~···eA:zut. mootness d~tio~ from events extrinsic to the 
litigation. 
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f.k d 1st inc:tlon v-iewed as 11 cr tt: ical 11 bv the-~opet Ceta: t 
~~ iS "3(;,$e....-(" ;~ 
is -ignorea- by tbe ~aqhtyr "Co-urt-; 
· \._~h .... c.hW~.A utu.J 011< ,~j 
Althouq ~~LV may be criticized) 
-HAo1 ([)/Jtl_ 
OA etfier ~re~A~Br ~' at 
~ 1\ot {ltAf(>i1f \ +o 
~disturb.- the fundamental rule that a plaintiff 
who can no lonqer assert a concrete iniurv 
remediable by iudicial action has ceased to present 
a case cognizable in an Article III court. 
1 0. 
these cases are relegated to a footnote. ~' at 12 n.7. But 
a· til.. ~ d ~e~LL, ~ ,... ,.,,,-tU(J 
the cases are ~i~ recentAdecisions of this Court. They 
~?ZL,./ 
applied long estaeli~~e~ principles of Art. III jurisprudence. 
A 
And no Justice who participated in them suggested the 
distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded treatment of 
these "less flexible" cases ignores their controlling relevance 
to the · issue presented here. 
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action 
to challenge certain high school regulations. The District 
Court stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate 
and that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the 
court failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted 
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had 
graduated. We held that the action was entirely moot because 
the "class action was never properly certified nor the class '" / 
~ 
properly identified by the District Court." 420 u.s., at 130. 
Since the faulty certification prevented the class from 
acquiring separate legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. 
We reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action 
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a third 
party. 427 u.s., at 430-431. See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 
U.S. 308, 310 n.1 (1976). And in Bradford, where the District 
Court had denied certification outright, the Court held that the 
11. 
named plaintiff's release from prison required the dismissal of 
his complaint about parole release procedures. 423 u.s., at 
149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 
u.s. 1, 8 (1978). 
The Court suggests that Jacobs and ·Spangler may be 
distinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing 
the denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact 
that in each case the class representatives were defending a 
judgment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed. 
The plaintiffs/respondents continued vigorously to assert the 
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route of 
appealing a denial of certification only because the district 
court had granted - albeit defectively - class status. We chose 
not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in 
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class 
representative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by 
adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and .Bradford as 
well, is no one has a~onal 
stake in 
~ 
for third parties, through the 
mechanism of class certification or otherwise.11/ The Court 
rejects that principle today: 
1 2. 
III 
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness 
~ 
is unprecedented, the content given that concept is~more 
. 
~~· 
startliR~~~~l. The Court splits the class aspects of this 
~
ction into two separate "claims": that the 
0 ta., .. ,... ~ tib ,J- c:t.., u......e. •• c t-1- C. cl 
maintained on behalf of ~ class and that the 
~ ) 
action may be 
class is entitled 
to relief on the merits. Since no class has been certified, the 
Court concedes that the claim on the merits is moot. Ante, at ___.__ 
. 15, 17. But respondent is said to have a personal stake in his 
"procedural claim" despite his lack of a stake in the merits. 
The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to 
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to 
respondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the 
certification question. Instead, respondent's "personal stake" 
is said to derive from two factors having nothing to do with any 
concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the Court finds 
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create a "right," 
"analogous to the private attorney general concept," to have a 
class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the case retains 
the "imperatives of a dispute capable of j~dicial resolution," 
which are identified as (i) a sharply presented issue, (ii) a 
concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested party 
actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15. 
1 3. 
The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in 
Rule 23 is e~t~rsl ¥ misplaced. We have 
~ 
~ f<tL-e,c,_l, ~ 
may not~ ·JUrlsd1ct1on when Art. 
held that even Congress 
III does not. Gladstone, 
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 u.s., at 100; O'Shea v. 
Littleton, 414 u.s., at 494 & n.2; see Marbury v. Madison, 
Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a rule of procedure 
which "shall not be construed to extend .•• the jurisdiction 
of the United States district courts." Fed. R. Civ. P. 82. 
Moreover, the "private attorney general concept" cannot supply 
the personal stake necessary to satisfy Art. III. It serves 
only to permit litigation by a party who has a stake of his own 
but otherwise might be barred by prudential standing rules. See 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 u.s., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 
u.s., at 737-738. 
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general 
concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new 
perception of Art. III requirements must rest entirely on its 
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the 
components of the test are no strangers to our Art. III 
jurisprudence, they are an aspect of those "policy rules often 
invoked by the court 'to avoid passing prematurely on 
constitutional questions.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. 
424 u.s., at 755-756 & n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 u.s. 
1 4 0 
83, 97 (1968). Such rules operate only in "'cases confessedly 
within [the Court's] jurisdiction~'" Ibid. The Court cites no 
decision that has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence 
of a sharply presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued 
case, and I am aware of none.~/ Indeed, each of these 
characteristics is sure to be presQ~t in the typical "private 
4- P.·~'-' ~-·--~ 
attorney general" action brought by iiilR jReQJ:Qo£i;rel dtizen. 1l/ 
-'\ -
Although we hAve re f used steadfastly to countenance the "publi c 
action," the Court's redefinition of the personal stake 
requirement leaves no principled basis for that practice.l!/ 
The Court reasons that this 9F~~~ departure from 
)o 
precedent is compelled by the difficulty of identifying a 
personal stake in a "procedural claim," particularly in 
"nontraditional forms of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the 
Court has created a false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class 
certification issues are "ancillary to the litigation of 
substantive claims." Ante, at (slip op., at 6). Any attempt 
t o identify a p@rsonll stake in such ancillary "claims" often 
must end in frustration, for they are not claims in any ordinary 
sense of the word. A motion for class certification, like a 
motion to join additional parties or to try the case before a 
i ur y inst e ad of a judge, seeks only to present a substantive 
c l aim in a particular context. Such procedural devices 
v eL........, ~~ ~ ~-- .,.,. ..,.,.,_t.. 
...,..,.,."""1 ......... ,..,. #a J~c.4C · LJII..- ,. I 1 1 _.LJ 5 • 
LJ ~~ .,:::.~ ....... , .... ~
,_, ~t;:c.c.- ~ ~~~,......, . L.~J~ 
 
generally have no value apart from their capacity to'\ :i,.R'e't'"eas2J _ 
~~-u:~o/ ~ u. 
th~ 1 ikel iho~ of succes~ on the merits. Accordingly, the 
moving party is neither expected nor re~uired to assert an 
interest in them independent of his interest in the merits. \ A 
I class representative is permitted to litigate the class 
certification question because it is inextricably entwined with \ 
I 
his attempt to establish substantive claims - not because of any 
)independent interest in serving as class representative and 
certainly not, as the Court suggests, because Art. III makes an 
xception for "nontraditional" forms of litigatio • ----------- --- . --
, f he class action is scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 
;) ~ ... • t. ~ ,:....._ "·-~ • .1. ""=' c:£. .,...;.{y J 
mer~y codifies procedures for dealing with a form of action 
1\ 
long known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004 
(1977). That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class 
aspect of litigation involving individual claims has never been 
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new procedural 
devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to the 
recognition of different "'means for presenting a case or 
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.'" Aetna 
Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 u.s., at 240 (1937) (Declaratory 
Judgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 
288 u.s. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added). 
ootness on the vitality of a device like the class action 
- ~ 
1 6. 
which aa2 sigRif~ga~tly adva~ced ~he agmi~i9tration of j~stieo,~ 
But it cannot 
provide a plaintiff when none is before the Court, for we are 
powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation of Art. III.16 
IV 
In short, we deal with a case in which the putative 
~~JJe.J-
class representative - respondent here - no longer has ~ ,. 
interest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member of 
the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been identified. 
The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal personal 
stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the jurisdiction 
of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only persons 
before this Court who appear to have an interest are the 
defendant and a lawyer who no longer has a client.~/ 
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals 
and remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot. 
FOOTNOTES 
11 See, e.q., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental 
Study Group, Inc., 438 u.s. 59, 72 (1978)~ Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. 429 u.s. 252, 260-261 (1977)~ 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 u.s. 490, 499 (1975)~ Linda R. S. v. 
Richard D., 410 u.s. 614, 617 (1973). 
!:.1 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the -- . 
War 418 u.s. 208, 227 (1974)~ O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 u.s. 488, 
494 (1974)~ Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 u.s. 163, 166-167 
(1972)~ Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 736-738 (1972)~ 
Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) (per curiam). The 
rule is the same when the question is mootness and a litigant 
can assert no more than emotional involvement in what remains of 
the case. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per 
curiam). 
ll See, e.g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401-
402 (1975)~ SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 u.s. 403, 
407 (1972)~ Powell v. McCormack, 395 u.s. 486, 496 n.7 (1969)~ 
Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 u.s. 301, 306 n.3 (1964) 
!/ The Court agrees that respondent has no personal 
stake in the ultimate outcome of the case, for it holds that the 
case must be dismissed as moot if no class is certified on 
~~ 
remand. Ante, at 15, 17. ~\the Court dQQ J: Ret suggest that 
respondent will be affected personally by any ruling on the 
class certification question that is remanded today. In fact, 
FN2. 
d- . ~~ C&~P\ apparently~~ncefd~ that respondent has no personal 
stake - "in the traditional sense" - in obtaining certification. 
Id., at 14. 
Several prisoners now in federal custody have filed a 
motion to intervene as parties respondent in this Court. 
Although the Court does not rule on that motion, I note that the 
motion was received well over a year after respondent was 
released from prison. In the interim, respondent obtained a 
ruling from the Court of Appeals and filed his petition for 
certiorari in this Court. Such untimely intervention comes too 
late to save the action under United Air Lines v. McDonald, 432 
u.s. 385 (1977). 
21 Respondent's lawyer opened his argument by saying 
that "[t]he mootness question in this case is, from a practical 
standpoint, not very significant." If the action is held moot he 
will simply "file a new case." Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. Except as 
necessary to respond to questions, the lawyer thereafter limited 
his presentation to a discussion of the merits. 
~I+~~ kJ 4C.d .,_ti•.IJL ~/..,_, ' J f-
.§_/ TS-@ ~ c e ;a;;t i "Q.ri ng U~Q 8lillii11ii1 represents a 
1\ 
judicial finding that injured parties other than the named 
plaintiff exist. 
can be identified. 
It also provides a definition by which they 
~....,JII,cc../ 
Certification sharpens the interests of 
\ 
unnamed class members in the outcome; only after certification 
FN3. 
will they be bound by the outcome. After certification, the 
action cannot be settled or dismissed without the approval of 
the court and approp~iate notice to class members. Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(e). Vigorous ai"'ocacy is assured by the authoritative 
imposition on the nameA plaintiffs of a duty adequately to 
represent the entire cl.Rss. If the named plaintiff's own claim 
becomes moot, the court can monitor his performance and 
decertify the class unner Rule 23 if he defaults in this 
? 
~~~ · 
~ responsibility./\ Afte l\ certificationr oA o~fie[ \101!'~ the case 
is no different in pri~ciple from ~ more traditional 
s: ..e,q ~-
representative action"' i:A \inie!\ a single party who cannot be 0 
~~-~ ~~the .,.._r because of~ ~~h""'his 




I c;.~~ h' • _ T e Court s analys1s, w 1ch emphas1zed that 
i\ . 
"[p]retrial detention is hy nature temporary" and that "[t]he 
individual could • • • suffer repeated deprivations" with no 
access to redress, falls squarely within the rule of Southern 
Pac. Terminal v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). See Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). In similar cases we have noted 
that the continuation of the action will depend "'especially 
[upon] the reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would 
; 
evade review.'" Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, , 213 n.11 
FN4. 
(1978), quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 u.s. 393, 402 n.11 (1975). 
These limitations themselves are inconsistent with the concept 
of "flexible" mootness and the redefinition of "personal stake" 
adopted today. 
~/ The individual claims of the original named 
plaintiffs had been settled after a judgment on the question of 
I 
liability. 432 u.s., at 389, 393 n.14. 
unnecessary if, as the Court holds today, the intervenor had a 
personal stake in the class certification issue itself. Since 
~4-i.....C. ~ 
the present respondent's claim ~ "expired" \'llitlA the passa~e of 
A J 
~, he stands in the same position as a member of the putative 
class whose claim has "expired" by reason of the statute of 
limitations. 
lQI See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 3_()8, 310 n.1 
(1976) (permitting intervenors to c the litigation 
despite suggestions of inquiring into ---
~ ~ questions of timing). 
-- 1~ V\~ 
dictum that a properly certified class is necessary to supply 
adverseness once the named plaintiff's claim becomes moot. East 
Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 u.s. 395, 406 n. 12 
(1977); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, 424 u.s., at 
·""' ~ , .. ~ ~ 
··": -- ·- ------·· .it..''' .:o;; . .-.-
/, J 
--~- ~.J::ll!, ..... .a....-~ ' 
.. 
FN5. 
754 n.6, 755-756: see Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 129-120 
(1977): Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 39 (1974). 
Conversely, we have often stated that the named plaintiff's 
individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action 
is filed and at the time of certification. Kremens v. Bartley, 
supra, at 143 n.6 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting): Sosna v. Iowa, 419 
u.s., at 402: see Bell v. Wolfish, u.s. n. 5 
(1979): Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382 n.9 (1978). 
~/ The Court has twice rejected the contention that a 
"spirited dispute" alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 35-36 (1974): Hall v. Beals, 
396 u.s. 45, 48-49 (1969) (per curiam). 
lll The Court's assertion to the contrary 
notwithstanding, there is nothing in the record to suggest that 
respondent has any interest whatever in his new-found "right to 
have a class certified." Ante, at 15. In fact, the record 
shows that respondent's interest in the merits was the sole 
motivation for his attempt to represent a class. The class 
claims were added to his complaint only because his lawyer 
feared that mootness might terminate the action. App., at 17: 
Brief for Respondent 23, 33. The record does not reveal whether 
respondent - as distinguished from his lawyer - now wishes to 
continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that his 
FN6. 
interest has nothing to do with the procedural protections 
described by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suits." 
Ante, at 14. It is neither surprising nor improper that 
respondent should be concerned with parole procedures. But · 
~~.-u.~~.~._ ~w~J 
respondent's actual interest is indistin~uishable froml\~t of a 
• ¢ 
"private attorney general" who mightr bring a "public action" to 
challenge tlo@ -5JtiR<jS of tb~ parole system£ :'7~ A>~~ 
~J4. 
l!l The Court's view logically cannot be confined to 
moot cases. If a plaintiff who is released from prison the day 
after filing a class action challenging parole guidelines may 
seek certification of the class, why should a plaintiff who is 
released the day before filing the suit be barred? As an Art. 
III matter, there can be no difference. 
Even on prudential grounds, there is little ~ifference 
~ ~ )4-ti'.,C.c•..:/- ,.._&A . 
.1. . I 
between this action and one filed promptly upon release. ~ ·~h1s 
Court has ruled on neither the merits G~ ~Ae saae nor the 
propriety of the class action. At the same time, it has vacated 
.) 
a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in turn the 
judgment of the District Court. No determination on any issue 
.!1 u, 4..- ~- c ...... c.~c:::a ..... l ~ 4:.-~···/...H, 
is left standing. ~ For every practical purpose, the case must 
begin anew. Q espoRdeRt's sonneel himself finds our resolution 
~ Nbe moatness. ~ion of no J"t"a 
rf ~;3 It is difficult to imagine a case in which the 
FN7. 
prudential considerations aligned against a finding of mootness 
are less compelling. 
15 I do not imply that the result reached today is 
necessary in any way to the continued vitality of the class 
action device. On the contrary, the practical impact of finding 
mootness in this case would be slight indeed. See note 13, 
supra. And this case may well be typical of class actions 
brought under Rule 23 (b)(1) or (2) to seek injunctive or 
declaratory relief. Such actions are not subject to frustration 
through sequential settlement offers that "pick off~ each 
intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, 
ante, at (slip op., at 11-12). Nor will substitute 
plaintiffs be deterred by the notice costs that attend 
certification of a class under Rule 23 (b)(3). 
~~~f• AI'.~ ,< -< 
16/ In i.t.s--he~d);eng rtt~h to "save" this action from 
- \ /o 
I l1 
mootness the Court role of a reviewing 
court. It fails to identify how, if at all, the District Court 
has erred. The Court does not address the District Court's 
ruling against respondent on the merits or the District Court's 
refusal to certify the broad class sought by respondent. Nor 
does the Court suggest that the District Court erred in fniling 
to consider the possibility of subclasses sua sponte. 
~ !'~./~ ) 
Nevertheless, respondent is given the opportunity to raise the 
FN8. 
subclass question on remand. That result cannot be squared with 
the rule that a litigant may not raise on appeal those issues he 
has failed to preserve by appropriate objection in the court 
below. The Court intimates that the District Court waited too 
long to deny the class certification motion, thus makinq a 
motion for subclasses a "futile act." Ante, at 17. But nothing 
in the record suggests that the District Court would not have 
entertained such a motion. Since respondent sought 
certification in the first place only to avoid mootness on 
appeal, the entry of an order against him on the merits cannot 
excuse him from raising the subclass issue thereafter. 
121 I imply no criticism of counsel in this case. The 
Court of Appeals agreed with counsel that the certification 
issue was appealable, and the case was brought to this Court by 
the United States. 
lfp/ss 2/11/80 Footnote - 12a; - p; - 11 - (Geraqhtv) 
12a. In a footnote, ante at 18 n. 11, 
the Court states: 
"This respondent suffered actual, 
concrete iniury as a result of the 
putatively illeqal conduct, and this 
iniury would satisfy the formalistic 
personal stake requirement if damaqes 
were souqht. See, e.q., Powell -v. 
McCormack, 395 u.s., at 495, 5oo. ( His 
injury continued up to and beyond the 
time the Dist~ict Court denied class 
certification.") .Afl.:t::g; at -18, -n. lt. 
This appears to be a cateqoric claim of 
the actual, concrete iniury our cases have 
required. Yet, aqain, the Court fails to identify 
the injury. The reference to damaqes, even if 
otherwise material, is irrelevant here as 
respondent souqht no damaqes - only iniunctive and 
declaratory relief. Moreover, counsel for 
respondent frankly conceded that his client "can 
obtain absolutely no additional personal relief" in 
this case. Tr. Oral Aqr. 25 • . If :b~eti the Court 
~ .. 1s cla1m1nq concrete injury "up to and bevond the 
1\ 
time" class certification was denied, it would 
if 
indeed be helpful for ~t to identify 
'f' 11 rtb: ~ . . ~--~h ~ spec1 1ca y~twe lAl~Y 1t perce1vesn~ t at 
~ .J.. 1 J __ 
leA~ ~~-~r TV 
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Here are some proposed rsponses to the Court's new 
footnote 11. I do not think the Court makes any telling points 
against our dissenting position, however, and if you decide 
against responding I will not be insulted. 
RIDER 1, P. 2 n.1: 
Each of these cases reiects explicitly the view, once expressed ~~ 
by Mr. Justice Harlan and now apparently espoused by the Court, 
that the personal stake requirement lacks constitutional 
significance. ~' at 16 n. 11; Flast -v; -cohen, 392 u.s. 83, 
120 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Until today, however, that 
view never had commanded a maiority. 
RIDER 2, p. 4 
4a/ The Court states that "the erosion of the strict o-1( 
formalistic perception of Art. III was begun well before today's 
decision," and that the Art. III personal stake requirement is 
"riddled with exceptions." Ante, at 16 n. 11. ~ 
.91- ~-~ 
~~-~~e~€~~~~~~ fails to cite a sinqle 
'\ " 
Court opinion in 
support of either statement. To the extent that the decision in 
Flast -v; -Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), act!Jlv supports the 
position ascribed to it in the dissent, id., at 117-120, it noes 
not survive the lonq line of express holdings that beqan with 
I 2. 
Warth - v; · Seldin, 422 u.s. 490 (1975), and were reaffirmed only 
; 
last term. Gladstone; · Realtors v; ·Villaqe · of Bellwood, 441 n.s. 
91, 99 (1979). See nn. 1 & 2, supra. 
RIDER 3, p. 8 
8a/ In assuming that the class aspects of the action 1\(v ~ 
continued after the denial of certification, McDonald departed 
I" 
the principles established in Sosna · v. - Iowa 
and Franks v; · Bowma ·TransportatioL See pp. 4-5, supra: 
United ·Airlines; - Inc. · v; McDonald, 432 u.s. 385, 399-400 
~~~ ~~4.<ce.p,.IJ4~~; 
(POWELL, J., dissentinq). j7. ' readinq of Rule 23 may ~~ 
1\ 
have caused some prej dice to in that case. Ibid. 
But it created no exception to the Ar • III requirement of a 
personal stake in the outcome, for there c be no doubt that 
the McDonald intervenors were interested parti plaintiff. 
RIDER 4, p. 11 • 
12a/ The Court notes that respondent may hav 
personal stake in obtaininq damaqes for his alleqedly ill qal 
detention. ~' at 16 n. 11. The relevance of that 
observation to the present action for iniunctive and d 
relief is not apparent. If the Court actually 
respondent retains a stake in this action for the purpo e of 
obtaininq damages, its refusal to consider the merits o 
claim is incomprehensible. 
3. 
~--
RIDER 5, p. 11 5. ~. 
., 
12b/ The Court attempts to limit the sweeping 
c. 
~~ 
consequences that ~ould flow from a straightforward application 
"' 
of these criteria, see infra, at 12-13 & n. 15, by asserting 
that "[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts."~, at 16 
n. 11. But the Court does not expound a l imiting principle of 
any kind. Adverse practical consequences certainly cannot 
explain today's result, since none would flow from a findinq of 
mootness in this case. See n. 15, infra. Nor does the 
"relation back principle," §inte, at 16 n. 11, further the 
analysis. Although this ~1 fiction may provide a ~1 




~ The Court attempts to limit the 
sweeping consequences that could flow from the 
application of these criteria, see infra, at 12-13 
and n. 15, by assertinq that "[e]ach case must be 
decided on its own facts", considerinq the 
"practicalities and prudential considerations". 
Ante, at 17 n. 11. The Court long has recoqnized a 
difference between prudential and constitutional 
V ~tD~ (Article III) standinq. A I am not aware that the 
I ( If.. J 
VU~ Court, until today, has ever merged these 
considerations for the purpose of eliminatinq the 
constitutional requirement of a personal stake in 
the litiqation. The Court cites no prior case for 
this view. Moreover, the Court expounds no 
limitinq principle of any kind. Adverse practical 
consequences, even if relevant to Article III 
analysis, cannot iustify today's holding as none 
whatever would flow from a decision of mootness. 
See n. 15, infra. Nor does the Court's reliance 
upon a "relation back principle",~' at 18, n. 
11, further analysis. Indeed, althouqh this mav 
provide a shorthand label for the Court's 
conclusion, it is hardly a principle and certainly 
not a limiting one. 
lfp/ss 2/11/80 Footnote · 12a - (Geraqhty) 
The Court states that "respondent 
~ 
suffered actual, con)f;;~ injury [that] 
continued up to and beyond the time the District 
1/ 
Court denied class certification. Ante, at 18 n. 
11. Apparently this statement is based on the 
assumption that "damaqes" were - or could have been 
- souuqht. We need not consider whether the 
situation would be different if damaqes had been 
(2 
souqht, ~ respondent souqht only iniunctive and 
declaratory relief. Indeed, counsel for 
respondent, frankly conceded that his client "can 
obtain absolutely no additional personal relief" in 
this case. Tr., Oral Arq.~ at 25. In view of this 
cateqoric concession, I invite the Court to 
identify the "actual, concrete iniury'~ suffered by 
respondent after his unconditional release from 
prison. 
er 2/12/80 
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I Text at paqe 4. 
It turns out that Professor Davis' views do not lend 
themselves to ready quotation, as the portion of the article 
referred to in our opinion was written in a somewhat whimsical 
tone that could be misunderstood. What he sain was that the law 
was clear that "standinq may rest upon a trifle, and it is 
equally clear that at least a triflinq interest of the plaintiff 
is always required. Since the trifle makes all the difference 
between standinq and lack of standinq, the difference between a 
trifle and zero becomes more than a trifle! One may ask: Why 
should the law of standinq be so nonsensical? My opinion is 
that drawinq the line between a trifle and zero is sensible, 
loqical, and practical, as I shall try to show." 35 u. Chi. L. 
Rev., at 613-614. 
He also said that: "I know of no federal case in which 
a plaintiff was held to have standinq without assertinq an 
interest of his own •••• I think it entirely clear that the 
Court has always required 'economic or other personal interests' 
as the basis for standinq, without exception." Id~, at 616. 
"Even thouqh the law of standinq is so cluttered ann confused 
that almost every proposition has some exception, the federal 
courts have consistently adhered to one maior proposition, 
without exception: One who has no interest of his own at stake 
always lacks standinq." Id., at 617. Finally, he emphasizes 
that federal courts have never permitted the "public action." 
Id;, at 614, 629-630. 
I am not certain what to quote on paqe 4. How about: 
2. 
"Indeed, the rule barrinq litigation by those who have no 
interest of their own at stake is applied so riqorously that it 
has been termed the "one major proposition" in the law of 
standinq "to which the federal courts have consistently adhered 
••• without exception." Davis, Standinq: Taxpavers and 
~ 
Others, 35 u. fthi. L. Rev. 601, 617 (1968). We have insisted 
upon the personal stake requirement in mootness and standinq 
cases because it is embedded in " 
II 
In Rider 1, on p. 2, I believe that the views 
expressed in Richardson fall in the same cateqory as Justice 
Harlan's view in Flast: they never commanded a maiority, and, 
as we say in Rider 2, have now been rejected by Warth and its 
proqeny. We could add a "see also" to the citations in Rider 1, 
citinq Richardson (POWELL, J., concurrinq). Or we could simply 
iqnore Richardson. I tend to think that Richardson is not 
sufficiently qlarinq a precedent to require our callinq 
attention to the inconsistency. On the other hand, you are 
perfectly entitled to sav that your past views have been 
rejected repeatedly by the maiority and now ouqht not to be 
resurrected. I am on the fence on this one. 
er 2/12/80 
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RIDER 1, p. 2 n.1: 
Each of these cases reiects explicitly the view, once expressed 
by Mr. Justice Harlan and now apparentlv espoused by the Court, 
that the personal stake requirement lacks constitutional 
significance. Ante, at 16 n. 11: Flast v. Cohen, 392 u.s. 83, 
120 (1968)(Harlan, J., dissenting). Until today, however, that 
view never had commanded a maiority. 
RIDER 2, p. 4 
/ 
4a/ The Court states that "the erosion of the strict 
formalistic perception of Art. III was bequn well before today's 
decision," and that the Art. III personal stake reauirement is 
"riddled with exceptions." Ante, at 16 n. 11. It fails, 
however, to cite a sinqle Court opinion in support of either 
statement. To the extent that the decision in Flast - v. Cohen, 
392 u.s. 83 (1968), supports the position ascribed to it in the 
dissent, id., at 117-120, it does not survive the lonq line of 
express holdings that beqan with Warth v. Seldin, 422 u.s. 490 
(1975), and were reaffirmed only last term. Gladstone, Realtors 
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 u.s. 91, 99 (1979). See nn. 1 & 2, 
supra. Even before Warth, a leading commentator observed that 
this Court had adhered to the personal stake reauirement 
2. 
"without exception." Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 616, 617 (1968). 
RIDER 4, p. 11. 
~~~ .,_; 
12a/ The Court states that "respondent suffered 
actual, concrete injury [that] would satisfy the 
formalistic personal stake requirement if damaqes were souqht." 
Ante, at 18 n. 11. We need not consider whether the situation ___._ 
would be different had respondent alleged a claim for damages, 
as respondent never has asked for anything but iniunctive and 
declaratory relief. App. 3-16. Indeed, counsel for respondent 
frankly conceded that his client "can obtain absolutely no 
additional personal relief" in this case. Tr. Oral Arg. 25. In 
view of this categorical concession, I invite the Court to 
identify the "actual, concrete iniury" that continued after 
respondent's unconditional release from prison. 
RIDER 5, p. 11 
12b. The Court attempts to limit the sweeping 
consequences that could flow from the application of these 
criteria, see infra, at 12-13 and n. 15, bv asserting that 
"[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts" on the basis of 
"practicalities and prudential considerations". Ante, at 17 n. 
11. The Court long has recognized a difference between the 
3. 
prudential and constitutional aspects of the standinq and 
mootness doctrines. See p. 2, supra. I am not aware that the 
Court, until today, ever has merged these considerations for the 
purpose of eliminating the Art. III requirement of a personal 
stake in the litigation. The Court cites no prior case for this 
view. Moreover, the Court expounds no limitinq principle of any 
kind. Adverse practical consequences, even if relevant to 
Article III analysis, cannot iustify today's holdinq as none 
whatever would flow from a findinq of mootness. See n. 15, 
infra. Nor does the Court's reliance upon a "relation back 
principle",~' at 18, n. 11, further analvsis. Althouqh this 
fiction may provide a shorthand label for the Court's 
conclusion, it is hardly a Principle and certainly not a 
limiting one. 
z.' tf, r2- ' 3 ~ 
jo: The Chief Justiob 
Mr. Justice Brennat; 
Mr . Justice Stewart 
Mr. Ju.atioe White 
Mr. Juetioe Marshal] 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
ltr. Justice R-~hnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
~-13-80 lram: Mr. Justice Powell 
3rd DRAFT C1roulated: ________ __ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATHio1roulated: FEB 1 3 1aal 
No. 78-572 
United States Parole Commission) On Writ of Certiorari to 
et al., Petitioners, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Third 
John M. Geraghty. Circuit. 
[February -, 1980] 
Mn. JusTICE PowELL, with whom Mn. JusTICE STEWAR'l' 
aud Mn . .JusTICE Rr.;HNQUIST join, dissenting. 
Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was 
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a 
class com.posed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will 
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The 
District Court denied class certification and granted summary 
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before 
briefs were filed , he was unconditionally released from prison. 
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The 
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment 
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was 
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that re-
spondent properly could appeal the denial of class certifi-
cation. The Court today agrees with this conclusion. 
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it says 
that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may be adapted 
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. Ante, at 
8- 12. Second, the Court holds that the named plaintiff has 
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept" 
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his per-
sonal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12-16. Both steps 
are significant departures from settled law that rationally can-
not be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case. 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
12 
'18-572-DISSENT 
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY 
I 
As the Court observes, this case involves t.be "personal 
~take" aspect of the mootness doctrine. Ante, at 7.' There 
is undoubtedly a "live" issue which an appropriate plaintiff 
could present for judicial resolution. The question is whether 
respondent, who has no further interest in this action, never-
theless may-through counsel-continue to litigate it. 
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal 
stake requirement with some care. When the issue is pre-
sented at the outset of litigation as a question of standing to 
sue, we have held that the personal stake requirement has a 
double aspect. On the one hand. it derives from Art. III 
limitations on the power of the federal courts. On the other, 
it embodies additional, self-imposed restraints on the exercise 
of judicial power. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). The 
prudential aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine 
of uncertain contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional 
minimum has been given definite content: "In order to satisfy 
Art. III. the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered 
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively 
illegal conduct of the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v. 
Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979).1 Although 
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, the C'.A>urt has re~ 
jected all attempts to substitute abstract concern with a sub-
ject-or with the rights of third parties-for "the concrete 
1 See, e. g .. Dulce Powe1· ro. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 
Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hou~ing 
Dev. r'orp . 429 LT. S. 252, 260-261 (1977) ; Wa1·th v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 
490, 499 (1975) ; Lmda. R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617 (1973). 
Earh of t heH' caHr" rejrct:s £•qtlir itl:,. tlw view, once rxpressed by Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan and now appareutl~· p,.:,pou~l'U by the Court, that the personal 
stake rf'quir<'mcut la('b eou;;titutiollal ::;ignifieanrr. Ante, at 16~n. 11·
FIMt , .. Cohl'll, ;m~ U. S. 83, 120 (190R) (Harlan, J., dis::<rntiug). Until 
today, however, that Yicw never had commanded <t majority. 
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in.iury required by Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Org. , 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976).2 
As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement 
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; see 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential con-
siderations not present at the outset may support continuation 
of an action in which the parties have invested substantial 
resources and generated a factual record.3 But an actual 
case or co11 troversy in the constitutional sense " 'must be ex-
tant at all stages of review.'" Pre·iser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 
395, 401 (1975) , quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 
452, 459, n. 10 (1974) . Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests'" are 
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide 
questions that cannot afl'ect the rights of litigants in the 
case before them." North Carolina v. "Q,ice, 404 U. S. 244, 
246 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The limitation 
flows directly from Art. III. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 
312, 316 (19"74) (per curiarn).4 
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance 
of review eannot control. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 401, 
I 
2 See, e. g .. Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 227 
(1974) ; O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974); Moose Lodge 
No. 107 v. Jrvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-167 (1972) ; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 
U. S. 727, 73fr-738 (1972) ; Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44, 46 (1943) 
(per curiam) . The rule is tlw same when the quest,ion is mootness and a 
litigant can assert no more than emotional involvement in what remains 
of the ca<:>e. Ashc1'oft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per 
CUI'iam) . 
3 See 1:3 C. Wright,, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure § 3533, itt. 265 (1975); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the 
Supreme Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373,376-377 (1974). 
~See . e. g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975); SEC 
v. Medical C'omrn. for Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403, 407 (1972); PoweU 
v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496, n. 7 (1969) ; Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375. 
U. S.:301, 306, n. 3 (1964) . 
78-572-DISSENT 
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n. 9 (1975); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974); 
United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920). 
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the 
necessary individual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the orig-
inal wrong may supply the individual interest in some circum-
stances. Sibron v. New Yorlc, 392 U.S. 40,53-58 (1968). So, 
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so inherently 
transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of 
litigation. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 ~ 
115 (1974); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 21qru. S. -
498, 515 (1911). The essential and irreducible constitutional 
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or 
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary. 
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view to-
day, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the 
outcome is not "flexible." Indeed, the rule barring litigation 
by those who have no interest of their own at stake is applied 
so rigorously that it has been termed the "one major proposi-
tion" in the law of standing "to which the federal ·courts have 
consistently adhered ... without exception." Davis, Stand-
ing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 617 
(1968).0 We have insisted upon the personal stake re-
quirement in mootness and standing cases because it is em-
5 The Court stn te. that. "thr erosion of the strict formalistic perception 
of Art. III wa;.; begun well before today'::; drci:sion," and that the Art. III 
prrsonal stakr requiremrnt i;: "riddl('d with exe(•ptionf'." Ante, at 16, n. 11. 
It faib, howrwr, to eite a ~inglr C'omt opinion in support of either sttLte-
mrnt. To the rxtent that the clrci~ion in Flast v. Cohen, :~92 U. S. 83 
(l!J68), support:; tho po"ition a.~cribrcl to it in t.hr cli:ssent, id., at 117-120, 
it do<>,; not ~urvivr tlw long line of Pxpre"s holdings that began with 
Warth v. Seldin, -!22 U. 8. 490 (Hl7.1) , and wen' reaflirmrd only last 
Trrm. Gladstone, Uealtors v. Village of Bellwood. 441 U. S. 91, 99 
(1979). 8re 1111. 1 & 2, supm. Evrn hrfore Warth. a IIJidiq§ cownenta-
-+e>r ob:<rrwd that thP per:soual ::;tak!' requirrment had no exer 1tions. 
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bedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the 
Constitution, "founded in concern about the proper-and 
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society." 
Warth v. Seld-in, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we 
have, until today, "prevent[ed] the judicial process from 
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the 
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v. 
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., con-
CUtTing in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 
727, 740 (1974) . 
II 
The foregomg decisions establish principles that the Court 
has applied consistently. These principles were developed 
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no 
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a puta-
tive class representative who alleges no individual injury "may 
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of 
the cla s." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974). 
Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule 
23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interests 
asserted by !the named plaintiff]." Sosna v.lowa, ~:>'Upra, at 
399 (1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live in-
terests of unnamed but identifiable class members may· sup-
ply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named 
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bow-
man 'l'ransportat'ion Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976); 
Sosna v. 1 owa, supra, at 402. 
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No 
class has been ct>rtified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any 
perso11al stake in the litiga tio11 .G In the words of his own 
G. -o OIH' ,;uggrst~ that rrspondPnt could bP affrctrd per,.:onall~, by any 
ruling ou thr cia;;,; certifieation qurstion t.hnt is remanded today. In fact, 
the Court apparently <·onerdrs that rr:-~pondrnt ha~ no prrsonal stake-"in 
the traditional ~Pn;o;r ' -in oLktming certification. Ante, at 14. 
Several pri~oner~ now 111 frderal ru::;t{)dy have filed a motion to inter-
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lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional per~ 
sonal relief" in this case. 'rr. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the 
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent 
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other 
persons presently incarcerated. lbid. 7 In these circum-
stances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require 
dismissal. But the Court views the case differently, and con-
structs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has 
no plaintiff. 
The Court announces today for the first time-and without 
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that 
there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness doctrine": 
"flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. The 
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application 
of "flexible" mootness to class action litigation. The cases 
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 
110-111. n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 
432 U. S. 385 ( 1977), and today's decision in Deposit Guaranty 
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. -. Each case is said to show 
that a class action is not mooted by the loss of the class repre-
sentative's personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, even 
though no class has been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself 
is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Art. III 
vene as partieR r<'~pondent in this Court. Although the Court does not 
rule on that motion, I note that the motion was received well over a 
year after respondent was released from prison. In the interim, re-
spondent obtained a. ruling from the Court of Appeals and filed his 
petition for certioran in thi::; Court. Such untimely intervention comes 
too bte to save the action under United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 
U. S. 385 (1977). 
1 RrsJJondent '~ lnwycr openrd his argum('nt. by sa:ving that "[t]he 
mootne~s question in this case is, from a pructical standpoint, not very 
significm1t." lf the artion is held moot he plans simply to "file a new 
case" 011 brhalf of prisoner;; ,;erving longer terms. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. 
On the ba~i,:; of thi::; represPntation by counsel, there is reason to believe 
tha.t. member~ of the ]Hit.ativr cla~<s at i:,;sue ultimately will be included in a 
clas · action thnt will not moot out. 
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may be met "thwugh means other than the traditional require~ 
ment of a 'personal stake in the outcome.' " Ante, at 15. In 
my view, the Court misreads these precedents. 
A 
In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class 
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse par-
ties. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240 
(1937).8 And in Gerstein, the Court applied a rule long 
established, outside the class action context, by cases that 
never have been thought to erode the requirement of a per-
sonal stake in the outcome. Gerstein held that a class action 
challenging the constitutionality 'Of pretrial detention proce-
dures could continue after the named plai11tiffs' convictions 
had brought their detentions to al1 end. The Court did not 
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the merits 
8 Certification is no merr formality. It represents a judicial finding 
that injured partie,; other thau the named plaintiff exist. It also provides 
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies and 
sharpens the interests of unnamed class members in the outcome; only 
thereafter will they be bound by the outcome. After certification, 
class members cau be crrtain that the action will not be settled or 
dismis.~rd withouL appropriate notice. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c); 3 H. 
Newberg Cla~:~s A(·tion~ § 5050 (1977); cf. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class 
Actions at the Precertification State: Is 1\otice Required?, 56 N. C. L. 
Rev. :303 (19i8). Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposi-
tion on the nam!:'d plaintiff. of a duty adequately to repr!:'sent the entire 
class. If the named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot after certification, 
the court can re-examme his ability to represent the interests of class 
members. Should it be found wantii1g, the Court may seek a substitute 
representative or even dE>certify the class. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c) ( 1), 
23 (d); f:'t'e 1 H. NewhPrg, supm, § 2192; Comment., Continuation arid 
Repre~entat.ion of Clas.~ Actions Following Di~missa.I of the Class Repre-
sentative, Hl74 Duke L .• J. 573, 58!+--590, 602-603. After certification, the 
case is no cliffcrPnt in principle from more tra.dit.ional represPntative actions 
involving, for example, a ~ingle pa.rty who ce~nnot participate himself 
beeau;;e of hi::; incompetence but i:s permitted to litiga.te through an ap-
pointed fiduciary 
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was unnPcessary. The action continued only because of the 
transitory nature of pretrial Jetention, which placed the 
·claim wi thin "that narrow class of cases'' that are "disti11ctly 
'capabk of repetition, yet evading review.~" 420 U. S., at 
110. n. 11.0 
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial 
of class cPrtification notwithstai1ding satisfaction of the class 
representative 's claim on the merits. But neithe1· case holds 
that Art. III may be satisfied in the absence of a personal 
stake in the outcome. In ·McDonald, a putative class member 
intervened within the statutory time limit to appeal the cer-
tifieation ruli11g. 4:32 (T. S .. at 3~0. 10 Because the Court found 
that her claim 'vas not time-barred, the intervenor in McDonald 
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed, 
the Court devoted its entire opinion to showing that the 
intrrvPnor's claim for f('liPf had not expired.n At most, 
M cDouald holds only that an action which is kept alive by 
interested parties v.·ithin prescribed periods of limitations does 
not "die" in an Art. III sense. 
There is dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify 
9 Tlw C'omt ',- Gersll,in :1 n:t1~ · ,;1 ~, whirh E>mphatiizf'd that. " rp]r<'trial de~ 
tention is hy nature trmpomry" and tlmt " rtJhe individual could ... 
:,utTer repratrd drprivation~" with uo acce:;..,; to rE-dress, falls squarely 
wit.hin the mlr of Southern Pac . Terminal v. JCC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 
(1911). SPe Roe"· Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). In similar cases 
we haYc nott•d that the ('Ontimmtion of the actiou will depend "'espe~ 
rially I upon] thp reality of the claim that, otherwise the i~ue would evade 
review."' Swtshe1' v. Brady. 438 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting 
Sosna v. iowa, 419 U. S. 30:3, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitutjons are 
incon,;i~tent with t.he concept. of "fl exible" mootness and the redefinition of 
"personal ~ta ke" adoptrd today. 
10 The ilHliYidual <·lailll" of tlw ori!(inal nanwd plaiutjffs had bern settled 
after judgmrnt on th<• qur:-;tion of liability. 432 P. S., at ;{89, :~93, n. 14. 
11 Thi., rxtPnsin· inqnir~· II'OIIld lwvp hePn uma·cL,>':>ary if, a,:; thf' Court 
holds today, the iutervenor had a personal stake in the class certification 
is~ue it"elf. Sin('e tlw prrsent respondent'~ claim long since has "expired," 
he stands in the &tmo position a" a member of the putative class whose 
claim has "expired" by rear:,on of the statute of limitatiolll), 
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was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the 
behest of the named plaintiffs .... " 432 U. S., at 393. That 
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 (1978), apparently is elevated 
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doc-
trine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine and 
the much narrower reasoning adopted today in Roper.J n 
Roper, the Court holds that a tl1tft1~ phtinti'tt"'W1w 1i'as pre 
vailed on the merits may appe the denial of class certifica 
tion because of a "eritical distinction" between mootne 
deriving from a judgment and mootuess resulting from event 
extrinsie to the Ji ·~ation. Ante, at- (slip op., at 9). When 
a prevailing rty seeks review of a ruling collateral to the 
judgme1 , oper concludes, Art. III is relevant only indirect! 
to t q uest1o11 of appealability. I d., at 7, 12. Roper als 
s gests that a named plaintiff whose judgment is satisfie 
may retain an economic interest in sharing litigation cost 
with the class. ld., at 10, n. 8. 
It is not apparent how Roper supports the decision ill this 
case. There is not even a speculative interest in sharing 
costs herf' . Moreovrr, since respondenes claim was mooted 
by an extrinsic event-his unconditipmtlrelease from prison 
the distinction Hlentificd in Jl,<Jper as "critical" is absent i 
this case. l d. , at n. P need not accept that distinctim 
as sound to cone P that Roper affol·ds only illusory suppor 
for the Court'~" ruling h 'rc. 
B 
The cases cited by the Court as "less flexible"-and there-
fore less authoritative-apply established Art. III doctriue in 
cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School 
Comrn'rs v. Jacobs, 420 P. S. 128 (1975) (per curiam); Wein-
stein v. Bradj01·d, 423 F. R. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasa-
dena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 
(1976). As they are about to bf'come second class precedents,. 
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12·, n. 7. But 
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the cases are rpccnt and carefully considered decisions of thi~ 
Court. They applied long' settled principles of Art. III juris~ 
prudence. And no Justice who participated in them suggested 
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded trea~ 
ment of these "less fiexibie" cases ignores their controlling 
relevance to the issue presented here. 
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to 
challenge certain high school regulations. The District Court 
tstated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and 
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court 
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted 
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had grad-
uated. We held that the action was entirely moot because 
the "class action was never properly certified nor the class 
properly identified by the District Court." 420 U.S., at 130.12 
Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquir-
ing separate legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. We 
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action 
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a 
third party. 427 U. S., at 430-431,. See also Baxter v. Palmi-
giano, 425 U.S. 308, 310, n. 1 ( 1976). And in Bradford, where 
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Court 
held that the named plaintiff's release from prison required the 
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures. 
12 The Yitalit~r of 1 h0 Jacobs result is undf'r;.:cored by the repeated 
dictum tha.t a properly CPrtified class is necessary to supply adverseness 
OJWP the named plaintiff's <"iaim becomes moot. East Texas Motor Freight 
v. Rodriguez , 431 r . s. 395, 406, n. 12 (1977); /!'ranks V. Bow·man Trans-
portatiOn Co .. supra. 424 U. S., at 754, n. 6, 755-756: sf'e K1'emens v. 
Bartley, 431 U. S. 119, 129-120 (1977); R-ichardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 
24, 39 (197 4) . Conversely, we ha.ve often stated that the named plain-
tiff's individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is 
filf'd a.nd at the time of certific<ttion. Kl'emens "· Bartley. s·upm, at 143, 
n. 6 (BRENNAN . ,J. , clis:,enting) ; Sosna v.Iowa, 419 U.S., at 4,02, 403; Sfile 
Bell v. Wolfish, - U. S. - , - , n. 5 (1979); Zablocki~. Redhail, 434 
u. s. 374, ~82, 11. 9 (1978) . 
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423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. 
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978). 
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Spanqler may be dis-
tinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the 
denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact that 
in each case the class representatives were defending a judg-
ment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed. 
The plaintiffs/respondents continued vigorously to assert the 
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route 
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District 
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose 
not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in 
Jacobs beca.use we recognized that the putative class repre-
sentative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by 
adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and Bradford as 
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal 
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mecha-
nism of class certification or otherwise.13 The Court rejects 
that principle today. 
III 
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness is 
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more 
disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this action 
into two separate "claims": (i) that the action may be main-
tained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the 
class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class has 
been certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the merits 
is moot. Ante, at 15, 17. But respondent is said to have a 
personal stake in his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a 
stake in the merits. 
18 In some drcnmslanees, litigants are permitted to argue the rights of 
third parties in support of their claims. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff 428 
U.S. 106, 11:3 (1976); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-256 (1953) . 
In each such case, however, the Court has identified a concrete, individual 
injury suffered by the litigant himself. Ibid.; see n. 2, supra, and accom-
panying te. ·t, 
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The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to 
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to re-
spondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the 
certification q uestion.14 Instead, respondent's "personal stake" 
is said to derive from two factors having nothing to do 
with concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the 
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create 
a "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept," 
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the 
case retains the "imperatives of a dispute cap·able of judicial 
resolution," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented 
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested 
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15.1" 
14 In a footnote, a niP, at 18, n. 11, the Court states: 
"Thi,.; rf'spondput ~ufi'Pred aetna!, concrete injury as a result of the 
putativf'l~· illegal conduct, and this injury would sa.t.isfy the formalistic 
pPrsonal stak<' n•quirrmr•nt if damages were sought. See, e. g., Powell v .. 
McCormack, 395 U.S., at 495-500." 
This nppenrs to be a categoriea.l claim of the actual, concrete injury our 
Ctlf'<'::i have rpquitwl. YPt, again, t.he Court fail;; to identify the injury. 
The n>ferenrfl to damages i;:; irrelevant here, a;; respondent sought no 
damagf,;-only injunctive and dfclaratory relief. Moreover, counsel for 
rc:;pondent frankly conc·eded that his client "can obtain absolutely no 
additional per:-;onal rPlief" in thi~ rase. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. If the Court 
SPriou"ly i:; (•laimiug eoncret.p injury "at all stagPS of review," see p. 3, 
supm, it would ~ h<' helpful for it to identify specifically this injury 
that was not. apparc•nt to re:;pondent's counsel. ----------1--.l. 7k_ ~~ 
1 " The Court. attempt~> to limit t.hc sweeping consfquences that could flow 
from the application of thPse criteria, sec infra, at 12-13, and n. 15, by 
a:;sprting that "[e]ach cn;:;e mw;t, be decided on its own fa.cts" on the basis 
of " pract.ira.!ities and prudential con:>iderations." Ante, at 17, n. 11. The 
Court long has reeognized a differpnce between the prudential and consti-
tutional aspect<'! of tlw ~tanding and mootness doctrinPs. See p. 2, supra. 
I am not. aware that the Court, unt.il today, ever has mergf'd tht'se consid-
erationR for the purpor,;fl of eliminating the Art. III requirfmfnt. of a per-
sonal ,;takP in th<~ Jitigati011. The Court cites no prior case for this view. 
Morrovrr, t ht> Court. PXpoumb no limiting principle of any kind . Adver:;e 
practical con~cqu<'ll<'ei:i, eveu if relevant to Art. III analysi8, cannot. ·ju:stify 
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The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule 
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not 
confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not. 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100; 
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a 
rule of procedure which "shall not be construed to extend . . . 
tho jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney gen-
eral concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to 
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a 
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise might be 
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S., at 737-738. 
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general 
concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new per-
ception of At't. III requirements must rest entirely on its 
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the com-
ponents of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurispru-
dence. they operate only in "'cases confessedly within [the 
Court's] jurisdiction.,." Franks· v. Bowman Transportation 
Co., 424 U. S., at 755-756, and n. 8. quoting Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court cites no decision that 
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply 
presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case, and 
I am aware of none. 16 Indeed, each of these characteristics is 
sure to be present in the typical "private attorney general" 
today',; holding as nonr whaleYer would flow from a finding of mootness. \ 
See n. 15, infra. Nor doe:-: the Comt':; reliance upon a "relation back 
prineiplr," ante, at lR, n. 11, further the anuJy:;is. Although this fiction 
may provide a ,.:horthand labrl for the Court';; conclusion, it is hardly a 
principle nncl ('c>rtainly not. a limiting one. 
16 The Court often ba~ rejected the contention that a "spirited dispute" 
alone is sufficient to ronfer juri:srliction. E. g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 
U. S. 24, 35-36 (19i4); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (pel' 
c·uriarn) .. 
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action brought by a public spirited citizen.17 Although we 
have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action," 
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement 
leaves no principled basis for that practice. 18 
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is 
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in 
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms 
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a 
false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class certification issues 
are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante, 
at - (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal 
17 The Court~ a:<,-ertmn to tllfl contrary notwithstanding, there is 
nothing in the rrcord to suggr~(. that respondent has any interest whatever 
in his new-found "right to have a class certified." Ante, at 15. In fact, 
the record shows that re"pondent's interest in the merits was the sole mo-
tivation for hi• att<'mpt to repre,;ent a class. The class claims were added 
to his complaint only beeause his lawyer" feared that mootness might 
terminate the actiOn . App., at 17; Brief for Repondent 23, 33. The 
record does not reveal whether respondent-as distinguished from his 
lawyer-now wi~hes to continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that 
his interest hal> nothmg to do with the procedural protections described 
by the Court as the ''primary benefits of cla.ss suits." Ante, at 14. It is 
neither surpming nor impropPr thnt respondent. s110uld be concerned with 
parole procedure:;. But ·respondent's actual interest is indistinguishable 
from the generali~ed mterest of a "private attorney general" who might 
bring a "public aetwn" to improve the operation of a parole system. 
18 The Comt ,.: ,·irw lo11:i<·ally eannot be confined to moot cnses. If a 
plaintJJf who is relensed from prison the day after filing a class actwn 
challenging parole guidelines may seek certification of the cla~;s, why should 
a plaintiff who is released thr day before filing the suit be barred? As an 
Art. III mat1rr, thrrc can l.Je no difference. 
Even on prudential ground~, there is little difference between this action 
and one filed promptly upon relea<:<e. In the present ca~;e , this Court 
has ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the class action. At 
the same time, it. has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in 
turn reversed thr judgml'nL of the Di:>trict Court. No determination on 
any issue is left :'itanding. For every practical purpose, the action must 
begin anew-thi;:; t1me without a plaintiff. The prudential considerations, 
in favor of a findmg of mootness could scarcely be more compelling, 
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stake in such ancillary 11claims" often must end in frustration, 
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word. 
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join addi-
tional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a 
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular 
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value 
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution 
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is 
neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them 
independent of his interest in the merits. 
Class actions may advance significantly the administration 
of justice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the class action is 
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to 
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long 
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004 
(1977). That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class as-
pect of litigation involving individual claims has never been 
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new proce-
dural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to 
the recognition of different "'means for presenting a case or 
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.'" 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240 (1937) 
(Declaratory Judgment Act). quoting Nashville, C. & St. L. 
R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 V. S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added). 
The effect of mootness on the vitality of a device like the 
class action may be a relevant prudential consideration.111 
10 I do not. imply that the rrsuit'. reached today i:; necessary in any 
way to the continued vitality of the class-action device. On the contrary, 
the practical impact of finding mootness in this case would be slight indeed. 
See note 13, supm. And this may well be typical of class actions brought 
under Rule 23 (b) (1) or (2) to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. Such 
actions are not subject to fntst.ration through sequential settlement offers 
that "pick off" each intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat. 
Bank v. Roper, ante, at - (slip op., at 11-12). Nor will substitute 
plaintiffs be deterred b)· the notice costs that attend certification of a class 
under Rule 23 (b) (3). 
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But it cannot provide a plaintiff when none is before the 
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation 
pf Art. III. 20 
IV 
In short, this is a case in which the putative class repre-
~entative-respondent here-no longer has the slightest .in-. 
terest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member 
of the class is before the Court·; indeed, none has been iden-
tified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal 
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the juris-
diction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only 
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are 
the defendants and a lawyer who no longer has a client. 21 
I would vacate the decision of the Court· of Appeals and 
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot. 
20 The Court'~ rffort ~ to "save" this artion from mootnes.~ lead it to 
depart strikingly from the normal role of a reviewing court. The Court 
fails to identify how, if at all, the District Court has erred. Nothing 
is said about the Dist.rict Court's ruliz}g on the merits or its refusal to 
certify the broad class sought by respondel).t. Nor does the Court adopt 
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court erred in fajling 
to consider the pos~>ibility of subclasses s·ua sponte. Nevertheless, re-
spondent-or his lawyer-is given the opporturuty to raise the subclass 
question on remand. That result cannot be squared with the rule that a 
litigant may not rajse on appeal those iS~>ues he has fa.iled to preserve by 
appropriate objection in the trial court. The Court intimates that the 
District Court waited too long to deny the class certification motion, thus 
making a motion for subrlastles a "futile act." Ante, at 17. But nothing in 
the record suggests that the District Court would not have entertajned 
such a motion. Since respondent sought certification in the first place only 
to avoid mootncss on appeal, the entry of an order against him on the 
merits cannot excuse him from presenting his subclass proposal to the 
Distriet Court thereaftrr. 
~ 1 I imply no critici,;m of rotm:;el in this case. The Court. of Appeals 
agreed with counsel that the certification issue was appealable, and th& 
'case was brought to this Court by the United States, 
er 2/26/80 
No. 78-572 Geraghty; INSERT on p. 9: 
In Roper, the Court holds that a named plaintiff whose judgment is 
satisfied may retain a personal stake in sharing litigation costs 
with the class. Ante, at (Slip Op. at 7 n. 6, 10). Finding 
that Art. III is satisfied by this continuing economic interest, .. 
Roper reasons that the rules of federal practice governing 
appealability permit a party to obtain review of certain procedural 
rulings that are collateral to a generally favorable judgment. See 
id., at 7, 9-10. The Court concludes that the denial of class 
certification falls within this category, as long as the appellants 
"assert a continuing stake in the outcome of the appeal." Id., at 
1 0. ~~ 
ftu'-~ ~~~-~JJ-k 
It is ~ appare Roper supper~ the decision in 
A 
llw, V7&-l'~~ .At~~~~ U\-
Indeed '~(Roper eaffirms the obligation of a federal this case. 
court to dismiss an appeal when the parties no longer retain the 
personal stake in the outcome required by Art. III. Here, there is 
--not even a speculative interest in sharing costs, and respondent 
positively denies that any of his individual interests will be 
affected by the appeal. See p. 6, supra. Thus, a fact that was 
critical to the analysis in Roper is absent in this case. One need 
not accept that analysis as sound to conclude that it affords no 
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Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was 
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a 
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will 
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The 
District Court denied class certification and granted summary 
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before 
briefs were filed, he was unconditionally released from prison. 
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The 
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment 
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was 
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that re-
spondent properly could appeal the denial of class certifi-
cation. The Court today agrees with this conclusion. 
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it says 
that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may be adapted 
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. Ante, at 
8-12. Second, the Court holds that the named plaintiff has 
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept" 
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his per-
sonal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12-16. Both steps 
are significant departures from settled law that rationally can-
not be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case. 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
~~ 
~ could present for judicial resolution. 
~propel pl~ . . . a 
Q. '~AI Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal 
"- f r th'J stake requirements with some care. When the issue is pre-
N"'. f'v ,/ sented at the outset of litigation as a question of standing to 
. .A sue, we have held that the perii!rctl st!tlte requirement has a 
\ OM 11'\ · .double aspect. On the one han , it derives from Art. III · ·r ~ · ~ limitations on the power of the federal courts. On the other, 
~:~ it embodies self-~mposed restraints on the exercise of judicial 
v& power. E. g., &ngleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 112 (1976); 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). The prudential 
aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine of uncertain 
contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional minimum has 
been given definite content: "[i]n order to satisfy Art. III, 
the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered some 
actual or threatene9. injury as a result of the putatively 
illegal conduct of the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v. 
Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979).1 Although 
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, the Court has re-
jected all attempts to substitute abstract concern with a sub-
ject-or with the rights of third parties-for "the concrete 
injury required by Art. III." Simon v. Bastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,40 (1976).2 
1 See, e. g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 
Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978); Mlington Heights v. M etropolitan Housing 
Dev. Corp. 429 U. S. 252, 260-261 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 
490, 499 (1975); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617 (1973). 
2 See, e. g., Schlesinger v. R eservists to Stop the Wm·, 418 U. S. 208, 227 
(1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974); Moose Lodge 
·No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 166-167 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 
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As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement 
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; see 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential con-
siderations not present at the outset may come into play 
after the parties have invested substantial resources in an 
action and generated a factual record. But an actual case 
or controversy in the constitutional sense "must be extant at 
all stages of review." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 
459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the legal 
relations of parties having adverse legal interests' " are moot 
because "federal courts are without power to decide questions 
that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before 
them." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971) 
(per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 
U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The limitation flows directly 
from Art. III. DeFunis v. Odega,ard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) 
(per curiam) .8 
Since the question is one of power, practical considerations 
do not control. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401 , n. 9 (1975); 
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 36 (1974); United States 
v. Alaska S. B. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116 (1920). Nor can public 
interest in the resolution of an issue replace the necessary in-
dividual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 
supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the original wrong 
may supply the individual interest in some circumstances. 
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53- 5-8 (1968). So, too, may 
the prospect of repeated future injury so inherently transitory 
U. S. 727, 736-738 (1972); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44, 46 (1943) 
(pe1· curiam). The rule is the same when the question is mootness and a 
litigant can assert no moro than emotional involvement in what remains 
of the case. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per 
curiam). 
8 See, e. g., Pre·iser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975); SEC 
v . . Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403, 407 (1972); Powell 
v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496, n. 7 (1969); Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 
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that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of litigation. 
Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U. S. llS. 
(1974); Southern P,ac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 
515 (1911). The essential and irreducible constitutional re-
quirement is simply ~~showing of continuing or threatened 
injury at the hands of the adversa.ry. 
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view to-
day, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the 
outcome is not "flexible." Indeed, the persona.! stake require-
ment sometimes appears rigidly formalistic. See Davis, 
Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 
613-614 (1968). We nevertheles have insisted upon the re-
quirement in mootness and standing cases because it is em-
bedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the 
Constitution, "founded in concern about the proper-and 
properly limited-role of the courts in a democra.tic society;" 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we 
have, until today, "prevent[ed] the judicial process from 
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the 
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v. 
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., con-
curring in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 
727, 740 (1974). 
II 
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the Court 
has applied consistently. These principles were developed 
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no 
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a puta-
tive elass representative who alleges no individual injury "may 
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of 
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974). 
Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule 
23 can it "acquir [ e] a legal status separate from the interests 
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399 (1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live in-
terests of unnamed but identifiable class members may sup-
ply the persona.l stake required by Art. III when the named 
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bow-
man Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976); 
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402. 
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No 
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any 
personal stake in the litigation.4 In the words of his own 
lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional per-
sonal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the 
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent 
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other 
persons presently incarcerated. lbid.5 In these circum-
stances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require 
dismissal. But the Court views the case differently and con-
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The Court announces today for the first time-and without 
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that 
there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness doctrine": 
"flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. The 
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application 
of "flexible" mootness to class action litigation. The~ cases 
inel~ Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975), 
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), and 
today's decision in Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, 
ante, p. -. Each case is said to show that a class action is 
not necessarily mooted by the loss of the class representative's 
personal stake in the merits, even though no class has been 
certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itseif is cited for the proposi-
tion that the requirements of Art. III may be met "through 
means other than the traditional requirement of a 'personal 
-stake in the outcome.' " Ante, at 15. · The Court grievously 
misreads these precedents, for they show nothing of the kind. 
A 
In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class 
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse par-
ties. Cf. A~tna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240 
( 1937) .6 And in Gerstein, the Court applied a rule long 
6 Certification is no mere formality. It represents a judicial finding 
that injured parties other than the named plaintiff exist. It also provides 
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies and 
sharpens the interests of unnamed cla13s members in the outcome; only 
after certification will they be bound by the outcome. After certifica-
tion, the action cannot be settled or dismissed without the approval of 
the court and appropriate notice to class members. Fed. Rule Civ. 
Proc. 23 (e). Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposi-
tion on tho named plaintiffs of a duty adequa.toly to represent the entire 
class. If the named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot, the court can 
monitor his performance and decertify the class under Rule 23 if he 
defaults in this responsibility. After certifica.tion, the case is no different 
in principle from more traditional representative a.ctions involving, for 
example, a si11gle party who cannot participate himself because of his 
incompetence but is permitted to litigate through an appointed fiduciary . 
78-572-DISSENT 
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·established by nonclass action cases that never has been 
thought to erode the requirement of a personal stake in the 
outcome. Gerstein held that a class action challenging the 
constitutionality of pretrial detention pro()edures could con-
tinue after the named plaintiffs' convictions had brought their 
detentions to an end. The action did not continue because a 
personal stake in the outcome on the merits was :unnecessary. 
Rather, the lawsuit fell in "that narrow Class of ()ases" that 
are "distinctly 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' " 
420 U. S., at 110, n. 11.7 
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial 
of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of the class 
representative's claim on the merits. But neither case departs 
from traditional understandings of the personal stake require-
ment. In McDonald, a putative class member intervened 
within the statutory time limit to appeal the certification 
ruling. 432 U. S., at 390.8 Because the Court found that 
her claim was not time-barred, the intervenor in McDonald 
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed, 
the Court devoted its entire opinion to showing that the 
intervenor's claim for relief had not expired.9 At most, 
7 The Court's Gerstein analysis, which emphasized that "[p]retrial de-
tention is by nature temporary" and that "[t]he individual could .. . 
suffer repeated deprivations" with no access to redress, falls squarely 
within the rule of Southern Pac. Terminal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 
(1911). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1973). In similar cases 
we have noted that the continuation of the action will depend " 'espe-
cially [upon] the reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would evade 
review."' Swisher v. Brady, 438 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitations them-
selves are inconsist.ent with the concept of ":flexible" mootness and the 
redefinition of "personal stake" adopted today. 
8 The individual claims of the original named plaintiffs had been settled 
after a judgment on the question of liability. 432 U. S., at 389, 393, 
n. 14. 
9 This extensive inquiry would have been unnecessary if, as the Court 
holds today, the intervenor had a personal stake in the class certification 
': 
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McDonald holds only that an action which is kept alive by 
interested parties within prescribed periods of limitations does 
not "die" in an Art. III sense. 
There is dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify 
was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the 
behest of the named plaintiffs .... " 432 U. S., at 393. That 
g·ratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 (1978), apparently is elevated 
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doc-
trine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine and 
the much narrower reasoning adopted today in Roper. In 
Roper, the Court is careful to explain that a named plaintiff 
who has prevailed on the merits may appeal the denial of class 
certification because of a "critical distinction" between moot-
ness deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting from 
events extrinsic to the litigation. Ante, at - (slip op., at 
9). When a judgment has been entered, Roper concludes, 
Art. III is relevant only indirectly to the question of appeal-
ability. !d., at 7, 12. Roper also suggests that a named 
plaintiff whose judgment is satisfied may retain an economic 
interest in sharing litigation costs with the class. I d., at 10,_ -r?"'-z>-.:r---
n. 8. 
It is far from apparent how lu:!se tw8 case;t can be recon .. . 
ciled. The Court does not identify an economic interest in 
this case. Moreover, since this case was mooted by an 
extrinsic event-the only plaintiff's unconditional release from 
prison-a "critical distinction" identified in Roper is absent 
here. That distinction fairly may be criticized. Ante, at 
-. But the fact remains that Roper does not purport to 
disturb the fundamental rule that a plaintiff who can no 
longer assert a concrete injury remediable by judicial action 
has ceased to present a case cognizable in an Art. III court. 
issue itself. Since the present respondent's claim long since has "expired," 
he stands in the same position as a member of the putative class whose 
claim has "expired" by reason of the statute of limitations . 
... ,. 
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B 
The cases cited by the Court as "less flexible"-and there-
fore less authoritative-established Art. III doctrine in cases 
0losely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. 
Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1075) (per curiam); Weinstein v. Brad-
ford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasadena City 
Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 ( 1976). 
As they are about to become second class precedents, these 
cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12, n. 7. But the 
cases are recent and carefully considered decisions of this 
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III juris-
prudence. And no Justice who participated in them suggested 
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded treat-
ment of these "less flexible" cases ignores their controlling 
relevance to the issue presented here. 
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class a.ction to 
challenge certain high school regulations. The District Court 
stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and 
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court 
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted 
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had grad-
uated. We held that the action was entirely moot because 
the "class action was never properly certified nor the class 
properly identified by the District Court." 420 U. S., at 130.'10 
Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquir-
ing separate legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. We 
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action 
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a 
third party. 427 U. S., at 430-431. Sec also Ba.1:ter v. Palmi-
giano, 425 U.S. 308,310, n. 1 (1976). And in Bmdford, where 
10 In some circumstances, litigants are permitted to argue the rights of 
third parties in snpport of their claims. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff 428 
U.S. 106, 113 (1976); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-256 (1953). 
In each such case, however, the Court has identified a concrete, individual 
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the District Court had denied certification outright, the Court 
held that the named plaintiff's release from prison required the 
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures. 
423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. 
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978). 
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Spangler may be dis-
tinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the 
denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact. that 
in each case the class representatives were defending a judg-
ment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed. 
The plaintiffs/respondents continued vigorously to assert the 
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route 
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District 
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose 
not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in 
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class repre-
sentative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by 
adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and Bradford as 
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal 
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mecha-
nism of class certification or otherwise.11 The Court rejects 
that principle today. 
III 
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness is 
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more 
11 The vitality of the Jacobs result is underscored by the repeated 
dictum that a properly certified class is necessa ry to supply adverseness 
onc-e the named palintiff's claim becomes moot. East Texas Motor Freight 
v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 406, n. 12 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Trans-
portation Co., supra, 424 U. S., at 754, n. 6, 755-756; see Kremens v. 
Bartley , 431 U. S. 119, 129-120 (1977); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 
24, 39 (1974). Conversely, we have often stated that the named pla.in-
tiff's individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is 
filed and at the time of certification. Kremens v. Bartley, supra, at 143, 
n. 6 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S., at 402; see 
Bell v. Wolfish,- U. S. -, --, n. 5 (1979); Zablocki v. R edhail, 434 
U.S. 374, 382, n. 9 (1978) , 
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disturbing. The Court splits the class asn cts of this action 
into two separate "claims": t hat the acti01 may be maintained 
by respondent on behalf of a class, and hat the class is en-
titled to relief on the merits. Since no class has been certified, 
the Court concedes that the claim on the merits is moot. 
Ante, at 15, 17. But respondent is said to have a personal 
stake in his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a stake in 
the merits. 
The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to 
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to re-
spondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the 
certification question. Instead, respondent's "personal stake" 
is said to derive from two factors having nothing to do with 
any concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the 
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create 
a "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept," 
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the 
case retains the "imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial 
resolution," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented 
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested 
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15. 
The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule 
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not 
confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not. 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100; 
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a 
rule of procedure which "shall not be construed to extend ... 
tho jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney gen-
eral concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to 
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a 
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise might be 
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U. S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S., at 737-738. 
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general 
1 
12 
concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new per-
ception of Art. III requirements must rest entirely on its 
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the com-
ponents of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurispru- ~-
dence, they E.re an aspect of those "policy rules often invoked~ 4 .. ~ 
by the court 'to avoid passing prematurely on constitutional "'Y" vl9- rv. 
questions.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 rl.~ -~./" 
U. S., at 755-756, and n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 1'-~-
83, 97 (1968). Such rul~ operate only in "'cases confessedly vc.. ~ Jt' /.6 .,_wl 
within [the Court's] junsdiction.'" ~~tlbid. The Court cites ~
no decision that has premised jurisdiction upon the bare exist-
ence of a sharp1y presented issue in a concrete and vigorously 
argued case, and I am aware of none.12 Indeed, each of these ~- · 
characteristics is sure to be present in the typical "privat 
attorney general" action brought by a public spirited citizen.13 
Although we have refused steadfastly to countenance the 
"public action," the Court's redefinition of the personal stake 
requirement leaves no principled basis for that practice.14 
12 The Court has twice rejected the contention that a "spirited dispute" 
alone is sufficient to confer juriRdiction. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 
24, 35-36 (1974); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (per cu1iam). 
13 Tho Court's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, there ·is 
nothing in the record to suggest that respondent has any interest whatever 
in his new-foun'd "right to have a class certified." Ante, at 15. In fact, 
the record shows that respondent's interest in tho merits was the sole mo-
tivation for his a.ttempt to represent a State. The class claims were a.dded 
to his ·complaint only because his lawyer feared that mootness might 
terminate the action. App., at 17; Brief for Repondent 23, 33. The 
record does not reveal whether respondent-as dist.inguished from his 
lawyer-now wishes to continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that 
his interest has nothing to do with the procedural protections described 
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suits." Ante, at 14. It is 
neither surprising nor improper that respondent should be concerned with 
p:u~le procedures. But respondent's actual interest is indistinguishable 
from the generalized interest of a "private attorney general" who might 
bring a "public action" to improve the operation of a parole system. 
14 Tho Court's view logically cannot be confined to moot cases. If a 
plaintiff who is released from prison the day after filing a class action 
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ck. 
The Court reasons that bQis departure from precedent is 
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in 
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms 
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a 
false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class certification issues 
are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante, 
at - (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal 
stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration, 
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word. 
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join addi-
tional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a 
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular 
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value 
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution 
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is 
neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them 
independent of his interest in the merits. 
Class actions may advance significantly the administration 
of justice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the class action is 
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to 
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long 
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004 
(1977). That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class as-
pect of litigation involving individual claims has never been 
challenging parole guidelines may seek certification of the class, why should 
a plaintiff who is released the day before filing the suit be barred? As an 
Art. III master, there can be no difference. 
Even on prudential grounds, there is little difference between this action 
and one filed promptly upon release. In the present case, this Court 
has ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the class action. At 
the same time, it has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in 
turn reversed the judgment of the District Court. No determination on 
any issue is left standing. For every practical purpose, the case must 
begin anew-this time without a plaintiff. It is difficult to imagine a 
case in which the prudential considerations aligned against a finding of 
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questioned. But even when we deal with truly new proce-
dural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to 
the recognition of different " 'means for presenting a case or 
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.'" 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240 (1937) 
(Declaratory Judgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L. 
R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added). 
The effect of mootness on the vitality of a device like the 
class action may be a relevant prudential consideration.15 
But it cannot provide a plaintiff when none is before the 
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation 
of Art. III.1 6 
15 I do not imply that the result reached today is nPce~8ary in any 
way to the continued vitality of the rla~s-action device. On the contrary, 
t.he practical impact of finding mootnP~s in this case would be slight indred. 
SPe note 13, supra. And this may well be typical of class actions brought 
under Rule 23 (b) (1) or (2) to seck injunctive or declaratory rPliPf. Such 
actions are not subject to frustration through sequential srtt lPmcnt offers 
that "pick off" cnch intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat. 
Bank v. Roper, ante, at - (slip op., at 11-12). Nor will substitute 
plaintiffs be deterred by the notice costs that attend certification of a class 
under Rule 23 (b) (3). 
16 The Court's efforts to "save" this action from mootnesR lead it to 
depart strikingly from the normal rolr of a reviewing court. Thr Court 
fails to identify how, if at all , thr Di~t.rict Court has erred. Nothing 
is said about the District Court's ruling on the mrrits, or its refusal to 
certify the broad class sought. by respondent. Nor does the Court sug-
gest that the District Court. erred in failing to con~ider the possibility of 
subcla~ses sua sponte. Nevcrthcle~s, respondent-or his lawyer-is given 
the opportunity to raiFe the subclns:; question on remand. That result 
cannot be squared with thr rule that a litigant may not raise on appeal 
those issues he has failed to preserve by a.ppropriate objection in the 
court below. The Court intimates thnt the District Comi waited too 
long to deny the class certification motion, thus making a motion for 
subclnsses a "futile act." Ante, a.t, 17. But nothing in the record Pug-
gests that. the District, Court would not have entertained such a motion. 
Since rePponclt'nt seught certification in the first. place only to avoid 
mootness on appeal, the entry of an order againt him on the merits 
cannot excuse him from raising the subclaBs issue thereafter. 
-
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IV 
n short, ~9al with a case in which the putative class 
representative-respondent here'-no longer has the slightest 
interest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member 
of the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been iden-
tified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal 
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the juris-
diction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only 
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are 
the defendant and a lawyer who no longer has a client.17 
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot. 
17 I imply no criticism of counsel in this case. The Court of Appeals 
agreed with counsel that the certification issue was appealable, and the 
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MR. J1 r ~rrLC~} PowELL, diss<'IIting. 
Rcspond<:>nt fihl this suit as a class action whik he was 
serving t.iml' in a f<:'deral prison. Hl' sought to n'prescnt a 
class compos<'d of "all federal prisoners who arc or who v.:ill 
becom<' rligibll• for relPasc on parole.' ' App .. at 17. The 
District Court dPni<>d class certification and granted ::;ummary 
judgment for petitiont•rs. Respond('IIt appral<'d, but bdore 
briefs were fikd, he was unconditionally released fro1n prison. 
Petitioners thcn moved to dismiss the appe>al a::; moot. The 
Court of Appeals denied the motion , reversed the j udgme11t 
of th e District ( 'ourt, and remanded the> case for furth er pro-
ceedings. Conceding that responciPn t's personal claim was 
moot, the Court of Appeals neverth<-'lcss coucludccl that re-
spondent properly could appeal the de11ial of class certifi-
cation. The Court today agrees with this conclusion. 
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First. it says 
that uwotness is a "flexible'' doetrine which may be adapted 
as we see fit to "uontraditional' ' forms of litigation. Ante, at 
8- 12. Srcond. the Court holds that the named plaintiff has 
a right "analogous to the private attorney g<'ll<:'ral concept'' 
to appeal th0 dt>nial of class C(•rtification evc11 when his per-
sonal clain1 for relief is moot. A11te, at 12- W. Both steps 
are significant departures from SE:>ttled law that rationally can-
not be confinpd to the narrow issu<· present<'d in this case. 
Accordingly, 1 disse 11 t . 
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I 
As the Court observes, this case involves the "personal 
stake" aspect of thr mootness doctrine. Ante, at 7. · There 
is undoubtedly a "live" issue which an appropriate plaintiff 
could present for j uclicial resolution. · The question is '"·hether 
respondent, who has no further interest in this action, never-
theless may- through counsel-continue to litigate it. 
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal 
stake requirrment with some care. When the issue is pre-
sented at thr outset of litigation as a question of standing to 
sue, we have held that the persoua] stake requirement has a 
double aspect. Ou thr one ham!. it derives from Art. III 
limitations on thf' power of tlw federal courts. On the other, 
it embodies additional, self-imposed restraints ou the exercise 
of judicial power. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. ~. 106, 112 
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). The 
prudential asp0ct of standing aptly is described as a doctrine 
of uncertain contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional 
minimum has been given definite content: "In order to satisfy 
Art. III, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered 
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively 
illegal conduct of the drfendant. " Gladstone, Realtors v. 
llillage of Helhoood, 441 F R. !H, 99 (1979). 1 Although 
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, thP Court has re-
jected all attempts to substitute abstract collcem with a sub-
ject-or with the rights of third parties- for "the concrete 
injury required by Art. III. '' Simon Y. Easterr1 Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Org., 4261!. R. 26. 40 (1976).2 
1 Se<>, e. q .. Duke PnweJ' C'n. v. Carolhw Environme11tal Study Group, 
Inc., 4:38 l'. S. 59. 72 (1971') ; Ar!i?Lyton lfeiyhts \' . Jletropolitan llou8ing 
Dev. Corp . .J-:2\J F. 8 . :25:2, :.W0-:2(i1 (1977): lVnrth \'. 8rldiu, .J-2:2 lf. S. 
490 . .J-09 (1975): [,i-!1(/a H . .S. v. llicharrl D .. -J.l() l'. S. (i1-J., 617 (1073). 
2 St'P, e. r; .. Schli!siur;er \'.Reservists to Stop the War, -J.li'\ U. 8. :208, 227 
(197-!) ; O'Shea \'. Littleton , 414 11. R. 4~~, -J.!J-J. (1\IH) ; Jfoose Lodge 
No . 107 v . Uvis, 407 1J. 8.16:3, 166- 167 (1972) ; .S1:ara Club v. Nfortou, -!05, 
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As the Court not<>s today, the same threshold requirement 
must b(• satisfiPd throughout thr action. Ante, at 8; see 
Sosna v. Iowa, 4H) F. R. 393, 402 (1975). Pmdential coll-
siderations not prrsPnt at the outset may support continuation 
of an action in which aft0r the parties have in vested substan-
tial resources in an action and generatNl a factual record." 
But an actual case or controversy in the constitutional sense 
"must he <>xtant at all stages of review." Steffel"· Thompson, 
415 1T. S. 452. 459, n. 10 (1074). Casrs that no longer 
"'toucfh I th0 legal relations of parties having adverse legal 
interests ' " arc moot brcause "frderal courts are without power 
to decidr questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in 
the case b(•fore them." !\'orth Carolina\'. Hice, 404 'U.S. 244, 
246 ( H)71) (per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haworth, 300 U. R. 227. 240-241 (10:37). The limitation 
flows directly from Art. J[[. DeF'Uizis Y. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 
312, 316 (1974) (per w .n'am).'1 
Since the question is one of pow·er, the practical importance 
of review cannot control. Sosna Y. Iowa, 410 P. S. 3n3. 401, 
n. 9 (1975); Richardson"· Ramirez, 418 F. S. 24. 36 (1074); 
Utzited States, .. Alaska S. S. C'o., 253 r. S. 113, 116 (1920). 
Nor can public iuterest in the resolution of an issue replace the 
necessary individual interest in the outcomP. See DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the orig-
inal wrong may supply the individual intPrest in some circum-
U. S. 7'27, 7:36-7:~~ ( 1!17:2): '1'11eston Y. [ '/luuw, :n~ l ' . 8 . .J-.J-. -Hi (Hl.J-:n 
(per cul'iam) . Tht> ruh• i~ th<' ~amp wlwn tlw <flll'><fion i>< mootn<'S>< and tL 
litigant. r·an a><><<'rt no mon· than l'motioual invoJwmPni in what remain>< 
of the <·a.~e . Ashdoft \'. Matti~S . .t:H ll . S. 171, 17:2-173 (1977) (pe1' 
curiam). 
3 SP<' 1:~ C. ·wright, A :\Tiller, and E. C'oopN, F<·<lPral Prartieo and Pro-
ccdurP § :35:{:~, at :2H5 (1D75): XotP, The ..\foofnP:<R Dodrine in the 
Supn•m<• Court , !-X Han·. L. HPv. :{7:3, :3/ti-:377 (1U7.J-). 
4 SrP, e. (f .. i'l'e1~~er v. Neu•kil'k, 422 lJ . S. :395, .J-01-1-02 (1975): SEC 
v. Medical Comm . jol' llu111an l?ioht:;, .J-O.J- U. 8. -40:3, .J-07 (HJ7:Z); J>oll'ell 
v. Mr·Comwck , :3!-.l.'i l'. 8. -1-l<fj, -l9U, u. i ( Wti\!) ; Line1· r Jajcu, Inc ., a75 
U. S. :301 , :30ti, n. 3 (JOG-!). 
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staHces. Sibr-on v. New York, 392 U.S. 40. 33-58 (1968). So, 
too, may the prospect of repeated futur<' injury so inherently 
transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of 
litigatio11. Super Tire Enuineering Co. Y. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 
115 (1974); Souther// Pac. Terminal Uo. v. ICC, 219. U. S. 
498, 515 (1911). The essential and irreducihk constitutional 
requiremeu t is simply a non frivolous shov,:ing of continuing or 
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary. 
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view to-
clay, that the core requirement of a JWrsonal stake in the 
outcorne is not "flexible." Indeed, the personal stake require-
ment sometimes appears rigidly formalistic. See Davis, 
Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. G01, 
G13- G14 (1968) . \Ve nC'vertheless have insisted upon thC' re-
quirement in mootness and standing cases because it is em-
bedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the 
Constitution, "founded in concern about the proper-and 
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society." 
Warth v. Seldin , 422 e. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we 
have, u11til today, "prevent[ed] the judicial process from 
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the 
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v. 
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Ke·n-
tucky ·welfare Rights Urg., s·upra, at 60 (Bm~NNAN, J., con-
curring in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 
727, 740 (1974) . 
II 
The foregoiug decisions C'stablish principles that the Court 
has applied consiste11tly. These principle's were developed 
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no 
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a puta-
tive class representative who alleges no individual injury "may 
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of 
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974). 
Only after a cla~s has beC'n certified in accordance with Rule 
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23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interests 
aserted by [the named plaintiffj ." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 
399 (1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live in-
terests of unnamed but identifiable class members may sup-
ply the perso11al stake required by Art. Ill when the named 
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bow-
man Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976); 
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402. 
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No 
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff uo longer has any 
personal stake in the litigation.r. In the words of his own 
lawyer, rPsponclent "call obtai11 absolutely no additional per-
sonal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg .. at 25. Even the 
lawyer has evinced no interest in conti11uing to represent 
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other 
persons prPsently incarcerated. Jbid. 0 ln these circum-
stances, Art. III and the precede11ts of this Court require 
dismissal. But th<> Court views the case differently, and con-
5 Xo OllP ~ugg<•:;t~ that rC'~pondent C"onld lw alfl'et<>d prrsonall~· by any 
ruling on t IH· C"ia~,; rrrt ifiration qul'stion t.hat i~ n·maJJdrd today. In fact, 
the Court. apparr11tl~· <·onr<·de~ that n•,;pondent ha~ 110 Jl<'l'l'iOil!tl ::;tah~'·jn 
the traditwnal ,.;('11~(·"-ill oLt.aining certification. Ante. at 14. 
Several pri::;oner,.; now in fPderal eu,;tody han' fil<'d a motion to inter-
vene a:> partit•,.; re"pondent. in thi" Court. Although tiH• Court. do<·~ not, 
rule on thal motion, I note that tlw motion wa:s rcc<·ived well over 11 
year aft f'f re~pond<·nt. wa,.; relea:;ed from pri,.;on. In the interim, rc-
sponclPnt. obtained a ruling from the Court, of App<•;tl,; <llld filrd hi::; 
petition for eertiorari in thi,.; Court. Such untinH'l~· intrrvention <·omes 
too lat n to savp tiH' adion undPr l'·nited Ai11 Liuel! Y. J1cDonald, .f32 
U. S. 385 (1977). 
6 Hr~poncJPnt '~ Jaw~·(')' Opl'nNJ hi,; argtll11<'11 f IJ~· ~a~· iug that " (f) he 
mootne,;,; rpJl':';t ion in thi,., C'a,.;<· i,.;, !'rom a pract ira! ,.;land point., 110l Yery 
significant.'' H the aetion i~ lwld moot he plan~ ~imp]~· to "file a new 
ca~e" on lwhalf of prisoner~ "<'n·ing longPr t<'l'm~. On thP ba,;i~ of thi:; 
re])l'l't<Pntation b.'· <·oun,.;pl, tlH•rn i,; n•ason t.o bPii<'V<' that member,; of the 
putativ<' C"la,.;~ at i~;:;IH' ultimaf .rl~· will br indudl'<l in a cia~,; action that will 
not moot oul. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. 
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structs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has 
no plaintiff. 
The Court announces today for the first time-aJ](l without 
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that 
there are two categories of "the Art. III moot11ess doctri11e": 
"flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. The 
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application 
of "flexible'' mootness to class action litigation. The cases 
principally relied upon are .i11clude Gerstei·n v. Puyh, 420 U. S. 
103, 110- 111, n. 11 (HJ75). United Airlines, Inc.\'. McDonald, 
432 'G. R. 3~5 (1D77). and today's decision in Deposit Guarauty 
Nat. Bank "· Hoper, ante, p. -. Each case is said to show 
that a class action is not n1ooted by the loss of the class repre-
sentative's JWrsoHal stak(' in th0 outcome. Pven though 110 class 
has bef'n certifiNl. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself is cited for the 
propositio11 that the requirements of Art. II f may be met 
uthrough. means other than the traditional req ui reJtWll t of a 
'personal stake in the outcome.'" A1de, at 15. The Court 
grievously misr<'ads these precedents, for they show nothing 
of the kind. 
A 
In Sos11a, th<' Court simply aekuowledged that actual class 
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse par·-
ties. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. Y. Haworth, 300 F. S. 227, 240 
( H.J37) : And in Gerstein , the Court applied a rule loug 
7 Crr1ification j, no mPn' fonnnlit~· . H rrpre~<'u(~ rt .itH.lieiHI fill(ling 
tha.t injured parliPs othPr tha!l tlw lHtlllPd pla.i11tiff Pxi"t. It al~o ]ll'ovide~ 
a definition b~· whieh thP.v c·ar1 be ideJl(.ifiPd . C!'rtif"icnt ion identif"ic•f; and 
sharpens tht• inl!'r!'st:; of unn:mwcl cla;.;::; mPmlwr>< in the mttc·onw ; only 
after tl't'li.ticntion will tlw~· he bouml h~· thP outeornP . After c·c·rlifiea~ 
t.ion, c·la"" nwmhrr~ c·ttn lw <'rrtain thnt the netion will Hot he ~ettlrcl or 
cli;:mi:<sc·d without. approprintc· Jlolil'e . Frcl. Hulc CiY. Proc. :2:~ (('): :-) H . 
KewbC'rg Clas. Action~ § ,')050 (Hl7'i); ef. Allll<IIHI Srtnillg Hulc• :2:) Cle~"s 
Artions at. the l'rc•c·ertification Rtatc: Is :\'otie<> H<'quirPd'!, .'i(i Y C. L. 
Hev, 303 ( lUi.S) . Yigorou,.; achoc·ac·J· i::; n:<,.:ured by the authoritative impo:;i-
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established-outside the class actio11 contf•xt--Ly cases that 
never have bN•n thought to erode tlw rPquirement of a per-
sonal stake in th(' outcome. Gerstein held that a class action 
challenging the constitutionality of prc•trial detention proce-
dures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions 
had brought thPir clcteu tions to an end. The• Court did not 
suggest that action a personal stake in the outcome 011 the 
merits was unnecessary. The action continued 01dy b<•cause 
of the transitory natun' of pretrial detention, which placed 
the lawsuit within "that narrow class of cases'' that are "dis-
tinctly "capabl<' of repetition , yet evading review.'" 420 
u. R .. at llO. II. 11.8 
McDonald and Roper sanction sonw appeals from the denial 
of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of the class 
representative 's claim on the merits. But neither case holds 
tion on the llHilll'd plaintiff:< of a dnt~· adPqiiHIPI~· to I'<'J)I'f'>"<'lll · thP r11tire 
clas:;. If t,Il(' ll:llllC'd pia in tiff'" own <·Ia irn be rom<'" moot a 1'tl' l' <·Ntifil'a tion, 
the conrt. <·an r<·-<·x<~minr hi:-' aiJilit~· to reprr~l'llt thP inl<•rr~l" of cla~s 
mrmhrr~ . Should it. b<' foulld wanting. thr Court ma~· ~<'rk a ;.;uh:;titute 
rrpr<'"<'nlalii'P or <'V<'Il. d<·<·Prtil\ thl\ <·las". FP<l. fhllc C'iv . l'ro<· . 2:) (e) (1), 
28 (d) ; ~rr I H . X<·wberg, supm. § 2Hl2; CommPnt , Continuation and 
TIPJll'f'"<'nta t.ion of Cia"" Actions Following Di~mi"'~al of I h<· Cia"" H.rprc-
sl'ntativ<', Hli4- DukP L . .T. 5i:~, 5kH-5!10, (i0:2-Go:3. After e<'rtitil':ttion, the 
ca:;e i~ no ditl'Pr<'nl in prinl'iple from mor<' 1nulitioJt:il repn'"PJIIativP action~ 
involving, for <·xample, a ~in~IP party who ennno1 partieipnt.<• him~<'lf 
beran~r of hi~ inrompl'tPnee hnl i,; IJ<'rmit.ted to litigate through an ap-
poiniPd fidnciHry. 
8 The Comt ',.; Gerstl:'in an:d.,·~i~, which rmpha~izNl that. "rplrclriHI de-
ten lion iH b~· n:ttnn· tr·mpontry" and tha.t " I t]hl' individual <·onld ... 
suli'cr n'pl'at('([ clepriva tion"" wi I h no Hl'<'l'~" to redre,..,~, fall" ~qua rely 
wit.hin the rule of •"vuthem Pac . 1'enninal ' . ICC, 2Hl U. S. -!D~, 515 
(1911). Sl'r Rtw \' . Wade. 4-10 ll . S. 11:3, 125 (1!1i3) . [n ~imilar ca:;es 
we have noll'd that tlw eontinu:Liion of the a<'lion will dP]JPnd '' 'e~pe­
cially fupon] th<• l'Palit~· of tiH• l'laim that. oth<·rwi"<' tht• i":;m• would pvadc 
rr,·ic·w.' " Swisher u. Rnuly. 4-:)K l'. S. 204, 213, 11. 11 (19i~), quoting 
Svsna r . lotCa, 4-Hl F . 8. ;ma, 4-02, 11. 11 (19i5). Thl'"C' limitations nn• 
ineon"i~l<·nl with ihr cmwPpl of "flexiblo" mootnl'i$~ Hml thr n·clrfinition of 
"pcr:;onal t't<rko" adopted today 
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that Art. ITT may bf' satisfie<..l in tlw abs('nC(' of a personal 
stake in tlH' outcome. In J.I!IcDonald, a putative class member 
intf'rvenE'd within thP statutory timC' li1nit to appeal the cer-
tification ruling. 432 e. s .. at 3DO." Bf'caUS!' thP Court found 
that her elain1 was not tiuw-barred, the intrrwnor in ~!cDmiA.kld 
possessed the stak(' IH:'Ct>ssary to pursue the action. lndef'd, 
the Court fkvoted its entire opinion to showing that the 
intervenor's claim for relif'f had not rxpirPd."' At most, 
McDo·nald holds only that an action which is kPpt alivP by 
illt('rested partiPs within prescribPd periods of lit11itations does 
not "die'' in an Art. III sense. 
Therp is dietum in Jfc/)ollald that the "rrfusal to certify 
>vas subject to appellatP revit-w aftt>l' fi11al judg11Jent at the 
bPhest of thP nanl<'d plai11tiffs .... " 432 r. S .. at 393. That 
gratuitous senklle<'. rt"peatPd in C'oopers & Lybmnd v. Livesay, 
437 r. R. 46:3. 4()!"J. 470. n. 15 (1978). apparently is elevated 
by thf' Court's opi11ion in this case to tlw status of 1ww doc-
triiH'. Tlwr<> is sPrious tension between this new doctrine and 
the llluch narrower reasoning adoptee! today in Hoper. Tn 
Roper, tlw Court holds that a 11amed plaintiff who has pre-
vailed on the uwrits n1ay apJwal thf' d<'llial of class ('ertifica-
tion becausr. of a "critical distinction'' lwtwePil mootness 
resulting from <'wnts <'xtrinsic to the litigation. A 11le, at-
(slip op., at 0). \YIH'n a pr<'vailillg party sePks r<'Vi('\\' of a 
ruling collateral to the judgment. Hoper concludes, Art. IJ[ 
is relevant only iudirectly to the quPstion of appealability. 
!d., at 7, 12. HoJ!er also suggests that a nalllrd plaintiff whose 
judgllwnt is satisfit>d may rPtain an economic intPrPst in shar-
ing litigation costs with the class. I d., at 10, n. 8. 
9 Tlu~ indi,·idual c·laim,.: of th!' original nanwd plaintiff,: had bP<'I1 >:rttkd 
nfl<·r a. judg11wnt on thr qur,.:tion of li:thilit~·. -n.? r. ~., :1t :)r.~J, :\n:l. 11 . 1~. 
1<> Thi~ t•xl<'ll:<i\'t' inquir~ · \\'ould ha,·r hP!'Il urnH't'<'~sa r~ · if. a:< tlw C'omt 
hold:; today, Lht• intNvenor had :1 per:<oltal ;-:tnkc in thP elu,;;-: <·Prtificatiou 
i:<:>U<' il,.:<'ll'. ;-;irH'<' t lu· pn·:<<'nl l't'>< Jlolldt•nt ',.: l'laim long :;iu<·!' ha.~ "Pxpired," 
he ,:land,; .in tlw ,.:aJlH' po:;itiou a~ a memlwr of till' putati,·<· ('Ia,:,; \\'h0:-<0' 
claim ha:; "t'Xpin·tl'' hy n':l.~on of tll(l ,:Ia t 11 t <' of limi tal iou~ . 
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It is far from apparent how Roper can br rrconciled with 
this case. The Court does not identify an economic interest 
here. Moreover, since respondent's claim was mooted by an 
extrinsic event-his unconditional release from prison-a "cri-
tical distinction" identified in Roper is absent in this case. 
That distinction fairly may be criticizrd. /d., at- (PowELL, 
J., clissrnting). But the fact remains that Roper does not 
purport to disturb thc• fundamental rule that a plaintiff who 
can no longer assert a concrete injury remediable by judicial 
action has ceased to prest•nt a case cognizable .in an Art. Ill 
court. 
The cases cited by the Court as "less fiexible ''-ancl there-
fore less authoritatiw-apply established Art. llf doctrine in 
·cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School 
Comrn'rs v. Jacobs, 4:20 U.S. 128 (1975) (per cur-iam); Wein-
stein v. Bradford, 4:23 D. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasa-
dena City Boar·d of Hducation v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424. 430 
(1976). As they are about to become second class precedents, 
these cases arr rrlegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12. n. 7. But 
the cases arc recent and can'fully considered decisions of this 
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III juris-
prudence. And 110 Justice who participated in them suggested 
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded treat-
ment of these "less flexible" cases ignores their controlling 
relevance to the issue preseutecl here. 
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to 
challenge certain high school regulations. The District Court 
stated 011 the record that class treatment \Vas appropriate and 
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives. but the court 
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted 
review. we were informed that the named plaintiffs had grad-
uated. \Ye held that the action was e11tirely moot because 
the "class aetio11 was never properly certified nor the class 
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properly identified by the District Court." 420 U. S., at 130. 11 
Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquir-
ing separate legal status. Art. III required a dismissal. We 
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action 
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a 
third party. 427 r. s., at 430-431. See also Baxter Y. Palmi-
giano, 425 F. S. 308,310, n. 1 (1976). Alld in Br.adford, where 
the District Court had denied certificatiou outright, the Court 
held that the named plaintiff's release from1>risou required the 
dismissal of his complaint about r>arole release procedures. 
423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & 1-'Fater Div. 
v. Craft, 436 e. S. 1, 8 (1978). 
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Spang'ler may be dis-
tinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the 
denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact that 
in each case the class representatives were defending a judg-
ment 011 the merits from which the defendants had appealed. 
The plaintiffs/ respondents continued vigorously to assert the 
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route 
of appealing a denial of certification 011ly because the District 
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose 
not to remand for correction of the ora1 certification order in 
Jacobs because we recoguized that the putative class repre-
sentative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by 
adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and Bradford as 
11 The vita lit_,. of the Jacobs result is under~('on•d by t.Jw l'P]WHtPd 
dictum tlmt. a propc•rly certified clas,; i~ ne<:e~~ary to :suppb· adverseness 
once the namPd plaintiff';-; ('!aim hrromC'~ moot. East Te.ta8 Motor l<'reiyht 
v. Rodriguez. -t:H F . S. 395, 406, n. 12 (1977) ; Prauks v. Bowma'll 'bau~;-
1J01'tation Co .. suwa, 4:24 U. S., at 754, n. (i. 755-756; SPl' K1'emens v .. 
Ba·rtley, 4;31 l 1 . S. 119, 129-120 (1977) ; Richardsou v. Ramirez, 418 P. S .. 
24, 39 (HJ7-1-). Couver,;ely, we hnve oflC'n ,;tated that the named plain-
tiff':s individual claim must be a live one both at. the timr the action is 
filed and at the tunC' of certification. Kremens v. Bartley. supra, at 143, 
n. 6 (B~tKNNAN, J .. di~~rntin~) : So~;na. Y. Iowa, 4Hl 1'. 8 .. at· .J-0:2, -1-0:3: ~ee 
Bell v. Wolfish,- ll. S. -, -, n. 5, (197,1)) ; Zablocki v. Redhail, 434-
U. S. 37'4,. 3il2, n. 9 ( 197.8). 
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well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal 
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mecha-
nism of class ce>rtification or otherwise.'" The Court rejects 
that principle today. 
III 
While the Court's 1ww concept of "flexibl0" mootness is 
unprecedent0d, the content given that coucept is even more 
disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this action 
into two s0paratP "claims'': (i) that tlw action may be maiu-
taiued by rcspomh'nt 011 lwhalf of a class. aud (ii) that the 
class is eutitled to relief on the merits. Siuee no class has 
been certified. th0 Court coucecles that tl1e claim o.n thr merits 
is moot. Ante, at 15. 17. But r0spondent is said to have a 
personal stake in his "procedural clai111" despite his lack of a 
stake in the n1t>rits. 
The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to 
respondent that may be rrdressed by. or any benefit to re-
spondeiJt that may accrue from. a favorable ruling on the 
certification q u0stion. lnstrad, respond0n t 's "persoual stake" 
is said to derive from two factors having nothiug to do with 
any concrete iujury or stake in thr outcome. First, the 
Court finds that the Fcd0ral Rules of Civil Procedure create 
a "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept," 
to have a cla s certified. Second, the Court thinks that the 
case retains tlw "imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial 
resolution." which are identified as (i) a sharply presented 
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested 
party actually contesting the case. A11te, at 14--15. 
The Court's reliance on some new "right'' inhereut in Rule 
12 IH some ('in·um~i.;mC'<'><, li1i~un1~ nrr IH·rmitic•cl to ar~~:uc• 1he righ1:; of 
third partie>< in :-~upport. of th<'ir claim~. E. y., 8iuyleto11 v. Wulff 428 
U.S. 106, ll:3 (J!JiO) ; Bnrrotc8 ' '·Jackson, a.Jti U. S. 249, 255-25ti (1953) . 
In <'aeh ~uch ra:sr, hom:>\'Cr, tlw Court ha:; idPnt ifird a eorH·rl't!', ill(!ividual 
injur~· ,;uffrrrd by rlw litigant hitn><!'lf. Ibid .; >'CC Jl. 2, Sll]n·o, and accom-
panying text. 
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23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congr-ess may not 
confer federal cour-t jurisdiction when Art. Ill dO('S not. 
Gladstone, Realtors Y. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. 8 .. at 100; 
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. 8 .. at 494. and n. 2; see Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 Crauch 137, 175-177 (180:3). Far less so may a 
rule of procedure which "shall not be construed to extrnd ... 
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts .. , }i"cd. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney gen-
eral concept" cannot supply the pcrso11al stake necessary to 
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to per-mit litigation by a 
party "vho has a stake of his o·wn but otherwise might be 
bar-r<'d by prud~:•ntial standing rules. ~ee Warth v. Seldin, 
422 T.. S .. at .)01; Sierra Club v. Nforton, 40.) U. ~-.at 737-738. 
Since ueither Rule 23 nor the private attomry general 
concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new per-
ception of Art. llf requirements must rest entirely on its 
tripartite test of concrete advPrseness. Although the com-
ponents of the test are 110 strangers to our Art. Ill jurispru-
dence. th<>y operate only in " 'cases co nfessedly ·within I the 
Court's I jurisdiction.'" Franks v. Bow111at1 Trans-portation 
Co., 424 r. s .. at 755- 756, and Jl. 8, quoting Flast Y. Cohell, 
3D2 U. f-\. 83. 07 (Hl68). The Court citrs no derision Lhat 
has prrmised jurisdiction upon tlw ban• existence of a sharply 
presented issue in a concretP and vigorously ar-gu<•d case. ami 
I am aware of none.'~ Indeed, Paeh of thesP character-istics is 
sure to be present in the typical "pr-ivatE' attorney g~:•neral" 
action brought by a public spirited citizell.u Although we 
13 Thr C'ourt oftc·n has rpjrctrd tlw ronlt'JI(,ion I hat a "::;pirikd d1~put<'" 
nl01w j,; "uflki!'nt to C'OIIfC'r juri:;di<"t.ion. E. g., Hirlwrdson \'. Hamil'ez, -Ht> 
U. S. 2-J. , :35-:~6 (HJ7.J.) ; Ilall \' . Beals. :396 U. 8. 4:5, 48-·Hl (1Uti9) (per 
curiam). 
1 ·1 Tlw Court '~ a",.:p rtion to thn ront.rar~· nutwith"fandinl-( . llwn• i,; 
nothing in tlw n ·l·ord to ,;uggp,;t. t.hat no,~pond<'llt has any inlPre"t what<'Yer 
in his n<>w-found '· right. fo han' a (']a"s <'rrfified." A-nti", af 15. In fad , 
the l'Cl'Onl ~how,; that. rp,;pondr!lt',.: inll'rc,;t. in the IUE:'rit>< wa,.: the "olt' mo-
tinttion for hi :; altE:'mpt to repre,.:cnl a State. The tla~:; claim:; wPre addE:'cl 
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have r0fuscd steadfastly to countenance the "public action," 
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement 
leaves 110 principl('d basis for that practice.u; 
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is 
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in 
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms 
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a 
false dilemma. As noted in Hoper, class certification issues 
are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Anle, 
at - (slip op .. at 6). A11y attempt to irle11 tify a personal 
stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration, 
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word. 
A motion fur class certification, like a motion to join addi-
tional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a 
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular 
to his c·omplmnt. only lwenu~c his l aw~·er fean'<.! that, mootnP~~ might 
termiuato th<• ac·tion. App., at. 17; Bripf for HPpoudrnt. :2:3, :~:3 . The 
record doe:; not. !'<'veal wlwthcr re~pondent-aH di~tingui~lwd from hi~ 
lawyer-now wi:-<he::; to C'ontimw with t.Jw <'a"'<' . If he doe"', it i:-< ei<'ar that 
his inten·"'t ha~ nothing to do with the pro<·L•dural protetlion:> dr;,;<·riiJed 
by thr Court. as the ''primary b<'nPfits of cia&; ::mit~. " Ante. at 1-J.. Hi~ 
neither :-<urpri:;ing !lOr improper that n·:-<pondl'nt. :-<houlcl be <·onc·L'flll'd with 
parole procedure:-: . Hut n•spomlent'~ aetual irlt<'re~t i~ indi"'tingui:-<hable 
from the g<•rwralizNI in1cn•"t of •L "private at .tome~· geJl<•ral'' who mighL 
bring n '' public aetion " to improve the OJWrat.ion of a paroiP :;y~tem. 
' 5 ThL· Court ',; \·i<'w logical!~· cannot. he confined to moot. ea~<'"'. ]f a 
plaintiff who is released from pri~;on the day a ftcr .tiling a elm;~ ad ion 
challenging parole guiclelim•:; may "e<'k C<'l'titieation of the ela:-<>', why Hhould 
a plainti.tl.' who i:s rnl<'nsrd the clay bPfore filing Lhc :;uiL be barred'? As an 
Art. III matter , hen· can I><' no difference. 
EvPll on prudential grouncb, tlwre is little difft•n•n<·L· lw!w<'en thi~ <t<.: tion 
and onf1 filf•d promptlr upon rPIC<k'e. Ln the pre~Pnt. <'as<', thi,; C'omt 
has ruled on neith<'r the m<·rits nor tlw propriety of th<• <"Ia.~;:; act ion . At 
the same timr, it, ha,.: va<"<tt<•d a judgml:'nt b~· tlw Court of Appeals that in 
turn rever,;ed tlw judgment of the Di:;trict. Court . ?\o d<'l<·r·mination Oil 
any i"~llP i" IPft "tanding. For <'ver~· practical Jllirpos<', tlw action nlllsi 
begin nnl'w- thi" tim<' without. :t plaintiff. The· prudPntial eon,;id<'l'ations 
in favor of a finding of mootnP~"' could ::;can·ply be more compelling. 
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colltext. Such procedural devices generally have no value 
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution 
of the case on the merits. Accordingly. tho moving party is 
neither expected nor required to assert au iutorest in them 
indf'pendent of his iuterest in the merits. 
Class actions may ad vane£' siguifican tly the administration 
of justice in appropriate cases. IJI(lecd, the class action is 
scarcely a new idf'a. Rule 23 codifies. and was illtended to 
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long 
known in equity. See 1 H. Xewherg, Class Actions ~ 1004 
( 1977) . That federal jurisdiction can attach to tlw class as-
pect of litigation invoh·itJg: i11di\·idua.l <'hLillls lias lle\·er bern 
questioned. But even when we deal with truly 11ew proce-
dural devices, our freedom to «adapt'' Art. HI is limited to 
the recognition of different " 'mea11s for prest:•n ting a case or 
controversy otherwise coy·nizable by the federal cvurts.'" 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S .. at 240 (1937) 
(Declaratory Judgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L. 
R. Co. v. Wallace, 2S8 P. S. :249. 264 (1933) (emphasis added). 
The effect of mootness on the vitality of a device like the 
class action may be a rPlevan t prudeu tial considPra tion. '0 
But it ca11not provide a plaintiff when none is bcforP the 
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation 
of Art. I1L 11 
lG I do not. imp!!· th:1t thP rr~nlt rE>nc·hrd toda_,. i" nrrr>Nlr~· in any 
way to tlw continued vitalit~· of the ela.,~-action dr1·il·e. 011 thr eonlrar!·, 
the practical impact of finding; mootnt-.·s in thi~ l'a~r would be ~lig;ht indeed. 
See note 1:3, HUpra. And thi;, tna~· well be typical of cia,.;.-; adionR broug;hL 
under Hult- 23 (b) (1) or (2) to Reek injunl'tiv<• or declaratory rdirf. Such 
artions are not ;;uhjl'd to fru~t mt ion through ~l'C!UPnt ial ,;pt1lrment ofl'er 
that. "pick off" caeh intPrwning plaintiff. Cf. Depu~it Guaruuty Nat . 
Bank v. Rupl'r, ante. at - (~lip op., at 11-12) . Xor will Hub~titute 
plaintitfs lw d<'ll·nwl by 1he notieC' l'O:-;ts tlwt attPnd cPrtification of a cla"s 
undt'r Hulc· 2:3 (IJ) (3) . 
17 Thr Court '" pffort:s to ' ·~avC'" this action from mootm•,;,. kad it to 
drpnrL ~trikingly from t lw normal roll' of a n•\'il'wing; eomt. Tlw Court 
ft~il::> to idclltify how, if aL all, the Di,trict ( 'ourt ha~ erred . Xothing 
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IV 
In short, this is a case in which thC' putative class repre-
sentative-respondent here-no longpr has the slightest in-
terest in the injuries allegt>d iu his complaint. No m<'mbt>r 
of the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been iden-
tified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal 
personal stake that is a constitutional prPrequisite to the juris-
diction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only 
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are 
the defendant ami a lawyer who no longer has a cliPnt.'" 
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with instructioJlS to dismiss the action as moot,. 
is said about. thr Di,;trid. C'ourt'~ rulin~ on thP mrrits or it~ rl'fu><al to 
errtif\ the broad rla~~ :<ought b~· n•,.:pomlrnt. .:\'or dor,.- thl' Court adopt 
the Court of Appl'al:;' ronrlu~ion that thl' Dist ric·t Court !'l'rrd in failing 
to eon:-;idrr t,hr po:<sibili t ~ · of ,;ttl)('la~:,;p::; sua ~ponte . XPvl'rt helc·~:-:, rc-
f'poncknt-or hi,.- law.n' r- i:-: gin•n thc' opportunity to rai;-;c• t hr suhr]a,.:,.: 
qup;-;tion on n'mand. That r!',.-ttlt cannot IJp squar'('(] with tlw rut(• that a 
litigant. ma~· Jtot. rai:-:e on HJlJH'al tho~<· is..;up,.- hP ha:< faiiPd to pnw'rvP by 
::tppropritttr objt•ct ion in t hr trial eomt. TIH• Comt intima t <'" that t hl' 
Di;;t rirt Comt wait Pd t.oo loltp; to dc·n~ · t lw eht>'S ePrt itica t ion mot ion, t hu:-; 
makin~ a motion for :-;ubrla"" a "futill' aet. " Anti'. at 17. Hut nothing iu 
the rrrord suggr:-:t,.; that thP Distri!'t Court. would not hav<• Pntl'rtai.rwd 
such a motion . Sin<·c re~poudPut "ought rertifiratiou in thP first pla<·P on!~ · 
to avoid moollH'""' on appl'al. the· c·ntr~· of an ordl•r ag;ain"t him on the 
mrrit~ <'HilllOi· <·xr·usP him from prPHPnting hi ,; suiJf'la:-::< propo:<al to the 
Di:<trirt Court i:-::-:11<' t lwn·aft<•r. 
18 I imp!~· no l'ritici:-:m of rouu,<·l in t.his ra:<P . TIH' C'omt of Appl'als 
ngrcrd with rouno<el that thr c·prt ifieation i,;;-;up wa,.; app<•alable, and the.' 
ca::;c wa :> brought to thi,; Cou.rt by the 1' nitf'd State,;, 
w d~ WIA<Wl t\A( 
J uS-r1c.c- SrewA), 
~J MR.. :f~11c· 
Re: H 1\lQu\~ d0; 7 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL) dissenting. 
Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was 
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a 
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will 
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The 
District Court denied class certification and granted summary 
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before 
briefs were filed, he- was unconditionally released from prison. 
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The 
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment 
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was 
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that re-
spondent properly could appeal the denial of class certifi-
cation. The Court today agrees with this conclusion. 
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it says 
that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may be adapted 
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. Ante, at 
8-12. Second, the Court holds that the named plaintiff has 
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept" 
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his per-
sonal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12-16. Both steps 
are significant departures from settled law that rationally can-
not be confined to the narrow issue presented in this casK 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
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As the Court observes, this case involves the "personal 
stake" aspect of the mootness doctrine. Ante, at 7. There 
is undoubtedly a "live" issue which an appropriate plaintiff 
could present for judicial resolution. The question is whether 
respondent, \\·ho has no further interest in this action, never-
theless may- through counsel-coutinue to litigate it. 
Recent drcisions of this Court have considered the personal 
stake requirement with some care. When the issue is pre-
seuted at the outset of litigation as a question of standing to 
sue, wr have held that the personal stake requirement has a 
double aspect. On the one hand. it derives from Art. III 
limitations on the power of the federal courts. On the other, 
it embodies additional, self-imposed restraints on the exercise 
of judicial power. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 
(1976) ; Warth v. Seld·in, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). The 
pruden tiaJ aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine 
of uncertam contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional 
minimum has been given definite content: "In order to satisfy 
Art. III, t11<' plaintiff must show that he personally bas suffered 
some actual or threatened iujury as a result of the putatively 
illegal conduct of the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v. 
Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91. 99 (1979).1 Although 
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, the Court has re-
jectf'cl all attempts to substitute abstract concem with a sub-
jectr-or with the rights of third parties-for "the concrete 
injury rt>qmred by Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rtghls Org., 426 U.S. 26,40 (1976).2 
1 See, e (! .. Duke Power Co. v. CaroUna. Envii'Omnenlal Study Group, 
Inc., 438 \ ' S. 59 , 7'2 (1978) ; Arlington II eights v. Met1'opolitml Housing 
Dev. Corp . 4:!0 U. R. 252, 260--261 (1977); Wa1'th v. Sl'ldin, 422 U. S. 
490, 499 (Hli5J : Linda R . S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. tH4, 617 (1973). 
2 ScP, e. u ..  Schll'l3inyer v. Ilest>roists to Stop the Wa1', 418 lf. 8. 208, 227 
(1974): () '8h ea 1 . Littleton, 41-1: U. S. 488, 494 (1974) ; Moosl' Lodye 
No .. 107 v l!'ms, 407 U, S, 163, 166- 167 (1972) ; Sie1'ta Club v Morton, 405-· 
78-572-DISSENT 
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY 3 
As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement 
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; see 
Sos·na v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential con-
siderations not present at the outset may support continuation 
of an action in which the parties have invested substantial 
resources and generated a factual record.a But an actual 
case or coutroversy in the constitutional sense 'fnust be. ex-
tant at all stages of revie~" A Steffel v. 1'hornpson, 415 U. S. 
452, 459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal intE:>rests' " are 
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide 
questions that caunot affect the rights of litigants in the 
case before thE:>m." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 
246 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The limitation 
flows directly from Art. III. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 
312, 316 (1974) (per curiarn).4 
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance 
of review cannot control. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393. 401, 
n. 9 (1975); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974); 
United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920). 
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the 
necessary individual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the orig-
inal wrong may supply the individual interest in some circum-
U. S. 727, 736-738 (1972); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44 , 46 (1943) 
(pe1· cwriam L The rule is the same when the question i:s mootnes:s and a 
litigant can al:isert. no more than emotional involvt>ment. iu what remains 
of the ra:<e Ashdoft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per 
curiam) . 
a See 1;3 C. Wright, A. Miller, ttnd E. Cooper, Federal Practic(• and Pro-
cedure §a5a;~ , at. 265 (1975); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the 
Suprenw Court, 88 Harv. L. Hev. 373,376-377 (1974). 
4 See, e. g., Preise1' \'. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 4D1-402 (1975) ; SEC 
v. Medi('a/ Curnrn. for Human Rights, 404 U. S. 4D3, 407 (1972) ; Powell 
v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496, n. 7 (1969); Liner v. Jafco, Inc ., 375 
u.s. 301 , aoo, n. 3 (1964) . 
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stances. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,53-58 (1968). So, 
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so inherently 
transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of 
litigation. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U. S. 
115 (1974); Southern Pac. Termin..al Co. v. ICC, 219, U. S. 
498, 515 (1911). The essential and irreducible constitutional 
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or 
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary. 
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view to-
day, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the 
outcome is uot "flexible." Indeed, the personal stake require-
ment sometimes appears rigidly formalistic. See Davis, 
Standing : Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 
613-614 (1968). We nevertheless have insisted upon there-
quirement in mootness and standing cases because it is em-
bedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the 
Constitution , "founded in concern about the proper-and 
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society." 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we 
have, until today, "prevent[ed] the judicial process from 
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the 
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v. 
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRI!)NNAN, J .. con-
curring in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 
727, 740 (1974). 
II 
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the Court 
has applied consistently. These principles were developed 
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no 
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a puta-
tive class representative who alleges no individual injury "may 
not seek relief on behalf of himself OJ' any other member of 
tlie class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488. 494 (1974). 
0nly after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule 
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'23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interests 
asserted by [the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 
399 (1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live in-
terests of unnamed but identifiable class members may sup-
ply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named 
plaintifi''s individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bow-
man Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976); 
Sosna v. 7 owa, supra, at 402. 
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No 
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has a.ny 
personal stake in the litigation.5 In the words of his own 
lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional per-
sonal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the 
lawyer has evinced no interest iu continuing to represent 
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other 
persons presently incarcerated. 1bid.6 In these circum-
stances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require 
dismissal. But the Court views the case differently, and con-
5 No ow· :::uggests t.hat respondt-nt could be affected personally by any 
ruling on the class certification question tJ1a.t is remanded today. In fact, 
the Court, apparently concedes that respondent has no per:>onal stake-"in 
the t.radiuonal sense"-in obt~tining certification. Ante, at 14. 
Several prisoners now in federal cwstody have 'filed a motion to inter-
vene as parties respondent in this Court. Although the Court does not 
rule on that motion, · I note that the motion was received well over a 
year after re:spondent was released frorn prison. In the interim, re-
spondent obtained a ruli11g from the Court of Appeals and filed his 
petition for !'erlioraii in this Court. Such untimely intervention comes 
too late to save the action under United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 
U. S. 385 (1977) . 
6 Re,;poudeut 's lawyer oprned his argument by saying that. " [t]he 
mootnt>:s:l qtwstion in this case is, from a practical sta.ndpoint., not very 
significant .'' lf tlw action i:s ht-ld moot. he plans si · to "file a new 
case" on behalf of prisonrr,; serving longer terms. On the basis of this 
representation by counsel, tlwre is reason to believe that members of the 
putative elass ~~'~ssue ultimate~ be included in a class action that wil 
uot moot out.~ of Oral Arg. 25. ) 
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structs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has 
no plaintiff. 
The Court announces today for the first time-and without 
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that 
there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness doctrine": 
"flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. The 
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application 
of "flexible" mootness to class action litigation. The cases 
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 
110-111, n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 
432 U. S. 385 ( 1977), and today's decision in Depos'it Guarwnty 
Nat. Ban/1, v. Roper, ante, p. -. Each case is said to show 
that a class action "is not mooted by the loss of the class re Jre-
sentative's personal stake in the outcome of the ~, even 
though no class has been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself 
is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Art. III 
may be met "through means other than the traditional require-
ment of a 'persOI1al stake in the outcome.'" Ante, at 15. In 
my view, the Court misreads these precedents. 
A 
In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class 
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse par-
ties. Cf. Aetna Lite Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. ·227, 240 
(1937) .7 And in Gerstein, the Court applied a rule long 
7 Certification is no mere formality. It repre::;ents :1 judicial finding 
that injun·d parties other tJum the named plaintiff exist. It al::;o providel:i 
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies and 
sharpens the interests of unnamed class member~ in the outcome; only 
thereafter will they be bound by the outcomr. After crrtification, 
ch1::;s mrmbPr~ can be certain that the action will not be ~;ettl<'d or 
di~>missrd wiil10ul. appropriate 11oticc. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc . 23 (c); 3 H. 
Newberg ClM:> Actions § 5050 (1977) ; cf. Almond, Settling Hulr 2;~ Clas~ 
Actions ltt the Precertifira.tion State: Is Notice Hequired ?, 56 N . C. L. 
Rev. 303 (1978). Vigorou~ advocacy i::; a~>sured by the a.uthorita.tive imposi~ 
tion on thr nmned plaintiffs of a duty adeqmttely t.o r!;!prei:ient the entire· 
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established, outside the class action context, by cases that 
never have been thought to erode the requirement of a per-
sonal stake in the outcome. Gerstein held that a class action 
challenging the constitutionality of pretrial detention proce-
dures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions 
had brought their detentions to an end. The Court did not 
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the lllerits 
wa.s unnecessary. The action continued only because o~ the ( ~ 
transitory nature of pretrial <letention, which placed the lf\w... 
wi\ within "that naTrow Class of cases" that are "distinctly 
'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" 420 U. S., at 
110, n . 11.8 
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial 
of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of the class 
representative's claim on the merits. But neither case holds 
that Art. III may be satisfied in the absence of a personal 
class. If t.hp named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot after certification, 
the court can re-examine his ability to represent the int{'res(t; of class 
member:;. Should it be found wanting, thr Court may seek a substitute 
representat.ivc or even decertify t.h(1 class. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 2:3 (c)(1), 
23 (d) ; see 1 H. Newberg, supta, § 2192; Comment., Continuation and 
Representat.ion of Class Actions Followi1~ Dismissal of the Class Repre-
sentative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, '589-590, 602-603. After certification, the 
ca::;e is no differrnt in principle from more traditional reprrsrntative actions 
involviug, for example, a single party who cannot participat{' himself 
because of his incompetence ·but is permitted to Htiga.te through an ap-
pointrd fiduciary. 
s The Court's Gerstein analysis, which emphasized that " [ p] retrial de~ 
tention is by nature temporary" and fhat "[t]he individual could .. . 
suffer repeated deprivation;;" with no acces:; to redress, falls squarely 
within the rule of So'uthem Pac. 'l'erminal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 
(1911). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1973). In similar cases 
we have noted that the continuation of the action will depend "'espe-
cially r upon] the reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would evade 
review."' Swishm· v. Brady, 438 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting 
Sosna. v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitatjous are 
incon:;i:;ten t with the conct>pt of '·flexible" mootness and the redrfinition of 
"personal -;(akA" adopted today. 
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stake iu the outcome. In McDonald, a puta.tive class member 
intervened within the statutory time limit to appeal the cer-
tification ruling. 432 U. S .. at 390.0 Because the Court found 
that her claim was not time-barred, the interveuor in McDonald 
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed, 
the Court devoted its entire opinion to showing that the 
intervenor's claim for relief had not expirecl.10 At most, 
McDonald holds only that an action which is kept alive by 
interested parties within prescribed periods of limitations does 
not "die" in an Art. III sense. 
There is dictum in M cDO'I'wJd that the "refusal to certify 
was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the 
behest of the named plaintiffs .... " 432 U. S., at 393. That 
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand Y. Livesay, 
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 ( 1978) , apparently is elevated 
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doc-
trine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine and 
the much narrower reasoning adopted today in Roper. In 
Roper, the Court holds that a named plaintiff' who has pre-
vailed on the merits may appeal the denial of class certifica-
tion because of a "critical distinction" between mootness 
deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting from events 
extrinsic to the litigation. Ante, at- (slip op., at 9). When 
a prevailing party seeks review of a ruling collateral to the 
judgment, Roper concludes, Art. III is relevant only indirectly 
to the question of appealability. !d., at 7, 12. Roper also 
suggests that a 11amed plaintiff whose judgment is satisfied 
may retain an economic interest in sharing litigation costs 
with the class. I d., at 10, n. 8. 
u The indJviuual chims of the original namPd plaintiff,; had been settled 
aftpr judgnwnt on the que;tion of liabilit~· . 432 U . S., at 389, 393, n . 14. 
10 This extensivr inquiry would havP brrn lllll1t1Ces:sary if, a~ tlw Court 
holds today, the intervenor had a per:sonal :stake in the da:ss certification 
i:ssue it;;p)f. Since the present re;;pondent's claim long since hm; "expired," ' 
he stands in t he same position as a nwmber of the putative cia.:;::; whose 
claim ha.:; "expired" by rea<;on of the statute of limitations. 
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'he Court in Roper c ates novel Art. c oc~ 
ich 1 disagree. Y _t is not apparent how Roper supports 
ec1s10n 111 IS c ie. There is not eveu a speculative 
interest in sharing costs here. Moreover, since respondent's 
claim was mooted by an extrinsic event--his unconditional 
release from prison-the distinction identified in Roper as 
"critical" is absent in this case. ld., at 9. One lleed not 
accept that distinction as sound to conclude that Roper affords 
only illusory support for the Court's rulir~g here. 
B 
The cases cited by the Court as "less fiexible"-and there-
fore less authoritative-apply established Art. III doctrine in 
cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School 
Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per c:ur'iarn); Wein-
stein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasa-
dena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 
(1976) . As they are about to· become second class precedents, 
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12, n. 7. But 
the cases are recent and carefully considered decisions of this 
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III juris-
prudence. And no Justice who participated in them suggested 
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded treat-
ment of these "less flexible" cases ignores their controlling 
relevance to the issue presented here. 
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to 
challenge certain high school regulations. The District Court 
stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and 
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives. but the court 
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted 
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had grad-
uated. We held that the action was entirely moot because 
the "class action was never properly certified 110r the class 
properly ideutified by the District Court." 420 U. R. , at 130. 1t 
n The dtality of the Jacobs resulL is underscored by the repeated 
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Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquir· 
ing separate legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. We 
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action 
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a 
third party. 427 U. S., a.t 430-431. See also Baxter v. Palmi-
giano, 425 U.S. 308,310, n. 1 (1976). And in Bradford, where 
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Court 
held that the named plaintiff's release from prison required the 
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures. 
423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. 
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978). 
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Spang·ler may be dis-
tinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the 
denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact that 
in each case the class representa.tives were defending a judg-
ment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed. 
The plaintiffs/respondents continued vigorously to assert the 
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route 
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District 
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose 
not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in 
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class repre· 
sentative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by 
adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and Bradford as 
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal 
dictum llmt a properly certified clas::; is necessary to supply adversenel:ls 
once the named plaintiff'::; claim becomes moot.. East Texas Motor Freight 
v. Rodr-ig·u<'z , 431 U. S. 395, 406, n. 12 (1977); Franks v. Bownwn Trans-
portation Co., supra, 424 U. S., ut 754, n. 6, 755-756; see K1'emens v. 
Bartl<'y, 431 F. S. 119, 129-120 (1977); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 
~4, 39 (1974) . Conversely, we ha.ve often stated that the named plain-
tiff'l:i individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action ii$ 
filed and at the timr of eertifieation. Kremens v. Bartley, supra, at 143, 
n. 6 (BRENNAN, J., clisSE>utiug); Sol!na \'.Iowa, 419 U.S., at 402, 403; see 
Bell v. Woljilih, - U. S. -, -, n. 5 (1979); Zablocki v. Redltail, 434 
u. s. 374, 382, 11. 9 (1978). 
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stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mecha-
nism of class certification or otherwise.' 2 The Court rejects 
that principle today. 
III 
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness is 
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more 
disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this action 
into two separate "claims": (i) that the action 1nay be main-
tained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the 
class is entitled to relief 011 the merits. Since no class has 
been certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the merits 
is moot. Ante, at 15, 17. But respondent is said to have a 
personal stake in his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a 
stake in the merits. 
The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to 
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to re-
spondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the 
certification question. Instead, respondent's "personal stake" 
is said to derive from two factors having nothing to do with 
~ concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the 
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create 
a "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept," 
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the 
case retains the "imperatives of ~ dispute capable of judicial 
resolution ," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented 
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested 
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15. 
The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule 
12 In some circumst<.~nces, litigaJltR are permitted to argue tJJC right8 of 
third parties in support of their claimH. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff 428 
U. S. 106, 11:3 (1976); Barrows v. Jackson, :346 U.S. 249, 255-256 (1953). 
In each such case, however, the Court. has identified a concrete, individual 
injury suffered by the lit.igant himself. Ibid.; see n. 2, supm, and accom-
panying text. 
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23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not 
confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not. 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100; 
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Fa.r less so may a 
rule of procedure which "shall not be construed to extend ... 
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney gen-
eral concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to 
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a 
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise might be 
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S., at 737-738. 
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general 
concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new per-
ception of Art. III requirements must rest entirely on its 
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the com-
ponents of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurispru-
dence, they operate only in " 'cases confessedly within [the 
Court's] jurisdiction.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation 
Co., 424 U. S., at 755-756, and n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court cites no decision that 
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply 
presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case. and 
I am aware of none.J 3 Indeed. each of these characteristics is 
sure to be present in the typical "private attorney general" 
action brought by a public spirited citizeu.1o1 Although we 
1a ThP Court. often has rejected t.he cuuteut,iun tlmt a "spirited dispute" 
alone is sulficiPnt. to confer juriBdict.ion. E. g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 
U. S. 24, a5-a6 (1974); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1909) (per 
curiam) . 
u The Court's assertion to the contrary notwith:;tauding, there is 
nothing in the record to sugge-::;t t.ha.t rc::;pondent hus any intere1.>t whatever 
in hi:; new-found " right to have a class cl'rtifiPd." Ante, at 15. In fact, 
the record shows that respond<'ut'::; inte-n·st in the merits was the sole mo-
tivation for his attempt to repr<'~ent a class. The cla::;s claim~ were added 
78-572-DISSENT 
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY 13 
have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action ," 
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement 
leaves uo principled basis for that practice.15 
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is 
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in 
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms 
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a 
false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class certification issues 
are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante, 
at - (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal 
stake in such ancillary uclaims" often must end in frustration, 
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word. 
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join addi-
tional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a 
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular 
to his complaint only becHIJSC his lawyE-r fearro that mootnrs:; might 
tenninate the action. App., at 17; Brief for Ht>pondent. 2:~, 33. The 
record does not reveal whether r«>spondent-us distinguished h·om his 
lawyer-uow wi~hes to continue with the case. lf he does, it is clear that 
his interest has nothing (.o do with t.he procedural protections de~cribed 
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class :;uit:;." Ante, at 14. It is 
neither surprising nor improper that re:spopdent should be concerned with 
parole procedure~. But respondent':; actna1 interest is indistinguishable 
from the genemlized intere..st of a "private attorney general" who might 
bring a "public action" to improve the operation of a parole system. 
1·5 The Court's view logically cannot. be confined to moot, ca:<!:'S . If a. 
plaintiff who is released from prison the day after filiug a class action 
challenging parole guidelines may ::;eek certification of the clas~, why ~;hould 
a plaintiff who i:s released the dny before filing the suit be barred? As an 
Art. III matter, here> can be no difference. 
Even on prudential groundi:i, there is little difference between thi:; action 
m1d one filed promptly ttpon rele<tse. In the prPsent ca:::e, this Court 
ha:; ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the cla.':lll action. At 
the same time, it has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in 
turn rever::;ed the judgment. of the District, Court. No determination on 
any ii:itiUC is left :;tanding. For every pra.ctical purposr, the action must 
begin HJlew-t.hi l:! tjmc without a. plaintiff. The prudential contiiderations 
ln frwor of (t finding of mootne~:; could t;Cttrcely be more compelling. 
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context. Such procedural devices generally have no value 
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution 
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is 
"neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them 
independent of his interest in the merits. 
Class actions may advance significantly the administration 
of justice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the class action is 
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to 
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long 
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004 
(1977). That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class as-
pect of litigation involving individual claims has never been 
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new proce-
dural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to 
the recognition of different " 'means for presenting a case or 
controversy othenvise cognizable by the federal courts.' " 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240 (1937) 
(Declaratory Judgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L. 
R . Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added). 
The effect of moobH'SS on the vitality of a device like the 
class action may be a relevant prudential consideratiou.1(1 
But it cannot provide a plaintiff when none is before the 
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation 
of Art. 1Tl.17 
36 I rlo not imply that thr ret;ult. reached todny is necessary in any 
way to the continued vitality of the class-action device. On the contrary, 
t.he practical imvacl of finding mootne~:; in thiti case would be slight indeed. 
Sre note 1~1, supra. And thi:s may well be typical of cln::;<; actions brought 
under Rulr 23 (b) (1) or (2) to srek injunctive or declaratory relief. Such 
actions are not subject to fru st-ration through ~equential settlement offer~ 
tha.L "pick off" e<Lch intervening plaintiff. Cf. Depo~it Gual'anty Nat . 
Ba1tk v. ' Ro71e1·, ante, at - (slip op., at 11-12) . r or will sub -titute 
plaintiffs he det-erred by the notice eosts that attend certification of lt claS/3 
nndPr Rule> 2:3 (b) (3) . 
17 The Court':s efforts to ",;avr" this action from mootnes, leau it to 
depart strikingly from the normal role of a reviewing court. The Court 
fails to identify how, if at all, the Di;;J,ri!'t Court ha» erred. Nothing-
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IV 
In short, this is a case in which the putative class repre-
seutative-respondent here-no longer has the slightest in-
terest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member 
of the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been iden-
tified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal 
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the juris-
diction of ap Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only 
persons before this Court who appear to })ave au interest are 
the defendant;.(iii1d a lawyer who no longer has a ohent. 111 ~ 
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot. 
is said about. tht> Dist.rict Court's ruling on the merits or its refusal to 
0ertify t.he broad class sought by respondent. Nor dot•s the Court n.dopt 
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court errPd in failing 
to consider the po~S::;ibility of subcla::;.,;e~; sua sponte. Neverthelei'S, re-
spondent-or his lawyer-i;: given the opportunity to raist> tht> subclass 
qurstion on fl'UHUld. That result. ca.nnot br squared with th r rule that a 
litigant. rna~·. not. raise on appeal tho::;e> issues he has fa.ilf'<l to preserve by 
appropriat<' obj('rt.ion in the trial court. TI1e Court. intinm.teH that the 
District. Court waited t.oo Ion~ to deny the cla!iS certification mot.ion, tlm:s 
making :1 motion for subrlasse::; a "futile act." Ante, at 17. But nothing iu 
the rceord ,;ugge,;ts that the Di,;trirt. C'ourt, would not hn.ve entertained 
such a mot ion. Sinrc r<'spondeut :sought certification in t.hr fir::;t. place ouly 
to avoid mootuP~~ on appeal, the cnt.ry of an order again~L him ou the 
merit:; rHJJilOL <·xcHse him from pre~enting his ~>ubcla:;:; propo~>ul to tho 
Di><t rict Comt thereafter. 
18 I imply no critici,o:m of counsel in tJ1is case. The Court of Appeals 
agreed with counsel that the certification i:s:sue ww> ap)X'nlablc, and the· 
r;t:>e wa. brought to this Court by the Uuited St:~trs. 
0v'W pv,Akf 1s 
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Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was 
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a 
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will 
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The 
District Court denied class certification and granted summary 
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before 
briefs were filed, he was unconditionally released from prison. 
Peti tioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The 
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment 
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was 
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that re-
spondent properly could appeal the denial of class certifi-
cation. The Court today agrees with this conclusion. 
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it says 
that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may be adapted 
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. Ante, at 
8- 12. Second, the Court holds that the named plaintiff has 
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept" 
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his per-
sonal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12- 16. Both steps 
are significant departures from settled law that rationally can-
not be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case. 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
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As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement 
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; see 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential con-
siderations not present at the outset may support continuation 
of an action in which the parties have invested substantial 
resources ami. generated a factual record.3 But an actual 
case or controversy in the constitutional se11se "'must be ex-
tant at all stages of rev iew.'" Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S.l 
395, 401 (1975), quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 
452, 459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests' " are 
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide 
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the 
case before them." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 
246 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haworth , 300 U. S. 227. 240-241 (1937). The limitation 
flows directly from Art. III. De.Punis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 
312, 316 (1974) (per curiam).4 
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance 
of reviev.· cannot control. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 401, 
n. 9 (1975); Richardso·n v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974); 
Un·ited States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920). 
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the 
necessary individual interest in the outcome. See De.Punis v. 
Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the orig-
inal wrong may supply the individual interest in some circum-
(per curiam) . The rule is the same when the question is mootness and a 
litiga.n t can a:,;:sert. no more than !'motional involvement in what remains 
of the ca~e Ashc1Joft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (pe1· 
c·urium) . 
3 See 1:~ C'. Wright, A. Miller, unci E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure § 35a:3, at. 265 (1975) ; Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the 
Suprt>nw Court, HR Harv. L. Hev. 37:3, 376-377 (1974), 
'1 Se(', e. g., Prezser v. Newkirk. 422 U. S. 395, 4D1-402 (1975); SEC 
v. Medical Comrn. for Human Riahtl3, 404 U. S. 4D3, 407 (1972); Poweu· 
v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 4R6, 496, n. 7 (1969); Liner v. Jafco, Inc ., 375. 
u.s. 301, aoo, n a (1964). 
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stances. Sibron v. New York, 392_ U.S. 40,53-58 (1968). So, 
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so inherently 
transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of 
litigation. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U. S. 
115 (1974); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219, U. S. 
498, 515 (1911). T\he essential and irreducible constitutional 
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or 
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary. 
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view to-
day, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the 
outcome is not "flexible."· Indeed, the personal stake require-
ment sometimes appears rigidly formalistic. See Davis, 
Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 
613-614 (1968). ViTe nevertheless have insisted upon there-
quirement in mootness and standing ·cases because it is em-
bedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the 
Constitutio11, "founded in concern about the proper-and 
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society." 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we 
have, until today, "prevent[ed] the judicial process from 
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the 
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v. 
SCRAP, 412 F. S. 669, 687 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., con-
curring in the judgment) ; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 
727, 740 (1974). 
II 
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the Court 
has applied consistently. These principles were developed 
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no· 
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a puta-
tive class representative who alleges no individual injury "may 
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of 
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974). 
Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule 
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23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interests 
asserted by [the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 
399 (1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live in-
terests of unnamed but identifiable class members may sup-
ply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named 
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bow-
man Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976); 
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402. 
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No 
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any 
personal stake in the litigation.5 In the words of his own 
lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional per-
sonal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. , at 25. Even the 
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent 
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other 
persons presently incarcerated. Ibid.6 In these circum-
stances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require 
dismissal. But the Court views the case differently, and con-
G No one suggt-:;ts t.hat respondent. could be affected personally by any 
ruling on the clat'S certification question that is remanded today. In fact, 
the Court. apparrntly concedes that respondent has no personal stake--"in 
the t.ra.cht.ional :;eH8e"-in obt~tining certification. Ante, at 14. 
Several prisoners now in federal custody have filed a motion to inter-
vene as partie:; respondent in this Court. Although the Court does not 
rule on that motion, I note that the motion was received well over a 
year after re:;pondent was released from prison. In the interim, re-
pondent obtained a mling from the Court of Appeal:; and filed his 
petition for certiorari in thi:; Court. Such untimely intervention comes 
loo late to save the action under United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 43Z 
u. s. 385 (1977) . 
0 R e:>J10ndent.'::; lawyer opened his argument. by saying that " [t]he 
mootne:;s question in this case i:s, from a practical standpoint., not very 
significan t." If the nction is held moot he pla.ns simply to "file a new 
<:a~<'" on hdt<tll' of prisonrr;; ~e rving longer trnn;;. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25 .. 
On tho hn~t,.. ol' thi::; rPprr~eutatioJt by couu;;el, ther!:' i:; reason to believe· 
that memhPr~ of the putativP ria~:; at i:ssuc ultimat!:'ly will be included in a: 
cia "H actiou thut will not moot out. 
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structs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has 
no plaintiff. 
The Court announces today for the first time-and without 
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that 
there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness doctrine": 
"flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. The 
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application 
of "flexible" mootness to class action litigation. The cases 
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 
110-111, n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 
432 U.S. 385 (1977), and today's decision in Deposit Guaranty 
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. -. Each case is said to show 
that a class action is not mooted by the loss of the class repre-
sentative's personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, even 
though no class has been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself 
is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Art. III 
may be met "through means other than the traditional require-
ment of a 'personal stake in the outcome.'" Ante, at 15. ·. In 
my view, the Court misreads these precedents. 
A 
In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class 
certification g1ves legal recognition to additional adverse par-
ties. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240 
(1937) .1 And in Gerstein, the Court applied a rule long 
7 Certification il> no mere formality. It represents a judicial finding 
that injured par1tc.- other than the named plaintiff exist. It also provides 
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies and 
sharpens tlw interests of unnamed class members in the outcome; only 
thereafter will they be bound by the outcome. After certification, 
class membrr::- can be certain that the action will not be settled or 
dismissed without, appropriate notice. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c); 3 H. 
Newberg Cia~~ Actions § 5050 (1977); cf. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class 
Actions at the Prerertification State: Is Notice Required'!, 56 N. C. L. 
Rev. 303 (1978). Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposi-
tion on the named plaintiffs of a duty adequately to represent the entire-
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·established, outside the class action context, by cases that 
never have been thought to erode the requirement of a per-
sonal stake in the outcome. Oerstein held that a class action 
challenging the constitutibnality of pretrial detention proce-
dures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions 
had brought their dete·n'tions to ail end. ''the Court did not 
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the merits 
was unnecessary. The action continued ouly because of the 
tra~1sito? .natur~of pretrial tletent~on, which pla?e~ the 
claim w1thm 11th~arrow class of cases" that are "d1stmctly 1 
'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' " 420 U. S., at 
110, n. 11.8 
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial 
of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of the class 
representative's claim on the merits. But neither case holds 
that Art. Ill may be satisfied in the absence of a personal 
cluss. If t.he named plaintiff'~ own claim becomes moot after certification, 
the court ran re-examine his ability to represent the interests of class 
members. Should it be found wanting, the Court may seek a substitute 
representat-ive or even decertify the class. Fed. Ruie Civ. Proc. 23 (c) (1), 
23 (d); ~o 1 l'I. Kewberg, s·upl'a, §2192; Comineht., Continuation and 
Represent a lion of Cia~, Actioilll Following Di:::missal of the Class Repre-
sentativr, 1974 Dukt> L. J. 57:3, 589-590, 602-603. After certification, the 
case is no different in principle from more t rarlitional representative actions 
involving, for example, a single pa.rty who cannot participate himself 
because of his incompetence but is permitted to litiga.te through an ap-
pointed fiduriary . 
8 The Court's Gerstein analysis, which emphasized that "[p]retrial de-
tention is by nature temporary" and that "[t]he individual could ... 
suffer repeated deprivations" with no accCI:iS to redretlS, falls squarely 
within the rule of Southern Pac. Terminal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 
(1911) . See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1973). In similar cases 
we have noted that the continuation of the action will depend " 'espe-
cially [upon] the reality of the clajm that otherwise the issue would evade 
review.' " Swisher 11 . Brady, 438 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 ( 1978), quoting 
Sosn(l; v. Iowa, 419 U. S. :39a, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitations are 
inconsistrnt. with the concept of "flexible" mootness and the redefinition 6i' 
"personal ' t.ake" adopted today. 
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stake in the outcome. In McDonald, a putative dass member 
intervened within the statutory time limit to appeal the cer-
tification ruling. 432 U. S .. at 390.9 Because the Court found 
that her claim was not time-barred, the intervenor in McDO'nald 
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed, 
the Court devoted its entire opinion to showing that the 
intervenor's claim for relief had not expired.10 At most, 
McDonald holds only that an action which is kept alive by 
interested parties within prescribed periods of limitations does 
not "die" in an Art. III sense. 
There is dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify 
was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the 
behest of the named plaintiffs .... " 432 U.S., at 393. That 
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 (1978), apparently is elevated 
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doc-
trine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine and 
the much narrower reasoning adopted today in Roper. In 
Roper, the Court holds that a named plaintiff who has pre-
vailed on the merits may appeal the denial of class certifica-
tion because of a "critical distinction" between mootness 
derivillg from a judgment and mootness resulting from events 
extrinsic to the litigation. Ante, at- (slip op., at 9). When 
a prevailing party seeks review of a ruling collateral to the 
judgment. Roper concludes. Art. III is relevant only indirectly 
to the question of appealability. ld., at 7, 12. Roper also 
suggests that a named plaintiff whose judgment is satisfied 
may rbtain an economic interest in sharing litigation costs 
with the class. I d., at 10, n. 8. 
9 The iudividual clnims of the original named phti.ntiffs had been settled 
after judgment on the qu{':Stion of liability. 432 U. S., at 389, 393, n. 14. 
10 Thi,; exten~ive inquiry would have been unnecessary if, as the Court 
hold:; today, the intervenor had a personal stake in the class certification 
issue its<'lf. Since the pre::;ent re..,poncleut'i:! claim long since h;u; "expired,"' 
he stands in the same positiOn as n member of the put-ative class whose· 
'claim bas "expired" by reason of the sta.tute of limit;~tions .. 
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It is not apparent how Roper supports the decision in this 
case. There is not even a speculative interest in sharing 
costs here. Moreover, since respondent's claim was mooted 
by an rxtrinsic evC'nt-his unconditional release from prison-
the distinction identified in Roper as "critical" is absent in 
this case. !d., at 0. One need not accept that distinction 
as sound to conclude that Roper affords ouly illusory support 
for the Court's ruling here. 
B 
The cases cited by the Court as "less fiexible"-and there-
fore less authoritative-apply established Art. III doctrine in 
·cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School 
C01mn'rs '·Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam); Wein-
stein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasa-
dena City Board of Education \'. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 
(1976). As they are about to become second class precedents, 
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12. n. 7. But 
the cases are rece11 t and carefully considered decisions of this 
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III juris-
prudence. And no Justice who participated in them suggested 
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded treat-
ment of these "less flexible" cases ignores their controlling 
relevance to the issue presented here. 
< 
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to 
challenge certain high school regulations. The District Court 
stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and 
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court 
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted 
review, we ~ere informed that the named plaintiffs had grad-· 
uated. We held that the action was entirely moot because 
the "class action was never properly certified nor the class 
properly identified by the District Court." 420 U. S., at 130.11 
11 The vitality of the Jacobs result is under::>cored by the repeated 
dictum tha.t a proper!~· certified cla::;,: is tJece;;::mry to ~>upply adversPness 
once the ntmwd plai.ntiff':s elaim h.ecomes m.oot. Ea~t 'l'exa~ Motor Freight 
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Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquir-
ing separate legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. We 
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action 
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a 
third party. 427 U. S., at ~30-431. See also Baxter v. Palmi-
giano, 425 U.S. 308, 310, n. 1 (1976). And in Bradford, where 
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Court 
held that the named plaintifl''s release from prison required the 
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures. 
423 U.S .. at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. 
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978). 
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Spang'ler may be dis-
tinguished because the plaintifl's there were not appealing the 
denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact that 
in each case the class representatives were defending a judg-
ment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed. 
The plaintifl's/ respondents continued vigorously to assert the 
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route 
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District 
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose 
not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in 
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class repre-
sentative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by 
adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and Bradford as 
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal 
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mecha-
v. Rodriguez , 431 r. S. 395, 406, n. 12 (1977); Franks V. Bowman Trans-
portation Co ., SU]Jra, 424 U. S., at 754, n. 6, 755-756; see K1'ernens v. 
Bartley, 431 U . S. 119, 129-120 (1977); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 
24, 39 (1974) . Collver~ely, wf' have often stated that the named plain-
tiff':; individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is 
filed and at the time of certification. Krernens v. Bartley. supra, at 143, 
n. 6 (BH'"NNAN , .T. , di~::-~nting) ; Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S., at 402, 403; see 
Bell v. Wolfish, - U. S. -, - , n. 5 (1979); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
U: S. 374, 382, n. 9 (1978). 
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nism of class certification or otherwise.12 The Court rejects 
that principle today. 
III 
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness is 
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more 
disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this action 
into two separate "claims": (i) that the action may be main-
tained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the 
class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class has 
been certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the merits 
is moot. Ante, at 15, 17. But respondent is said to have a 
personal stake in his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a 
stake in the merits. 
The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to· 
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to re-
spondent that may accrue from. a favorable ruling on the· 
certification question. Instead, respondent's "personal stake"· 
is said to derive from two factors having nothing to do· 
with concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the· 1 
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create 
a "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept,"' 
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the 
case retains the "imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial 
resolution," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented 
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested 
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15. 
The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule 
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not 
12 In . ome eirC'Utn~t~mces, litiga.nts arP permitted to argue t.he rights of 
third partie::; in ~upport of their claims. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff 428 
U.S. 106, 11:3 (1976); Barmws v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-256 (1953). 
In each such <'ilSP, however, the Court. has identified a concrete, individual 
injury suffrrrc! hy the litigant himself. Ibid.; ::;ee n. 2, supra, and. accom..-
panying text •. 
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confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not. 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100; 
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a 
rule of procedure which "shall' not be construed to extend ... 
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney gen-
eral concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to 
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a 
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise might be 
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S., at 737-738. 
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general 
concept can fill the .i urisdictional gap, the Court's new per-
ception of Art. ITI requirements must rest entirely on its 
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the com-
ponents of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurispru-
dence. they operate only in " 'cases confessedly within [the 
Court's] jurisdiction.'" Franks v. 'Bowman Transportation 
Co., 424 F. S .. at 755-756, a.ud n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court t)ites no decision that 
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply 
presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case, and 
I am aware of none.13 Indeed. each of these characteristics is 
sure to be present in the typical "private attorney general" 
action brought by a public spirited citizen.14 Although we 
1a The Court often has rejected the coutent,ion tha,t a "spirited dispute" 
alone is suffieicnt to confer jurisdiction. ·E. g., R-ichardson v. Rarn'irez, 418 
U. S. 24, 35-36 (1974); HaLl v. Beals1 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (pe1· 
cw·iam). 
1<1 The Court's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, there is 
nothing in the record t.Q sugge<>t that re.;poudent has any interest whatever 
in his new-found "right to have a class certified." Ante, at 15. In fact, 
the record ~how~ that re<>pondent 's intere;;t in the merits was the sole mo-
tivation for hi;.; attempt to repre~ent a cla:ss. The class claims were added 
to his compbinL only because his lawyer feared that mootness might 
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have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action," 
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement 
leaves no principled basis for that practice.15 
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is 
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in 
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms 
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a 
false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class certification issues 
are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante, 
at - (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal 
stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration, 
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word. 
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join addi-
tional parties or to try the ·case before a jury instead of a 
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular 
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value 
terminate the action. App., at 17; Brief for H.epondent 23, 33. The 
record doe:; not reveal whether respondent-as distinguished from his 
lawyer-now wishes to continue witl1 the ca.-;e. If he does, it is clear that 
his interes1. has nothing to do with the procedural protection1:1 described 
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suit::;." Ante, at 14. It is 
neit.her ::;urpn::;ing nor improper that re::;pondent should be concerned with 
parole procedure;;. But respondent's actual interest is indi::;tinguishable 
from the generalized intere::;t of a "private attorney general" who might 
bring a "public action'' to improve the operation of a parole system. 
1" The Court's view logically cannot be confined to moot ca::;es. If a 
plaintiff who is released from prison the day after filing a class action 
challenging parole guidelines may 1:1eek certification of the cla~:~s, why should 
a plnintiff who i::; released the day before filing the suit be ba.rred? As an 
Art. III matter, here can be no difference. 
Ewn on prudential grounds, there is little difference between this action 
and one filed promptly upon release. In the pre::;ent case, this Court 
has ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the cla:;s action. At 
the same time, it has vact~ted a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in 
turn reversed the judgment of the District Court. No detennination on 
any is~ue i::. left standing. For every practical purpose, the action must 
begin aJlew-this tjme without a. plaintiff. The prudential considerations 
in fayor of n fi11ding of mootness could scarcely be more compelling, 
78-572-DISSENT 
14 UNITED STATF.B PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY 
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution 
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is 
neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them 
independen t of his interest in the merits. 
Class actions may advance significantly the administration 
of justice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the class action is 
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to 
clarify, procedures for dealillg with a form of action long 
known iu equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004 
(1977) . That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class as-
pect of litigatiotJ involving individual claims has never been 
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new proce-
dural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to 
the recognition of different "'meaus for presenting a case or 
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.'" 
Aetna Life Ins .. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240 (1937) 
(Declaratory Judgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L. 
R. ro. V. Wallace, 288 u.s. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added). 
The effect of mootness on the vitality of a device like the 
class action may be a relevant prudential consideration. 16 
But it cannot provide a plaintiff when none is before the 
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation 
of Art. Ill.17 
w I do not. imply that tho rpsult rPachPd today is necessary in any 
way to the continuPd vitalit~r of the clas.,;-action device. On the contrary, 
tho practical impact of finding mootnes~:~ in this case would be slight indeed. 
See notP 13, supra. And this may well be typical of class actions brought 
und<•r Hule 23 (b) (1) or (2) to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. Such 
;lction,.,; are noL ~:~ubj ect t.o fru~tration through ~equential settlement offers 
that "piek off" each intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit G'Uamnty Nat. 
Bank v. Rope1·, ante, at - (:-;lip op., ai 11-12) . Nor will substitute 
plaintiffs bl:' d!:'terred by the notice costs that at.tend certification of a class 
under Rule 2:3 (b) (3) . 
17 The Court 's effort · to "~avE'" this action from mootness lead it to 
depart ~Lrikingly from the normal role of a. reviewing court. The Court 
fail s to identify how, if at all, Lhe Dist.riet Court hal:l erred. Nothing· 
ifl sH id abou1. the Dist.rict Court 's ruling on t.hp merits or its refusal to. 
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IV 
In short, this is a case in which the putative class repre-
sentative-respondent here-no longer has the slightest in-
terest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member 
of the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been iden-
tified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal 
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the juris-
diction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only 
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are 
the defendants and a lawyer who no longer has a client.' 8 I 
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot. 
certif~· the broad class sought by respondent. Nor does the Court adopt 
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court erred in fa.iling 
to con:>ider t.he po~sibility of :;ubcla8~e:s .sua spoute. Nevertheless, re-
spondent-or his lawyer-is given the opportunity to raise the subclass 
question on rrmnnd. That rr::;ult. rannot be :squared with the rule that a 
litigant. may not raiHe on appeal those issue:; he has fa.iled to pre::;erve by 
appropriatP object.ion in the trial court. The Court inti1m~tes that the 
District Court waited t.oo long to deny the elass certification motion, thus 
making a motion for :subrlas:se:; <t " futile act." Aute, at 17. But nothing in 
the record :-;uggest::; that the Di:4rict Court. would not ha.ve entertained 
such a motion . Since respondent sought certifica.tion in the first place only 
to avoid mootne:>t< on appeal, the entry of an order against him on the 
merit:> cannot rxcuse him from prr:>enting his :subclass proposal to the 
Di~trict Court thPreafter. 
18 I imply no criticism of counsel in this case. The Court of Appeals 
agre(•d with ronn~Pl that the certific<Ltion i. · ·ue \\'as appealable, and the 
,case was brought to this Court by the United States. 
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Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was 
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a 
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will 
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The 
District Court denied class certification and granted summary 
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before 
briefs were filed, he was unconditionally released from prison. 
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The 
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment 
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was 
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that re-
spondent properly could appeal the denial of class certifi-
cation. The Court today agrees with this conclusion. 
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it says 
that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may be adapted 
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. Ante, at 
8- 12. Second, the Court holds that the named plaintiff has 
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept" 
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his per-
sonal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12-16. Both steps 
are significant departures from settled law that rationally can-
not be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case. 





2 U ITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY 
I 
As the Court observes, this case involves the upersonal 
stake" aspect of the mootness doctrine. Ante, at 7. There 
is undoubtedly a "live" issue which an appropriate plaintiff 
could present for judicial resolution. The question is whether 
respondent, who has no further interest in this action, never-
theless may-through counsel-continue to litigate it. 
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal 
stake requirement with some care. When the issue is pre-
sented at the outset of litigation as a question of standing to 
sue, we have held that the personal stake requirement has a 
double aspect. On the one hand, it derives from Art. III 
limitations on tl1e power of the federal .courts. On the other, 
it embodies additional, self-imposed .restraints on the exercise 
of judicial power. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 112 
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975)". · The 
prudential aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine 
of uncertain contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional 
minimum has been given definite content: "In order to satisfy 
Art. III, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered 
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively 
illegal conduct of the defendant." · Gladstone, Realtors v. 
Village of Bellwood, 441 u: S. '91 , ·99 (1979).1 Although 
noneconomic inJuries can confer standing, the Court has re-
.iected all attempts to substitute abstract concern with a sub-
ject-or w1th the rights of third parties-for "the concrete 
injury required by Art. III.". Simon v. Eastern Kentucky· 
Welfare Rights Org.; 426 U. S. 26, 40 (1976) .2 
1 See, e. (J ., Duke Powd C'o . v. Carolina Envi1'Dnmental Study G1·oup, 
Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan. Housing /) D 
Dev. Corp . 429 U. S. 252, 260-261 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. r- I" I G. 
490, 499 (1975) ; Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973),1 
2 See, e. g., Schle.swger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227' 
(1974) ; O'Shea v. Ltttleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974); Moose Lodge 
No . 107 v. Uvis, 407 U. S. 163, 166-167 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 
(]~ S. 727:, 73&-7a~ (Hl7.Z' ; 'l'ile::;f.Km v.. Ullman ; 318 U. S. 44, 46 (1943)! 
L 
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As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement 
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; see 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential con-
siderations not present at the outset may support continuation 
of an action in which the parties have invested substantial 
resources and generated a factual record.8 But an actual 
case or controversy in the constitutional sense " 'must be ex-
tallt at all stages of review.'" Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S., 
395, 401 ( 1975), quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 
452, 459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests' " are 
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide 
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the 
case before them." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 2M, 
246 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The limitation 
flows directly from Art. lli. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 
312, 316 (1974) (per curiam)."' 
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance 
of review cannot control. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 401, 
n. 9 (1975) ; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974); 
United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920). 
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the 
necessary individual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the orig-
inal wrong may supply the individual interest in some circum-
(per cu1·iam) . The rule is the same when the question is mootness and a 
litigant cau usl:>tlrt no more than emotional involvement in what remains 
of the case Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per 
curiam) . 
8 See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure § 3533, a.t 265 (1975) ; Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the 
Supreme Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373, 376-377 (1974) . 
4 See, e. g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975); SEC 
v. Ml3dical Cormn. for Hu·man Rights, 404 U. S. 403, 407 (1972); PoweU 
v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496, n 7 (1969) ; Line1· v. Jafco, Inc., 37& 
U.S. 301, 306, n . 3 (1964). 
---
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stances. Sibron v. New York, 39~ U.S. 40, 53-58 (1968). So, 
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so inherently 
transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of 
litigation. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U. S. 
115 (1974); Southern Pac. Terminal Go. v. ICC, 219, U. S. 
498, 515 (1911) . 11he essential and irreducible constitutional 
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or 
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary. 
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view to-
day, that the core requ~· uent of a p~rsonal stake in the 
outcome is not "flexible."• .Jntleed, e persona s a e reqmre-
ment sometimes appea s11 rigidly formalistic~~ See Davis, 
:...:.~----~:).l.arftttl"flg'i--J...Jaxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 
..,..-....__~--~13-614 (1968 . insisted upon~ 
qw~Sl"MR:ts in mootness and standing ·cases because it is em-
. bedded i'a the case or controversy limitation imposed by the 
ConstitUtion, "founded in concern about the proper-and 
l)•operly limited- role of the courts in a democratic society." 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we 
have, until today, "prevent[ ed] the judicial process from 
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the 
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v. 
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., con-
curring in the judgment) ; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 
727, 740 (1974). 
II 
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the Court 
has applied consistently. 1'hese principles were developed 
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no· 
exception for class actions. 'f'hus, we have held that a puta-
tive class representative who alleges no individual injury "may 
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of 
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974). 
, Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule· 
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23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interests 
asserted by [the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 
399 (1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live in-
terests of unnamed but identifiable class members may sup-
ply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named 
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bow-
man Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976); 
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402. 
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No 
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any 
personal stake in the litigation.5 In the words of his own 
lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional per-
sonal relief" in this case. 'l'r. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the 
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent 
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other 
persons presently incarcerated. Ibid.6 In these circum-
stances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require 
dismissal. But the Court views the case differently, and con-
5 No one :suggest~ tl1<tt respondent could be affected personally by any 
ruling on the class certification question that is remanded today. In fact, 
the Court apparE'ntly concedes that respondent has no personal stake-"in 
the trachtional ::;E'n:se"-in obtaining certification. Ante, at 14. 
Several pri8oner;:; uow in federal custody have filed a motion to inter-
vene a:s parties re;:;pondenL in this Court. Although the Court does not 
rule 011 that motion, I note that the motion was received well over a 
year after re~Spondent was released from prison. In the interim, re-
spondent obta.ined a mlmg from the Court of Appeals and filed his 
petition for certiorari in this Court. Such untimely intervention comes 
too late to t:>ave the action under United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 43Z 
u. s. 385 (1977) 
0 Ret:lpondent 's lawyer opeued his argument by saying that "[t]he 
mootne~SS que8tion in this case is, from a practical standpoint, not very 
significa.nt." If the a.rtion is held moot he plans simply to "file a new 
ea~(\" on lwhall' of prismwrs sPrving longrr tE'rm,.; . Tr. of Oral Arg. 25 .. I 
On iho lHt t'JH of ilus rrpre~entntion by coum;el, therE' i~S rE'ason to believe· 
tlmt nwmber;:; of the putatiw rla::;s at issue ultimatE'ly will be included in a: 
cla::;t> artwr1 thul will not moot <>ut. 
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structs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has 
no plaintiff. 
The Court announces today for the first time-and without 
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that 
there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness doctrine": 
"flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. The 
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application 
of "flexible" mootness to class action litigation. The cases 
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 
110-111, n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 
432 U.S. 385 (1977), and today's decision in Deposit Guaranty 
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. -. Each case is said to show 
that a class action is not mooted by the loss of the class repre-
seHtativ~ 's p~rsonal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, even I 
though no class has been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself 
is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Art. III 
may be met ''through means other than the traditional require~ 
ment of a 'personal stake in the outcome.' " Ante, at 15. ·. In 
my view, the Court misreads these precedents. 
A 
Tn Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class 
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse par-
ties. Cf. Aetna Life Tns . Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240 
(1937) .7 And in Gerstein, the Court applied a rule long 
7 Certification i:, no mere formality. It represents a judicial finding 
that injured parties other than the named plaintiff exist. It also provides 
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies and 
sharpens the interests of unnamed clns.'l members in the outcome ; only 
thereafter will they be bound by the outcome. After certification, 
cla:ss membrn; can be certain that the action will not be settled or 
dismis:sed Without appropriate notice. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c) ; 3 H. 
Newberg Class Actions § 5050 (1977) ; cf. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class 
Actions at tlw l'recertification State: Is Notice Required?, 56 N. C. L. 
Rev. 303 (1978). Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposi-
tion on the named plamtiffs of a duty adequat('ly to represent the entire-
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·established, outside the class action context, by cases that 
never have been thought to erode the requirement of ~ per-
sonal stake in the outco~e. G·etstein held that a class action 
challenging the constitutionality of pretrial detention proce-
dures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions 
had brought their det~·ntions to an ena. 'the ''Court did not 
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the merits 
was wmecessary. The action continued only because of the 
tra~1sito~y . natu~~of pretrial c1etent~on, which pla?e~ the 
da1m w1thm 11tu';'.narrow class of cases" that are "d1stmctly 1 
'capable of repetition, yPt evading review.'" 420 U. S., at 
110, n. 11.8 
M cDoncild and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial 
of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of the class 
representative's claim on the merits. l3ut neither case holds 
that Art. Ill may be satisned in the absence of a personal 
class. If t.he named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot after certification, 
the court can re-examine his ability to represent the interests of class 
members. Should it. be found wanting, the Court may seek a substitute 
representative or even decertify the class. Fed. Tiuie Clv. Proc. 23 (c) (1), 
23 (d) ; ~e 1 B:. Newberg, sitpl'a, § 2192; Comineht., Continuation and 
Representation of Class ActioiUJ Following Dismissal of the Class Repre-
sentative, 1974 DukP L. J. 573, 589-590, 602-603. After certification, the 
case is no d1fferent in principle from more traditional representative actions 
involving, for example, a single pa.rty who caJ1not participate himself 
because of his incompetence but is permit.ted to litigate through an ap-
pointed fiduciary. 
8 The Court's Gen1tein analysi:;, which emphasized that "[p]retrial de-
tention is by nature temporary" and that "[t]he individual could .. . 
suffer repeated deprivations" with no acces:; to redress, falls squarely 
within the rule of Southern Pac. Terminal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 
(1911) . See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1973) . In similar cases 
we have noted that the continuation of the action will depend " 'espe-
cially [upon] the reality of the clajm that otherwise the is:;ue would evade 
review.'" Swisher v. Brady, 468 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting 
Sosna v. iowa, 419 U. S. 396, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitaUons are 
inconsistent. w1th the concept of "Jicxible" mootness and the redefinition of 
"personal Bt.ake" adopted today. 
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stake in the outcome. In McDonald, a putative class member 
intervened within the statutory time limit to appeal the cer-
tification ruling. 432 U. S., at 390.9 Because the Court found 
that her claim was not time-barred, the intervenor in McDonald 
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed, 
the Court devoted its entire. O:J?inion to showing that the 
intervenor's claim for relief had not expire(}.ltl At most, 
McDonald holds only that an action which is kept alive by 
interested parties within prescribed periods of limitations does 
not "die" in an Art. III sense. 
There is dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify 
was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the 
behest of the named plaintiffs .... " 432 U. ·s., at 393. That 
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 (1978), apparently is elevated 
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doc-
trine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine and 
the much narrower reasoning adopted today in Roper. In 
Roper, the Court holds that a named plaintiff who has pre-
vailed on the merits may appeal the denial of class certifica-· 
tion because of a "critical distinction" between mootness 
deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting from events 
extrinsic to the litigation. Ante, at- (slip op., at 9). When 
a prevailing party seeks review of a ruling collateral to the 
judgment, Roper concludes, Art. III is relevant only indirectly 
to the question of appealability. !d., at 7, 12. Roper also 
suggests that a named plaintiff whose judgment is satisfied 
may retain an economic interest in sharing litigation costs 
with the class. !d., at 10, n. 8. 
0 The iudividual claims of the original named plaintiffs had been settled 
after judgment on the question of liability . 432 U.S., at 389, 393, n. 14. 
10 This extensive inquiry would have been unnecessary if, as the Court 
holds today, the intervenor had a personal stake in the class certification 
issue i1. ~elf . Since the present re,;pondent's claim long since has "expired,'~· 
he i:ltanili! in the wme position as a member of the put.a.tive cla.ss whose· 
• claim has "expired" by rea.-;on of the 8tatnte of limit1~tions .. 
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It is not apparent how Roper supports the decision in this<. 
case. There is not even a speculative interest in sharing 
costs here. Moreover, since respondent's claim was mooted 
by an extrinsic event-his unconditional release from prison-
the distinction identified in Roper as "critical" is absent in 
this case. I d., at 9. One need not accept that distinction 
as sound to conclude that Roper affords only illusory support 
for the Court's ruling here. 
B 
The cases cited by the Court as "less fiexible"-and there-
fore less authoritative-apply established Art. III doctrine in 
cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School 
Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam); Wein-
stein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasa-
dena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 
(1976). As they are about to become second class precedents, 
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12. n. 7. But 
the cases are receu t and carefully considered decisions of this 
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III juris-
prudence. And no Justice who participated in them suggested 
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded treat-
ment of these "less flexible" cases ignores their controlling 
relevance to the issue presented here. 
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to 
challenge certain high school regulations. The District Court 
stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and 
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court 
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted 
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had grad- · 
uated. We held that the action was entirely moot because 
the "class action was never properly certified nor the class 
properly identified by the District Court." 420 U.S., at 130.11 
11 The vitality of the Jacobs result is underscored by the repeated 
dictum tlw.t lL properly certified class is nece~:>:;ary to supply adverseness 
(>noo the named plm.ntiff's claim h,ecomes m.oot. East 1'exas Motor Freight· 
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Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquir· 
ing separate legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. We 
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action 
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a 
third party. 427 U. S., at ~30-431. See also Baxter v. Palmi-
giano, 425 U.S. 308, 310, n. 1 (1976). And in Bradford, where 
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Court 
held that the named plaintiff's release from prison required the 
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures. 
423 U. S. , at 149. See also Memphis Liyht, Gas & Water Div. 
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978) . 
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Span(fler may be dis-
tinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the 
denial of class certification. 'The Court overlooks the fact that 
in each case the class representatives were defending a judg-
ment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed. 
The plaintiffs/ respondents continued vigorously to assert the 
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route 
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District 
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose· 
not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in 
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class repre-
sentative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by 
adequate certification. Uncferlying Jacobs, and Bradford as 
well, IS the elementary principle that no one has a personal 
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mecha-
v. Rodr-iyuez, 431 U. S. 395, 406, n. 12 (1977) ; Franks v. Bowman Trans-
por-tatiun Co., supra, 424 U. S., aL 754, n. 6, 755--756 ; see Kremens v. 
Bm·tley, 431 U. S. 119, 129- 120 (1977) ; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 
24, 39 ( 197 4). Conversely, we ha.ve often stated that the named plain-
tiff's individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is 
filed and at the time of certification. Kr-emens v. Bartle·y, ~'Upra, at 143, 
n. 6 (BRENN AN, .f., dis:,:enting) ; Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S., at 402, 403; see 
Bell v. Wolfi~h,- U. S. -, -, n. 5 (1979) ; Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
U: S. 374, 382, n. 9 (1978) . 
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11ism of class certification or otherwise.1 2 The Court rejects 
that principle today. 
III 
While the Court's new concept of 11flexible" mootness is: 
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more 
disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this action 
into two separate 11claims' ' : (i) that the action may be main-
tained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the 
class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class has 
been certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the merits 
is moot. Ante, at 15, 17. But respondent is said to have a 
personal stake in his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a; 
stake in the merits. 
The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to· 
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to re-
spondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the· 
certification quest~ Instead, respondent's "personal stake"' 
is said to derive from two factors having nothing to do· 
with concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the· 1 
Court finds that the .Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create 
a 11right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept,". 
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the 
case retains the "imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial 
resolution ," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented 
issue, (ii ) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested· 
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15. L 
The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule 
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not 
1 2 In some circumst.ances, litigants are permitted to argue tJ1e rights of 
third par tie.- in support of their claims. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff 428 
U. S. 106, 11 :3 (1976); Ban·ows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-256 (1953) . 
1 n eu,ch "uch case, however, the Court has identified a concrete, individual 
injury .;uffererl by the litigant himself. Ibid.; see n. 2, supra, and. accom-
pan 'ing text. 
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confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not. 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, ·441 U. S., at 100; 
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a 
rule of procedure which "shall' not be construed to extend ... 
the jurisdiction ·of the United States district courts." Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney gen-
eral concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to 
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a 
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise' might be 
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U. S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S., at 737-738. 
Since neither Rule '23 nor the private attorney general 
concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new per-
ception of Art. HI requirements must rest entirely on its 
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the com-
ponents of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurispru-
dence, they operate only in "'cases confessedly within [the 
Court's] jurisdiction.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation 
Co., 424 U. S., at 755-756, and n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court -cites no decision that 
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply 
presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case, and 
I am aware of none.13 Indeed, each of these characteristics is 
sure to be present in the typical "private attorney general" 
action brought by a public spirited citizen.14 Although we 
13 The Court often has rejected the contention that a "spirited dispute" 
alone is suffieicnt to confer jurisdiction. ·E. g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 
U. S. 24, a5-a6 (1974); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (per 
curiam). 
H The Court 's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, there is 
nothing in the record to suggest U1at rc;;pondent has any interest whatever 
in his new-found "right to have a cla,;s certified." Ante, at 15. In fact, 
the record shows that respondent's interest in the merits was the sole mo-
tivation for hi~ attempt to represent a class. The class claims were added 
to hi:; complaint only because his lawyer feared that mootness might 
'· 
78-572-DISSENT 
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY 13 
have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action," 
the Court's redefinition of the petsonal stake requirement 
leaves no principled basis for that practice.15 
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is 
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in 
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms 
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a 
false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class certification issues 
are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante, 
at - (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal 
stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration, 
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word. 
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join addi-
tional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a 
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular 
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value 
terminate the t~ction. App., at 17; Brief for Repondent 23, 33. The 
record does not reveal whether respondent-as distinguished from his 
lawyer-now wishes to continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that 
his i11terest has nothing Lo do with the procedural protections described 
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suits." Ante, at 14. It is 
neiLher surprising nor improper that respondent should be concerned with 
parole procedures. But respopdent's actual interest is indistinguishable 
from the generalized interest of a "private attorney general" who might 
bring a "public action" to improve the operation of a parole system. 
15 The Court's view logically cannot be confined to moot cases. If a 
plaintiff who is released from prison the day after filing a class action 
challenging parole guidelines may seek certification of the class, why should 
a plaintiff who is released the day before filing the suit be barred? As liJl 
Art. III matter, here can be no difference. 
Even on prudential grounds, there is little difference between this action 
and one filed promptly upon release. In the present case, this Court 
has ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the class action. At 
the same t.ime, it has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in 
turn reversed the judgment of the District Court. No determination on 
any issue is left standing. For every practical purpose, the action must 
~egin anew-this time without a plaintiff. The prudential consideratione 
in favor of a. finding of mootness could scarcely be more compelling. 
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apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolutibn 
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is 
neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them 
independent of his interest in the merits. 
Class actions may advance significantly the administration 
of justice in appropriate oases . . Indeed, the class action is 
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to 
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long 
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004 
( 1977) . That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class as-
pect of litigation involving individual claims has never been 
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new proce-
dural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to 
the recognition of difi'erent " 'means for presenting a case or 
coutroversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.'" 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, ·300 U. S., at 240 (1937) 
(Declaratory Jutlgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L. 
R. Co. v. ~Vallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added). 
The efi'ect of mootness on the vitality of a device like the 
class action may · be a relevant prudential consideration.16 
But it caunot provide a plaintiff' when none is before the 
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation 
of Art. III.11 
lij J do not. imply thaL the rf'sult reached today is necessary in any 
way to the continued vitality of the class-action device. On the contrary, 
Lhe practical 1mpact of finding mootness in this case would be slight indeed. 
See note 13, supra. And this may well be typical of class actions brought 
under Hule 23 (b) (1) or (2) to "Seek injunctiw or declaratory relief. Such 
actions are not subjf:'ct t{) frustration through sequential settlement offers 
tha.t " pick off" C<Lch intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat. 
Bank v. Roper, ante. aL - (slip op., at 11-12). Nor will substitute 
plaintiffs be deterred by the notice costs that attend certification of a class 
nJJder Rule 23 (b) (3) . 
17 The Court's effort:; w ":;ave" this action from moot,ness lead it to 
depart stnkmgly from the norma] role of a reviewing court. The Court 
fails to identify how, if at all, the District Court has erred. Nothing· 
is said ah011t, the DiRtnrt Court '::; ruling on t.hf' merits or its refusal to •. 
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IV 
In short, this is a case in which the putative class repre-
sentative-respondent here-no longer has the slightest in-
terest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member 
of the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been iden-
tified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal 
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the juris-
diction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only 
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are 
the defendants and a lawyer who no longer has a client.18 
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot. 
certify the broad rlas::; sought by respondent. Nor does the Court adopt 
the Court. of Appeals' conclusion tha.t. the District Court erred in failing 
to consider t.he po~sibility of subclasses S'Ua S]Jonte. Nevertheless, re-
spondrnt--or his lawyer-is given the opportunity to raise the subclass 
question on remand. That result. cannot. be squared with the rule that a 
litigant may not mise on <tppea1 those issues he has failed to prl'l>erve by 
appropriate object,ion in the trial court. The Court intimates that the 
District Court waited t.oo long to deny the class certification motion, thus 
making n motion for subcla:sses a "futile act." Ante. at 17. But nothing in 
the record suggests that the Di:;trict. Court, would not h<we entertained 
such a motion. Smce respondent sought certification in the first place only 
to <wmd mootues;; on appeal, the ent.ry of an order against him on the 
merits cannot rxcuse him from presenting his subclass proposal to the 
Di><t rirt Court thereafter. 
18 I imply no cnhcism of counsel in this case. The Court of Appeals 
agreed with coun::;el that the certification issue was appealable, and the 
c<LSe wa :;; brought to this Court by the United Stafeb. 
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[February - , 1980] 
MH. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART J 
and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. 
Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was 
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a 
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will 
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The 
District Court denied class certification and granted summary 
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before 
briefs were filed, he was unconditionally released from prison. 
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The 
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment 
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was 
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded .that re-
spondent properly could appeal the denial of class certifi-
cation. The Court today agrees with this conclusion. 
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it says 
that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may be adapted 
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. Ante, at 
8-12. Second, the Court holds that the named plaintiff has 
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept" 
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his per-
sonal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12-16. Both steps 
are significant departures from settled law that rationally can-
not be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case. 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
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As the Court observes, this case involves the ''persona:! 
stake" aspect of the mootness doctrine. Ante, at 7. There 
is undoubtedly a "live" issue whi~h an appropriate plaintiff 
could present for judicial resolution. The question is whether 
respondent, who has no further interest in this action, ·never-
theless may-through counsel-continue to litigate it. 
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal 
stake requirement with some care. When the issue is pre-
sented at the outset of litigation as a question of standing to 
sue, we have nekl that the personal stake requirement has a 
double aspect. On the one hand, it derives from Art. III 
limitations on the power of the federal .courts. On the other, 
it embodies additional, self-imposed .restraints on the exercise 
of judicial power. E. y., Singleton v. Wulff1 428 U. S. 106, 112 
(1976); Wa·rth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975Y, · The 
prudential aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine 
of uncertain contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional 
minimum has been giveR definite content: "In order to satisfy 
Art. III, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered 
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively 
illegal conduct of the defendant." · Gladstone, Realtors v. 
Village of Bellwood, 441 u: S. 91, ·99 (1979).1 Although 
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, the Court has re-
jected all attempts to substitute abstract concern with a sub-
ject-ot· w1th the rights of third parties-for "the concrete· 
injury required by Art. III.". Simon v. Eastern Kentucki[' 
Welfare Rtghts Org., 426 U. S. 26; 40 (1976) .2 
1 See, e g., Duke Powm~ Co. v. Carolina Envi1'0nmental Study Gt·oup; 
Inc ., 438 U. S. 59, 7.:.! {1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropol-itan. Housing[f _ 
De·v. Corp. 429 U. S. 252, 260-261 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. INSE~I 
490, 499 (1975) ; Liuda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617 (1973) . 
2 Sre, e. y., Schl&smyel' v. Rese1·vists to Stop the W m·, 418 U. S. 208,· 227· 
(1974); 0'8hea v. Ltttleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 {1974); Moose Lodge 
No 107 v. Uml$ 1 407 U S. 163, 166-167 (1972) ; Sierra Club v. Morton1 405 
U\ S. 7'27';, 7.3Q-7a8 {197.2,; Till'stKm v .. Ullman1 :318 U. S. 44, 46 (1943)ti) 
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Each of these cases reiects explicitly the view, once expressed 
by Mr. Justice Harlan and now apparently espoused by the Court, 
that the personal stake requirement lacks constitutional 
significance. ~'at 16
1
n. 11; Flast v; - Coheq, 392 u.s. 83, 
120 (1968)(Harlan, J., dissenting). Until today, however, that 
view never had commanded a maiority. 
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As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement 
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; see 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential con-
siderations not present at the outset may support continuation 
of an action in which the parties have invested substantial 
resources and generated a factual record.8 But an actual 
case or controversy in the constitutional sense " 'must be ex-
taut at all stages of review.'" Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. \ 
395, 401 (1975), quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 
452, 459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests'" are 
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide 
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the 
case before them." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 2ti4, 
246 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haworth , 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The limitation 
flows directly from Art. III. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 
312, 316 (1974) (per curiam).' 
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance 
of review cannot control. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 401--
n. 9 (1975); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974); 
United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920). 
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the 
necessary individual iuterest in the outcome. See DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, S'upra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the orig-
inal wrong may supply the individual interest in some circum-
(per curium) . 'l'he rule is the same when the question is mootneas and a 
litigant can i18&ert no more than emotional involvement in what remains 
of the Cit.\l<l. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per 
C'uriarn) . 
8 See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure § 3533, at 265 (1975); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the 
Supreme Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373,376-377 (1974). 
4 Sce, e. g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975); SEC 
v. Medical Comrn. !o1· Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403, 407 (1972); Poweu· 
v. McComtack, 395 U. S. 486, 496, n. 7 (1969); Liner v. Jajco, Inc., 37& 
U.S. 3011 3061 n. 3 (1964). 
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stances. Sibron v. New York, 392, U.S. 40, 53-58 (1968). So, 
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so inherently 
transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of 
litigation. Super Tire Engineering Go. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 
115 (19'14); Southern Pac. Terminal Go. v. ICC, 219, U. S. 
498, 515 (1911) . The essential and irreducible constitutional 
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or 
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary. 
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view to-
day, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the tNS£12-7 1-
outcome is not It flexible.'" f7fffifeecH~:;ef;i;mtJ:84~e=remlffi~-1 /N
11 
~) 
some 1 ars \..! 
tanding: Taxpayers and 
13-614(1~9~6~-U~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
iremen in mootness and standing cases because it is ei~ 
bedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by tlie 
Constitution, "founded in concern about the proper-and 
properly limited- role of the courts in a democratic society.'' 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we 
have, until today, "prevent[ed] the judicial process from 
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the 
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v. 
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (19?3); see Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., con-
curring in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 
727, 740 (1974). 
II 
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the Court 
has applied consistently. These principles were developed 
outside the class action context. But Art. III con ains no· 
exception for class actions. 11hus, we have held that a puta-
tive class representative who alleges no individual injury "may 
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of 
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974). 
,Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule 
y tNStRT 3 
INSERT 2, p. 4: 
Indeed, the rule barrinq litiqatio~ by those who have no 
interest of their own at stake is applied so riqorously that it 
has been termed the "one maior proposition" in the law of 
standing "to which the federal courts have consistently adhered 
••• without exception." Davis, Standinq: Taxpayers and 
Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 617 (1968).~/ We have insisted 
upon the personal stake requirement 
INSERT 3, p. 4 
~/ The Court states that "the erosion of the strict 
formalistic perception of Art. III was bequn well before today's 
decision," and that the Art. III personal stake requirement is 
"riddled with exceptions." ~,at 16
1
n. 11. It fails, 
however, to cite a sinqle Court opinion in support of either 
, statement. To the extent that the decision in Flast - v; - Cohen, 
~ 
l 392 u.s. 83 (1968), supports the position ascribed to it in the 
I 
I dissent, id;, at 117-120, it does not survive the lonq line of 
express holdinqs that beqan with Warth - v; - Seldin, 422 u.s. 490 
(1975), and were reaffirmed only last term. Gladstone; - Realtors -
v. -Villaqe - of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979). See nn. 1 & 2, 
supra. Even before Warth, a leadinq commentator observed that 
the personal stake requirement had no exceptions. Davis, 
Standinq: Taxpayers and Others, 35 u. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 616, 617 
(1968). 
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23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interests 
asserted by [the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 
399 (1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live in-
terests of unnamed but identifiable class members may sup-
ply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named 
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bow-
man 'l'ranspo1'tation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976); 
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402. 
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No 
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any ~ 
personal stake in the litigation.X In the words of his O'W.D------
lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional per-
sonal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the 
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent 
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other J} 
persons presently incarcerated. lbidj In these circum-
stances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require 
dismissal. But the Court views the case differently, and con-
~o one ::mggests tlHLt respondent could be affected personally by any 
ruling on the class certification question that is re!Jlli,nded today. In fact, 
the Court apparPntly concedes that respondent has no personal stake-"in 
the traditional sen:;;e"-in obt~tining certification. Ante, at 14. 
Several prisoner,; now in federal custody have filed a motion to inter-
vene as parties re:;pondent in this Court. Although the Court does no-r--' 
rule on that motion, I note that the motion was received well over a 
year after respondent was released from prison. In the interim, re-
spondent obtained a ruling from the Court of Appeals and filed his 
petition for cPrtiorari in this Court. Such untimely intervention comes 
too late to save t.he action under United Ai1·lines, Inc. v. McDonald, 43Z 
..., I u.S. 385 (1977) . 
;!..J---JRespondent's lawyer opPned his argument by saying that "[t]he 
mootness question in thi:> case is, from a practical standpoint., not very 
significaJlt " 1f the iLction is held moot he plans simply to "file a new 
C<l:l(\" on uehalf of prisonpr:; l;('fVing longPr t~rm~ . Tr. of Oral Arg. 25 .. ' 
On thl~ basil" of thi:; rE>pre:;entation by counsel, therp i::; reason to believe 
that member:; of the putativP ria::;>: at I:lSlW ultimately will be included in lli 
clal:i:s arta)ll thu t will not moot out. 
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structs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has 
no plaintiff. 
The Court announces today for the first time-and without 
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that 
there are ~wo categories of "the Art. III mootness dQc_trine": 
"Hexible" anti "less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. 'l'he 
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate tl;le application 
of "flexible" mootness to class action litigation. The cases 
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 
110-111, n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 
432 U . S. 385 (1977) , and today's decision in Deposit Guaranty 
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. -. Each case is said to show 
that a class action is not mooted by the loss of the class repre-
seutative's personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, even I 
though JJO class has been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself 
' is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Art. ~ 
may be met " through means other than the traditional require~ 
:J-
ment of a 'persona! stake in the outcome.'" Ante, at 15. ·. In 
my view, the Court misreads these precedents. 
A 
In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual cla.ss 
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse par-
ties. Cf. Aetna Life Tns. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240 
(1937) .~ And in Gerstei1L, the Court applied a rule long 
i Certification i::, no mere formality. It represents a judicial finding 
that injured parties other than the named plaintiff exist. It also provides 
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies and 
sharpens the interests of unnamed class members in the outcome ; only 
thereafter will they be bound by the outcome. After certification, 
class membPro can be certain that the action will not be settled or 
dismissed Without, app-ropriate notice. Fed. H.ule Civ. Proc. 23 (c); 3 H. 
Newberg Class Actions § 5050 (1977) ; cf. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class 
Actions at the !'recertification State : Is Notice Required?, 56 N. C. L. 
Rev. 303 (1978) . V1gorous advocacy i::; assured by the authoritative imposi-
tion on the named plamtiffs of a duty adequatRly to reprel:lent the entire-
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·established, outside the class action context, by cases that 
never have been thought to erode the requirement of a per-
sonal stake in the outcon~e. 'Cl'e'rstein held that a class action 
challenging the eonstitutibnality 'of pretrial detention proce-
dures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions 
had brought 'their det~m'tions 'to an end. ''1'he Court did not 
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the merits 
was uunecessary. The action continued only because of the 
tra~sito~y . natur~ of pretr~al detent~on , which pla~e~ the 
cla1m w1thw 11t~ narrow class of cases" that are "d1stmctlyl 
'capable of repetition , yPt evading review.'" 420 U. S., at 
110, n. 11. 
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial 
of class certincation notwithstanding satisfaction of the class 
representative1s claim on the merits. "But neither case holds 
that Art. Ill may be satisned in tbe absence of a personal 
clas:i!. If t.he named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot after certification, 
the court can re-examine his ability to represent the interests of class 
members. Should it. be found wanting, the Court ma.y seek a substitute 
representat.ive or even decertify the class. Fed. Ruie Clv. Proc. 23 (c)(l), 
23 (d) ; :>ee 1 B: 'Newberg, sup1'a, § 2192 ; Coi'iiineht, Continuation and 
Representa t iOn of Clas:; Actiohs Following Dismissal of the Class Repre-
sentative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 589-590, 602-603. After certification, the 
case is no different in principle from more traditional representative actions 
involving, for example, a single party who cru111ot participate himself 
becau~e oi hi:i! mcompetence bnt is permitted to litigate through an ap-
pointed fiduciary. 
'f The Court's Gerstein analysi::;, which emphasized that " [p]retrial de-
tention is by nature temporary" and that " [t]he individual could . . • 
suffer repeated deprivations" with no acces::; to redretll:!, falls squarely 
within the rule of So'Uthern Pac. Te1·minal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 
(1911) . See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1973). In similar cases 
we have noted that the continuation of the action will depend " 'espe-
cially [upon] the reality of the claim that otherwise the is.sue would evade 
review.)" Swisher v. Brady, 4::!8 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U S. 393, 402, n. 11 (1975) . The~:;e limitations are 
incon,;;istent With the con ct>pt of '' flc>xibl e" mootnes:;; and the redefinition o¥ 
"personal st.akn" adopted toda . 
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stake in the outcome. In M cDonaZd, a putative class member I 
intervened within the statutory time limit to a al the cer- J.!} 
tification ruling. 432 U. S., at 390. ecause the Court found 
that her claim was not time-barred, the intervenor in McD011ald 
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed, / 
the Court devoted its entire. O:J?inion to showing that the J!/ 
intervenor's claim for relief had not expire'd.~t most, 
McDonald holds only that an action which is· kept alive by 
interested parties . within prescribed periods of limitations does 
not "die" in an Art. III _sense: 
There is dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify 
was subject to appellate review after final judgment at tre--
behest of the named plaintiffs .... " 432 U. ·s., at 393. That 
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. I5 (1978), apparently is elevated 
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doc-
trine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine and 
the much narrower reasoning adopted today in Roper. In 
Roper, the Court holds that a named plaintiff who ·has pre-
vailed on the merits may appeal the denial of class certifica..-· 
tion because of a "critical distinction" between mootness 
deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting from events 
extrinsic to the litigation. Ante, at- (slip op., at 9). -when 
a prevailing par·ty seeks review of a ruling collateral to the 
judgment, Roper concludes, Art. III is relevant only indirectly 
to the question of appealability. ld., at 7, 12. Roper also 
suggests that a named plaintiff whose 'judgment is satisfied 
may retain an economic interest in sharing litigation costs 
with the class. ld., at 10, n. 8. 
10
.li"The individual claims of the original named plaintiffs had been settled 
after judgment on the question of liability. 432 U. S., at 389, 393, n. 14. 
lf;M(This extensive inquiry would have been unnecessary if, as the Court 
holds today, the intervenor had a personal stake in the class certification 
issue itself Since the present re;;pondent's claim long since has "expired,••· 
he st.a.nds in the same position as a. member of the putative class whose-
, claim has "expired" by reason of the statute of limitations. 
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H .is uot apparent how Roper supports the decision in thif' 
case. There is not even a speculative interest in sharing 
costs here. Moreover, since respondent's claim was mooted 
by an extrinsic event-his unconditional release from prison-
the distinction identified in Roper as "critical" is absent in 
this case. !d., at 9. One need not accept that distinction 
as sound to conclude that Roper affords only illusory support 
for the Court's ruling here. 
B 
The cases cited by the Court as "less fiexible"-and there-
fore less authoritative-apply established Art. III doctrine in 
'Cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School 
Comrn'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam); Wein-
stein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasa-
dena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 
(1976). As they are about to become second class precedents, 
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12, n. 7. Bu.!.--, 
the cases are recent and carefully considered decisions of this 
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III juris-
prudence. And no Justice who participated in them suggested 
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded treat-
ment of these "less flexible" cases ignores their controlling 
relevance to the issue presented here. 
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to 
challenge certain high school regulations. The District Court 
stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and 
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court 
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted 
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had grad- · 
uated. We held that the action was entirely moot because 
the "class action was never properly certified nor the class .... 1 
properly identified by the District Court." 420 U.S., at 130.w. !!I 
IJi.The vitality of the Jacobs result is undertKJored by the repeated 
dictum that a properly certified class is nece&;ary to supply adverseness 
QllOO the named. plai.nt.i1f's claim h,ecomes mpot. EaJJt 'l'exas Motol' fi'l'eight' 
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Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquir~ 
ing separate legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. We 
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action 
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a 
third party. 427 U. S., at 430-431. See also Ba:xter v. Palmi-
g'iano, 425 U.S. 308,310, n. 1 (1976). And in Bradford, where 
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Court 
held that the named plaintiff's release from prison required the 
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures. 
423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Di~ 
v. Craft , 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978) . 
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Span(/ler may be dis-
tinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the 
denial of class certification. ·The Court overlooks the fact that 
in each case the class representatives were defending a judg-
ment on the merits ftom which the defendants had appealed. 
The plaintiffs/ respondents continued vigorously to assert the 
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route 
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District 
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose 
not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in 
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class repre-
sentative had suffered no injury tliat could be redressed by 
adequate certification. Uncferlying Jacobs, and Bradford as 
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal 
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mecha-
v. Rodrig'uez, 431 U. S. 395, 406, n . 12 (1977) ; F1·anks v. Bowman Trans-
portation Co., supra, 424 U. S., at 754, n. 6, 75&-756 ; see kremens v. 
Bartley, -!31 U. S. 119, 129-120 (1977) ; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 
24, 39 (1974). Conversely, we have often stated that the named plain-
tift"s individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is 
filed and at the time of certification. Kremens v. Bartley, supra, at 143, 
n. 6 (BttEN N AN, .f., d1ssenting) ; Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S., at 402, 403; see 
Bell v. Wolfish,- U. S -, -, n. 5 (1979) ; Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
U: . 374, 38'2.; n. 9 (197 ). 
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nism of class certification or otherwise.f The Court rejects 
that principle today. 
III 
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness is 
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more 
disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this action 
into two separate "claims'': (i) that the action may be main-
tained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the 
class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class has 
been certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the merits 
is moot. Ante, at 15, 17. But respondent is said to have a; 
personal stake iu his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a; 
stake in the merits. 
~The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to· 
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to re-
s ondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the· 
certification ques 1on. Instead, respondent's "personal stake"· 
is said to derive from· two factors having nothing to do· 
with coucrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the·l 
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create 
a "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept,"' 
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the 
case retains the "imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial 
resolution," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented 
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested ~ 
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15._( 
---T"he Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule 
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not 
JS;(n borne drcum:st.ances, litigants are permitted to argue tJ1e rights of 
third parties in :support of their claims. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff 428 
U.S. 106, 113 (1916) ; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 255-256 (1953). 
ln each such case, however, the Court has identified a concrete, individual 
injury suffered by the lit.jgant himself. ibid.; :see n. 2, supra, and. accom.,. 
J?anying tc"t.. 
1.1/ (NS£iZT 4 
E 1~£er s 
INSERT 4, p. 11. 
states: 
!!/In a footnote,~' at 18 1n. 11, the Court 
f "This respondent suffered actual, concrete injury 
as a result of the putatively illeqal conduct, and 
this injury would satisfy the formalistic personal 
stake requirement if damaqes were souqht. See, 
e.q., Powell v. - Mceormack, 395 u.s., at 495-500." 
-------
This appears to be a categorical claim of the actual, concrete 
injury our cases have required. Yet, aqain, the Court fails to 
identify the injury. The reference to damaqes is irrelevant 
here, as respondent souqht no damages - only injunctive and 
declaratory relief. Moreover, counsel for respondent frankly 
conceded that his client "can obtain absolutely no additional 
~ 
personal relief" in this case. Tr.AOral Arq. 25. If the Court 
seriously is claiminq concrete injury "at all staqes of review," 
see p. 3, supra, it would indeed be helpful for it to identify 
specifically this iniury that was not apparent to respondent's 
counsel. 
RIDER 5, p. 11 
15/ The Court attempts to limit the sweepinq 
consequences that could flow from the application of these 
criteria, see infra, at 12-13
1
and n. 15, by assertinq that 
"[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts" on the basis of 
3. 
"practicalities and prudential considerations". ~' at 171 n. 
11. The Court lonq has recoqnized a difference between the 
prudential and constitutional aspects of the standinq and 
mootness doctrines. See p. 2, supra. I am not aware that the 
Court, until today, ever has merqed these considerations for the 
purpose of eliminating the Art. III requirement of a personal 
stake in the litigation. The Court cites no prior case for this 
view. Moreover, the Court expounds no limitinq princiole of any 
kind. Adverse practical consequences, even if relevant to 
Article III analysis, cannot iustify today's holdinq as none 
whatever would flow from a findinq of mootness. See n. 15, 
infra. Nor does the Court's reliance upon a "relation back 
principle.." ~'at 18, n. 11, further the analysis. Althouqh 
this fiction may provide a shorthand label for the Court's 
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confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not. 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100; 
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury 
· v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a 
rule of procedure which "shall-not be construed to extend . . . 
the jurisdiction 'of the United States district courts." Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney gen-
eral concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to 
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a 
party who has a stake of his own but otherwi~' might be 
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S., at 737-738. 
Since neither Rule '23 nor the private attorney general 
concept can fill the jurisdictional· gap, the Court's new per-
ception of Art. III requirements must rest entirely on its 
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the com-
ponents of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurispru-
dence, they operate only in " 'cases confessedly within [the 
Court's] jurisdiction.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation 
Co., 424 U. S., at .755-756, a.nd n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court -cites no decision that 
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply 
resented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case, and 
I am aware of none. Indeed, each of these characteristics is 
sure to be present in the typical "private attorney general" 
action brought by a public spirited citizen.) Although we 
1~The Court often has rejected the conteut.ion that a "<>pirited dispute" 
alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. ·· E. g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418. 
U. S. 24. 35-36 (1974); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (per 
curiam) . 
tr111 The Court's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, there is 
nothing in the record to suggest that respondent has any interest whatever 
in his new-found "right to have a cla.ss certified." Ante, at 15. In fact, 
the record shows that respondent's interest in the merits was the sole mo-
tivation for hi~> attempt to represent a cla~SS. The class claims were a<:lded 
to hi:; conrplain.L only because his lawyer feared that mootneBI:l migbt 
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have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action," 
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement 
leaves no principled basis for that practice:f 
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is 
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in 
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms 
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a 
false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class certification issues 
are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante, 
at - (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal 
stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration, 
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word. 
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join addi-
tional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a 
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular 
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value 
tem1inate the action. App., at 17; Brief for llepondent 23, 33. The 
record does not reveal whether respondent-as distinguished from his 
luwyer-now wishes to continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that 
his iJJt<'rest has nothing to do with the procedural protections described 
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suits." Ante, at 14. It is 
ncit.her surprising nor improper that respondent should be concerned with 
parole procedures. But respopdent's actual interest is indistinguishable 
from lhe generalized interest of a "private attorney general" who. might 
bring a "public action" to improve the operation of a parole system. 
#&The Court's view logically crumot be confined to moot cases. If a 
plaintiff who is released from prison the day after filing a class action 
challenging parole guidelmes may seek certification of the class, why should 
a )lain tiff who i1:1 released the day before filing the suit be barred? As lW 
Art. III matter, 1ere can be no difference. 
Even on pru entia! grounds, there is little difference between this action 
and one filed promptly upon release. In the present case, this Court 
has ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the class action. At 
the same time, it has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in 
tum revertied the judgment of the District Court. No determination on 
any issue is left standing. For every practical purpose, the action must 
}?egin anew- this tjme without a plaintiff. The prudential considerations 
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apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution 
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is 
neither expe(lted nor required to assert an interest in them 
independent of his interest in the merits. . 
Class actions may advance significantly the administration 
of justice in appropriate oases . . Indeed, the class action is 
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to 
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long 
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004 
( 1977) . That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class as-
pect of litigation involving individual claims has never been 
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new proce-
dural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to 
the recognition of different "'means for presenting a case or 
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.' " 
Aetna Life Ins. .. Co. v. Haworth, ·300 U. S., at 240 (1937) 
(Declaratory Judgment Act), ·quoting Nashville, C. & St. L. 
R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added). 
The eft'ect of mo?tness Oll the vitality of a device like the rtf 
class action may be a relevant prudential consideration._r-
-1fut it ca11not provide a plaintiff when none is before the 
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation 
of Art 'II.I) 
~ 1 du not imply tha.t the result reached today ·is necessary in any 
wuy lo the continued vitality of the class-action device. On the contrary, 
the practical impact of finding mootness in this case would be slight indeed. 
St'e note 13, supra. And this may well be typical of class actions brought 
under Rule 23 (b )(1) or {2) to seek injunctive or aeclaratory relief. Such 
actions are not subject to frustration through sequential settlement offers 
tha.t "pick off" each intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat. 
'Bank v. Ropet·, ante, at - (slip op., at 11-12). Nor will substitute 
plnintiffs be deterred by the notice costs 1hat attend certification of a class 
under Rule 23 (b)(3) . 
~The Court's efforts to "save" this action from mootness lead it to 
depart strikingly from the normal role of a reviewing court. The Court 
fails to identify how, if at all, the Distriet Court has erred. Nothing-
is ·aid ahont. the District Co11rt's ruling on the merits or its refusal t(). 
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In short, this is a case in which the putative class repre-
sentative-respondent here--no longer has the slightest in-
terest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member 
of the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been iden-
tified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal 
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the juris-
diction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only 
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are 'E.f 
the defendants and a lawyer who no longer has a client.w-r-
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with justructions to dismiss the action as moot. 
certify the broad dass sought by respondent. Nor does the Court adopt 
the Court, of Appeals' conclu8ion t.ha.t. the District Court erred in failing 
lo comilder t.he possibility of ·ubclasses sua sponte. Nevertheless, re-
sponden tr-o r his lawyt>r-is givPn the opportunity to raise the subcl!IBS 
question on remand. Tha.t result cannot be squared with the rule that a 
litigant may not raise on appeal tl10se issues he has fa.iled to preserve by 
appropriate object.ion in the trial court. The Court intimates that the 
Di:;trict Court waited too long to deny the cla.ss certification motion, thus 
making a motion for subcla8ses a. " futile act." Ante, at 17. But nothing in 
tpe reeord suggests that the Di8trict. Court would not h<we entertained 
such a motwn. Smce respondent sought c~rtifica,tion in the first place only 
to avoid mootnes::; on appeal, the ent.ry of an order against him on the 
merit8 cannot excuse him from pn•senting his 8UbclaS8 proposal to the 
Di,.trirt Court thereafter. 
--,I imply no crit1cism of counsel in this case. The Court of Appeals 
agreed with counsel that the certification iS8ue was appealable, and the 
ease was brought to this Court by the United States. 
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Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was 
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a 
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will 
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The 
District Court denied class certification and granted summary 
j udgmeut for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before 
briefs were filed, he was unconditionally released from prison. 
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The 
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment 
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was 
1noot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that re-
spondent properly could appeal the denial of class ·certifi-
cation. The Court today agrees with this conclusion. 
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it says 
that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may be adapted 
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. Ante, at 
8-12. Second, the Court holds that the named plaintiff has 
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept" 
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his per-
.. sona1 claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12-16. Both steps 
are significant departures from settled law that rationally can-
not be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case. / 
Accordingly, I dissent. / 
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l 
As the Court observes, this case involves t.pe "personal 
t3take" aspect of the mootness doctrine. Ante, at 7.' There 
is undoubtedly a "live" issue which an appropriate plaintiff 
could present for judicial resolution. The question is whether 
respondent, who has no further interest in this action, ·never-
theless may-through counsel-continue to litigate it. 
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal 
stake requirement with some care. When the issue is pre-
sented at the outset of litigation as a question of standing to 
sue, we have held that the personal stake requirement has a 
double aspect. On the one hand, it derives from Art. III 
limitations on the power of the federal courts. On the other, 
it embodies additional, self-imposed restraints on the exercise 
of judicial power. E. g., Sin(/leton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975): The 
prudential aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine 
of uncertain contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional 
minimum has been given definite content: "In order to satisfy 
Art. III. the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered 
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively 
illegal conduct of the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v. 
Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979).1 Although 
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, the Court has re~ 
jectecl all attempts to substitute abstract concern with a sub- / 
jectr-or with the rights of third parties-for "the concrete/ 
1 See, e. g .. Duke Powe1• C'o. v. Carolina Envi1'onrnental Study G1·oup 
Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Met1'opolitan Housin 
Dev. Corp . 429 U. S. 252, 260-261 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 
490, 499 (1975) : Linda R. S. v. Richa1·d D., 410 U. S. 614, 617 (1973). 
Each of the~e ca,.;e, rejects wpljntl.1 tlw view, once expressed by Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan nnd now apparent]~ t>;;pou~ed by the Court, t.ht~t the personal 
-,take rpquin·mer.rt , lack::; cor~ ~titutioual. ~ignifieanrP . An~e, at . 1~,~; 
Flast \ , C'vhell , .ml F. S. ~3, 120 (19U8) (Hurlau, J ., dJ~entmg~. Until 
tod"y, bowm•·, ti»d. Ykw nmr hod rorn•nunrlOO "majodty/ 
; ~ olSo 
~t'\;+tJ s~~ 
v~ RidAtlrJSdV\ J 
~t ~ us.'"'"' 
,toLl47V 
(Pow at-.,! . ., 
U}Y\CfAflh ~) .. 
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injury required by Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976).2 
As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement 
must be satisfied throughout the a-ction. Ante, at 8; see 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential con-
siderations not present at the 01..1tset may support continuation 
of an action in which the parties have invested substantial 
resources and generated a factual record.8 But an actual 
case or coutroversy in the constitutional sense "'must be ex-
tant at all stages of review.' " Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 
395, 401 (1975), quoting Steffel v. Tho'rnpson, 415 U. S. 
452, 459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests' " are 
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide 
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the 
case before them." North Carolina v. ~ice, 404 U. S. 244, 
246 (1971) (per curiam) , quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240--241 (1937). The limitation 
flows directly from Art. lii. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 
312, 316 (1974) (per curiam).4 
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance 
of reviE>w cannot control. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 39~, 401, ,---
2 See, e. g., Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 227 
(1974) ; O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974); Moose Lodge 
No. 107 v. Uvis, 407 U. S.163, 166-167 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 
U. S. 727, 736-738 (1972) ; 7'ileston v. UUman, 318 U. S. 44, 46 (1943) 
(per c·uriam) . The rule is the same when the questiop is mootness and a 
litigant can assert no more than emotional involvement in what remains 
of the case. Ashc1'o!t v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per 
curiam). 
8 See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure § 3533, at 265 (1975); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the 
Supreme Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373,376-377 (1974). 
4 See, e. g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975); SEC 
v. Medical Comrn. for Hurnan Rights, 404 U. S. 403, 407 (1972); Powe,~ _/" 
v. McConnack, 395 U. S. 486, 496, n. 7 (1969); Liner v. Jafco, Inc ., 37Y 
U. S.:301, 306, n. 3 (1964). 
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n. 9 (1975); Richardson v. Rarnirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974); 
United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920). 
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the 
necessary individual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the orig-
inal wrong may supply the individual interest in some circum-
stances. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,53--58 (1968). So, 
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so inherently 
transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of 
litigation. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 ~· -r 
115 (1974); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219jU. S. 
498, 515 (1911). The essential and irreducible constitutional 
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or 
threate11ed injury at the hands of the adversary. 
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view to-
day, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the 
outcome is not "flexible." Indeed, the rule barring litigation 
by those who have no interest of their own at stake is applied 
so rigorously that it has been termed the "one major proposi-
tion" in the law of standing "to which the federal ·courts have 
consistently adhered ... without exception." Davis, Stand-
ing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 617 
(1968).G We have insisted upon the personal stake re- ~ 
quirement in mootness and standing cases because it is em-~ 
5 The Court stntei' 1 hat, "thr erosion of the strict formalistic perceptio 
of Art. III was begun well bPforr tod11y's decision," and that tlw Art. III 
personal st11k<> rPquin .. ment i~:< "riddled with excc•ptionR." A11te, at 16, n. 11. 
H fail~, howevPr, to eitt> a ~ingl<· Comt opinion in support of either state 
mrnt. To the rxtent that the d<>ci,;ion in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 
(1068), supports the po::;ition a;o;cribPd to it in tJw di;,;sent, id., at 117-120, 
it" do(':-; not ~urvivr the long line of PXJlrr~s holdings that began with 
Warth v. Seldin. 422 U. S. 490 (Hl75) , and were reaffirmed only last 
...--:.ccrm. Gladstone , Realtors v. Village of Bellwood. 441 U. S. 91, 99 . 
(Hl79). ~ ce nn. 1 & 2, suwa. Ev<>n before Warth, ~eadil'l, cetltftt@Rt~ ~~S<fV "")o.,\11 ~ 
kolo .ob~Nwd . that the personal ~take r<>qu~rrme~1t had no excep~ions. ~!&~f"l:\ ~ 
Dav1s, Sl:nndmg. Cfet.ttlll' tt,; .mtl Othus, fl5 l. Glu. "b, :21l'C 6Qt-JU'IG, 6171 ( 
(1968) . -
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bedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the 
Constitution, "founded in concern about the proper-and 
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society." 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we 
have, until today, "prevent[ ed] the judicial ptocess from 
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the 
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v. 
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENl'fAN, J., con-
curring in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 
727, 740 (1974) . 
II 
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the Court 
has applied consistently. These principles were developed 
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no 
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a puta-
tive class representative who alleges no individual injury "may 
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of 
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974). 
Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule 
23 can it uacquir r e l a legal status separate from the interests 
asserted by l the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 
399 (1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live in-
terests of unnamed but identifiable class members may sup-
ply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named 
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bow-
man Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976); 
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402. 
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No 
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any 
personal stake in the- 1itigation.6 In the words of his own~ 
6 No onr ·uggestH that rrspondent could bt- affected personally by any 
ruling on the rlass cert.ification question that is remanded today. In fact, 
the Court. apparently concedes that respondent ha,o,; no personal stake--"in 
the traditional ~ense"-in obt.aming certification. Ante, at 14. / 
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lawyet, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional per-
sonal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the 
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent 
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other 
persons presently incarcerated. lbid. 7 In these circum-
stances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require 
dismissal. But the Court views the case differently, and con-
structs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has 
no plaintiff. 
The Court announces today for the first time-and without 
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that 
there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness doctrine": 
"flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. The 
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application 
of "flexible" mootness to class action litigation. The cases 
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 
110-111, n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 
432 U. S. 385 ( 1977), and today's decision in Deposit Guara;nty 
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. -. Each case is said to show 
that a class action is not mooted by the loss of the class repre-
sentative's personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, even 
though no class has been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself 
is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Art. III 
vene as parties re~ponclent in this Court. Although the Court does not 
rule on that motion, I note that the motion was received well over a 
year after re:>ponclent was released from prison. In the interim, re-
spondent obtained a ruling from the Court of Appeals and filed his 
petition for certiorari in this Court. Such untimely intervention comes 
too bte to sav<-' the action under United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 
U. S. 385 (1977) . 
7 R(•spond<>nt 's lawyer opened hiR n.rgumcn1 by saying that "[t]he 
mootne:;s quf'slion in this case is, from a practical standpoint, not very 
significant." lf the action is held moot he plans simply to "file a new 
case" 011 behalf of prisoner~ serving longer terlllls. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. 
On the bal'i;; of thi::; represf'nlation by counsel, there is rea::;on 1o believe 
thttt. mcmb(•rt-: of tlw put.utive class u,t i~ue ultimately will be included in a 
class action that w11l not moot Ol1t. 
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may be met "through means other than the traditional require· 
ment of a 'personal stake in the outcome.' " Ante, at 15. In 
my view, the Court misreads these precedents. 
A 
Iu Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class 
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse par-
ties. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240 
(1937).8 And in Gerstein, the Court applied a rule long 
established, outside the class action context, by cases that 
never have been thought to erode the requirement of a per-
sonal stake in the outcome. Gerstein held that a class action 
challenging the constitutionality of pretrial detention proce-
dures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions 
had brought their detentions to a11 end. The Court did not 
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the merits 
8 Certification is no mere formality. It represents a judicial fincling 
that injured parties other than the named plaintiff exist. It al~o provides 
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies and 
sharpens the intere::;ts of unnamed elass members in the outcome; only 
thereafter will they be bound by the outcome. After certification, 
clas, members cau be certain that the action will not be settled or 
di::;missecl without appropriate notice. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c); 3 H. 
Newberg Class Actions § 5050 (1977); cf. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class 
Actions at the Precertification State: Is :Kotice Required'?, 56 N. C. L. 
Rev. 303 (1978). Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposi-
tion on the named plaintiffs of a duty adequately to represent the entire 
clas::l. IJ' the named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot after certification, 
the court can re-examine his ability to represent the interests of class 
members. Should it be found wantil1g. the Court may seek a substitute 
representative or even decertify the class. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c) ( 1), 
23 (d) ; see 1 H . Newberg, s·up1'a, § 2192; Comment., Continuation and 
Repre:;entat.ion of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Repre-
sentative, 19i4 Duke L. J. 573, 58\l-590, 602-603. After certification, the 
rase is no diffNent in principle from more tra.dit.ional representative actions 
involving, for example, a single pa.rty who crumot participate himself 
be<·ause of hi,; incompetence but b permitted to litig~tte through an ap-
pointed fiduciary 
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was unnecessary. The action continued only because of the 
transitory nature of pretrial deteution, which placed the 
·claim within "that narrow class of cases" tha.t a.re "distinctly 
'capable of repetition, yet evading review.''' 420 U. S., at 
110, 11. 11.9 
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial 
of class certification notwithstai1ding satisfaction of the class 
representative's claim on the merits. But neither case holds 
that Art. III may be satisfied in 'the ·absence of a personal 
stake in the outcome . . In McDonald, a putative class member 
intervened within the statutory time limit to appeal the cer-
tification ruling. 432 U.S., at 390.H' Because the Court found 
that her claim 'vas not time-barred, the intervenor in McDonald 
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed, 
the Court devoted its entire opinion to showing that the 
lntrrvenor's claim for relief had Hot expired.n At most, 
McDonald holds only that an action which is kept alive by 
interested parties within prescribed periods of limitations does 
not "die" in an Art. III sense. 
There is dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify~ 
9 Tho Court '>< Gerstein annl~·si~'<, which emphasizrd that. "rpJrrtriaJ de-
tention is by naturr temporary" and that "l"t]he individual could ... 
uffer reprated deprivations" with no acce.-;..,; to rrdre::;.:;, falls squarely 
within the rule of Southern Pac. Terminal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 
(1911). See Roe'- Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). In similar cases 
we have nott•d that the contmuation of the action will depend "'espe-
cially iuponJ tlw rrality of the claim that. otherwise the is,;ue would evade 
review.'" Swishe1' v. Brady. 4:3 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 39:3, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitutjons are 
inconsi~ienL with the concept of '·tJcxible" mootness and the redefinition of 
"personal stake" adopt('d today. 
10 Tho individual !'!aim,.; of' thr original namPd plaintiffs had bePn ;;ettlecl 
after judgment on th<• qurstion of liability. 432 tT. S., at :~89, :m3, n. 14. 
11 Thi.-: rxtrn,.;iv\' i11quiry would huvp lll>Pn llllll('CP~iiary if, as the Court 
hold~:> today, the wtervenor had a personal sta.ke iJ1 the class certification 
issue it ·elf. Siuce th!' pre::;ent re.~pondent's claim long since has "expired," 
he Rtands in the same position as a member of the putative class who~a 
claim has "expired" by reason of the statute of limitations. 
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was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the 
behest of the named plaintiffs .... " 432 U. S., at 393. That 
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers&: Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 (1978), apparently is elevated 
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doc-
trine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine 
the much narrower reasoning adopted today in Roper. 
Ropm, th urt-tw as a a name p am 1 w o as e-
vailed on the merits may appeal the denial of class ce lfica-
tion because of a "eritical distinction" between ootness 
deriving from a juqgment and mootuess rf'sultiug . m events 
extrinsic to the litigation. Ante, at- (slip op. t 9). When 
a prevailing party seeks review of a ruling lateral to the 
judgment, Roper concludes, Art. III is relevant only iudirectly 
to the question of appealability. ld., 7, 12. Roper also 
suggests that a named plaintiff who judgment is satisfied 
may retain an economic interest · ( sharing litigation costs 
with the class. !d., at 10, n. 8. 
It is not apparent how Roper supports the decision in this 
case. There is not even I! speculative interest in sharing 
costs herf'. Moreover, si 1ee respondent's claim was mooted 
by an extrinsic event-+his unconditional release from prison-
the distinction ide-ntified in Roper as "critical" is absent in 
this case. I d., at, 9. Ont> lle<'d not accept that distiuction 
as sound to conclude that Roper affol'ds only illusory support 
fol' the ourt's rulin,. here. 
The cases cited by the Court as "less flexible"-and there-
fore less authoritative-apply establislwd Art. III doctrine in 
cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis Schoo/ 
C01mn'rs v. Jacobs, 420 F . S. 128 (1975) (per curiam); Wein-
stein v. Bradford, 423 P. S. 147 (1975) (per c'uriam); Pasa-
denJ1 City Board of Eduwtion v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 
(1976) . As they are about to become second class precedents, 
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12·, n. 7. But 
er 3/1/80 
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In Roper, the Court holds that a named plaintiff whose judgment is 
satisfied may retain a personal stake in sharing litigation costs 
with the class. ~,at --· Finding 
that Art. III is satisfied by this continuing economic interest, 
Roper reasons that the rules of federal practice qoverning 
appealability permit a party to obtain review of certain procedural 
rulings that are collateral to a generally favorable iudgment. See 
id., at 7, 9-10. The Court concludes that the denial of class 
certification falls within this category, as long as the appellants 
"assert a continuing stake in the outcome of. the appeal." Id., at 
1 0. 
It is far from apparent how Roper can be thought to 
support the decision in this case. Indeed, the opinion by the 
CHIEF JUSTICE in RoEer reaffirms the obligation of a federal court 
to dismiss an appeal when the parties no longer retain the personal 
stake in the outcome required by Art. III. Here, there is not even 
a speculative interest in sharing costs, and respondent positively 
denies that any of his individual interests will be affected by the 
appeal. See p. 6, supra. Thus, a fact that was critical to the 
analysis in Roper is absent in this case. One need not accept that 
analysis as sound to conclude that it affords no support for the ~ 
Court's ruling here. ~ 
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the cases are recent and carefully considereg ~ecisions of thi~ 
Court. They applied long' settled principles of Art. III juris~ 
prudence. And no Justice who partiCipated in them suggested 
the distinction drawn today. · The Court's b,ackhanded trea~ 
ment of these "less flexibie" cases ignores their controlling 
relevance to the issue presented here. 
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to 
challenge certain high school regulations. .The District Court 
:stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and 
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court 
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted 
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had grad-
uated. We held that the action was entirely moot because 
the "class action was never properly certified nor the class 
properly identified by the District Court." 420 U.S., at 130.12 
Since the faulty certi~cation prevented the class from acquir~ 
ing separate legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. We 
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action 
saved from mootness only by . the timely intervention of a 
third party. 427 U. S., at 430--431. See also Baxter v. Palmi~ 
giano, 425 U.S. 308, 310, n._l (1976).. And in Bradford, where 
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Cour.:.....----
held that the named pl~intiff's release from prison required the 
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures. 
12 Tlw vitality of the Jacobs result is umler,;cored by the repeated 
dictum tha.t a properly. certified class is necessary to supply adverseness 
onoe the named plaintiff'::; rlaim becomes moot. East Texas Motor F'reight 
v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 406, n . 12 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Trans-
portation Co., supra. 424 U. S., at. 754, 11. 6, 755-756; see K1'emens v. 
Bartley, 431 U. S. 119, 129-120 (1977); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 
24, 39 ( 197 4) . Conversely, we have often stated that the named plain-
tiff's individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is 
filed and at the t ime of certification. Kremens v. Bartley, s·upra, at 143, 
n. 6 (BRENNAN, J ., dis:,enting) ; Sosna y. Iowa, 419 U.S., at 402, 403 ; s~e 
§ell v. Wolfi-sh,- U. S. -, -, n. 5 (1979); Zablocki t . Redhail, 434 / 
u. s. ·a74, '$82, n. 9 (1978). / 
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423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. 
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978). 
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Span{fler may be dis-
tinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the 
denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact that 
in each case the class representatives were defending a judg-
ment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed. 
The plaintiffs/respondents continued vigorously to assert the 
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route 
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District 
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose 
not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in 
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class repre-
sentative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by 
adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and Bradford as 
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal 
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mecha-
uisltl of class certification or otherwise.18 The Court rejects 
that principle today. 
III 
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness is 
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more 
disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this action 
into two separate "claims": (i) that the action may be main-
tained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the 
class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class has 
been certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the merits ~ 
is moot. Ante, at 15, 17. But respondent is said to have a...,..........-
personal stake in his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a 
stake in the merits. 
18 Tn some rircnmstancPs, litigants are permitted to argue the rights of 
third parties in ,;upport of their claims. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff 428 
U.S. 106, 113 (1976); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-256 (1953). 
In each such case, however, the Court has identified a concrete, individual 
injury ::mffPred by the litigant himself. Ibid.; see n. 2, s·upra, and accom-
panying text, 
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The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to 
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to re-
spondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the 
certification question.14 Instead, respondent's "personal stake" 
is said to derive from two factors having nothing to do 
with concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the 
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create 
a "right,'' "analogous to the private attorney general concept," 
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the 
case retains the "imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial 
resolution," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented 
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested ~ 
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15.1:; ~ 
14 In a footnote , ante, at 18, n. 11, the Court states: 
"Thi~ respondent Htff(•red actual, concrete injury as a result of the 
putativPiy illPgal conduct, and this injury would sat.isfy the for!1illlistic 
prr:;onal stake rrquin'ment . .jf damages were sought. See, e. g., Powell v .. 
McCornu.u:k , :395 U.S., at -195-500." 
Thii:i appe>:trs to be a rategorical claim of the actual, concrete injury oul' 
casrs have requin•d. Yet, again, the Court. fails to identify the injury. 
The rPferenre to damages is irrrlevant here, as respondent sought no 
damages-only iujunetive and drclamtory relief. Moreover, counsel for 
respondent fraukly conc·eded that his client "can obtain absolutely no 
additional JWrsoual reltef" iu this cusP. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. If the Court 
/ Priously i:; (•!aiming roncretf' injury "at all stages of review," see p, 3, 
supra. it would i~ be helpful for it to identify specifically t.his injury 
that was not. apparent to re::;pond('nt's counsel. 
15 The Court attempt::; to limit t.he sweeping consequences that could flow 
from tht1 applica.tion of the"'e eriteria, see infra, at 12-13, and n. 15, by 
assrrting that "ll'Jarh case must be decided on its own fa.cts" on the basis 
of "practicalities and pntdential con::>iderations." Ante, at 17, n. 11. The 
Court long has recognized a difff'rf'nce between the prudential and consti-
tutional aspects of thf' ;;tanding and mootness doctrines. See p. 2, supra. 
I am not. aware that the Court, unt.il today, ever has merged these consid-
erations for rhe purpose of eliminating the Art. III requirement. of a per-
sOJutl stakP in thH litigatio11. The Court cites no prior case for this view. 
Morro\'<'!' , tlw Court rxpound:,; no limiting principle of any kind. Adverse 
practic·al con~(·qttenre:;, even if rrlcvant to Art. III analysis, cannot: justify 
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The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule 
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not 
confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not. 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100; 
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a 
rule of procedure which "shall not be construed to extend ... 
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney gen-
eral concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to 
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a 
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise might be 
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S., at 737-738. 
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general 
concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new per-
ception of At't. III requirements must rest entirely on its 
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the com-
ponents of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurispru-
dence, they operate only in "'cases confessedly within [the 
Court's] jurisdiction.'" Franks· v. Bowman Transportation 
Co., 424 U. S., at 755-756, and n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court cites no decision that 
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply~ 
presented issue in a concret~ and vigorously argued case, and 
I am aware of none.10 Indeed, each of these characteristics is 
sure to be present in the typical "private attorney general" 
today':; holding '" · none whatever would flow from a finding of rnootness. \ 
See n . 15, infra. Kor dot:>" the Court's reliance upon a "relation back 
prineiplr," ante. at 18, n . 11, further the analysis. Although this fiction 
may providP Lt ~hurt hu ncl labrl for the Court':; conclusion, it is hardly a. 
principle :md cwtninly not. a limiting one. 
10 The Court oftPn has rejected t hr contention that a "spirited dispute': / 
alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. E. g., Richardsr:m v. Ramirez, 418__............-
U. S. 24, 35-36 (19i4); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (per 
curiam) . 
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actio11 brought by a public spirited citizen.17 Although we 
have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action," 
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement 
leaves no principled basis for that practice.18 
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is 
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in 
a "procedural claim:," particularly in "nontraditional forms 
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a ____-
. false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class certification issues....,........--
are "ancillary to 'the litigation of substantive claims." Ante, 
at - (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal 
17 The CourtH asserhon to tlw contrary notwithstanding, there is 
nothing in the r!i'cord to sugg!i'~t. that respondent has any interest whatever 
in his new-found '·right to have a class certified." Ante, at 15. In fact, 
the record show~ that respondent's interest in the merits was the sole mo-
tivation for his attempt to represent a class. The class claims were added 
to his complaint only because his lawyer' feared that mootness might 
terminH te the action. App., at 17; Brief for Repondent 23, 33. The 
record does not rew•al whether respondent-as distinguished from his 
lawyer-now wi~hes to continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that 
his interest has nothing to do with the procedural protections described 
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suits." Ante, at 14. It is 
neither surpri:>ing nor improper that respondent s110uld be concerned with 
parole procedures. But Tespondent's actual interest is indistinguishable 
from the generalized mtcrest of a "private attorney general" who might 
bring a "public actwn" to im11rove the operation of a parole system. 
18 Tlw Court " \ ' JI:'W logicall~ eannot be confinl:'d to moot cases. If a 
plaintiff who is released from prison the day after filing a class action 
challenging parole guideline:; may seek certification of the cla::ss, why should 
a plaintiff who is released the day before filing the suit be barred? As an 
Art. III mat1 rr, thrre can bl:' no difference. 
Even on prudential grounds, there is little difference between this action 
and one filed promptly upon relea.se. In the present case, this Court 
hail ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the cla8s action . At 
the same time, it has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeal" that in 
turn rever-ed the judgml:'nt of the District Court. No detennination on 
any issue is left ;;tanding. For every practica.l purpose, the action must 
begin anew-tlu,; tJme without a plaintiff. The prudentia.l considerations, 
in favor of a Jlndmg of mootn"' oould """'IY be """ onmpelli/ 
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stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration, 
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word. 
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join addi-
tional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a 
judge. seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular 
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value 
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution 
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is 
neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them 
independent of his interest in the merits. 
Class actions may advance significantly the administration 
of justice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the class action is 
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to 
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long 
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004 
(1977). That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class as-
pect of litigation involving individual claims has never been 
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new proce-
dural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to 
the recognition of different " 'means for presenting a elise or 
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.'" 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240 (1937) 
(Declaratory Judgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L. 
R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added). 
The effect of mootness on the vitality of a device like th,~ ./ 
class action may be a relevant prudential consideration.1/ 
10 I do not. imply that the r<'sult. reached t.oday is nece:ssary in any 
way to the continued vitality of the class-action device. On the contrary, 
the practical impact of finding mootness in this case would be slight indeed. 
See note 13, supra. And this may well be typical of class actions brought 
under Rule 23 (b)(1) or (2) to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. Such 
actions are not subject to frustration through sequential settlement offers / 
that "pick off" eac·h intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat. 
Bank v. Roper, ante, at - (slip op., at 11-12). Nor will substitute 
plaintiffs be deterred by the notice costs that attend certification of a claS& 
under Rule 23 (b)(3). 
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But it cannot provide a plaintiff when none is before the 
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation 
pf Art. !IV0 
IV 
In short, this is a case in which the putative class repre-
l)entative-respondent here-no longer has the slightest .in.., 
terest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member 
of the class is before the Court·; indeed, none has been iden-
tified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal 
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the juris-
diction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only 
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are 
the defendants and a lawyer who no longer has a client.21 
I would vacate the decision of the Court· of Appeals and 
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot. 
20 The Court's efforts to "save" this action from mootness lead it to 
depart strikingly from the normal role of a reviewing court. The Court 
fails to identify how, if at all, the District Court has erred. Nothing 
is said about the District Court's ruling on the merits or its refusal to 
certify the broad class sought by respondel).t. Nor does the Court a.dopt 
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court erred in failing 
to consider the possibility of subclasses sua sponte. Nevertheless, re--
spondent-or his lawyer-is given the opportunity to raise the subclass 
que~iion on remand. That result cannot b!.' squared with the rule that a 
litigant may not raise on appeal those issues he has failed to preserve by 
appropriate object.ion in the trial eourt. The Court intimates that the 
District Court waited t.oo long to deny the class certification motion, thus 
making a. motion for subclasses a "futile act." Ante, at 17. But nothing in 
the record suggests that the District Court would not have entertained 
such a motion. Since respondent sought certification in the first place only 
to avoid mootness on appeal, the entry of an order against him on the 
merits cannot excuse him from presenting 'his subclass proposal to the 
District Court thereafter. 
21 I imply no critici~m of rounsel in this case. The Court. of Appeals 
agreed with counsel that the certification issue was appeaJable, and the-
"case was brought to this Court by the United States, 
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Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was 
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a 
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will 
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The 
District Court denied class certification and granted summary 
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before 
briefs were filed, he was unconditionally released from prison. 
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The 
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment 
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was 
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that re-
spondent properly could appeal the denial of class certifi-
eation. The Court today agrees with this conclusion. 
The Court's analysis proceed·s in two steps. First, it says 
that mootness is a "flexible"· doctrine which may be adapted 
as we see fit to "nontraditional". forms of litigation. Ante, at 
8-12. Second, the Court holds that the named· plaintiff has 
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept" 
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his per-
sonal claim for relief is moot.. Ante, at 12=-16. Both steps 
are significant departures from settled law that rationally can-
not be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case~ 
.Accordingly, I dissent. 
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I 
As the Court observes, this case involves the "personal 
stake" aspect of the mootness 'doctrine. Ante, at 7. There 
is undoubtedly a "live" issue whi<Jh an appropriate plaintiff 
could present for judicial resolution. The question is whether 
respondent, who has no further interest in this action, never-
theless may-through. counsel-continu~ to .litigate it. 
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal 
stake requirement with some care. When the issue is pre-
sented at the outset of litigation as ,a question of standing. to 
sue, we have held that the personal stake requirement has a 
double aspect. On the one hand, it derives from Art. - III 
limitations on the power of the federal courts. On the other, 
it embodies additional, self-imposed restraints on the exercise 
of judicial power. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, -112 
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). ·The 
prudential aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine 
of uncertain contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional 
minimum has been given definite content: "In ·order to satisfy 
Art. III, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered 
some actual or threatened injury as a result oJ the putatively 
illegal conduct of the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v. 
Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979).1 Although 
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, the Court has re-
jected all attempts to substitute abstract concern with a sub-
ject-or with the rights of third parties-for uthe concrete 
1 See, e. g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 
Inc ., 438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Dev. Corp. 429 U. S. 252, 260-261 (1977) ; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 
490, 499 (1975) ; Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1Q73). 
Each of these ca;.;e~ rejects the view, once expressed by Mr. Justice Harlan 
and now apparent ly espoused by the Court, that the personal stake 
requirement lacks constitutional significance. Ante, at 16, n. 11; Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, .J., dissenting); see also United \ 
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974) (PowELL, J ., concurring). 
Until today, however, that view never had commanded a majQrity. 
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injury required by Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
-Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976).2 
As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement 
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; see 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential con-
siderations not present at the outset may support continuation 
of an action in which the parties have invested substantial 
resources and generated a factual record.3 But an actual 
case or controversy in the constitutional sense " 'must be ex-
tant at all stages of review.' " Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 
395, 401 (1975) , quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 
452, 459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests'" are 
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide 
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the 
case before them.'' North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 
246 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The limitation 
flows directly from Art. III. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 
312, 316 (1974) (per curiam).' 
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance 
of review cannot control. Sosna v. fowa, 419 U. S. 393, 401, 
2 See, e. g. , Schlesin{ler v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 227· 
(197.4) ; O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974); Moose Lodge 
No. 107 v. Jrvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-167. (1972); Sierra Club. v. Morton, 405. 
U. S. 7'/.7~ 736-738 (1972); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44, 46 (1943) , 
(per curiam) . The rule is the same when the question i~ mootness and .a 
litigant can assert no more than emotional involvement in what remains 
of the case. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 {1977) (per 
curiam) . 
3 See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure § 3533, at 265 (1975); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the 
Supreme Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373, 376-977 (1974) . , , . , 
4 See, e. g., Preiser. v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975); SEC . 
v. Medical Comm. for H.uman ,. flights , 404 .u. S. ·403, 407 (1972) '; Powell 
v. MCCormack, 395 U. S. 486, , 496, n. 7 (1969); Liner v. Jafco, Inc ., 375 
U.S, 301, 306, n. 3 (196.4) . 
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n. 9 (1975); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S . 24, 36 (1974); 
United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920). 
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the 
necessary individual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the orig-
inal wrong may supply the individual interest in some circum-
stances. Sibron v. New York, ~92 U.S. 40, 5S.:.58 (1968). So, 
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so ·inherently 
transitory that ·it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of 
litigation. Super Tire Engineering Co. v.' McCorkle, 416 U. S. 
115 (1974); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 
498, 515 (1911). The essential and irreducible constitutional 
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or 
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary. 
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view to-
day, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the 
outcome is not "flexible." Indeed, the rule barring litigation 
by those who have no interest of their own at stake is applied 
so rigorously that it has been termed the "one major proposi-
tion" in the law of standing "to which the federal courts have 
consistently adhered ... without exception." Davis, Stand-
ing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 617 
(1968).5 We have insisted upon the personal stake re-
quirement in mootness and standing cases because it is em-
bedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the 
e The Court states that "the erosion of the strict formalistic perception 
of Art. III was begun well before today's decision," and that the Art. III 
personal stake requirement is "riddled with exceptions." Ante, at 16, n. 11. 
It fails, however, to cite a single Court opinion in support of either state-
ment. To the extent that the decision in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 
(1968), 8Upports the position ascribed to it in the dissent, id., at 117-120, 
it does not survive the long line of express holdings that began with 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. "490 (1975), and were reaffirmed only last 
Term. Gladstone, Realtors v, Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. ·91, 99 
( 1979). See nn. 1 & 2, supra. Even before Warth, Professor Davis 
observed that the personal stake requirement had no exceptions. Davis, 
s•ttpra, at 616, 617 (1968), 
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Constitution, "founded in concern about the proper-and 
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society." 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we 
have, until today, "prevent[ed] the judicial process from 
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the 
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v. 
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see S-imon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., con-
curring in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 
727, 740 (1974). 
II 
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the Court 
has applied consistently. These principles were developed 
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no 
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a puta-
tive class representative who alleges no individual injury "may 
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of 
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974). 
Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule 
23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interests 
asserted by [the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 
399 (1975) . "Given a properly certified class," the live in-
terests of unnamed but identifiable class members may sup-
ply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named 
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bow-
man Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976) ·; 
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402. 
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. Ne 
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any 
personal stake in the litigation.8 In the words of his own 
8 No one suggests that respondent could be affected personally by any 
ruling on the class certification question that is remanded today. In fact, 
the Court apparently concedes that respondent has no personal stake-"in 
the traditional sense"-in obtaining certification. Ante, at 14. 
Several prisoners p.ow in federal custody have filed a motion to inter-
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lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional per-
sonal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the 
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent 
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from o.ther 
persons presently incarcerated. lbid. 7 In these circum-
stances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require 
•dismissal. But 'the 'Court view8' the caSe differently, and.con-
structs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has 
no plaintiff. 
The Court announces today for the first time~and without 
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that 
there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness doctrine": 
"flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, ·and n. 7. - The 
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application 
of "flexible" mootness to c1ass action litigation: The cases 
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 
110-111, n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 
432 U.S. 385 (1977), and today's decision in Deposit Gua'l'anty 
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. -. Each case is said to show 
that a class action is not mooted by the loss of the class repre-
·sentative's personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, even 
though no class has been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself 
is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Artr. III 
vene as parties respondent in this Court. Although the Court does not 
rule on that motion, I note that the motion was received well over a 
year after respondent was released from prison. In the interim, re-
spondent obtained a ruling from the Court of Appeals and filed his 
petition for certiorari in this Court. Such untimely intervention comes 
too late to. save the action under United Airlines, Inc . v. McDonald, 43~ 
u. s. 385 (1977). 
1 R~pondent's lawyer opened his argument by saying that "[t]he 
mootness question in this case is, from a practical standpoint, not very 
significant." If the action is held moot he . plans simply to "file a new 
case" on behalf of prisoners serving longer terms. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. 
On the basis of this representation by counsel, there is reason to believe 
that members of the putative class at issue ultimately will be included in ;a 
· -r • ~~'class ":taction that will not moot --eut. 
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may be met "through means other than the traditional require-
ment of a 'personal stake in the outcome.' If Ante, at 15. In 
my view, the Court misreads these precedents. 
A 
In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class 
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse par-
ties. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240 
(1937) .8 And in Gerstein, the Court applied a rule long 
established, outside the class action context, by cases that 
never have been thought to erode the requirement of a per-
sonal stake in the outcome. Gerstein held that a class action 
challenging the constitutionality of pretrial detention proce-
dures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions 
had brought their detentions to an end. The Court did not 
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the merits 
8 Certification is no mere formality. It represents a judicial finding 
· that injured parties other than the named plaintiff exist. It ~lso provides 
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies arid 
sharpens the interests of unnamed class · members in the outcome; only 
thereafter will t hey be bound by the outcome. After certification, 
class members can be certain that the action will not be settled or 
dismissed without appropriate notice. Fed.· Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c); 3· H. 
Newberg Class Actions § 5050 (1977); cf. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class 
Actions at the Precertification State: · Is Notice Required?, 56 N. C: L. 
· Rev. 303 (1978) . Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposi-
tion on the named plaintiffs of a · duty adequately to represent the entire 
class. If the named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot after certification, 
the court can re-examine his ability to represent the interests of class 
members. Should it be found wanting, the Court may seek a substitute 
representative or even decertify the class. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c) ( 1), 
23 (d) ; see 1 H. Newberg, supra, § 2192; Comment, Continuation and 
Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Repre-
sentative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 589-590, 602-603. After certification, the 
case is no different in principle from more traditional representative actions 
involving, for example, a ·single party who cannot participate himself 
because of his incompetence but is permitted to litigate through an ap-
pointed fiduciary. 
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was unnecessary. The action continued only because of the 
transitory nature of pretrial detention, which placed ·the 
claim within "that narrow class of cases" that are "distinctly 
'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" 420 ·u. S., at 
110, n. 11.9 
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial 
of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of the class 
representative's claim on the merits. · B!lt neither case holds 
that Art. III may be sa~isfied in · the· absence of a personal 
stake in the outcome. In ·McDonald, a·ptitative class member 
intervened within the statutory time limit to appeal the cer-
tification ruling. 432 U.S., at 390.10 Because the Court found 
that her claim was not time-barred, the intervenor in McDonald 
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed, 
the Court devoted its entire opinion to showing that the 
intervenor's claim for relief had not expired.11 At most, 
McDonald holds only that an action which is kept alive by 
interested parties within prescribed periods of limitations does 
not "die" in an Art. III sense. 
There is dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify 
9 The Court's Gerstein analysis, which emphasized that ."[p]retrial de-
tention is by nature temporary" and that "[t]he individual could ... 
suffer repeated deprivations" with no access to redress, falls squarely 
within the rule of Southern Pac. Terminal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 
(1911) . See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, '125 (1973). In similar cases 
we have noted that the continuation of the action will depend "'espe-
cially [upon] the reality of the claJm that otherwise the issue would evade 
review.'" Swisher v. Brady, 438 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitatjons are 
inconsistent with the concept of "flexible" mootness and the redefinition of 
"personal stake" adopted today. 
10 The individual claims of the original named plaintjffs had been settled 
after judgment on the question of liability. 432 U. S., at 389, 393, n. 14. 
11 This extensive inquiry would have been unnecessary if, as the Court 
holds today, the intervenor had a personal stake in the class certification 
issue itself. Since the present respondent's claim long since has "expired;" 
he stands in the same position as a member of the putative class who,st} 
~·, "c~~im has "ex~ired" by reason of the statute of limitations, 
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was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the 
behest of the named plaintiffs .... " 432 U. S., at 393. That 
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 (1978), apparently is elevated 
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doc-
trine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine and 
the much narrower reasoning adopted today in Roper. In 
Roper, the Court holds that named plaintiffs whose claims 
have been paid may retain a personal stake in sharing antici-
pated litigation costs with the class. Ante, at- (slip op., at 
7 n. 6, 10). Finding that Art. III is satisfied by this alleged 
ec0110mic interest. Roper reasons that the rules of federal 
practice governing appealability permit a party to obtain re-
view of certain procedural rulings that are collateral to a 
generally favorable judgment. See id., at 7. 9-10. The Court 
concludes that the denial of class certification falls within this 
category, as long as the named plaintiffs "assert a continui11g 
stake in the outcome of the appeal."· Id., at 10. 
It is far from apparent how Roper can be thought to sup-
port the decision in this case. Indeed, the opinion by THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE in Roper reaffirms the obligation of a federal 
court to dismiss an appeal when the parties no longer retain 
the personal stake in the outcome required by Art. III. Ibid. 
Here, there is not even a speculative interest in sharing costs, 
and respondent affirmatively denies that he retains any stake 
or personal interest in the outcome of this appeal. See p. 6, 
supra. Thus, a fact that was critical to the analysis in Roper 
is absent in this case. One need not accept that analysis as 
sound to conclude that it affords no support for the Court's 
ruling here. 
B 
The cases cited by the Court as 11less flexible"-and there-
fore less authoritative-apply established Art. III doctrine in 
cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School 
Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam); Wein-
~Stein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasa-
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dena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 
(1976). As they are about to peco~e second class precedents, 
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at'12, n. 7. But 
the cases are recent and carefully considered decisions of' this 
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III juris-
prudence. And no Justice who participated in them suggested 
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded treat-
ment of these "less ~exible" cases ig:irores their controlling 
relevance to the issue presented liere. , 
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to 
challenge certain high school regulations. . The District Court 
stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and 
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court 
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted 
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had grad-
uated. We held that the action was entirely moot because 
the "class action was never ·properly certified nor the class 
properly identified by the District Court." 420 U.S., at 130.12 
Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquir-
ing separate legal status, Art.' III required a· dismissal. We 
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action 
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a 
third party. 427 U.S., at 430-431. See also Baxter v. Palm_i-
giano, 425 U.S. 308,310, n. 1 (1976). And in Bradford, where 
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Court 
12 The vitality of the Jacobs result is underscored by the repeated 
dictum that a properly certified class is necessary to supply adverseness 
onoe the named plaintiff's claim becomes moot. East -Texas 'Motor Freight 
v. Rodriguez , 431 U. S. 395, 406, n. 1'2 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Trans-
portation Co., supra, 424 'U. S., at 754, n. ·6, 756-756; see Kremens v. 
Bartley, 431 U. S. 119, 129-120 "(1977); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 
24, 39 (1974). Conversely, we have often stated that the named plain-
tiff's individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is 
filed and at the time of certification. Kremens v. Bartley, supra, at 143, 
n. 6 (BRENNAN, J ., diEsenting); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S., at 402, 403; see 
Bell v. Wolfish,- U. S. -, -, n. 5 (1979); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
" · U.s. ·374, :a~, n. 9 {1978). 
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held that the named plaintiff's release from prison required the 
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures. 
423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. 
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978). 
The Court suggests that lacobs and Spangler may be dis-
tinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the 
denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact that 
in each case the class representatives were defending a judg-
ment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed. 
The plaintiffs/respondents continued vigorously to assert the 
claims of the class. ·They did not take the procedural route 
of appealing a denial of certification only beca-use the District 
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose 
not to remand for correction of the ora1 certification order in 
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class repre-
sentative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by 
adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and Bradford as 
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal 
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mecha-
nism of class certification or otherwise.18 The Court rejects 
that principle today. 
III 
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness is 
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more 
disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this action 
into two separate "claims": (i) that the action may be main-
tained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the 
class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class has 
been certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the merits 
is moot. Ante, at l5, 17. But respondent is said to have a 
18 In some circumstances, litigants are permitted to argue the rights of 
third parties in support of their claims. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff 428 
U.S. 106, 113 (1976); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 255-256 (1953) . 
In each such case, however, the Court has identified a concrete, individual 
injury suffered by the litigant himself. Ibid.; see n. 2, supra, and accom-
·panying ·text. 
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personal stake in his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a 
stake in the merits. 
The Court makes no . effort to identify any injury .to 
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to re-
spondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the 
certification question.14 Inst~ad, respondent's "personal stake" 
is said to derive from two fa:ctors having nothing to · do 
with concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, · the 
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create 
a. "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept," 
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the 
case retains the "imperatives ··of a· dispute capable of judicial 
resolution," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented 
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-inter~sted 
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15.1 5 
14 In a footnote, ante, at 18, n. 11, the Court states: 
"This respondent suffered actual, concrete injury as a result of the 
putatively illegal conduct, and this injury would satisfy the formalist-ic 
personal stake requirement if damages were sought. See, e. g., Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U. S., at 495-500." 
This appears to be a categorical claim of the actual, concrete injury our 
cases have required. Yet, ·again, t.he Court fails to identify the injury. 
The reference to damages is irrelevant here, as respondent sought no 
damages-only injunctive and declaratory relief. Moreover, counsel for 
respondent frankly conceded that his client "can obtain absolutely no 
additional personal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. If the Court 
seriously is claiming concrete ·injury "a.t all stages of review," see p. 3, 
supra, it would be helpful for it to identify specifically this injury that 
wa.~ not apparent to respondent's counsel. Absent such identification, the \ 
claim of injury is indeed an empty one. 
15 The Court attempts to limit the sweeping consequences that could flow 
from the application of these criteria, see infra, at 12-13, and n. 15, by 
asserting that "[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts" on the basis 
of "practicalities and prudential considerations." Ante, at·17, n. 11. The 
Court long has recognized a difference between the prudential and consti-
tutional aspects of the standing and mootness doctrines. See p. 2, supra. 
I am not aware that the Court, until today, ever has merged· these consid-
' 'erations for the purpose of eliminating the Art. III requirement of a per-
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The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule 
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not 
confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not. 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100; 
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a 
rule of procedure which "shall not be construed to extend . . . 
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney gen-
eral concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to 
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a 
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise might be 
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S., at 737-738. 
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general 
concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new per-
ception of Art. III requirements must rest entirely on its 
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the com-
ponents of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurispru-
dence, they operate only in " 'cases confessedly within [the 
Court's] jurisdiction.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation 
Co., 424 U. S., at 755-756, a.nd n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court cites no decision that 
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply 
presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case, and 
I am aware of none.16 Indeed, each of these characteristics is 
sonal stake in the litigation. The Court cites no prior case for this view. 
Moreover, the Court expounds no limiting principle of any kind. Adverse 
practical consequences, even if relevant to Art. III analysis, cannot justify 
today's holding as none whatever would flow from a finding of mootness. 
See n. 15, infra. Nor does the Court's reliance upon a "relation back 
principle," ante, at 18, n. 11, further the analysis. Although this fiction 
may provide a shorthand label for the Court's conclusion, it is hardly a 
principle and certainly not a limiting one. 
16 The Court often has rejected the contention that a "spirited dispute" 
alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. E . g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418. 
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sure to be prest}nt in the typical "private attorney general" 
action brought by a public spirited citizen.17 Although we 
have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action," 
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement 
leaves no principled basis for that practice.18 
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is 
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in 
a. "procedural claim," particula.rly in "nontraditional forms 
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a 
false dilemma. As no~d in Roper, class certification issues 
U. S. 24, ~5-36 (1974); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (per 
curiam) . 
17 The Courts assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, there is 
nothing in the record to suggest that respondent has any interest whatever 
in his new-found "right to have a class certified." Ante, at 15. In fact, 
the record shows that respondent's interest in the merits was the sole mo-
tivation for his attempt to represent a class. The class claims were added 
to his complaint only because his lawyer feared that mootness might 
terminate the action. App., at 17; Brief for Repondent 23, 33. The 
record does not reveal whether respondent-as distinguished from his 
lawyer-now wishes to continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that 
his interest has nothing ·to do with the procedural protections described 
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suits." Ante, at 14. It is 
neither surprising nor improper that respondent should be concerned with 
parole procedures. But respondent's actual interest is indistinguishable 
from the generalized interest of a "private attorney general" who might 
bring a "public action" to improve the operation of a parole system. 
18 The Court'~ view logically cannot be corifined to moot cases. If a 
plaintiff who is released from prison the day after filing a class action 
challenging parole guidelines may seek certification of the class, why should 
a plaintiff who is released the day before filing the suit be barred? As an 
Art. III matter; there can be no difference. 
Even on prudential grounds, there is little difference between this action· 
and one filed promptly upon release. In the present case, this Court 
has ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the class action. At 
the same time, it has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in · 
turn reversed the judgment of the District Court. No determination on · 
any issue is left standing. For every practical purpose, the action must 
begin anew-this tjme without a plaintiff. The prudential considerations, 
in· favor of a finding of mootness could scarcely be more compelling, 
78-572-DISSENT 
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY 15 
are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante, 
at - (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal 
stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration, 
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word. 
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join addi-
tional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a 
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular 
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value 
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution 
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is 
neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them 
independent of his interest in the merits. 
Class actions may advance significantly the administration 
of justice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the class action is 
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to 
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long 
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004 
(1977). That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class as-
pect of litigation involving individual claims has never been 
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new proce-
dural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to 
the recognition of different "'means for presenting a case or 
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.'" 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240 (1937) 
(Declaratory Judgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L. 
R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added). 
The effect of mootness on the vitality of a device like the 
class action may be a relevant prudential consideration.19 
10 I do not imply that the result reached today is necessary in any 
way to the continued vitality of the class-action device. On the contrary, 
the practical impact of finding mootness in this case would be slight indeed. 
See note 13, supra. And this may well be typical of class actions brought 
under Rule 23 (b) ( 1) or (2) to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. Such 
actions are not subject to frustration through sequential settlement offers 
that "pick off" each intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat. 
Bank v. Roper. ante, at - (slip op., at 11-12). Nor will substitute 
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But it cannot provide a plaintiff when none is before the 
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation 
of Art. IIV0 
IV 
In short, this is a case in which the putative class repre-
sentative-respondent here-no longer has the slightest in-
terest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member 
of the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been iden-
tified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal 
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the juris-
diction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only 
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are 
the defendants and a lawyer who no longer has a client. 21 
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot. 
plaintiffs be deterred by the notice costs that attend certification of a clll8B 
under Rule 23 (b) (3). 
20 The Court's efforts to "save" this action from mootness lead it to 
depart strikingly from the normal role of a reviewing court. The Court 
fails to identify how, if at all, the District Court has erred. Nothing 
is said about the District Court's ruling on the merits or its refusal to 
certify the broad class sought by respondent. Nor does the Court adopt 
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court erred in failing 
to consider the possibility of subclasses sua sponte. Nevertheless, re-
spondent-or his lawye~is given the ~pportunity to raise the subclass 
question on remand. That result cannot be squared with the rule that a 
litigant may not rajse on appeal those issues he has failed to preserve by 
appropriate objection in the trial court. The Court intimates that the 
District Court waited t.oo long to deny the class certification motion, thus 
making It motion for subclasses a "futile act." Ante, at 17. But nothing in 
the record suggests that the District Court would not have entertained 
such a motion. Since respondent sought certification in the first place only 
to avoid mootness on appeal, the entry of an order against him on the 
merits cannot excuse him from presenting his subclass proposal to the 
District Court thereafter. 
21 I imply no criticism of counsel in this case. The Court of Appeals· 
agreed with counsel that the certification issue was appealable, and the-
'Ctule was brought to this Court by the United States. 
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Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was 
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a 
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will 
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The 
District Court denied class certification and granted summary 
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before 
briefs were filed, he was unconditionally released from prison. 
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The 
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment 
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was 
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless· concluded that re-
spondent properly could appeal the denial of class certifi-
eation. The Court today agrees with this conclusion. 
The Court's analysis proceed·s in two steps. First, it says 
that mootness is a "flexible"' doctrine which may be adapted 
as we see fit to "nontraditional". forms of litigation. Ante, at 
8-12. Second, the Court holds that the named' plaintiff has 
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept" 
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his per-
sonal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12:..16. Both steps 
are significant departures from settled law that rationally can-
not be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case~ 
_ju_S(I 
Accordingly, I dissent. / 
' 
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As the Court observes, this case involves the "personal 
stake" aspect of the mootness 'doctrine. Ante, at 7. There 
is undoubtedly a "live" issue whi'(lh an appropriate plairttiff 
could present for judiciai resolution. Tne question is whether 
respondent, who has no further interest in this action, never-
theless may-through· counsel-continu~ to litigate it. 
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal 
stake requirement with some care. When the issue is pre-
sented at the outset of litigation as .a question of standing. to 
sue, we have held that the personal stake requirement has a 
double aspect. On the one hand, it derives from Art.- III 
limitations on the power of the federal courts. On the other, 
it embodies additional, self-imposed restraints on the exercise 
of judicia] power. E. g., Sin{fleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, -112 
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). ·The 
prudential aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine 
of uncertain contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional 
minimum has been given definite content: "In order to satisfy 
Art. III, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered 
some actual or threatened injury as a result oi the putatively 
illegal conduct of the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v. 
Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979).1 Although 
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, the Court has re-
jected all attempts to substitute abstract concern with a sub-
jectr-or with the rights of third parties-for "the concrete 
1 See, e. g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 
Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Dev. Corp. 429 U. S. 252, 260-261 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 
490, 499 (1975); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1Q73). 
Each of these ca!:ie!:i rejects the view, once expres ed by Mr. Justice Harlan 
and now apparently espoused by the Court, that the personal stake 
requirement lacks constitutional !:iignificance. Ante, at 16, n . 11; Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, .J., dissenting); see abo United\ 
States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 180 (1974) (PowELL, J ., concurring). 
Until today, however, that view never had commanded a majority. 
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injury required by Art. Ill." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
-Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976).2 
As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement 
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; see 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential con-
siderations not present at the outset may support continuation 
of an action in which the parties have invested substantial 
resources and generated a factual record.3 But an actual 
case or controversy in the constitutional sense " 'must be ex-
tant at all stages of review.' " Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 
395, 401 (1975), quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 
452, 459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests'" are 
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide 
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the 
case before them.'' North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 
246 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The limitation 
flows directly from Art. III. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 
312, 316 (1974) (per curiam).' 
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance 
of review cannot control. Sosna v. lowa, 419 U. S. 393, 401, 
2 See, e. g., Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 227· 
(197,4); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974); Moose Lodge . 
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-167. (1972); Sierra Club. v. Morton, 405. 
U. S. 7'),7~ 736-738 (1972); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44, 46 (1943) , 
(per curiam). The rule is the same when the question i~ mootness and .a 
litigant can assert no more than emotional involvement in what remains 
of the case. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per 
curiam) . 
3 See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure § 3533, at 265 (1975); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the 
Supreme Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373, 376-~77 (1974). , ,, 1 • , 
•See, e. g., Preiser. v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975); SEC . 
v. Medical Comm. forlf.u11ULn.l;Ughts·, 404 .u. S.-403, 407 (1972) '; Powell 
v. MCCorfiULck, 395 U. S. 486, , 496, n. 7 (1969); Liner v. Jajco, Inc., 375 
U.S, 3011 306, n. 3 (196.4). 
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n. 9 (1975); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974); 
United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920). 
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the 
necessary individual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the orig-
inal wrong may supply the individual interest in some circum-
stances. Sibron v. New York, q92 U.S. 40, 5s.:-58 (1968). So, 
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so 'inherently 
transitory that ·it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of 
litigation. Super Tire Engineering Co. v.' McCorkle, 416 U. S. 
115 (1974); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 
498, 515 (1911) . The essential and irreducible constitutional 
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or 
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary. 
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view to-
day, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the 
outcome is not "flexible." Indeed, the rule barring litigation 
by those who have no interest of their own at stake is applied 
so rigorously that it has been termed the "one major proposi-
tion" in the law of standing "to which the federa.l courts have 
consistently adhered ... without exception." Davis, Stand-
ing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 617 
(1968).5 We have insisted upon the personal stake re-
quirement in mootness and standing cases because it is em-
bedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the 
5 The Court states that "the erosion of the strict formalistic perception 
of Art. III was begun well before today's decision," and that the Art. III 
personal stake requirement is "riddled with exceptions." Ante, a.t 16, n. 11. 
It fails, however, to cite a single Court opinion in support of either state-
ment. To the extent that the decision in FlMt v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 
(1968), supports the position ascribed to it in the dissent, id., at 117-120, 
it does not survive the long line of express holdings that began with 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. ·490 (1975), and were reaffirmed only last 
Term. GladiJtone, Realtors v, Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 
(1979). See nn. 1 & 2, supra. Even before Warth, Professor Davis 
observed that the personal stake requirement had no exceptions. Davjs, 
s'(lpra, at 616, 617 (1968), 
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Constitution, "founded in concern about the proper-and 
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society." 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we 
have, until today, "prevent[ ed] the judicial process from 
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the 
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v. 
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Ken· 
tucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., con· 
curring in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S, 
727, 740 (1974). 
II 
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the Court 
has applied consistently. These principles were developed 
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no 
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a puta-
tive class representative who alleges no individual injury "may 
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of 
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974). 
Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule 
23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interests 
asserted by [the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 
399 (1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live in. 
terests of unnamed but identifiable class members may sup-
ply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named 
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bow-
man Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976) ·; 
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402. 
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. N0 
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any 
personal stake in the litigation.6 In the words of his own 
6 No one suggests that respondent could be affected personally by any 
ruling on the class certification question that is remanded today. In fact, 
the Court apparently concedes that respondent has no personal stake-"in 
the traditional sense"-in obtaining certification. Ante, at 14. 
Several prisoners p.ow in federal custody have filed a. motion to inter· 
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lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional per-
sonal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the 
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent 
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from o-ther 
persons presently incarcerated. lbid.1 Iri these circum-
·stances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require 
~dismissal. But 'the 'Court views' the ca8e differently, and-con-
structs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has 
no plaintiff. 
The Court announces today for the first time--...:and without 
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that 
there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness doctrine": 
11flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, ·and n. 7. - The 
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application 
of "flexible" mootness to c1ass action litigation.- The cases 
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 
110-111, n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 
·432 U.S. 385 (1977), and today's decision in Deposit Gua'T'anty 
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. -. Each case is said to show 
that a class action is not mooted by the loss of the class repre-
·sentative's personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, even 
though no class has been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself 
is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Artr. III 
vene as parties respondent ·in this Court. Although the Court does not 
rule on that motion, I note that the motion was received well over a 
year after respondent was released from prison. In the interim, re-
spondent obtained a ruling from the Court of Appeals and filed his 
petition for certiorari in this Court. Such untimely intervention comes 
too late to. save the action under United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 43~ 
u. s. 385 (1977). 
7 Respondent's lawyer opened his argument by saying that "[t]he 
mootness question in this case is, from a practical standpoint, not very 
significant." If the action is held moot he . plans simply to "file a new 
case" on behalf of prisoners serving longer terms. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. 
On the basis of this representation by counsel, there is reason to believe 
that members of the putative class at issue ultimately will be included in ;a 
•elass'<'action that will not moot.Qut. 
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may be met "through means other than the traditional require-
ment of a 'personal stake in the outcome.' " Ante, at 15. In 
my view, the Court misreads these precedents. 
A 
In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class 
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse par-
ties. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240 
(1937).8 And in Gerstein, the Court applied a rule long 
established, outside the class action context, by cases that 
never have been thought to erode the requirement of a per-
sonal stake in the outcome. Gerstein held that a class action 
challenging the constitutionality of pretrial detention proce-
dures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions 
had brought their detentions to an end. ·The Court did not 
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the merits 
8 Certification is no mere formality. It represents a judicial finding 
· that injured parties other than the named plaintiff exist. It ~so provides 
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies and 
sharpens the interests of unnamed class · members in the outcome; only 
thereafter will they be bound by the outcome. After certification, 
class members can be certain that the action will not be settled or 
dismissed without appropriate notice. Fed.· Rule Civ. Proc. '23 (c); 3 ' H. 
Newberg Class Actions § 5050 (1977); cf. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class 
Actions at the Precertification State: · Is Notice Required?, 56 N. C: L. 
Rev. 303 (1978) . Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposi-
tion on the named plaintiffs of a · duty adequately to represent the entire 
class. If the named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot after certification, 
the court can re-examine his ability to represent the interests of class 
members. Should it be found wanting, the Court may seek a substitute 
representative or even decertify the class. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c)(1), 
23 (d) ; see 1 H . Newberg, supra, § 2192; Comment, Continuation and 
Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Repre-
sentative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 589-590, 602-603. After certification, the 
case is no different in principle from more traditional representative actions 
· involving, for example, a single party who cannot participate himself 
because of his incompetence but is permitted to litigate through an ap-
pointed fiduciary. 
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was unnecessary. The action continued only because of the 
transitory nature of pretrial detention, which placed 'the 
'Claim within "that narrow class of cases" that are "distinctly 
'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" 420 ·u. S., at 
110, n. 11.9 
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial 
of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of the class 
representative's claim on the merits. · Bpt neither case holds 
that Art. III may be sat~sfied in · the · absence of a personal 
stake in the outcome. In M cDoriald, a·putative class member 
intervened within _the statutory time limit to -appeal the cer-
tification ruling. 432 U.S., at 390.10 Because the Court found 
that her claim was not time-barred, the intervenor in McDonald 
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed, 
the Court devoted its entire opinion to showing that the 
intervenor's claim for relief had not expired.11 At most, 
McDonald holds only that an action which is· kept alive by 
interested parties within prescribed periods of limitations does 
not "die" in an Art. III sense. ~ 
There is dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify / 
9 The Court's Gerstein analysis, which emphasized that. :'[p]retrial de-
tention is by nature temporary" and that "[t]he individual could ... 
suffer repeated deprivations" with no access to redress, falls squarely 
within the rule of Southern Pac. Te1'minal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 
(1911) . See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1973). In similar cases 
we have noted that the continuation of the action will depend " 'espe-
cially [upon] the reality of the claJm that otherwise the issue would evade 
review.'" Swisher v. Brady, 438 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitatjons are 
inconsistent with the concept of "flexible" mootness and the redefinition of 
"personal stake" adopted today. 
10 The individual claims of the original named plaintills had been settled 
after judgment on the question of liability. 432 U. S., at 389, 393, n. 14. 
11 This extensive inquiry would have been unnecessary if, as the Court 
holds today, the intervenor had a personal stake in the class certification 
issue itself. Since the present respondent's claim long since has "expired;,. 
he stands in the same position as a member of the putative class who.s~ 
. .w.;m b., "ex~i.ed" by ,_n of tho 'tatute of limitations. ./ 
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was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the 
behest of the named plaintiffs .... " 432 U. S., at 393. That 
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 ( 1978), apparently is elevated G 
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doc- ~ 
trine. There is serious tension between this new do.cj~· tnmcl ____ _ 
the much narrower reasoning ado ted toda m Roper. In 
Roper, the Court holds that named plaintiffs Gv.;,hi1'rno~~~ifd~--­
h81: r I . ; l'ttiel litftJ'Y retain a per-soual stake in s 1aring antici-
pated litigation costs with the class. Ante, at- (slip op. , at 
7 n. 6, 10). Finding that Art. III is satisfied by this alleged 
economic interest. Roper reasons that the rules of federal 
practice governing appealability permit a party to obtain re-
view of certain procedural rulings that are collateral to a 
generally favorable judgment. See id., at 7. 9- 10. The Court 
concludes that the denial of class certification falls within this 
category, as long as the !lamed plaintiffs "assert a contiuuillg 
stake in the outcome of the appeal."· /d., at 10. 
It is far from apparent how Roper can be thought to sup-
port the decision iu this case. Indeed, the opinion by THE 
CHIEF JusTICE in Roper reaffirms the obligation of a federal 
court to dismiss an appeal when the parties no longer retain 
the personal stake in the outcome required by Art. III. Ibid. 
Here, there is not even a speculative interest in sharing costs, 
and respondent affirmatively denies that he retains any stake 
or personal interest in the outcome of this appeal. Ree p. 6, 
supra. Thus, a fact that was critical to the analysis in Roper 
is absent in this case. One -H~HIU 11 0 t &!!!!€ ])~ that analysis a.s-
soHm:l *'~ conclude that ~aftords no support for the Court's 
Lfii'ling here. 
B 
The cases cited by the Court as 11less flexible"-and there-
fore less authoritative-apply established Art. III doctrine in 
cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School ____-
Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam); Wein-r 
15tein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasa-
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dena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 
(1976). As they are about to lJecome second class precedents, 
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at '12, n. 7. But 
the cases are recent and carefully considered decisions of' this 
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III juris-
prudence, And no Justice who participated in them suggested 
\ the distinctio~ drawn today . . The Court;s backhanded treat-
ment of these "less flexible" cases igitores their controlling 
relevance to the issue presented here. , 
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action .to 
challenge certain high scpool regulations. . The District Court 
stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and 
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court 
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted 
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had grad-
uated. We held that the action was entirely moot because 
the "class action was never ·properly certified nor the class 
properly identified by the District Court." 420 U. S., at 130.12 
Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquir-
ing separate ,legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. We 
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action 
saved from mootness only by · the timely intervention of a 
third party. 427 U. S., at 430-431. See also Baxter v. Palm.i-
giano, 425 U. S. 308,310, n. 1 (1976). And in Bradford, where 
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Cour~ 
12 The vitality of the Jacobs result is underscored by the repeated 
dictum that a properly certified class is necessary to supply adverseness 
onoo the named plaintiff's claim becomes moot. · East Texas Motor Freight 
v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 406, n. 12 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Trans-
portation Co., supra, · 424 lJ. S., at 754, n. ·6, 755-756; see K1'emens v. 
Bartley, 431 U. S. 119, 129-120 '(1977); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 
24, 39 (1974). Conversely, we have often stated that the named plain-
tiff's individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is 
filed and at the time of certification. Kremens v. Bartley, supra, at 143, 
n. 6 (BRENNAN, J ., diosenting); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S., at 402, 403; see 
Bell v. Wolfish, - U. S. -, -, n. 5 (1979); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
• · U.S. -374, :3S2, n. 9 (1978). 
"T8-5T2.-DISSEN'r 
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY 11 
held that the named plaintiff's release from prison required the 
tdismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures. 
423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. 
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978). 
The Court suggests that lacobs and Spangler may be dis-
tinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the 
denial of class certification. 1'he Court overlooks the fact that 
in each case the class representatives were defending a judg-
ment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed. 
The plaintiffs/respondents continued vigorously to assert the 
claims of the class. ·They did not take the procedural route 
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District 
Court had granted-albeit defectively--class status. We chose 
not to remand for correction of the ora1 certification order in 
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class repre-
sentative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by 
adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and Bradford as 
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal 
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mecha-
nism of class certification or otherwise.18 ·The Court rejects 
that principle today. 
III 
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness is 
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more 
·disturbing. ·The Court splits the class aspects of this action 
into two separate "claims": ('i) that the action may be main-
tained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the 
class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class has 
been certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the merits ~ 
is moot. Ante, at l5, 17. But respondent is said to have a/ 
18 In some circumstances, litigants are pennitted to argue the rights of 
third parties in support of their claims. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff 428 
U.S. 106, 113 (1976); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 255-256 (1953). 
In each such case, however, the Court has identified a concrete, individual 
injury suffered by the litigant himself. Ibid.; see ·n. 2, supra, and accom-
·panying ·text. 
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personal stake in his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a. 
stake in the merits. 
The Court makes no . effort. to identify any injury .to 
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to re-
spondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the 
certification question.14 Instead, respondent's "personal stake" 
is said to derive from tw~ fa:ctors having nothing to · do 
with concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, · the 
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create 
a "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept," 
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the 
case retains the "imperatives 'of a· dispute capable of judicial 
resolution," which are ·identified as (i) a sharply presented 
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-inter~sted 
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15.15 
14 In a footnote, ante, at 18, n. 11, the Court states: 
"This respondent suffered actual, concrete injury as a result of the 
putatively illegal conduct, and this injury would satisfy the forirullistic 
personal stake requirement if damages were sought. See, e. g., Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S., at 495-500." 
This appears to be a categorical claim of the actual, concrete injury our 
cases have required. Yet, ·again, t:be Court fails to identify -the -injury. 
The reference to damages is irrelevant here, as respondent sought no 
damagef>'-only injunctive and declaratory relief. Moreover, counsel for 
respondent frankly conceded that his client "can obtain absolutely no 
additional personal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. If the Court 
seriously is claiming concrete ·injury "at all stages of review," see p. 3, 
supra, it would be helpful for it to identify specifically this injury that 
was not apparent to respondent's counsel. Absent such identification, the \ 
claim of injury is indeed an empty one. 
15 The Court attempts to limit the sweeping consequences that could flow 
from the application of these criteria, see infra, at 12-13, and n. 15, by 
asserting that " [e]ach case must be decided on its own facts" on the basis 
of "practicalities and prudential considerations." Ante, at ·17, n. 11. The 
Court long has recognized a difference between the prudential and consti-
tutional aspects of the standing a11d mootness doctrines. See p. 2, supra. 
I am not aware that the Court, until today, ever has merged· these consid-
'· 'erations for the purpose of eliminating the Art. III requirement of a per• 
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The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule 
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not 
confer federal court jurisdiction when· Art. III does not. 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100; 
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a 
rule of procedure which "shall not be construed to extend ... 
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney gen-
eral concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to 
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a 
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise might be 
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U. S., at 501; Sierra <:Jlub v. Morton, 405 U. S., at 737-738. 
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general 
concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new per-
ception of Art. III requirements must rest entirely on its 
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the com-
ponents of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurispru-
dence, they operate only in " 'cases confessedly within [the 
Court's] jurisdiction.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation 
Co., 424 U. S., at 755-756, and n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court cites no decision that 
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply 
presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case, and 
I am aware of none.16 Indeed, each of these characteristics is 
sonal stake in the litigation. The Court cites no prior case for this view. 
Moreover, the Court expounds no limiting principle of any kind. Adverse 
practical consequences, even if relevant to Art. III analysis, cannot justify 
today's holding as none whatever would flow from a finding of mootness. 
See n. 15, infra. Nor does the Court's reliance upon a "relation back 
principle," ante, at 18, n. 11, further the analysis. Although this fiction 
may provide a shorthand label for the Court's conclusion, it is hardly a 
principle and certainly not a limiting one. 
16 The Court often has rejected the contention that a "spirited dispute" 
alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. E. g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418. 
'\ 
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sure to be present in the typical "private attorney general" 
action brought by a public spirited citizen.17 Although we 
have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action," 
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement 
leaves no principled basis for that practice.18 
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is 
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in 
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms 
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a 
false dilemma. As no~d in Roper, class certification issues 
U. S. 24, 35-36 (1974); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (per 
curiam) . 
17 The Courts assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, there is 
nothing in the record to suggest that respondent has any interest whatever 
in his new-found "right to have a class certified." Ante, at 15. In fact, 
the record shows that respondent's interest in the merits was the sole mo-
tivation for his attempt to represent a class. The class claims were added 
to his complaint only because his lawyer feared that mootness might 
terminate the action. App., at 17; Brief for Repondent 23, 33. The 
record does not reveal whether respondent-as distinguished from his 
lawyer-now wishes to continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that 
his interest has nothing ·to do with the procedural protections described 
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suits." Ante, at 14. It is 
neither surprising nor improper that respondent should be concerned with 
parole procedures. But respondent's actual interest is indistinguishable 
from the generalized interest of a "private attorney general" who might 
bring a "public action" to improve the operation of a parole system. 
18 The Court.':; view logically cannot be confined to moot cases. If a 
plaintiff who is released from prison the Clay after filing a class action 
challenging parole guidelines may seek certification of the class, why shoulcf 
a plaintiff who is released the day before filing the suit be barred? As an 
Art. III matter, there can be no difference. 
Even on prudential grounds, there is little difference between this action· 
and one filed promptly upon release. In the present case, this Court 
has ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the class action. At 
the same time, it has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in · 
turn reversed the judgment of the District Court. No determination on · 
any issue is left standing. For every practical purpose, the action must 
begin anew-this time without a plaintiff. The prudential considerations. 
in· favor of a finding of mootness could scarcely be more compelling, 
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are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante, 
at - (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal 
stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration, 
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word. 
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join addi-
tional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a 
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular 
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value 
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution 
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is 
neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them 
independent of his interest in the merits. 
Class actions may advance significantly the administration 
of justice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the class action is 
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to 
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long 
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004 
( 1977). That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class as-
pect of litigation involving individual claims has never been 
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new proce-
dural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to 
the recognition of different "'means for presenting a case or 
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.' " 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240 (1937) 
(Declaratory Judgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L. 
R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added). 
The effect of mootness on the vitality of a device like the 
class action may be a relevant prudential consideration.19 
19 I do not imply that the result reached today is necessary in any 
way to the continued vitality of the class-action device. On the contrary, 
the practical impact of finding mootness in this case would be slight indeed. 
See note 13, supra. And this may well be typical of class actions brought 
under Rule 23 (b) ( 1) or (2) to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. Such 
actions are not subject to frustration through sequential settlement offers 
that "pick off" each intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat. 
Bank v. Roper, ante, at - (slip op., at 11-12). Nor will substitute 
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But it cannot provide a plaintiff when none is before the 
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation 
of Art. III. 20 
IV 
In short, this is a case in which the putative class repre-
sentative-respondent here-no longer has the slightest in-
terest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member 
of the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been iden-
tified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal 
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the juris-
diction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only 
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are 
the defendants and a lawyer who no longer has a client.21 
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot. 
plaintiffs be deterred by the notice costs that attend certification of a elMs 
under Rule 23 (b)(3). 
20 The Court's efforts to "save" this action from mootness lead it to 
depart strikingly from the normal role of a reviewing court. The Court 
fails to identify how, if at all, the District Court has erred. Nothing 
is said about the District Court's ruling on the merits or its refusal to 
certify the broad class sought by respondent. Nor does the Court adopt 
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court erred in failing 
to consider t.he possibility of subclasses sua sponte. Nevertheless, re-
spondent-or his lawyel'-is given the ~pportunity to raise the subclass 
question on remand. That result cannot be squared with the rule that a 
litigant may not raise on appeal those issues he has failed to preserve by 
appropriate objection in the trial court. The Court intimates that the 
District Court waited too long to deny the class certification motion, thus 
making 11, motion for subclasses a "futile act." Ante, at 17. But nothing in 
the record suggests that the District Court would not have entertained 
such a motion. Since respondent sought certification in the first place only 
to avoid mootness on appeal, the entry of an order against him on the 
merits cannot excuse him from presenting his subclass proposal to the 
District Court thereafter. 
21 I imply no criticism of counsel in this case. The Court of Appeals 
agreed with counsel that the certification issue was appealable, and the-
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom THE CHIEF JusTICE, 
MR. JusTICE STEWART and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join, 
dissenting. 
Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he wa8 
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a 
class composed of "all federai prisoners who are or who will 
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The 
District Court denied class certification and granted summary 
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before 
briefs were filed, he was unconditionally released from prison. 
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The 
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment 
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was 
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that re-
spondent properly could appeal the denial of class certifi-
cation. The Court today agrees with this conclusion. 
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it says 
that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may be adapted 
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. Ante, at 
8- 12. Second, the Court holds that the named plaintiff has 
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept" 
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his per-
sonal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12-16. Both steps 
1 2 1]_80_ 
are significant departures from settled law that rationally can- / 
not be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case. 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
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I 
As the Court observes, this case involves the 11personal 
stake" aspect of the mootness doctrine. Ante, at 7. There 
is undoubtedly a 11live" issue which an appropriate plaintiff 
could present for judicial resolution. The question is whether 
respondent, who has no further interest in this action, never-
. theless may- through counsel-continue to litigate it. 
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal 
stake requirement with some care. When the issue is pre-
sented at the outset of litigation as a question of standing to 
sue, we have · held that the personal stake requirement has a 
double aspect. On the one hand, it derives from Art. III 
limitations on the power of the federal courts. On the other, 
it embodies additional, self-imposed restraints on the exercise 
of judicial power. E . g. , Singleton v. Wulff , 428 U. S. 106, 112 
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). The 
prudential aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine 
of uncertain contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional 
minimum has been given definite content: "In order to satisfy 
Art. III, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered 
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively 
illegal conduct of the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v. 
Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979).1 Although 
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, the Court has re-
jected all attempts to substitute abstract concern with a sub-
ject-or with the rights of third parties-for "the concrete 
1 See, e. g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 
Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978) ; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Dev. Corp. 429 U. S. 252, 260-261 (1977) ; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 
490, 499 (1975) ; Linda R . S. v. Richard D ., 410 U. S. 614, 61'7 (1973) . 
E ach of thrsr ea ~e~ rr jerts the view, once expre~~ed b~· ::\[r. Justice Harlan 
a nd 11 ow apparent!~ · ~.,;pou~ed by thP Court , tha t thr per~onal stake 
requin•ment lack» ron~titutiona l signifi cance. Aute, a t 16, n. 11 ; Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U. S. x;l, 120 (196S) (Harlan, .J. , di,.;~cnting) ; ~re al ;;o ['nited 
States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 180 (197-1) (PowELL, .J., concurring) , 
Unt\1 today, however, that view never had commanded a major~ty. 
• ! 
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injury required by Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,40 (1976).2 
As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement 
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; see 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential con-
siderations not present at the outset may support continuation 
of an action in which the parties have invested substantial 
resources and generated a factual record.3 But an actual 
case or controversy in the constitutional sense "'must be ex-
tant at all stages of review.' " Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 
395, 401 (1975), quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 
452, 459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the 
legal relations of parties having adverse .legal interests' " are 
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide 
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the 
case before them." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 
246 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Aet'!W Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The limitation 
flows directly from Art. III. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 
312, 316 (1974) (per curiam).4 
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance 
of review cannot control. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 401, 
2 See, e. g., Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 227 
(1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974); Moose Lodge 
No. 107 v. Jivis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-167 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 
U. S. 727, 736-738 (1972); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44, 46 (1943) 
(per curiam). The rule is the same when the question is mootness and a 
litigant can assert no more than emotional involvement in what remains 
of the case. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 {1977) (per 
curiam). 
8 See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Pro-
eedure § 3533, at 265 (1975); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the 
Supreme Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373,376-377 (1974) . 
4 Sec, e. g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975) ; SEC 
v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403, 407 (1972); Powell 
v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496, n. 7 (1969} ; Liner v. Jafco, Inc:, 375 
U.S. 301; 306, n. 3 (1964). 
• 
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n, 9 (1975) ; R-ichardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974); 
United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920). 
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the 
necessary individual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, supra, at '316. Collateral consequences of the orig-
. inal wrong may supply the individual interest in some circum-
stances. Sibron v: New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53-58 (1968). So, 
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so inherently 
transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of 
litigation. Super Tire 'Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U. S. 
115 (1974) ; Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 
498, 515 (1911) . The essential and irreducible constitutional 
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or 
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary. 
These cases 'demonstrate, contrary to the · Court's view to-
day, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the 
outcome is not "flexible." Indeed, the nile barring litigation 
by those who have no interest of their own at stake is applied 
so rigorously that it has been termed the "one major proposi-
tion" in the· law of standing "to which the federal courts have 
consistently adhered ... without exception." Davis, Stand-
ing : Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. -ltev. 601, 617 
(1968) .5 We have insisted upon the personal stake re-
quirement in mootness and standing cases because it is em-
bedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the 
~ The Court states that "the erosion of tbe stricy formalistic perception '} 
of Art. III was 'begun well before toda.y"'s decision, and that the Art. II1 [ '7 
per::>onal stake requirement is "riddled with exceptions." Ante, at l~t-n-. .,..,11.-. - - \ _) 
t fails, however, to cite a single Court opinion 'in support of either state-
t . 'To the extent tbat tbe decision in '/l'lCUlt v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 
(1968), supports the position a~Scribed to it. in the dissent, id., at 117- 120, 
it does not :;urvive the long line of express holdings that began with 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975) , and were ·reaffirmed only last 
Term. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 
( Hl79) . See nn . l & 2, supm Even beforp Wa1'th, Profp:;::;or Davis 
ob::wrved that tlw per:;onal 8take requirement had no exeeptwn:s. Davis, 
'w pra, a1 til 6, 617 (1968). 
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Constitution, "founded in concern about the proper-and 
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society." 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we 
have, until today, "prevent[ ed] the judicial process from 
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the 
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v. 
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 68'7 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., con-
curring in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S, 
727, 740 (1974). 
II 
The foregoing decisions e~tablish principles that the Court 
has applied consistently. These principles were developed 
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no 
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a puta-
tive class representative who alleges no individual injury "may 
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of 
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, .414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974) . 
Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule 
23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interests 
~tsserted by [the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 
399 (1975) . "Given a properly certified class," the live in-
terests of unnamed but identifiable class members may sup-
ply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named 
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bow-
man Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976); 
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402. 
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No 
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any 
personal stake in the litigation.6 In the words of his own~ 
6 No one suggest~:> that respondent could be affected personally by any 
ruling on the class certification question that is remanded today. In fact, 
the Court apparently concedes that respondent has no personal stake-"in 
the traditional sense"-in obtaining certification. Ante, at 14. 
Several prisouers now in federal custody have filed a motion to inter-/ 
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lawyer, respondent 11can obtain absolutely no additional per-
sonal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the 
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent 
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other 
persons presently incarcerated. lbid. 7 In these circum-
stances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require 
.dismissal. But the Court views the case differently, and con-
structs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has 
no plaintiff. 
The Court announces today for the first time-and without 
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that 
. there are two categories of 11 the Art. III mootness doctrine": 
11fiexible" and 11less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. The 
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application 
of 11fiexible" mootness to class action litigation. · The cases 
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 
110-111, n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 
432 U.S. 385 (1977.), and today's decision in Deposit Guaranty 
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. -. Each case is said to show 
that a class action is not mooted by the loss of the class repre-
sentative's personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, even 
though no class has· been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself / 
is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Art. III / 
vene as parties respondent in this Court. Although the Court does not 
rule on that motion, 'I note that the motion was received well over a 
year after respondent was released from prison. In the interim, re-
spondent obtained a ruling from the Court of Appeals and filed his 
petition for certiorari in this Court. Such untimely intervention comes 
too late to save the action under United Airlines, Inc . v. McDonald, 432 
u. s. 385 (197!7). 
7 Respondent's lawyer opened his argument. by saying that "[t] he 
mootness question in this case is, from a practical standpoint., not very J,ts tvlt 
5
s..eJ ~ 
significant." If the action is ~ moot e pans Simply to "file a new 
case" on behalf of prisoner,; se rving longer terrru;. Tr. of Oral Arg~ [ 
On the ba~;is of this repre~entation by counsel, tl1cre i~; rea~;on to believe :J o.::k' 
that members of the putative class at issue ultimately will be included in a 
class action that will not moot out. · 
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may be met "through means other than the traditional require-
ment of a 'personal stake in the outcome.'" Ante, at 15. In 
my view, the Court misreads these precedent.."i. 
A 
In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class 
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse par-
ties. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, .240 
(1937) .8 And. in Gerst~in, the Court. applied a rule long 
established, outside the class action context, by cases that 
never have been thought to erode the requirement of a per-
sonal stake in the outcome. Gerstein held that a class action 
challenging the constitutionality of pretri"al detention proce-
dures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions 
had brought their detentions to an end. The Court did not 
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the merits / 
8 C',ertificatiun is no mere formality. It represents a judicial finding 
that injured parties other than the named plaintiff exist. It also provides 
a definition by which they can be identified. certification identifies and 
sharpens the interests of unnamed class .members in the outcome; only 
thereafter will they be bound by the outcome. · After certification, 
class members can be certain . that ~he action will not be settled or 
dismissed without appropriate notice. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c); 3 H. 
Newberg Class Actions § 5050 (1977); cf. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class 
Actions at the Precertification State: Is Notice Required?, 56 N. C. L. 
Rev. 303 (1978) . Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposi-
tion on the named plaintiffs of a duty adequately to represent the entire 
clalls. If the named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot after certification, 
the court can re-examine his ability to represent the interests of class 
members. Should it be found wanting, the Court may seek a substitute 
representative or even decertify the class. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c) (1) , 
23 (d); see 1 H. Newberg, supra, § 2192; Comment, Continuation and 
Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Repre-
sentative, 1974 Duke L. J . 573, 589-590, 602-603. After certification, the 
case is no different in principle from more traditional representative actions 
involvii1g, .for example, a single party who cannot participate himself 
because of his incompetence but is permitted to litigate through an a~./ 
p(,ihtt>d fidu-ciary. ./ 
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was unnecessary. The action continued only because of the 
transitory nature of pretrial detention, which placed the 
daim within "that narrow class of cases" that are "distinctly 
'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' " 420 U. S., at 
110, n. lL9 
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial 
of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of the class 
representative's claim on· the merits. But neither case holds 
. that Art. III may be satisfied in the absence of a personal 
stake in the outcome. ·In· McDonald, a putative class member 
intervened within the statutory time limit to appeal the cer-
tification ruling. 432 U.S., af390.10 Because the Court found 
that her claim was not time-barred, the intervenor in McDonald 
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed, 
the Court devoted its entire opinion to showing that the 
intervenor's claim for relief had not expired.11 At most, 
McDonald holds only that an action which is kept alive by 
interested parties within 13rescribed periods of limitations does 
not "die" in an Art. Ht sense. 
There !s dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify~ 
" The Court's Gerstein analysis, which emphasized that "[p]retrial de-
tention is by nature temporary" and that "[t]he individual could ... 
suffer repeated deprivations" with no access to redress, falls squarely 
within the rule of Southern Pac. Terminal v. JCC, 219 U . S. 498, 515 
(1911) . See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. U3, 125 (1973). In similar cases 
we have noted. that the continuation of the action will depend " 'espe-
cially [upon] the reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would evade 
review.H• Swisher v . Brady, 438 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting 
Sosoo ' v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitations are 
i):1consistent with the concept of "flexible" mootness and the redefinition of 
uper~:~onal stake" adopted today. 
10 The individual claims of the original named plaintilfs had been settled 
after judgment on the question of liability. 432 U. S., at 389, 393, n. 14. 
1 1 This extensive inquiry would have been unnecessary if, as the· Court 
holds today, the intervenor had a personal stake in the class certification 
issue itself. Since the present respondent's claim long since has "expired," 
he stands in the same position as a member of the putative class whOBe' / 
tlaim has "expired" by reason of the statute of limitations. __/ 
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was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the 
behest of the named plaintiffs .... " 432 U. S., at 393. That 
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 ( 1978), apparently is elevated 
by the Court's opinion 'in this case to the status of new doc-
trine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine and 
the much narrower reasouing adopted today in Roper. In 
~the Court holds that the named plaintiff's. who have 
refused to accept proffered individual settlements, retain a 
personal stake in sharing anticipated litigation costs with the 
class. Ante, at - (slip op., at 7 n. 6. 10) . Finding that 
Art. III is satisfied by this alleged economic interest, Roper 
reasons that the rules of federal" practice governing appeal-
ability permit a party to obtain review of certain procedural 
rulings that are collateral" to a generally favorable judgment. 
See id. , at 7. 9- 10. The Court concludes that the denial of 
class certification falls within this category, as long as the 
named plaintiffs "assert a continuing stake in the outcome of 
the appeal." !d., at 10. 
It is far from apparent how Roper can be thought to sup-
port the decision in this case. Ii1deed; the opinion by THE · 
CHIEF JusTICE in Roper reaffirms the obliga.tion of a federal 
court to dismiss an appeal when the parties no longer retain 
the personal stake in the outcome required by Art. IIL Ibid. 
Here, there is not even a speculative interest in sharing costs, 
and respondent affirmatively denies that he retains any stake 
or personal interest in the outcome of ~is appeal. See p. 6, 
supra. Thus, a fact that was critical to the analysis in Roper 
is absent in this case. 011e at analysis can disagree with 
yet conclude that Roper affords ourt's 
ruling here. 
B 
The cases cited by the Court as "less flexible"-and there-
fore less authoritative-apply established Art. III doctrine in 
cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School ,. 
Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam); Wei~
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stein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasa-: 
dena City Board of Education v. Spang"ler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 
(1976). As they are about to become second class precedents, 
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12, n. 7. But 
the cases are recent and. carefully considered decisions of this 
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III juris-
prudence. And no Justice who participated in them suggested 
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded treat-
ment of these "less flexible" cases ignores their controlling 
relevance to the issue presented here. 
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to 
challenge certain high schooi regulations. The Disttict Court 
stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and 
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court 
failed to comply with Ruie 23. After this Court granted 
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had grad: 
uated. We held that the action was entirely moot because 
the "class action was never properly certified nor the class 
properly identified by the District Court.'; 420 U. S. , a.t 130.12 
Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquir-
ing separate le~al status, Art. III required a dismissal. We 
r.eached precisely the same conclusion in Spangier, an actiot;t 
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a 
thir.d party. 427 U. S., a.t 430-431. See also Baxter v. Palmi-
g.iano, 425 U.S. 308, :no, n. 1 (1976). And in Bradford, where 
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Court / 
1 2 The vitality of the Jacobs resul t is underscored by the repeated 
dictum that a properly certified class is necessary to supply adverseness 
onoe the named plaintiff)s claim becomes moot. East 'l'exas Motor Freight 
v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 406, n. 12 (1977) ; Franks v. Bowman Trans-
portation Co., supra, 424 U. S., at 754, n. 6, 755-756 ; see K1'emens v. 
Bartley , 431 U. S. 119, 129-120 (1977) ; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 
24, 39 (1974) . Conversely, we have often stated that the named plain-
tiff 's individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is 
filed and at the time of certification. Krem ens v. Bartley, supra, at 143, 
n. 6 (BRENNAN, J ., diEsenting) ; Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S., at 402, 403; see 
Bell v. Wolfish, - U. S. - , - , n. 5 (1979); Zablocki v. R edhail, 434 v. s. :3?4, ·3~, n: 9 (1978l. 0 ' 0 / 
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held that the named plaintiff's release from prison required the 
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures. 
423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. 
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978). 
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Spangler may be dis-
tinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the 
denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact that 
in each case the class representatives were defending a judg-
ment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed. 
The plaintiffs/ respondents continued vigorously to assert the 
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route 
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District 
·Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose 
not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in 
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class repre-
sentative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by 
adequate certification. Under1ying Jacobs, and Bradford as 
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal 
stake in obtaining relief for thir~ parties, thr.ough the mecha-
nism of class certification or otherwise.1 3 The Court rejects 
that principle today. 
III 
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness is 
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more / 
disturbing. 'The Court splits the class aspects of this action 
into two separate "claims" : (i) that the action may be main-
tained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the 
class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class 
een certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the rits 
IS moot. . But respondent is said to }have a 
1 3 In some circumstances, litigants are permitted to argue the rights of 
t hird parties in support of their claims. E . g., Singleton v. Wulff 428 
U. S. 106, 113 (1976) ; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-256 (1953) . 
In each such case, however, the Court has identified a concrete, individual 
injur~ suffered by the litigant himself. Ibid. ; seen. 2, supra, and accom-~ 
p•nymg text. / 
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personal stake in his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a 
stake in· the merits. 
The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to 
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to re-
spondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the 
certification question.14 Instead, respondent's "personal stake" 
·is said to derive from two fa:ctors having nothing to do 
with concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the 
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create 
a "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept," 
·to have a Class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the 
case retains the "imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial 
resolution," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented 
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested / 
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15.1G / 
14 ln a footnote, ante, at 18, n. 11, the Court states: 
"This respondent sufi'er<'d actual, concrete injury as a result of the 
putatively illegal conduct, and this injury would satisfy the formalistic 
personal st<lke requirement if damages were sought. See, e. g., Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U. S., at 495-500." 
This appears to be a categorical claim of the actual , concrete injury our 
cases httve required. Yet, again, the Court fails to identify the injury. 
The reference to damages is irrelevant here, as respondent sought no 
damag<':>-only injunctive and declaratory relief. Moreover, counsel for 
respondent frankly conceded that his client. "can obtain absolutely no 
additional personal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. If the Court 
seriously is c!n.iming concrete injury "at all stag!'~'< of review," see p, 3, 
supm, it would bf• helpful for it to identify specifically thi~ injury that 
was not a.ppar<'nt to respondPnt's counsel. Ab~t>nt such identification, the 
claim of injury i~ imked an empty one. I 
1
5 The Court attempts to limit the sweeping consequences that could flow ~ 
3 
-/4 / [? 
from the application of these criteria, see infra, at ~· and n. {. by L t
asserting that "[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts" on the basis 
of "practicalities and prudential con.;iderations." Ante, at 1~[-1~ > 
Court long has recognized a difference between the prudentwl and consti-
utional aspects of the standing and mootness doctrines. See p. 2, supra. 
I am not aware that the Court, until today, ever has merged these consid-
erations for the purpose of eliminating the Art. III requirement. of a per-· 
78-572-DISSENT 
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY 13 
The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule 
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not 
confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not. 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100; 
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a 
rule of procedure which "shall not be construed to extend ... 
~he jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private a.ttorney gen-
eral concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to 
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a 
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise might be 
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S., at 737-738. 
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general 
concept can fill the. jurisdictional gap, the Court's new per-
ception of Art. III requirements must rest entirely on its 
tripartite tes.t of concrete adverseness. Although the com-
ponents of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurispru-
dence, they operate only in " 'cases confessedly within [the 
Court's] jurisdiction.' " Franks v. Bowman Transportation 
Co.,, 424 U. S., aJ, 755-756, and n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court cites no decision that 
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply 
presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case, and ~ 
I am aware of none.16 Indeed, each of these characteristics is/" 
sonal stuke in the litigation. The Court cites no prior case for this view. 
Moreover, tlw Court. expounds no limiting principle of any kincl . Advel'l:;e 
practical consequences, even if relevant to Art. III analysis, cannot ju:stify I 
today's holding ns none whatever would flow from a finding of mootnes::; . [, (,. ij 
ee n. , infra. Nor doe:; the Court's reliance upon a :fiation back] -v 
principle, ' ante, at 18, n. 11, further the analy::;is. Although thi!:i fiction 
may provide a shorthand label for the Court':; concluKion, it i:s l~ardly a 
priuciple and certainly not a limiting one. 
16 The Court often has rejected the contention that a "spirited dispute" 
aion'e is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. E. g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 4i8 
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sure to be present in the typical "private attorney general" 
action brought by a public spirited citizen.17 Although we 
have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action," 
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement 
leaves no principled basis for that practice.18 
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is 
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in 
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms ~ 
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a~ 
false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class certification issues 
U. S. 24, 35-36 (1974); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (per 
curiam). 
1 7 The Courts assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, there is 
nothing in the record to suggest that respondent has any interest whatever 
in his new-found "right to have a class certified." Ante, at 15. In fact, 
the record shows that respondent's interest in the merits was the sole mo-
tivation for his attempt to represent a class. The class claims were added 
to his complaint only because his lawyer feared that mootness might 
terminate the action. App., at 17; Brief for Repondent 23, 33. The 
record does not reveal whether respondent-as distinguished from his 
lawyer-now wishes to continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that 
his interest has nothing to do with the procedural protections described 
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suits." Ante, at 14. It is 
neither surprising nor improper that respondent should be concerned with 
parole procedures. But respondent's actual interest is indistinguishable 
from the generalized interest of a "priva.te attorney general" who might 
bring a "public action" to improve the operation of a parole system. 
18 The Court'~ view logically cannot be confined to moot cases. If a 
plaintiff who is released from prison the day after filing a class action 
challenging parole guidelines may seek certification of the class, why should 
a plaintiff who is released the day before filing the suit be barred? As an 
Art. III matter, there can be no difference. 
Even on ru tial rounds, there is little difference between this action 
an one filed promptlY. wpga Peleaee. In the present case, this Court 
has ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the class action. At 
the same time, it has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in 
turn reversed the judgment of the District Court. No determination on 
any issue is left standing. For every practical purpose, the action must 
begin anew-this tjme without a plaintiff. The prudential considerations 
in favor of a fi11ding of mootness could scarcely be more compelling. 
' ,,,.•·:.. 
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are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante, 
at - (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal 
stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration, 
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word. 
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join addi-
tional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a 
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular 
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value 
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution 
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is 
neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them 
independent of his interest in the merits. 
Class actions may advance significantly the administration 
of justice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the class action is 
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to 
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long 
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004 
( 1977). That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class as-
pect of litigation involving individual claims has never been 
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new proce-
dural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to 
the recognition of different "'means for presenting a case or 
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.' " 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240 (1937) 
(Declaratory Judgment Act) , quoting Nashville, C. & St. L. 
R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added). 
The effect of mootness on the vitality of a device like t~~ / 
class action may be a relevant prudential consideratio/ 
19 I do not imply that the resul t reached today is nece:;sa ry in any 
way to the continued vitality of the class-action device. On the contrary, 
the practical impact of ~ mootness in this case would be slight indeed. 
ee note , supra. And this may well be typical of class actions brought 
nnder Rule 23 (b) (1) or (2) to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. Such 
actions are not subject to frustration through sequential settlement offers 
t at " · off" each intervening plain tiff. Cf. De osit Guamnt Nat. {2- /.3 
Bank v. Rope!', ante, at - (slip op., at ) . Nor will substitute' 
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But it cannot provide a plaintiff when none is before the 
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation 
of Art. III.20 
IV 
In short, this is a case in which the putative class repre-
sentative-respondent here-no longer has the slightest in-
terest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member 
of the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been iden-
tified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal 
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the juris-
diction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only 
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are 
the defendants and a lawyer who no longer has a client.21 
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot. 
plaintiffs be deterred by the notice costs that attend certification of a class 
under Rule 23 (b)(3). 
20 The Court's efforts to "save" this action from mootness lead it to 
depart strikingly from the normal role of a reviewing court. The Court 
fails to identify how, if at all, the District Court has erred. Nothing 
is said about the District Court's ruling on the merits or its refusal to 
certify the broad class sought by respondent. Nor does the Court adopt 
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court erred in failing 
to consider tJw possibility of subclasses sua sponte. Nevertheless, re-
spondent-or his lawyer-is given the opportunity to raise the subclass 
question on remand. That result cannot be squared with the rule that a 
litigant may not raise on appeal those issues he has failed to preserve by 
appropriate objectjon in the trial court. The Court intimates that the 
District Court waited too long to deny the class certification motion, thus 
making n motion for subclas~es a "futile act." Ante, at 1 . u not ung m 
the record suggests that the District Court would not; have entertained 
such a motion. Since respondent sought certification in the first place only 
1--"""'--"'a~vo~'d mootness on appeal, the entry of an order against him on the 
merits · subclass proposal to the 
District Court, t.I-I'IV8U fhP: 
21 I imply no criticism of counsel in this case. The Court, of Appeals 
agreed with counsel that the certification issue was appealable, and the 
case was brought to this Court by the United States. 
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MR. JusTICE STEWART and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join, 
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Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was 
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a 
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will 
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The 
District Court denied class certification and granted summary 
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before 
briefs were filed, he was unconditionally released from prison. 
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The 
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment 
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was 
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that re-
'spondent properly could appeal the denial of class certifi-
cation. The Court today agrees with this conclusion. 
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it says 
that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may be adapted 
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. Ante, at 
8-12. Second, the Court holds that the named plaintiff has 
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept" 
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his per-
sonal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12-16. Both steps 
are significant departures from settled law that rationally can-
not be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case. 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
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I 
As the Court obs~rves, this case involves the "personal 
stake" aspect of the mootness doctrine. Ante, at 7. There 
is undoubtedly a "live" issue which an appropriate plaintiff 
could present for judicial resolution. The question is whether 
respondent, who has no further interest in this action, never-
theless may-through counsel-continue to litigate it. 
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal 
stake requirement with some care. When the issue is pre-
sented at the outset of litigation as a question of standing to 
sue, we have held that the personal stake requirement has a 
double aspect. On the one hand, it derives from Art. III 
limitations on the power of the federal courts. On the other, 
it embodies additional, self-imposed restraints on the exercise 
of judicial power. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 112 
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). The 
prudential aspect of standing. aptly is described as a doctrine 
of uncertain contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional 
minimum has been given definite content: "In order to satisfy 
Art. III, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered 
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively 
illegal conduct of the defendant.'1 Gladstone, Realtors v. 
Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979).1 Although 
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, the Court has re-
jected all attempts to substitute abstract concern with a sub-
ject-or with the rights of third parties-for "the concrete 
'1 S"ee, e. g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 
lnc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
1>ev. Corp. 429 U. S. 252, 260-261 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 
490, 499 (1975); Linda R . S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617 (1973) . 
Each of these cases rejects the view, once expressed by Mr. Justice Harlan 
and now apparently espoused by the Court, that the personal stake 
requirement lacks constitutional significance. Ante, at 16, n. 11; Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, J ., dissenting) ; see also United 
States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 180 (1974) (PowELL, J ., concurring) . 
Until today, however, that v-iew never had commanded a majority. 
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injury required by Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,40 (1976).2 
As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement 
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; s~'e 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Pruderiti~l'con­
siderations not present at the outset may suppor~ cotitinuation 
of an action in which the parties have invested sUbstantial 
resources and generated a factual record.3 But an actual 
case or controversy in the constitutional sense " 'must be ex-
tant at all stages of review.' " Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 
395, 401 (1975), quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 b. S. 
452, 459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests' " are 
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide 
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the 
case before them." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 
246 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The limitation 
flows directly from Art. III. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 
312, 316 (1974) (per curiam).' 
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance 
of review cannot control. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 401, 
2 See, e. g., Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 227 
(1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974); Moose Lodge 
No. 107 v. Jrvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-167 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 
U. S. 727, 736-738 (1972); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44, 46 (1943) 
(per curiam). The rule is the same when the question is mootness and a 
litigant can assert no more than emotional involvement in what remains 
of the case. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per 
curiam). 
3 See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure § 3533, at 265 ( 1975) ; Nate, The Mootness Doctrine in the 
Supreme Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373,376-377 (1974). 
'See, e. g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975); SEC 
v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403, 407 (1972); Powell 
v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496, n. 7 (1969); Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 
U. S. 301, 306, n. 3 (1964}. 
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n. 9 (1975); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974); 
United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920). 
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the 
necessary individual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v. · 
Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the orig-
inal wrong may supply the individual interest in some circum-
stances. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53-58 (1968). So, 
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so inherently 
transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of 
litigation. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 
115 (1974); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 
498, 515 (1911). The essential and irreducible constitutional 
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or 
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary. 
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view to-
day, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the 
outcome is not "flexible." Indeed, the rule barring litigation 
by those who have no interest of their own at stake is applied 
so rigorously that it has been termed the "one major proposi-
tion" in the law of standing "to which the federal courts have 
consistently adhered ... without exception." Davis, Stand-
ing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 617 
(1968).5 We have insisted upon the personal stake re-
quirement in mootness and standing cases because it is em-
bedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the 
5 The Court staJes tlmt "the ermdon of the strict , formnli stic perreption 
of Art. III was begun well before today's decision," and that the Art. III 
personal stake requirrment is "riddl<>d wit.h exceptions." Ante, at. 16-17, 
n. 11. It fails, howrver, to cite a single Court opinion in support of either 
statement.. To the extent that the decision in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 
(1968), supports the position ascribed to it in the dissent, id., at 117-120, 
it does not survive . the long line of express holdings that began with 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 49o (1975), and were reaffirmed only last 
Term. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 
(1979) . See nn. 1 & 2, sup,ra. Even before Warth, Professor Davis 
.~bs~rved t?at the pe~~onal stake reqtlrement had l'llo exceptions. Daviis, 
s~ra, at 616, 617 (1968)'. 
·, 
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Constitution, "founded in con~rn about the proper-and .. . 
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society." 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we 
have, until today, "prevent[ ed] the judicial process from ' 
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the 
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v. 
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., con;-
curring in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 
727, 740 (1974). 
II 
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the Court 
has applied consistently. These principles were developed 
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no 
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a puta-
tive class representative who alleges no individual injury "maY, 
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of 
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974). 
Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule' 
23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interestS' 
asserted by [the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 
399 (1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live in-
terests of unnamed but identifiable class members may sup-
ply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named 
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bow-
man Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976); 
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402. 
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No 
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any 
personal stake in the litigation.6 In the words of his own 
6 No one suggests that respondent could be affected personally by any 
ruling on the class certification question that is remanded today. In fact, 
the Court apparently concedes that respondent has no personal stake-"in 
the traditional sense"-in obtaining certification. Ante, at 14. 
Several prisoners now in federal custody have filed a motion to inter-
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lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional per~ 
sonal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the 
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent 
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other 
persons presently incarcerated. I~id. 7 In these circum-
stances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require 
dismissal. But the Court views the case differently, and con-
structs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has 
no plaintiff. 
The Court announces today for the first time-and without 
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that 
there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness doctrine": 
"flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. The 
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application 
of "flexible" mootness to class action litigation. The cases 
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 
110-111, n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 
432 U.S. 385 (1977), and today's decision in Deposit Guaranty 
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. -. Each case is said to show 
that a class action is not mooted by the loss of the class repre-
sentative's personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, even 
though no class has been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself 
is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Art. III 
vene as parties respondent in this Court. Although the Court does not 
rule on that motion, I note that the motion was received well over a 
year after respondent was released from prison. In the interim, re-
spondent obtained a ruling from the Court of Appeals and filed his 
petition for certiorari in this Court. Such untimely intervention comes 
too late to save the actien under United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 
u. s. 385 (1977) . 
7 Respondent's lawyer opened his argument by saying that "[t]he 
mootness question in this case is, from a practical standpoint, not very 
significant." If the action is dismi.-sed as moot he plans simply to "file a 
new case" on behalf of prisoners serving longer terms. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 
25. On the basis of this representation by counsel, there is reason to be-
lieve that members of the putative class at issue ultimately will be included 
in a class action that will not moot out. 
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may be met 11through means other than the traditional require-
ment of a 'personal stake in the outcome.' " Ante, at 15. In 
my view, the Court misreads these precedents. 
A 
In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class 
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse par-
ties. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240 
(1937).8 And in Gerstein, the Court applied a rule long 
established, outside the class action context, by cases that 
never have been thought to erode the requirement of a per-
sonal stake in the outcome. Gerstein held that a class action 
challenging the constitutionality of pretrial detention proce-
dures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions 
had brought their detentions to an end. The Court did not 
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the merits 
8 Certification is no mere formality. It represents a judicial finding 
that injured parties other than the named plaintiff exist. It also provides 
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies and 
sharpens the interests of unnamed class members in the outcome; only 
thereafter will they be bound by the outcome. After certification, 
class members can be certain that the action will not be settled or 
dismissed without appropriate notice. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c); 3 H. 
Newberg Class Actions § 5050 (1977); cf. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class 
Actions at the Precertification State: Is Notice Required?, 56 N. C. L. 
Rev. 303 (1978). Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposi-
tion on the named plaintiffs of a duty adequately to represent the entire 
class. If the named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot after certification, 
the court can re-examine his ability to represent the interests of class 
members. Should it be found wanting, the Court may seek a substitute 
representative or even decertify the class. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c) (1), 
23 (d); see 1 H. Newberg, supra, § 2192; Comment, Continuation and 
Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Repre-
sentative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 589-590, 602-603. After certification, the 
case is no different in principle from more traditional representative actions 
involving, for example, a single party who cannot participate himself 
because of his incompetence but is permitted to litigate through an ap-
pointed fiduciary. 
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was unnecessary. The action continued only because of the 
transitory nature of pretrial detention, which placed the 
claim within "that narrow class of cases" that are "distinctly 
1capable of repetition, . yet evading· review.' " 420 U. S., at 
110, n. lV 
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial 
of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of the class 
representative's claim on the merits. But neither case holds 
that Art. III may be satisfied in the absence of a personal 
stake in the outcome. In McDonald, a putative class member 
intervened within the statutory time limit to appeal the cer-
tification ruling. 432 U.S., at 390.10 Because the Court found 
that her claim was not time-barred, the intervenor in McDonald 
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed, 
the Court devoted its entire opinion to showing that the 
intervenor's claim for relief had not expired.11 At most, 
McDonald holds only that an action which is kept alive by 
interested parties within prescribed periods of limitations does 
not "die" in an Art. III sense. 
There is dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify 
9 The Court's Gerstein analysis, which emphasized that "[p]retrial de-
·tention is by nature temporary" and that "[t]he individual could ... 
suffer repeated deprivations" with no access to redress, falls squarely 
within the rule of Southern Pac. Terminal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 
'(1911). 'See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1973). In similar cases 
·we 'have noted that the continuation of the action will depend " 'espe-
cially [upon] the reality of the cla.im that otherwise the issue would evade 
·review.' '" SwiSher v. Braay, 438 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 1J. S. 393, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitatjons are 
inconsistent with the concept of "flexible" mootness a:nd the redefinition of 
''personal stake" adopted today. 
10 The individual clarms of the <1riginal named plaintiffs had been settled 
after judgment on the question of liability. 432 U. S., at 389, 393, n. 14. 
11 This extensive inquiry would have been unnecessary if, as the Court 
holds today, the intervenor had a personal stake in the class certification 
issue itself. Since the present respondent's cla.im long since has "expired," 
he stands in the same position as a member of the putative class whose ,, 
claim has "expired" by reason of the statute of limitations. 
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was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the 
behest of the named plaintiffs,. ... " 432 U. S., at 393. That 
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 (1978), apparently is elevated 
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doc-
trine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine and 
the much narrower reasoning adopted today in Roper. In 
Roper the Court holds that the named plaintiffs, who have 
refused to accept proffered individual settlements, retain a 
personal stake in sharing anticipated litigation costs with the 
class. Ante, at - (slip op ., at 7 n. 6, 10). Finding that 
Art. III is satisfied by this alleged economic interest, Roper 
reasons that the rules of federal practice governing appeal-
ability permit a party to obtain review of certain procedural 
rulings that are collateral to a generally favorable judgment. 
See id. , at 7, 9-10. The Court concludes that the denial of 
class certification falls within this category, as long as the 
named plaintiffs "assert a continuing stake in the outcome of 
the appeal." !d., at 10. 
It is far from apparent how Roper can be thought to sup-
port the decision in this case. Indeed, the opinion by THE 
CHIEF JusTICE in Roper reaffirms the obligation of a federal 
court to dismiss an appeal when the parties no longer retain 
the personal stake in the outcome required by Art. III. Ibid. 
Here, there is not even a speculative interest in sharing costs, 
and respondent affirmatively denies that he retains any stake 
or personal interest in the outcome of his appeal. See p. 6, 
supra. Thus, a fact that was critical to the analysis in Roper 
is absent in this case. One ·can disa.gree with that analysis 
yet conclude that Roper affords no support for the Court's 
ruling here. 
B 
The cases cited by the Court as ttless flexible"-and there-
fore less authoritative-apply established Art. III doctrine in 
cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School 
Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam); Wein-
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>Stein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasa• 
dena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 
(1976). As they are about to become second class precedents, 
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12, n. 7. But 
the cases are recent and carefully considered decisions of this 
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III juris-
prudence. And no Justice who participated in them suggested 
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded treat-
ment of these "less flexible" cases ignores their controlling 
relevance to the issue presented here. 
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to 
challenge certain high school regulations. The District Court 
stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and 
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court 
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted 
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had grad-
uated. We held that the action was entirely moot because 
the "class action was never properly certified nor the class 
properly identified by the District Court." 420 U.S., at 130.12 
Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquir-
ing separate legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. We 
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action 
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a 
third party. 427 U.S., at 430-431. See also Ba:xter v. Palmi-
giano, 425 U.S. 308,310, n. 1 (1976). And in Bradford, where 
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Court 
12 The vitality of the Jacobs result is underscored by the repeated 
dictum that a properly certified class is necessary to supply adverseness 
:<moo the named plaintiff's claim becomes moot. East Texas Motor Freight 
v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 406, n. 12 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Trans-
portation Co., supra, 424 U. S., at 754, n. 6, 755-756; see Kremens v. 
Bartley, 431 U. S. 119, 129-120 (1977); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 
24, 39 (1974). Conversely, we have often stated that the named plain-
tiff's individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is 
filed and at the time of certification. Kremens v. Bartley, supra, at 143, 
n. 6 (BRENNAN, J., di~senting); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S., at 402, 403; see 
11eit v. Wolfish,- U. S. -, -, n. 5 (1979); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
t1. s. 374, 382, n. 9 (1978). . ·~. 
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held that the named plaintiff's release from prison required the 
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures. 
423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. 
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978). 
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Spangler may be dis-
tinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the 
denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact that 
in each case the class representatives were defending a judg-
ment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed. 
The plaintiffs/respondents continued vigorously to assert the 
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route 
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District 
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose 
not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in 
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class repre-
sentative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by 
adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and Bradford as 
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal 
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mecha-
nism of class certification or otherwise.13 The Court rejects 
that principle today. 
III 
While the Court's new concept of u~exible" mootness is 
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more 
disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this action 
into two separate uclaims": (i) that the action may be main-
tained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the 
class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class has 
been certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the merits 
is moot. Ante, at 15-16, 19-20. But respondent is said to 
13 In some circumstances, litigants are permitted to argue the rights of 
third parties in support of their claims. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff 428 
U.S. 106, 113 (1976); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,255-256 (1953). 
In each such case, however, the Court has identified a concrete, individual 
injury suffered by the litigant himself. Ibid.; see n. 2, supra, and accom-
panying text. 
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have a personal stake in his "procedural claim" despite his 
lack of a stake in the merits. 
The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to 
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to re-
spondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the 
certification question.14 Instead, respondent's "personal stake" 
is said to derive from two factors having nothing to do 
with concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the 
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create 
a' "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept," 
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the 
case retains the "imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial 
resolution," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented 
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested 
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15.15 
14 In a footnote, ante, at 18, n. 11, the Court states: 
"This respondent suffered actual, concrete injury as a result of the 
putatively illegal conduct, and this injury would satisfy the formalistic 
personal stake requirement if damages were sought. See, e. g., Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S., at 491>-500." 
This appears to be a categorical claim of the actual, concrete injury our 
cases have required. Yet, again, the Court fails to identify the injury. 
The reference to damages is irrelevant here, as respondent sought no 
damages-only injunctive and declaratory relief. Moreover, counsel for 
respondent frankly conceded that his client "can obtain absolutely no 
additional personal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. If the Court 
seriously is claiming concrete injury "at all stages of review," see p. 3, 
supra, it would be helpful for it to identify specifically this injury that 
was not apparent to respondent's counsel. Absent such identification, the 
claim of injury is indeed an empty one. 
15 The Court attempts to limit the sweeping consequences that could flow 
from the application of these criteria, see infra, at 13-14, and n. 18, by 
asserting that "[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts" on the basis 
of "practicalities and prudential con~derat.ions." Ante, at 17-18, n. 11. 
The Court long has recognized a difference between the pmdential and con-
stitut.ional aspects of the standing nnd mootness doctrines. See p. 2, supra. 
I am not aware that the Court, until today, ever has merged these consid- , 
erations for the purpose of eliminating the Art. III requirement of a per• · 
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The Court's reliance on some new 11right" inherent in Rule 
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not 
confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not. 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100; 
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a 
rule of procedure which 11shall not be construed to extend . . . 
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the 11private attorney gen-
eral concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to 
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a 
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise might be 
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U. S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S., at 737- 738. 
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general 
concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new per-
ception of Art. III requirements must rest entirely on its 
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the com-
ponents of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurispru-
dence, they operate only in 11 'cases confessedly within [the 
Court's] jurisdiction.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation 
Co., 424 U. S., at 755-756, and n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court cites no decision that 
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply 
presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case, and 
I am aware of none.16 Indeed, each of these characteristics is 
sonal stake in the litigation. The Court cites no prior case for this view. 
Moreover, the Court expounds no limiting principle of any kind. Adverse 
practical consequences, even if relevant to Art. III analysis, cannot justify 
today's holding as none whatever would flow from a finding of mootness. 
See n. 18, inf ra. Nor does the Court's reliance upon a "'relation back' 
principle," ante, at 18, n. 11, further the analysis. Although this fiction 
may provide a shorthand label for the Court's conclusion, it is hardly a 
principle and certainly not a limiting one. 
1 6 The Court often has rejected the contention that a "spirited dispute" 
alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. E . g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 
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sure to be present in the typical "private attorney general" 
action brought by a public spirited citizen.17 Although we 
have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action," 
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement 
leaves no principled basis for that practice.18 
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is 
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in 
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms 
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a 
U. S. 24, 35-36 (1974); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (per 
curiam). 
17 The Courts assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, there is 
nothing in the record to suggest that respondent has any interest whatever 
in his new-found "right to have a class certified." Ante, at 15. In fact, 
the record shows that respondent's interest in the merits was the sole mo-
tivation for his attempt to represent a class. The class claims were added 
to his complaint only because his lawyer feared that mootness might 
terminate the action. App., at 17; Brief for Repondent 23, 33. The 
record does not reveal whether respondent-as distinguished from his 
lawyer-now wishes to continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that 
his interest has nothing to do with the procedural protections described 
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suits." Ante, at 14. It is 
neither surprising nor improper that respondent should be concerned with 
parole procedures. But respondent's actual interest is indistinguishable 
from the generalized interest of a "private attorney general" who might 
bring a "public action" to improve the operation of a parole system. 
18 The Court's view logically cannot be confined to moot cases. If a 
plaintiff who is released from prison the day after filing a cla8S action 
challenging parole guidelines may seek certification of the class, why should 
a plaintiff who is released the day before filing the suit be barred? As an 
Art. III matter, there can be no difference. 
Even on prudential grounds, there is little difference between this action 
and one filed promptly after the named plaintiff's release from prison. 
In the present case, this Court has ruled on neither the merits nor the 
propriety of the class action. At the same time, it has vacated a judg-
ment by the Court of Appeals that in turn reversed the judgment of the 
District Court. No determination on any issue is left, standing. For 
every practical purpose, the action must begin anew-this time without a 
plaintiff. The prudential considerations in favor of a finding of mootness 
could scarcely be more compelling. 
78-572-DISSENT 
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY 15 
false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class certification issues 
are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante, 
at - (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal 
stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration, 
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word. 
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join addi-
tional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a 
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular 
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value 
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution 
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is 
neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them 
independent of his interest in the merits. 
Class actions may advance significantly the administration 
of justice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the class action is 
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to 
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long 
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004 
(1977). That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class as-
pect of litigation involving individual claims has never been 
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new proce-
dural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to 
the recognition of different 11 'means for presenting a case or 
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.'" 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240 (1937) 
(Declaratory Judgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L. 
R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added). 
The effect of mootness on the vitality of a device like the 
class action may be a relevant prudential consideration.19 
19 I do not imply that the result reached today is necessary in any 
way to the continued vitality of the class-action device. On the contrary, 
the practical impact of moot.ness in this case would be slight indeed. 
See note 18, supra. And this may well be typical of class actions brought 
under Rule 23 (b) ( 1) or (2) to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. Such 
actions are not subject to frustration through sequential settlement offers 
that "buy off" each intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat. 
Bank v. Roper, ante, at - (slip op., at 12-13). Nor will substitute 
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lJut it cannot provide a plaintiff when none is before th~ 
Court, for we arb powerless'Jt-o.assume jurisdiction in violation 
~f Art. IIV0 ' ' 
• lV 
In short, this is a c~ in which the putative class repre-
sentative-respondent, here-no longer has the slightest in-
terest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member 
of the class is before th~ Court; indeed, none has been iden-
tified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal 
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the juris-
diction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only 
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are 
the defendants and a lawyer who no longer has a client.21 
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot. 
plaintiffs be deterred by the notice costs that attend certification of a class 
under Rule 23 (b) (3). 
20 The Court's efforts to "save" this action from mootness lead it to 
depart strikingly from the normal role of a reviewing court. The Court 
fails to identify how, if at all, the District Court has erred. Nothing 
is said about the District Court's ruling on the merits or its refusal to 
certify the broad class sought by respondent. Nor does the Court adopt 
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court erred in failing 
to consider the possibility of subclasses Bua Bponte. Nevertheless, re-
spondent--or his lawyer-is given the opportunity to raise the subclass 
question on remand. That result cannot be squared with the rule that a 
litigant may not raise on appeal those issues he has failed to preserve by 
appropriate objection in the trial court. The Court intimates that the 
District Court waited too long to deny the class certification motion, thus 
making a motion for subclasses a "futile act." Ante, at 19. But nothing in 
the record suggests that the District Court would not have entertained 
such a motion. Since respondent sought certification in the first place only 
to avoid mootness on appeal, the entry of an order against him on the 
merits provides no excuse for his subsequent failure to present a subclass 
proposal to the District Court. 
21 I imply no criticism of counsel in this case. The Court of Appeals 
agreed with counsel that the certification issue was appealable, and the 
case was brought to this Court by the United States. 
